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THE GROWTH
OF
BRITISH POLICY.

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THE GROWTH
OF
BRITISH POLICY

BY

SIR J. R. SEELEY LITT. D., K.C.M.G.

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PART III.

CROMWELL AND THE MILITARY STATE.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST DUTCH WAR.

THE transition in foreign policy caused by the fall of the Monarchy in 1649 is the most complete and abrupt that will be dealt with in this book. Foreign policy became of necessity a new thing from the moment that the Monarchy was removed, and the change thus made could not be undone by the Restoration of the Monarchy. The period of the so-called Commonwealth was long enough to allow the new conception of policy to take root.

At the transition-point we cannot avoid making a general comparison between the two kinds of policy. We have traversed a long period in which dynastic considerations of marriage and succession have determined everything; we now see before us a period when such considerations are eliminated. It would be too much to say that they simply gave place to considerations of national well-being, for there were also interests of the ruling party to be considered, there was a system bequeathed to the new government from the Civil War. But theoretically

our policy now became national, and practically under the Protectorate it was at least more national than it had been under the Stuart Monarchy.

There can be no question that an advance was made when the fantastic system which drew a whole nation in the train of a single family was discarded. But, as English history has always abhorred extremes, the improvement was less manifest, because the old system had been less abusive than it might have been in another country. In particular our policy did not become more peaceful, but decidedly more warlike, by becoming national.

Peace and non-intervention pushed to an extreme had long been the established tradition of English policy. From the first outbreak of rebellion in the Netherlands against Philip II to the conclusion of the Treaties of Westphalia, England had intervened only and barely as much (if we except the age of Buckingham) as was necessary for her own safety.

Dynastic government was now removed, and forthwith this peaceful tradition was set aside. England became more warlike than she had been at any time since the Hundred Years' War with France. Although she had been torn by war within the British Islands for ten years and might be supposed to need rest, she now makes war with the Dutch Republic. Oliver succeeds to the power of the Long Parliament, and it has sometimes been alleged as a proof of Oliver's humanity that after attaining supreme power he sheathed his sword. But after making peace with the Dutch, Oliver went to war with the Spanish Monarchy, and thus England, which for a century had been a peaceful Power, now in twelve years of the new system waged two deliberate wars with great European States. We shall see moreover that the Dutch wars of Charles II

were undertaken in pursuance of a policy which the Restoration Monarchy had inherited from the Protectorate.

Why a national policy in England should be more warlike than a dynastic system we shall inquire in the proper place. We note in the meantime that there lies before us, as might be expected from the personality of Oliver Cromwell, and from the Imperialism which he represented, one of the most martial periods of English history. It is true that the wars of the Commonwealth were individually less burdensome than those of the eighteenth century, but they follow in rapid, almost uninterrupted series. The country had but newly emerged from a civil war of ten years (reckoning from the first disturbances in Scotland), and there now followed a renewal in 1649 of the war in Ireland, war with Scotland in 1650 and 1651, and concurrently with these maritime war with the Royalist party. Then followed in 1652 war with the Dutch, which was closed in 1654. In 1655 began war with the Spanish Monarchy.

This enumeration brings to light the phases through which the policy of the Commonwealth passed. It begins in civil war and passes by gradations into foreign war.

Bearing in mind our general observation that the civil troubles were largely the effect of the interaction of England, Scotland, and Ireland, we remark that as the first Civil War had been caused by the action first of Scotland and then of Ireland upon England, and in like manner the second Civil War of 1648, and indirectly the Military Revolution itself at the close of 1648, had been caused by the action of Scotland, so the Military Revolution led to a great reaction of England upon Ireland and Scotland.

This Military Movement is in reality the only Revolution of England in the full sense of that word, the only

attempt which the English nation has made to shake off tradition. It is a purely English event in which the Scotch have no more share than in the defeat of the Spanish Armada and which took place also wholly outside Ireland. For the moment therefore it created a wholly new relation between the three kingdoms. Necessarily therefore it was followed by new dealings between England and Ireland and between England and Scotland. Oliver Cromwell, who in the first Civil War had been a great cavalry officer and party leader, the soul of the Military Party, and who in the second Civil War had won the decisive battle, now stood forward as the national English hero. He creates a new relation between the three kingdoms in which England takes the first place, shaking off the kind of yoke which had been imposed upon it through the Covenant by Scotland. This work is mainly accomplished between 1649 and 1651.

It was but natural that English should be entangled with Scotch and Irish affairs. But they were entangled also with the affairs of another country, viz. the Netherlands. We have seen how close had been from old times, and especially from the days of Elizabeth, the sympathy and intercourse between the English and the Dutch. The recent intermarriage between the Houses of Stuart and Orange had drawn the bond tighter. The struggle of King and Parliament was, as it were, reflected in the spectacle of Dutch politics, where the Stadholder stood for King and the States of Holland for Parliament. It was therefore not merely on account of trade-disputes that war broke out in 1652 between England and the States-General. That war grew up more naturally and, as it were, instinctively, out of the English Revolution, which could not but produce a perturbation in Holland, almost as in Scotland.

Meanwhile it was also natural that the new constitution in England should need a certain amount of reconstruction. Imperialism belongs naturally to the governments which have a monarchical form. As an army has a commander-in-chief, so government by the army is naturally administered by the Commander-in-chief.

In 1654 all this important business which necessarily followed in the train of the Military Revolution had been successfully dealt with. A settlement had been made with Ireland, Scotland and the Netherlands. The Lord General Cromwell had dismissed the Parliament which, since its mutilation by Pride's Purge, had only served to conceal the supremacy of the army. The edifice was henceforth complete.

Accordingly the year 1653 marks a turning-point, the close of the Revolution, the opening of a definitive state of things. Great Britain and Ireland, for international purposes more fully united than ever, now compose a powerful military state, and their resources are in the hand of a great statesman and soldier. This military state proceeds to declare war with the Spanish Monarchy.

Thus from about 1653 to Oliver's death in 1658 we have a system of government in effective operation. As after 1658 this system is in dissolution, so before 1653 it is but in growth and preparation.

There is in the whole of English history nothing more profoundly interesting than the attempt made between 1648 and 1654 to reconstruct the state from the foundation, and in particular to unite the three kingdoms into a single commonwealth. But this Essay is not concerned with constitutional changes, however interesting, nor can we even dwell upon the internal disturbances and wars

which accompanied the reunion of the three kingdoms. The fact of that reunion is indeed most important to us, but on the whole we must be prepared to regard all such insular events much as Blake did when in his fleet off Aberdeen he received the news of the dissolution of the Long Parliament. It is said that, being then exhorted by his captains to declare against Cromwell, he replied No, it is not for us to mind affairs of state, but to keep foreigners from fooling us. That is, he held a position outside the British state, from which he kept watch on its relation with foreign states. In like manner this Essay deals with the foreign relations of the community inhabiting the British islands, and so the mutual relations of the parts of that community interest us only so far as they may indirectly affect our foreign relations.

We are also to bear in mind that, striking as this chapter of our history is and important too by its indirect consequences, yet in a general view, including later as well as earlier periods, the short duration of the Protectorate and the speedy downfall of the institutions then founded disentitle it to be treated at any great length.

From this point of view we see in the period between 1648 and 1654 principally the struggle of England and the Netherlands.

On the wars of Scotland and Ireland we merely remark as follows:—

England and Scotland being distinct kingdoms, the abolition of monarchy in England had of course no effect in Scotland, while the trial and execution in England of the King of Scotland necessarily strained in the most violent manner the relations between the two peoples. It is one of the striking analogies between the tragedy of Charles I and that of Mary Stuart that a sovereign of

Scotland was in both cases put to death by the English. Now the son of Charles I succeeded to the throne by unquestionable right in Scotland at the moment of his predecessor's death. After January 1649 Charles II was King of Scots by the admission even of those who denied his right to the title of King of England, and is so called in the State Papers of the Commonwealth. Thus for the moment the Military Revolution had the effect of undoing all that had been done since the accession of Elizabeth towards the union of the Southern and Northern parts of Britain. The personal link was broken, and for the moment violent hostility between the two governments took the place of sympathy.

In Ireland civil war had never ceased. There Ormond still professed to hold his commission from the King. Between the English Commonwealth and the population of Ireland there was the same kind of discord which prevails in primitive society between alien races and alien religions. The massacres of Drogheda and Wexford were soon to give proof of this.

Thus a rearrangement of the mutual relations of the three kingdoms had to be effected by war. A third civil war of the most tremendous kind takes place, growing naturally out of the second Civil War, which is that of 1648.

In the life of Oliver Cromwell the distinctness of this great event is very strongly marked. Oliver was a victorious commander, and also a great ruler and statesman. But he did not, like Napoleon, appear in all these characters at once. He assumed them successively. From 1653 to 1658, for five years, he is the ruler of the country, bearing for the greater part of that time the title of Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

During this last period of his career he is a great European statesman, he makes peace with the States-General, alliance with France and Sweden, war with the Spanish Monarchy. But during this period he is no longer a soldier, he commands no army, he fights no battle. He is not the Wellington or Wolfe, but the Pitt, of the European war. For when he became a ruler he had already laid down his sword. His last battle was that of Worcester.

And as his victories were over before the Protectorate, so in the grand Rebellion they have not begun. In the first Civil War he is the most distinguished of officers, as he is the most remarkable of party leaders, but he does not yet win battles in his own name. He is not nominally the commander at Marston Moor or Naseby, but only the officer to whom in each case the victory is chiefly due.

But between 1648 and 1651 he is the great commander and winner of battles. From Preston to Worcester he commands armies in his own name, and not only wins victories, but wins the only important victories that are won. Considered as a military commander, the special and peculiar work of Cromwell is not the defeat of Charles I, but that rearrangement of the relations of the three kingdoms which we have just discussed. It was by the sword of Cromwell that the so-called Commonwealth, that is, the government of the army, which was first set up in England, was triumphantly established in Ireland and Scotland.

That this alarming revolution was allowed by foreign monarchies to complete itself in the British Islands was due in the main to the causes which have been already explained. Bellièvre writes to Servien at the time of the King's trial: 'As you know very well, they are so suspicious here with regard to everything that proceeds from

France that that which would pass unnoticed from others is declared criminal when it comes from us; and as, of foreign Powers, they fear us alone, they pay such attention to our actions and our words that the least expression of the resentment which we must feel for that which they have done might be enough to *lead them to make alliance with Spain.*' These words furnish the key of the policy at once of the French and of the Spanish Courts. Since the secession of the Dutch from the French alliance and the outbreak of civil troubles in France the European war had sunk into a duel between France and Spain, and a duel in which the combatants were very equally matched. Spain had conceived new hopes from the movement of the Fronde, and at the same time France had lost her ally. It was a critical moment for both these Powers, and therefore both were nervously careful not to offend England. The government newly set up in England was assuredly warlike; it had a fleet and an army; and neither France nor Spain could face the thought of seeing British ships and men placed at the service of her antagonist. But there was another foreign Power which by its position was forced to take a different view of British affairs. This was the United Netherlands, which, now at length relieved of the Spanish incubus, enters upon a new period of its history.

With this new phase of the Netherlands begins a new period in the foreign relations of England. As the Elizabethan age might be said to begin with the first rebellion of the Netherlands against Spain, so a second period of greatness for England begins when the Netherlands take, after the Treaty of Münster, the place from which the Spanish Monarchy is now retiring. Henceforth the Netherlands will play a greater and more important part

in our story. We have before us three great wars between England and Holland, and beyond this an alliance of the two Sea Powers which is still more memorable, which indeed is the great and dominating combination of the opening of the eighteenth century.

The foundation of this new relation was laid by the marriage of the first William and the first Mary in 1641. By this the Stuart family, at the moment when its position in England was shaken, acquired a new support, and at the same time the English and Dutch nations, which had always had a strong sense of kindred, were drawn closer together. So much was visible at the moment, but other consequences and results of the marriage came to light in course of time.

It was perceived that if the House of Stuart in England had gained help in its difficulties, not less had the House of Orange in the Netherlands acquired a new support of the utmost importance, by this alliance.

The year 1648 seemed to be fatal to all royal Houses in Western Europe, so that an observer of political currents might then have predicted that Monarchy was approaching its last hour, and was about to give place, in all advanced countries, to a republican system. It actually fell in England, and the lively French mind now took the infection of the ideas that were in the air. In Paris republicanism was preached and barricades were set up in this same year. And in the same year also that virtual monarchy which had grown up in the Netherlands and was attached to the family of the Liberator, received a sudden blow; the tendency which from the outset had always set in favour of it, was suddenly arrested.

Not that the Monarch was wanting. That standing difficulty of the hereditary system, that it depends upon

an accident, that the man worthy to reign may fail in the monarchical family, was not felt here. It is true that the Stadholder Frederick Henry died in March 1647. The fiction which identifies a son with his father and might enable the Dutch up to that time to believe, or make believe, that they had still their Liberator among them, could no longer help them. Henceforth they had but a grandson of William the Silent. But then he was named William. He was William II. He was 'un tres gentill cavalier,' as the Earl of Warwick writes to his mother. He was 'the ablest man whom the House of Orange had produced,' in the opinion of the enemy of the family, De Witt. At the death of his father he was twenty-one years of age.

It was not the death of Frederick Henry but the Peace of Munster that shook just at this moment the monarchical power of the House of Orange. The Princes of the House of Orange had been in request as Liberators and Protectors of the Dutch people against Spain, and ever since the people had aimed at independence, except during the twelve years of truce, they had needed such liberation and protection, for during all that time they had been at war with Spain. Now that peace was made definitively, and there was really little prospect that Spain at least would ever trouble them again, the condition of the state was fundamentally altered. The function of Liberator or Protector lapsed. The unique House, which in a population of traders, bankers and sailors held a court, bore hereditary titles, and had a sort of hereditary right to the chief public offices, seemed henceforth out of place.

For the new Prince this created a position which was peculiarly intolerable because he had risen to a higher rank than any former Prince of Orange. The tide which

now suddenly ebbed had just before risen higher than ever. His predecessors had been great noblemen but not of royal rank ; *he* had married the Princess Royal of England ; his son, if he should have a son, might not impossibly succeed by right to the British throne.

He is the one unhappy Prince of Orange in a century and a half, the only one who missed his vocation. His misfortune lay in this that his time fell in the interval between the decline of Spanish and the rise of French ascendancy. His three predecessors had won honour in resisting the former, his son was to rise still higher in resisting the latter ; he alone, not less gifted than they, saw to his despair the republic make peace, and found his occupation gone. Hence the wildness of his conduct during his short term. Perhaps it was happy for him that after three years he died suddenly at the age of twenty-four.

With his death disappeared for a moment the rudiment of Monarchy in the Netherlands. His son was not born, and the effects of the peace were shown in the Stadholderless time, which now began and which lasted till the third William had arrived at manhood. Thus Dutch history has a chapter which corresponds somewhat closely to that which in English history is inscribed Commonwealth. The English Monarchy fell in 1649, the Dutch in 1650 ; the English Monarchy was restored in 1660, the Dutch in 1672.

The condition of the two countries being so remarkably similar, and the two nations and the two royal Houses being so closely connected, it was inevitable that they should exercise a strong mutual action. In the English Revolution the Dutch were concerned scarcely less closely than the Scotch.

It is indeed possible that William II, had he lived, would have run a great career and have acquired as much fame as his forefathers or as his son ; in that case however the fame would perhaps have been of a sinister kind. From the archives of the House of Orange we may learn what he aimed at, and we may also perceive that he might probably have succeeded, and that by succeeding he would have drawn Europe into another course.

He regarded the Peace of Munster precisely as it was regarded by the French government, by Mazarin himself. The retirement of the Netherlands from the war with Spain, which had confounded the policy of Mazarin at the moment of its consummation, had at the same time frustrated all his own hopes. But there was no reason why he, as there was no reason why Mazarin, should acquiesce in the disappointment. Both had separately great resources, and it was open to them to put these resources together.

Mazarin, who had hoped to settle with Spain as triumphantly as he had settled with Austria, and then to interfere in England, desired now to induce the States-General to cancel the Peace. William II, who had hoped to follow in the steps of Maurice or Frederick Henry, and to rival Condé and Turenne, also desired to cancel the Peace. And he too desired not less than Mazarin to interfere in England in favour of the family which had introduced him into the royal caste. There was every likelihood that by a combined effort William and Mazarin would be able to reverse the peaceful policy which had gained the upper hand for a moment in the States-General. Parties in the Netherlands were pretty equally divided. The trading party represented by the States of Holland and the Burghers of Amsterdam had for a moment gained

the control of foreign policy. But the House of Orange controlled the other six provinces and had the people on its side. What might not William hope to accomplish, aided by his youth, his energy, his hereditary aptitude and hereditary reputation, his royal rank, and lastly by the powerful assistance of Mazarin and the deep purse of the French government? The two statesmen together would certainly cancel the Peace, revive the alliance of 1635 and probably also at last accomplish that partition of the Catholic Low Countries which had been contemplated in 1635.

In this change of Dutch policy would be involved no doubt a change in the Dutch constitution. The awkward and intricate system of government which had hitherto prevailed would be simplified. The Dutch would at last find what long before they hoped to find in Queen Elizabeth and in the Duke of Anjou, a Monarch. The grandson of William the Silent would become the first King or Sovereign Duke of the Dutch provinces. He would endow the country with a most valuable French alliance, with the family alliance of the King of Scots and with the friendship of the Royalist party in England.

Not that William was a plotter, or that he allowed his mind to dwell on such ambitious schemes. To him it seemed that the plotting and the ambition were on the other side; he meditated only a measure of self-defence against the trading party who threatened to deprive him of his hereditary position, who were dangerous to the union of the provinces, and who in making the Treaty of 1648 had actually broken the Treaty of 1635. But the defensive measure would probably have involved such a revolution as we have described, and so Mazarin writes to Servien (April 5th, 1647): You may, if you think proper, let fall a

word to make him (i.e. the Prince) understand that a conjuncture may occur when, if he has secured the protection and good will of their Majesties, he may attain to a greatness quite beyond that of his predecessors.

We speak of the father of a great English king. This great English king and great master of European policy was born within a week of his father's death on November 6th, 1650, and at that time the revolution in concert with France was already beginning in the Netherlands. It is important for the history of William III and of England that we should conceive clearly the position of the House of Orange at the time of his birth. I therefore make room for a few sentences from one of the latest letters of William II, dated August 27th, 1650. It is written to an unknown friend.

"I have obliged the province of Friesland through the president of the week, who is dependent on me, to represent to the States-General that it is disgraceful to us to see France embarrassed as she is without offering her our aid, considering the debt we owe her. He will also propose that a frank letter should be written to the Archduke (i.e. the Governor of the Catholic Low Countries) to show him that this state cannot see or allow him to meddle further in the affairs of France, and offering mediation for a fair settlement. He will also propose that the Spaniards should be asked to perform what has been promised by the Treaty of Munster for the advantage of my House, in default of which the measures that may seem good shall be adopted. I am assured that they are not in a condition to satisfy this demand, and as they have tried to embarrass me you can fancy I shall not lose the opportunity of retaliating. I cannot say how desirous I am to entertain you, and as I hope the King and Queen (i.e. of France) will

pay the Princess Royal the honour of a visit after her confinement, I conjure you to exert yourself to the utmost with his Eminence that you may accompany them ; which will give us more opportunity to talk of many things. I do not despair that we shall soon have war with the Spaniards, but it is necessary for us to take our measures."

So stands the House of Orange just before the birth of William III. It is in close alliance with France ; it is bent on plunging the Netherlands into war with Spain ; it is a House with royal pretensions, engaged in a mortal struggle with Republicanism.

War with Spain, not war with the English Commonwealth, for the restoration of his brother-in-law, is the object William has most at heart. Nevertheless he entertains the Prince of Wales at vast expense, he sends money in support of his cause to Scotland, and in his negotiations with Mazarin the restoration of the Stuarts is occasionally mentioned.

But did not a war with Spain accompanied by a domestic revolution constitute an undertaking sufficient to absorb his attention ? Would he burden himself at the same time with a war with England ? The answer is that intervention in England did not strike him as thus purely optional, a mere family duty which it was open to him to perform or neglect. The new government in England already regarded him as their enemy ; they regarded Mazarin as their enemy ; and they were roused to immediate hostile action by the mere menace of a concert between him and Mazarin. William found that his opponents in the State of Holland were receiving support from England ; Mazarin found that Spain was likely to receive support from England. In short a great international combination was springing up. The newly-founded

Republic of England, the republican party in the Netherlands, and the republican Fronde in France, were rallying to the side of Spain; and opposed to this combination stood the monarchical and family alliance of the three Houses of Bourbon, Stuart, and Orange. It was therefore scarcely possible for William to separate the British question from the Spanish question, or to make the revolution he contemplated on the Continent without at the same time declaring against the English Commonwealth.

We need scarcely therefore enter into the vexed question of the draught treaty of October 20th, 1650. In this document the Prince and the King of France undertake to attack the Catholic Low Countries jointly on May 1st, 1651, also to break with England and to restore the Stuarts, and not to make a separate peace with Spain. Some writers have disputed the genuineness of the document. Among those who grant this there has been disagreement as to the significance of it, some¹ regarding it as implying an assumption by the Prince of full monarchical power and therefore a fixed intention of subverting the constitution of his country, others² treating it as a mere informal sketch of a policy to be pursued by legal means. But William II does not pass across our scene; whatever were his plans, they were frustrated within a month from the date of this paper by his sudden death. It is enough for us to remark that it corroborates (and Mr Geddes points out that the weight of authority is on the side of its genuineness) what the international situation itself renders probable, viz. that the restoration of the Stuarts was one of the articles of the secret compact between William and Mazarin.

¹ Sirtema de Grovestins
S. II.

² Groen van Prinsterer.

But the death of the Prince was a very great event, for a whole policy, which might have changed the face of Europe, died with him. His party was essentially monarchical, and was therefore paralysed until his unborn son should arrive at manhood. The republican party of Holland passed at once by his death from despair and from the prospect of dissolution to the control of affairs.

Already on July 30th, 1650, the Revolution had begun which was to crush this party. The Prince had arrested six of the delegates of the Province of Holland and imprisoned them in the fortress of Loevesteyn. In this act he seems to imitate Mazarin, who had lately arrested the great Condé, Longueville and Conti, leaders of the Fronde, and had been warmly applauded for so doing by the Prince himself. He had next proceeded to march troops upon Amsterdam. At the moment of his sudden death he was 'master of the republic'.

Almost immediately after his death the power passed over to the party which he had so easily crushed. For all the strength of the Orange party resided in its head, and it lost its head on November 6th. In the first days of January there met at the Hague a Great Convocation of delegates from the Seven Provinces. By this time indeed there was a new Prince of Orange, but he was a baby, concerning whom his mother and grandmother were debating whether he should be christened Charles William or William. And so the paralysis of the party continued, and their antagonists were able, at the Convocation, to destroy, so far as legislation could do it, the germ which had been on the very point of developing into Monarchy. Republicanism had won in the Netherlands even more truly than in England two years earlier.

¹ The phrase is Mr Geddes'.

A great event not only for the Netherlands, but also for France, and Spain, and for all Europe! A great event for England! For the second time the new English government was relieved from the danger of a foreign intervention. The war of Scotland and England was at this time proceeding. In the interval between the Prince's successful stroke and his sudden death was fought the battle of Dunbar. The decisive catastrophe of Worcester followed in the next year. Now had William II lived, the King of Scots might have been aided in the first months of 1651 by a grand alliance of France and the Netherlands in his favour, and the result might easily have been different. But the Monarchical Coalition was broken by his death and there was no prospect of repairing it. Mazarin had suffered another great disaster; republicanism would now assuredly prevail for a time in the Netherlands and therefore probably in England, and it was probable that the cause of the Fronde would receive a new impetus in France.

The tide of republicanism seemed to be steadily rising. Charles I had fallen, and now William II on the other side of the sea. England was a Commonwealth, and now for the first time the Netherlands too seemed to be really a Commonwealth. Might it not be expected that these two communities, so closely akin in blood and religion and so similar in trading and maritime propensities, would proceed in due course to unite in close alliance? And yet we are now to see them for the first time engaging in war. Now breaks out a rivalry which hitherto had been held in check. While the monarchy and the quasi-monarchy lasted they had remained at peace; no sooner does republicanism prevail in both communities than we see them in spite of a strong common interest become enemies.

What now occurred between England and the Netherlands had been witnessed already between England and Scotland. Those two countries had rebelled almost at the same time against Charles I; in both rebellion had been successful, and the religious tendency of both communities had been similar; yet now, almost immediately after the fall of Charles I, England and Scotland were at open war. This was the effect of the close contact between the two countries, and between England and the Netherlands there was contact almost equally close. In the Elizabethan age, at the time of the Armada, it may be said that the Netherlands were even closer to England than Scotland as yet was. If they had drifted away in the next generation, a new and most important link now held them together, the link of royal marriage. In commerce and colonisation the two nations had developed together and lived in perpetual contact and collision.

This peculiar intimacy of the two communities was indicated in a striking manner by the step which the English Government took in 1651 after the death of the Prince. We remember that after the death of William the Silent the Dutch laid their country unreservedly at the feet of Queen Elizabeth, desiring no better lot than to become her subjects. Now at the death of the second William, while the Great Convocation was sitting, two ambassadors from England, Oliver St John and Walter Strickland, appeared with a similar proposal, tending not merely to an ordinary alliance, but to 'a more strict and intimate alliance and union, whereby there may be a more intrinsical and mutual interest of each in other than hath hitherto been for the good of both.'

Thus on the eve of war England and the Netherlands

discussed a plan of exceptionally close union. This may show us that we have to do with a quarrel of relatives!

The military revolution of 1648, a movement far more radical and profound (though it proved ephemeral) than that which had begun in 1640, could not but disturb the relations of England and the Netherlands on the one side as it disturbed those of England and Scotland on the other. Over all the seas the English and Dutch were in contact; now it was a marked feature of this revolution that it was felt beyond the sea and on the sea, wherever Englishmen had settled or English ships went. In the first Civil War Parliament had kept control of the fleet, but in the second Civil War the fleet had been divided, and it had threatened on the whole to incline the other way. From this time we see a maritime royalism, at the head of which Rupert appears, contending henceforth with Blake on the sea, as before with Cromwell on land.

An English civil war on the sea! This was an occurrence the more pregnant because for half a century the sea had been growing more and more important to England. The numerous English convulsions of the Tudor time had been at least confined to the island. For the first time in 1648 it began to appear that there was an England on the Atlantic and far away beyond the Atlantic. The maritime war of Royalist and Republican touched one of the most sensitive nerves of the new England, its foreign trade.

Already there existed, though still on a small scale, a Colonial Empire of England. Our colonies were indeed small compared with the vast territories which had so long, nominally at least, belonged to the Spanish Monarchy. They were not, as they are now, scattered over the globe. But a modest overflow of English people had

taken place across the North Atlantic. To our one Tudor colony of Newfoundland had been added, as we have said above, a continental England on the eastern coast of North America and a few West Indian islands. This development, not striking in mere magnitude, had however not only contributed much to the Puritan Revolution, but had also materially altered the character of our state. The change which Raleigh had foreseen had taken place. England's 'interest in foreign trade' had grown considerable, she had become a commercial state. She became, as it were, conscious of this when the Civil War became maritime, as it did in 1648, when the communication between England and English settlements was interrupted by royalist privateers.

In this maritime Civil War the Dutch could not but be entangled. Their ships, far more than our own, crowded the narrow seas and the North Atlantic. The larger part of our foreign trade made use of Dutch bottoms. Nor indeed could the Dutch be regarded as wholly neutral in the civil war of England. The English struggle of King and Parliament was blended with the Dutch struggle of the House of Orange and the States of Holland, and royalists all over the English world looked scarcely more to the Prince of Wales, who now speedily became King of Scots, than to Prince William II of Orange, and afterwards to the babe in the arms of the Princess Royal. Until the death of William II in 1650 the Netherlands drifted under the same influences as Scotland towards war with England. They were opposed to the republican movement, they clung to the dynasty, they were appalled by the execution of Charles I. But when republicanism prevailed in the Netherlands also after the death of the Prince, a more peaceful prospect seemed to open. Hence the mission

of St John and Strickland in 1651, the object of which was to unite the two states upon the basis of republicanism.

It is surprising at first sight that this proposal should have so completely failed, and that the two republics, threatened by the same enemies, viz. the Stuart interest, the Catholic interest, and France, instead of uniting in self-defence should now for the first time make war upon each other.

But there was a fundamental difference between the anti-monarchical government in England and the anti-monarchical government of the Netherlands. The former was concentrated, resolute and all-powerful. There might be in Britain a vast amount of royalist feeling, but it had no voice and no influence upon the policy of the government. It had been purged out of the Parliament and defeated in the field. The ruling party was not a precarious majority, which cannot afford to lose votes and is therefore driven to a temporising course, but a minority depending upon force, whose one principle of action is audacity and whose one hope of safety is in success. It is easy for such a government to have a resolute and consistent policy, and by the help of a devoted army it may succeed. For this is the nature of Imperialism.

On the other hand the republicanism of the Netherlands in 1651 was in the highest degree precarious. It was founded simply on the superiority in wealth of the Province of Holland over the other six provinces. In the absence of a Prince of Orange who might embody and impersonate the wishes of the nation, the Dutch nation for a time lost its unity, and a national policy became impossible. The Dutch were no longer one thing, but seven things, and of these seven things the largest and

most powerful was the Province of Holland. Holland therefore began forthwith to take the lead, and in 1653 John de Witt, son of one of the prisoners of Loevesteyn, became Pensionary of Holland, and in that capacity guided Dutch policy for the rest of his life. But the power he represented was a mere *preponderance*, which would only last so long as the six provinces refrained from combining against Holland, and to maintain which therefore required infinite tact, and the most watchful caution. He could not afford to forget that he ruled a country which was devoted to the House of Orange, and therefore strongly inclined to the House of Stuart. In the Netherlands in short public opinion counted for much, whereas in England the government was not in any way accountable to public opinion.

The negotiations of 1651 on the proposal of union brought this difference strongly to light. From March to June St John and Strickland resided at the Hague and, though their main object was to secure both governments by union against Stuart machinations, they were made to feel during those three months that they were living amidst a population almost hostile to them. ‘Every day the Princess Royal and her brother, the Duke of York, who had returned to the Hague, rode slowly past the ambassadors’ residence with ostentatious pomp and an imposing suite, staring at the house, from top to bottom, in a manner to encourage the rabble, which her procession gathered up in its way, to commit an insult. A warning also reached the ambassadors from Rotterdam that the royalists there were conspiring to murder them; not improbable, looking to the fate of Doreslaar (Dorislaus) at the Hague and of Ascham at Madrid. They drew the attention of the States of Holland to the insulting nature of the Princess’s

processions. The sterner Republicans in the Holland States wanted to instruct the Princess and her brother to leave the Hague during the visit of the ambassadors; but the proposal was modified into a request to the Princess Royal and the Queen of Bohemia to keep their dependents in order¹.

It is also apparent from the grounds alleged by the Dutch for rejecting the scheme of union, that even under republican guidance they retained their royalist predilections. A principal object of the scheme was to deprive the Stuarts of the shelter and basis of operations which the Dutch territory afforded to their supporters. Rebels against the English Government accordingly were to be banished from Dutch territory. This proposal was expressly rejected by the Dutch. ‘We cannot,’ they said ‘banish from our soil all persons who are banished out of England. Our country is a refuge for the exiles of all nations’.

Thus the English demand for union, in itself a somewhat exorbitant demand, did not commend itself to Dutch public opinion, and fell through. But what followed is startling. The pendulum swung suddenly round from importunate friendship to violent hostility. In this same year 1651 Parliament passed the Navigation Act, and in 1652 Blake and Tromp were exchanging broadsides in the Channel.

The Navigation Act, which remained substantially in force for nearly two hundred years, is the great legislative monument of the Commonwealth. It was the first manifestation of the newly-awakened consciousness of the community, the act which laid the foundation of the English commercial empire. For this measure the great

¹ Geddes, p. 173.

² Quoted by Geddes (*Administration of John de Witt*, i. p. 178) from a MS. Narrative of the Ambassadors preserved at the Record Office.

adventurers of two generations had paved the way. It consummated the work which had been commenced by Drake, discussed and expounded by Ralegh, continued by Roe, Smith, Winthrop and Calvert. It completed the apparatus of our foreign trade by creating an English commercial navy. Hitherto we had had indeed merchants in England, colonies in America and on the Atlantic, and factories in India. But the link between them, what was then called the navigation, had been mainly supplied by the Dutch. By excluding the Dutch from the carrying trade of English commodities we now took into our own hands the whole work of commerce, to which our nation was henceforth mainly to devote itself. But by the same act we struck a deadly blow at the very state to which, but a few months before, we had offered almost an incorporating union. If that state in her long struggle with Spain had displayed such prodigious vitality and energy, this was because the Spaniard had never known how to strike her in the vital part. Her near neighbour, the other Protestant state, the other trading state, found out this vital part at once. The Netherlands lived by the carrying trade of the world, and of this the carrying trade of England formed a considerable, and was soon to form a still greater, part. And thus though Dutch greatness was yet to last another half century, its decline commences here. The Navigation Act of 1651 is the first nail in its coffin.

But might not England have rested content with the Navigation Act? It secured her own commercial interests, and, if she was offended at the rejection of her advances, it was assuredly more than a sufficient revenge. Was the war which followed necessary? Was it unavoidable that our Protestant Republic should begin its career by making

war upon the other Protestant Republic and thus exposing both Protestantism and Republicanism to the most imminent risk ?

This question reminds us that the same English Government was already at war with Scotland and with that very party in Scotland which had taken the leading share in crushing Prelacy and reducing the power of Monarchy. The truth is, it was a Sovereign Army ; war was its natural, its all-sufficient policy. It had every encouragement to abide by this policy. Very shortly after the return of St John and Strickland from their unsuccessful mission the dispute with Scotland was triumphantly settled at Worcester. Cromwell, who in spite of his victory at Dunbar, found himself beset with difficulties in Scotland, succeeded in luring his enemy into England, where he was able to overwhelm him once for all by an immensely superior force. The King of Scots became a fugitive, and the kingdom of Scotland, having lost its army, fell a helpless prey to the English invader. England's new Government had evidently the favour of the Lord of Hosts. Why should it seek any other aid ? The fate of Scotland would assuredly be the fate of the Netherlands also. The union which they had declined would speedily be forced upon them by the sword.

It is indeed not easy, as Buckingham had found, to create at short notice a navy capable of winning victories. But we are to observe that between 1648 and 1652 the Commonwealth had formed and trained a navy not less successfully than in the first Civil War the Parliament had formed an army. The maritime war with the Netherlands grew up naturally and gradually out of the maritime war with Royalism. Robert Blake, who in the first war is a soldier appears after 1648 as a sailor and a sea-king, the

rival of Francis Drake. How closely united in those days the two services were is seen not only by the example of Blake but also by that of Monk, and, on the other side, of Rupert. Since that covert, half-piratical war with Spain which had been the first school of the English navy no impulse towards the developement of naval strength had been so potent as that which was now given by the Maritime Civil War. The royalists held Jersey, the Scilly Isles, the Isle of Man, and some Irish ports, and from these ports they preyed upon English trade. But they had to learn that if there was one thing which the new Government of England understood it was war. No financial difficulties, no constitutional scruples, hampered them. The navy was speedily reorganised; Blake expelled Rupert from the narrow seas, pursued him first to the Tagus, then into the Mediterranean, asserting the authority of England in a tone which had not been heard since the days of Essex and Ralegh, and not only against the struggling Government of Portugal but against Spain itself. On his return he forced John Grenville to surrender in Scilly and Carteret in Jersey.

Taking land and sea together, the transformed England could rival any European state in the organisation of military force. It was a military age. The lessons of Maurice, Gustavus and Wallenstein had been taken to heart by the European Governments. Standing armies were the order of the day. Condé and Turenne were approaching their zenith. Charles the Tenth was about to begin his career. But at this moment the most thoroughly military state in Europe was England, the country of Cromwell and Blake, where the army had actually taken possession of the government. Its triumphs were already what might be expected from its organisation. It had conquered

Scotland, which since January 1649 was a foreign state ; it had subdued Ireland ; it had driven its enemies before it over the seas. We need not therefore be surprised to find it prepared in 1652 to deal with the Netherlands as it had already dealt with Scotland. It was fully prepared to challenge the great Sea Power and to pit Blake against Tromp. It had also, like Napoleon, its commercial system. The cannon of Blake would be aided by the Navigation Act, and the Protestant Republic naturally destined, like Scotland, to union with England would be taught by such pressure to submit to its destiny.

In 1652 the English Commonwealth was already beginning to feel itself secure from the hostility of the leading states of Europe. It had indeed not yet adopted a definitive policy towards France and Spain, but still contented itself with asserting its rights intrepidly, nay imperiously, against all Powers alike. It still enjoyed that good fortune, which is a fundamental fact in its history, that France and Spain, being engaged in a struggle which just then was more than usually equal, could not afford to break with it, but on the contrary were forced to compete for its favour. It was hated by both alike—we have seen Mazarin plotting with the Prince of Orange against it, and the Spanish Minister, Don Louis de Haro, after the murder of its Ambassador, Ascham, said to Hyde, ‘I envy those gentlemen for having done so noble an action,’—yet it was openly acknowledged, after a certain delay, by both alike. Spain naturally took the plunge first, for, at the moment of the foundation of the Commonwealth, Spain saw the House of Stuart and the House of Orange closely united with her enemy France. That monarchical alliance, which was only frustrated by the death of the Prince of Orange, was pointed both at Spain and the English Commonwealth,

which therefore were naturally tempted to combine, and indeed Spain still remembered against the House of Stuart the conduct of Charles I in the matter of Oquendo's fleet. It was a great event when the Spanish Ambassador Don Alonzo de Cardenas was received by Parliament in solemn audience, delivering his letters of credence to the Speaker and acknowledging the House as the supreme power of the nation in the name of the greatest prince in Christendom.

After a time the recognition by Spain led to that of France. Those were years of great perplexity for Mazarin, who was indeed sadly declined from the glorious position he had occupied in 1646. He had now the Fronde upon his hands, backed by the arms of Spain. He could not afford to contend at the same time with England, and yet, while Henrietta Maria resided in France and received a pension from the French Government, while the young Charles II was believed to receive advice from Mazarin, non-intercourse between the French and English Governments was certain in no long time to ripen into war. Mazarin at last saw the necessity of abandoning the attitude of hostility to the English Revolution which he had taken up so early. His change of policy was to lead in time to memorable results. In this place we only note that after a considerable interval passed in tentatives and secret negotiations the public acknowledgment of the Commonwealth by the Government of Louis XIV took place on December 21st, 1652, when M. de Bordeaux had his audience of the Parliament, and said that 'the union which should exist between neighbouring states is not regulated by the form of their Government.'

Such triumphant success had English Republicanism

in its first form, before the power of England was gathered up in the hand of Cromwell. Even before the Dutch war began, the new State had taken up a secure position in the world, recognised by Spain and soon to be recognised by France. It must indeed have already seemed to politicians the most powerful, and perhaps also the most ambitious, state in Christendom. This successful administration of foreign affairs ought scarcely to be attributed to Cromwell. The maritime war in which such vigour and such imperious decision were displayed was neither conducted nor inspired by Cromwell. It was Henry Vane who reorganised the navy, and it was chiefly Robert Blake who wielded it with so much effect. In this chapter of our history these two names shine side by side, much as Pitt and Wolfe a century later.

Apart from Cromwell, the Commonwealth was warlike and ambitious. Such was the phase of affairs when it plunged into war with the Netherlands. Nor is any personal influence of Cromwell to be traced in the Navigation Act, though that marks the commencement of a new commercial and imperial policy for England. Altogether the policy that resulted in the Dutch war and the Dutch war itself, though they correspond in date to the culmination of Cromwell's influence, are nevertheless not in any way due to that influence. Though, when he took the government into his hands, he inherited the Dutch war, he was not responsible for it, and he put an end to it as speedily as possible.

That war was the natural result of the perturbation which had been caused in foreign trade and everything connected with it by what we have called the Maritime Civil War. There had long been a trade rivalry between the English and Dutch. In 1624, 1646, and 1650 there

had been agitation and even legislation against the Dutch carrying trade. Now too, that is in March 1651, the Dutch concluded a treaty with Denmark concerning the customs of the Sound, which threatened, in the words of the Council of State, a 'destroying mischief¹' to the Baltic trade of England. In short there was an acute crisis in the commercial relations of England and the Netherlands. Had the English mood been calm, had an Elizabeth, a Walpole or a Peel presided over our policy, peace might perhaps have been preserved. But we were in a martial temper, and we were in a higher state of military preparation than at any previous time. Moreover it is to be observed that the Maritime Civil War developed, as it were, insensibly and almost naturally into war with the Netherlands. Royalism in some of the colonies, e.g. in Barbados, formed a sort of alliance with the Dutch carrying trade. Political feeling was blended with the commercial rivalry of the two states. In the list of English grievances we see along with the old story of the Massacre of Amboyna the insults heaped by the Dutch populace on St John and Strickland and the impunity of the murder of Dorislaus. Almost more marked was the strong political feeling of the Dutch themselves. The Orange party was in a great majority, and it was a Stuart party. It had not indeed immediate control of the Government, which was peacefully disposed. De Witt foreboded ruin to both states from the war of which he watched the approach. But the Government could not resist public opinion, and that clamoured for war, not merely out of a feeling of commercial rivalry, but in the joint interest of the Houses of Orange and Stuart, because war would bring, they hoped, first the restoration of the Stadholderate at home, and next the restoration of the Stuarts in England.

¹ Geddes, *op. cit.* p. 177.

Thus the first Dutch War is transitional. It is half a civil war, and is to be classed, under one aspect, with the war with Scotland which was decided at Worcester. It grows out of the Maritime Civil War as the war with Scotland had grown out of the Land Civil War. But in another aspect it is the war by which England for the first time assumed her modern position as the great trading and Maritime Power of the world. By it for the first time she shook herself free from her commercial dependence upon the Netherlands and showed herself capable not only of standing alone but of surpassing the Netherlands.

The war may be said to have commenced in June, 1652, that is, about midway between the Battle of Worcester and the dissolution of the Long Parliament. It was closed at the end of April in the year 1654, when not only the Parliament had fallen but a new constitution had been devised for England and the Protectorate was in full vigour. According to the plan of this Essay we abstain from narrating military operations and content ourselves with noting in general the character of the war.

The Navigation Act was in force and English ships were hampering Dutch commerce by exercising the right of search. The Dutch fleet, which had been greatly reduced at the Peace of Münster, was accordingly ordered to be augmented by 150 ships. A considerable augmentation actually took place and in May 1652 Tromp put to sea. It is to be noted that this famous Admiral was a devoted adherent of the House of Orange. There was as yet no war, but he met Blake off Dover. He was instructed to protect Dutch merchantmen from search and capture. On the other hand Blake was instructed to assert

'the old English claim to dominion in the narrow seas by compelling foreign ships to lower their flag. A kind of battle or half-battle, a collision almost inevitable in the circumstances, took place between the two fleets. And thus the dispute, which a special embassy had been despatched some months before to settle by negotiation in London, fell to be settled on the sea by war. The excitement produced by the battle could not be allayed in the irritable mood of both nations.

It was only too easy for the English Government to strike a heavy blow at their enemy. There was a Dutch fishing fleet off the coast of Scotland, carrying perhaps 8000 persons. Blake fell upon it in July, dispersed it, sank three of the ships of war that protected it, and captured the remaining eight or nine. A Dutch fleet of East Indiamen was returning richly laden. It was expected to take the route round the North of Scotland. Blake sailed to meet it towards the Orkneys. Tromp pursued him with a fleet of ninety-six ships. On August 5th they sighted each other, but a hurricane came on, which deprived Tromp of more than half of his fleet, while Blake's fleet escaped injury. In the same month De Ruyter defeated Ayscue off Plymouth. Tromp, disgraced for the moment in consequence of his misfortune, gave way to Vice-Admiral Witte Cornelis De With¹. On October 8th De With and De Ruyter met Blake and Ayscue in the Channel, and a battle was fought not very decisive, but in which the Dutch found themselves paralysed by the discord of the Republican and Orange factions in the fleet. Tromp was now restored and defeated the English completely on December 10th. From

¹ Not to be confounded with Cornelis De Witt, the well-known brother of the statesman. See Geddes, p. 249.

this time till the end of February he remained master of the Channel, when he is said to have mounted a broom at his mast-head and even meditated entering the Thames. England's fortune was at the lowest ebb.

The tide turned in 1653. In a great battle of three days, which raged between Portland and Beachy Head, Blake, Deane, and Monk defeated Tromp, De Ruyter and Evertsen. This took place at the beginning of March. In June another engagement took place off the Dutch coast, when Tromp had to retreat before Monk and Deane, who were joined during the battle by Blake. In this battle Deane was killed. Finally in the early days of August Monk and Tromp met for the last time off the Texel. Tromp was killed and the Dutch fleet suffered terribly. But the English now retired from the Dutch coast, as after the battle of March the Dutch had retired from the English.

These are the principal occurrences of the war, from which it might appear that the two states were pretty equally matched in naval power. Nevertheless it came to light that the English had certain substantial advantages. One was that the Dutch ships were inferior in size to the English, bore lighter guns and carried fewer men. In the course of the summer the great Dutch admirals represented this to their Government in the strongest terms. Commander De Ruyter declared openly to the Committee that 'he would not again go to sea unless the fleet was strengthened with better ships.' But the principal weakness of the Dutch was in their military administration, which had lost all its unity and efficiency with the fall of the House of Orange. Indeed not merely the administration, but the state itself, had lost its unity. Each of the seven states had a will of its own. Zealand

envied Holland, and Holland vexed Zealand. In the most critical moments of battle these jealousies broke out. The leading Dutch statesman, John De Witt, whose public life precisely covers the period of the Dutch wars of England, not only recognized, but approved and promoted, this fatal disintegration of the state. In a letter of May 10th, 1652 (quoted by Mr Geddes), he writes: 'The English call the United Netherlands by the name of a republic; but these provinces are not one republic; each province apart is a sovereign republic, and these United Provinces should not be called a republic in the singular, but federated or united republics, in the plural number.'

Another circumstance made this war most ominous for the Dutch. It might have been expected that a state which had emerged wealthy and mighty from a desperate war of eighty years would at least bear lightly the effort of this short struggle with England. In the war of Spain and the Netherlands the mighty Spain had been ruined, while its rebel had risen to wealth and fortune. But a contrary result was witnessed now. The Netherlands now seemed quite unable to support the burden of war, while England seemed to suffer little. Famine and despair afflicted the Dutch population, and their politicians acknowledged that no remedy but peace could save the life of the state. The explanation was that Spain had made a land-war, whereas England made a naval war, upon the Netherlands; at the same time Spain, through her vast colonies, had been most vulnerable by sea at a time when the Netherlands, having as yet no colonies, were not so vulnerable. In the war of England and the Netherlands these conditions were altered. Most of the wealth of the Dutch was now floating on the waves or stored up in colonies beyond the sea. It lay therefore

exposed to the attack of England. England meanwhile was by no means equally exposed, being still in the main an agricultural country and in no way dependent upon foreign trade. In the most summary account that can be given of the war this difference in the position of the two Powers comes to light. We see the Dutch throughout on the defensive against damaging blows which they cannot retaliate. Blake swoops down upon their fishing-fleet; he lies in wait for the East Indian commercial fleet. In the battle of March the Dutch fleet is formed in four squadrons in order to protect 150 merchantmen. And upon this vast foreign trade depends almost the whole prosperity of the United Provinces and the very livelihood of the Dutch population.

Economically therefore they were at a terrible disadvantage, for the very reason that they were commercially more developed than England. England was not as yet hampered by its own wealth or entangled in the intricate machinery of its trade. We were in fact better prepared for war than we have almost ever been before or since. For we were just then a military state with a military government. We had had four years of the Maritime Civil War, in which our navy had gained organization and discipline, and behind the navy there was, what had been wanting under Elizabeth and has been wanting for the most part since, a formidable and disciplined standing army. The two services were closely blended together. It is in this war particularly that we are surprised by the appearance of distinguished soldiers in command of fleets, because it is only at this time that the army and the navy are equally active and prominent. Blake himself did not tread the deck of a ship of war till he had passed his fiftieth year. Monk,

one of Oliver's most trusted officers, commanded in the action which was fatal to Tromp. It seems to be due but to accident that Oliver himself never directed a sea-fight. On the Dutch side the Tromps and De Ruyters are seamen by profession, and when Jacob van Wassenaer, Baron of Obdam, was appointed by the State of Holland to succeed Tromp, though he was at the time colonel of a cavalry regiment, Mr Geddes conjectures that the example of England was followed.

But states have another resource in war beside military organisation and wealth. They may seek aid from alliances. We naturally ask, Did not Mazarin see his opportunity when the war of England and the Netherlands broke out in 1652? Nay, we found Mazarin, who had been alarmed as early as 1646 at the very thought of a republic in England and who still in 1650 had meditated in conjunction with Prince William the restoration of the Stuarts, formally acknowledging the English Commonwealth at the close of 1652, when it must have appeared more dangerous than ever, and when it had already been for some months at war with the Dutch.

But in 1652 the troubles of the Fronde developed themselves into actual civil war. In the autumn of that year Condé, retiring from Paris, entered into treaty with the King of Spain and raised the provinces against the government of Mazarin. Once more the English Commonwealth was relieved from the danger of foreign intervention by the internal embarrassments of the great Powers.

Thus France is temporarily paralysed. Spain too is preoccupied with her French war, not to mention that her day of greatness is over. It is a new feature that at a great maritime crisis these two Powers, hitherto the only

Powers, beside the Netherlands, with which England has had to reckon, should be without influence. The old international system of Europe, such as we have known it from the time of Charles V, seems, for the moment at least, to have disappeared.

Accordingly that secondary system, the system of the North, which hitherto has remained in the background, now becomes prominent. At this point, when we see the modern trade policy of England founded by the passing of the Navigation Act, we also witness the commencement of a Baltic policy. It is caused, like the Navigation Act itself, by the disturbance of trade which arose out of the Maritime Civil War.

Of the vast foreign trade of the Dutch, which was endangered by their war with England, a principal branch was their Baltic trade. During the war it was likely to pass into neutral hands. On the other hand it was possible for them to convert their influence in the Baltic into a most effective weapon against England. Here first we have occasion to make a remark which in a view of the growth of British Policy is fundamental. England is at this moment awakening to the consciousness of her commercial and maritime vocation. What the Dutch have done already in colonisation and foreign trade she begins to understand that she can do also. But for this purpose she must manufacture, maintain in efficiency, and continually renew, an instrument which is highly expensive and requires an unfailing supply of certain materials, namely, a fleet. Now these materials, timber, tar, hemp, &c., were only to be procured in those days from the Baltic countries. Any occurrence therefore which endangered the communications of England with these countries struck at the root of her commercial

and maritime greatness. These countries were numerous and of vast extent, but they were so situated that traffic with them must pass through a narrow strait, and therefore could be interrupted by any Power which could control that strait. It follows that in those days, and after those days for more than a century, it was matter of life and death for England that no Power, whether Denmark or Sweden or Russia, should acquire the power of shutting the Baltic. On this principle our Baltic policy almost exclusively rested. It follows also that the Dutch, when in the winter of 1652 they found themselves for a moment through the victory of Tromp masters of the sea, would desire to crush once for all their maritime rival by closing the Baltic against him. This they hoped to do by an alliance with Denmark, which, it is to be observed, was naturally opposed to England on account of the connexion of its royal house with the Stuarts. They had entered upon this policy before the war began by what was called their Redemption Treaty with Denmark, and the English Government had already taken alarm, as we may see from the following passage of the instruction of the Council of State to St John and Strickland¹:—

‘Whereas the trade of this nation, through the Sound into the Baltique Sea is of very great concernment, both in respect of the usefulness of the commodities brought from thence, so necessary among other things for building and rigging of ships, which it is not convenient we should only receive or not at the pleasure of other nations; but more especially in regard of the great number of ships we have employed in the transportation of those bulky goods,

¹ Printed by Mr Geddes from the MS. Order Book of the Council of State, May 9th, 1651 (p. 176).

whereby mariners are bred, and they and our shipping maintained; and being also but short voyages, are often at home, to be made use of in case of any public occasions of the state requiring their service; and whereas this trade, being very much weakened otherwise, is in danger to be wholly lost by the agreement that hath been lately made between the King of Denmark and the States General of the United Provinces,' &c. &c.

When the war had fairly begun, the desire to exclude the English from the Baltic became blended in the minds of the Dutch with anxiety for their own Baltic trade. In August 1652 they sent to Copenhagen an envoy named Keyser with a small squadron of ships of war, with the commission to suppress, as far as might be safe, all neutral trade through the Sound, and at the same time to prey upon English trade. A proclamation was issued forbidding the transport direct or indirect to England of 'any munitions of war or any materials serving for the outfit of ships.' It will be understood from what has just been said that this was a mortal blow at the English navy.

Within the Baltic there raged rivalries similar, on a smaller scale, to those of the Bourbon and the Habsburg, of Spain and the Netherlands. Denmark and Sweden had been enemies for a century since the rise of Gustav Wasa; Sweden and Poland had maintained a dispute of succession for more than half a century. In these struggles Denmark might hope to receive valuable aid from her great neighbour, the Netherlands, and was disposed to purchase it by compliance. Accordingly in the winter of 1652—53 a treaty was concluded between the Netherlands and Denmark, by which the Sound was closed against English ships, Denmark engaging to maintain this prohibition by a fleet, the Nether-

lands engaging to bear part of the expense of such fleet and to defend Denmark against any hostilities she might incur in consequence of the treaty.

Thus the Dutch acquire an important alliance. England on the other hand stands alone. She has however the advantage of having settled all her domestic disputes. It is indeed not against England that the Dutch contend, but against Great Britain, which for the first time appears as a thoroughly united power. It is moreover Great Britain the Military State, possessing a powerful navy and behind that a powerful and disciplined army.

Such then is the First Dutch War, which is in some respects the type to which all the later wars of England have conformed, while it differs strikingly from earlier wars. In other respects however it is peculiar to the age of the Military State, and in some respects again it resembles the Second Dutch War which followed the Restoration. One striking characteristic of these two wars is that from both the great Continental Powers, the Habsburg and the Bourbon alike, hold aloof.

But in April, 1653, while the war was at its height, a new revolution occurred in England. The republican form was dropped, and the imperialism, which had been established substantially by Pride's Purge, now assumed the monarchical form most natural to it. The Lord General Cromwell dissolved the Long Parliament, and after another assembly, not properly a Parliament but commonly called the Little Parliament or Barebones' Parliament, had sat for a short time and dissolved itself, a new form of Monarchy was established by the independent action of some military officers. The Protectorate begins.

CHAPTER II.

THE PEACE OF CROMWELL.

IT is one of the correspondences between the career of Cromwell and that of Napoleon that Cromwell's Brumaire (the dissolution of the Long Parliament) occurred during a war, and that Cromwell, like Napoleon, on rising to the head of affairs, made it his business to restore peace. In fact, as Cromwell resembles Napoleon, so does the Government he superseded resemble the Directory. We may go further and say that both those Governments alike resemble the Government which was superseded by Caesar, the so-called First Triumvirate.

All these Governments alike are examples of Imperialism, but of *unmonarchical* Imperialism. All alike display a prodigious military energy. The First Triumvirate conquered Gaul and settled the East. The Directory conquered Italy and practically annexed Switzerland. In like manner the Purged Parliament conquered Scotland and Ireland and suppressed royalism over all the seas. At the same time all alike display a certain wildness, or want of coherence, in their foreign policy. The generals make war and peace almost at their own pleasure, Caesar in Gaul, Bonaparte in Italy; and the self-will of individual generals brings disaster on the state,—Crassus loses an

army at Carrhae—the French are driven out of Italy by Suworoff. The remedy is in all cases the same. A supreme general is created, whose function it is to direct and control the military energy of the state. Imperialism gives birth to an Emperor, and the world sees a Caesar, a Napoleon, or a Cromwell.

Cromwell had been absent in Ireland and Scotland, as Caesar in Gaul, or Bonaparte in Egypt. In his absence English policy had certainly shown itself somewhat wild and spasmodic. The Government had offered to the States General an exceptionally close union, and not being able to obtain so much as this had swayed violently round in a contrary direction. England was now at war with the United Provinces. In this war she displayed energy and obtained success, for she was in a martial mood and had a military government. But could a lover of his country see with satisfaction the course she was taking? Under the Stuart kings she had enjoyed peace almost without intermission. But now in the tenth year since the Parliament had levied war against the Stuart king, now after ten years of ruinous civil conflict the new Government no sooner finds itself securely established than it undertakes a new war against a great continental Power.

Again, complaint had arisen against the Stuart king that he had not been sufficiently zealous in the cause of Protestantism. And yet in the main, though feebly, he had supported the Protestant interest. He had negotiated persistently in behalf of the Elector Palatine. The only wars he had waged had been against Catholic Powers, Spain and France, and he had broken with France in the cause of the Huguenots. But no sooner had the new Government been established than it undertook a ruinous war, and aimed the most destructive blows, against

a Protestant Power, the very Power which had borne the brunt of the Catholic attack for well nigh a century. The more we recognize, as recent historians, notably Mr S. R. Gardiner, teach us to do, that religion, rather than politics, gave the impulse to the Great Rebellion, the more startling does this result appear. A Catholic Queen and a Prelatic King were intolerable to us in that phase of our religious history; nor was this surprising when we consider how much the cause of the Reformation had sunk. All the more surprising is it that when the stumblingblock was removed, the Catholic Queen expelled, the Prelatic dynasty dethroned, England, now for the first time unreservedly Protestant, should introduce a suicidal discord into the camp of the Reformation.

It is true that the confusion in foreign policy does not seem to have been a principal ground of the revolution of April 1653. Foreign policy indeed was a department to which Cromwell had hitherto been comparatively a stranger. Unlike in this respect to Bonaparte, who was strange to the ideas and internal movement of the French Revolution but made himself early master of its foreign relations, Cromwell was passionately moved by the revolutionary impulse, was a politician before he was a soldier, and again a soldier before he was a general. He had risen by slow degrees to the position of a kind of national statesman, representing England as against Scotland and Ireland. But before 1653 it would perhaps be difficult to show that he had given his attention to European policy, though in his famous conversation with Whitelocke, in which he broached so frankly the question, What if a man should take upon him to be King? we find Whitelocke saying, 'As to foreign affairs, though the ceremonial application be made to the Parliament, yet the expectation

of good or bad success in it is from your Excellency, and particular solicitations of foreign Ministers are made to you only.' But even this conversation took place in the autumn of 1652.

But after April, 1653, the State, whatever we may think of its internal government, has internationally the character of a Great Power, that is, it has a Government which, resting on a disciplined irresistible army, is strong and secure, and its decisions are made for it by a resolute, fearless and sagacious man. It will not indeed be more energetic than it has lately been ; this is impossible ; but it will know its own mind better, it will no longer oscillate from one extreme to the other.

For five years, between April 1653 and September 1658, England, or rather Great Britain and Ireland, is a European State similar to Sweden in the reign of Gustavus Adolphus. It has a great and victorious fleet, it has a great and victorious army, and its policy is decided by one of whom Queen Christina said that he had done greater things than any man living, though the Prince de Condé might be ranked next. When we compare this period as a whole with that which had immediately preceded it we see that Cromwell's great international work consisted in this, that he put England decidedly on the Protestant side in Europe. In one word, he brought the war with the Protestant Netherlands to an end, he concluded an alliance with the Protestant Sweden, and, having done this, he did not rest content with a condition of peace, but entered into war with the Spanish Monarchy and, in order to carry on this war, formed an alliance with that Power which, though Catholic, had all along favoured internationally the Protestant interest, namely, France.

We are therefore to treat of the policy of the Protectorate under two heads, first, as it composes the differences bequeathed from the former Government and restores peace, secondly, as it enters upon a new war. Cromwell and De Witt rise to the head of affairs at almost precisely the same moment, Cromwell in April, De Witt in July of 1653. For on July 30th De Witt was sworn in as Grand Pensionary of Holland, and thus assumed the office which, in the abeyance of the Stadholderate, carried with it practically the government of the United Provinces. In both countries the new system founded on the fall of royal Houses adopted at the same moment the monarchical principle in another form, England by creating a Protector, the Provinces by creating a vigorous Pensionary thirty years old.

Negotiations for peace began in the interval between the dissolution of the Long Parliament in April and the meeting of the Little Parliament in July. Cromwell had the advantage that the Dutch felt the necessity of peace much more than the English. Their Tromp might be equal, or even superior, to our Blake, but the fabric of their prosperity was not solid enough to bear the pressure of war with such a Power as England.

As before the war began, so now it was felt that in the intercourse of the two states there was scarcely an alternative between hostile rivalry and close union. Either the Navigation Act and destruction of Dutch commerce, or such a union that Dutch commerce should become a part of English commerce, in which case perhaps the Navigation Act might be repealed.

We have remarked several times how readily the idea of union between England and Holland suggested itself. Cromwell was even more likely than Elizabeth or than

the Long Parliament to be attracted by it. His mind was possessed by religious conceptions; he more than any man had founded a new union between England and Scotland; probably more than any man he had been revolted by the suicidal quarrel of two Protestant Powers at the very moment when England had become more Protestant than ever. He was accustomed to work on a large scale and by means of great forces. Now that for the first time he felt himself a European statesman he would naturally desire to apply to international politics the method which had become habitual to him. He who had overcome the English Cavaliers by creating a Puritan chivalry, who had overcome the Scotch Covenant by a freer and grander English Covenant, was now to enter the arena where Habsburgs and Bourbons and Wasas had so long contended together. We need not say that his policy was not likely to be that of the Stuarts. But neither would it be that of Elizabeth, nor would it be that of a statesman of the eighteenth or of the nineteenth century. Cromwell would regard himself as bound to be a champion of what he called the Gospel; the model he would set before himself would be Gustavus Adolphus.

Elizabeth, as far as she is able, adopts the principle of non-intervention, and this principle has revived in the nineteenth century, especially since the severance of England and Hanover. But neither the Long Parliament nor Cromwell inclines at all to this policy. They are not only warlike, but they go out of their way to form connexions with the European Continent. In this respect the Protectorate and the Long Parliament resemble each other. For if Cromwell makes peace with the Netherlands, abandoning the idea of union, he only does so after

a struggle, and because he finds it impossible to realize that idea. And yet had it been realized, had the United Netherlands become to England as another Scotland, it is evident that our insularity would have been sacrificed. A Power would have been created which would have had an overwhelming maritime ascendancy and at the same time, being assailable by land, would have needed a great standing army. It would have been a military state as much as Sweden. The design was indeed abandoned, but that the ambition which suggested it remained appears from the pains Cromwell took to get possession of Dunkirk.

The fundamental principle of the policy of the Protectorate, as it appears in all the State Papers, is the union of all the Protestant Powers of Europe under the leadership of England. A Cromwell could adopt no other basis of policy. But he had another principle which lay almost as near his heart as Protestantism itself, the principle of toleration. This had an important effect upon his foreign policy. It led him to draw a distinction among Catholic Powers. Wherever the Inquisition reigned he saw a State with which not only he could not have alliance but could scarcely remain at peace, since it was not only Catholic but also intolerant. But there were other Catholic States, which admitted the principle of toleration. The chief of these was France, which had its Edict of Nantes. Cromwell had not at the outset any special inclination to a French alliance. As we have seen, the Commonwealth had hitherto inclined rather to Spain, and on the other hand Spain had anticipated France (the country of Henrietta Maria) in acknowledging the Commonwealth. But very early in the negotiations with the Dutch we find Cromwell laying it down that while there can be no alliance

with states which maintain the Inquisition, alliance with France is permissible on condition that French Protestants are not molested in their religious freedom. Thus at the very commencement of the Protectorate a germ is visible in the mind of Cromwell, from which afterwards grew the war with Spain and the alliance with France.

We have here the outline of a policy which is large and grand, but one main article of it, union with the Netherlands, was impracticable. Or rather it was practicable only, and that in a modified form, on a royalist basis. That child at the Hague, who was regarded both by Cromwell and De Witt with such jealous ill-will, who was at once an Orange and a Stuart, would one day weld the two nations into a mighty alliance, which should give the law to Europe. But the Dutch government which De Witt represented was a mere loose federation of seven governments, and De Witt was bent upon keeping it such. An energetic Protestant policy was repugnant to him just because it was energetic, because it would draw together the seven provinces, which it was his object to hold apart. He did not feel as a citizen of the United Provinces but purely as a Hollander, and his object was simply by tact and adroitness to draw the other six provinces into a course advantageous to the trade of Holland. Such a system was too delicate to blend with the energetic system of Cromwell. The Protestant union proposed, had it been adopted in the United Provinces, must have roused the old heroism of the Dutch population, and the result of this would have been startling to Cromwell and more than startling to De Witt. The old feelings and thoughts would have brought back in a moment the old beloved House. The cry of *Oranje boven* would have been raised again; De

Witt and his party and his policy would have disappeared; and at the same time the revolution, since the House of Orange and the House of Stuart were so closely united, would have set the Dutch nation in threatening opposition to the government of Cromwell himself. He learnt this gradually in the negotiations of 1653, while the Little Parliament was sitting and the Protectorate taking shape. Just as in the Little Parliament itself the high-flown ideas of the victorious party in domestic matters took momentary shape and disappeared, so at the same time its foreign policy was reduced to a more modest and practical form.

An account of the Treaty of 1654, to be at all exact or complete, would require a volume, and moreover it belongs to the history of the United Provinces rather than of England, of the administration of De Witt rather than of the Protectorate. De Witt's statesmanship is from first to last a miraculous performance on the tight-rope. He succeeded for almost twenty years in working a constitutional machine which might have seemed too clumsy and intricate for the most consummate dexterity. What he did in 1654 could not be made intelligible to the reader without a long explanation, which would be quite out of place here, of the Constitution of the United Provinces. We are concerned with Cromwell, not with De Witt. •

Cromwell then discovered that the Provinces would not tolerate the idea of a complete union, though they were prepared for a close alliance and only hoped that it might be made close enough to involve the repeal of the Navigation Act, though not the loss of their own sovereignty. He had to content himself with an ordinary treaty, though we may perhaps imagine him calculating that when his grand Protestant Alliance was

once launched, the Provinces being included in it, they would fall into a dependence on England which would in the end cause them to desire the union they now rejected. Having once descended to this lower level, the task of making peace was comparatively easy to him, since to the Dutch peace was almost a necessity, while he himself declared to the envoy of the Swiss evangelical cantons, 'with tears in his eyes, and invoking the name of God, that nothing had grieved him so much as this war.'

But two difficulties remained to be dealt with.

1. The first brings to light the peculiar relation of England to the United Provinces by showing that that state was not regarded as simply foreign but rather as another Scotland. Cromwell had already expelled the King of Scots from Scotland; he now held it necessary to exclude the Stuart family from the government of the Netherlands. But in his view the Stuart family and the Orange family were indistinguishable. William of Orange, who was to live in English history as a kind of second Cromwell, who was in like manner to dethrone a Stuart King and to occupy his place, is regarded in his infancy by Cromwell as a kind of second Charles Stuart, as a dangerous embodiment of the dynastic principle.

Peace with the Netherlands was only possible for Cromwell because for the time they were under a republican government. But this republican government was scarcely more than an accident; it was opposed to the popular feeling; it was a makeshift not likely to outlast the minority of the Prince of Orange and likely enough to pass away much sooner. Already the proposal had been made to invest the child with the offices which

his ancestors had held, entrusting the execution of them to his relatives and adherents. In these circumstances it seemed essential to Cromwell that the exclusion from office of the Prince of Orange should be made in some form a condition of the peace. Yet if there was one feeling in which the population of the United Provinces, excepting Holland, were unanimous it was devotion to the House of Orange.

On the other hand, what Cromwell desired so much was precisely what the Province of Holland, the ruling Province under the existing system, also desired. It was therefore natural that he should try to attain his object by an understanding with them.

We are to note that what he aimed at was in some sort the conquest of the United Provinces, for to dictate to a people what its government shall be is practically to assume the government of it. If we study the methods of the French Revolution and Napoleon in dealing with foreign states we shall see that they held a state conquered when they had set up in it a government dependent on themselves. Cromwell's proceeding was less violent in that he contented himself with giving a new guarantee to a government which already existed. Nevertheless it was felt by the Dutch population to be the proceeding of a conqueror. So long as Cromwell lived they felt themselves to be living under his yoke, and when he died the boys in the streets of Amsterdam sang that the devil was dead. Had he lived longer or had his system taken root and his conquest of Dunkirk borne its natural fruits, the dependence of the United Provinces upon the mighty Military State which he had founded would have become much more evident.

The spirit of the Dutch people was not sunk so low

that they should consciously and deliberately submit to this humiliation. The States-General did not ratify an undertaking to exclude the Prince of Orange from the offices which had been hereditary in his family. They only undertook that any one who in the future should hold the office of Stadtholder and Captain-General should be bound by oath to observe the treaty. But Cromwell took advantage of the state of decomposition into which the Dutch Commonwealth had fallen. As we have said, it was not now one thing but seven things, and of the seven the Province of Holland was by far the greatest. The Province of Holland had also its States; it was by the States of Holland that John De Witt had been appointed Pensionary. From this Assembly then Cromwell required an Act of Exclusion, by which they engaged never to elect the Prince of Orange nor any of his descendants as their Stadtholder or Captain-General or Admiral, nor to consent to the appointment of a Prince of Orange as Captain-General of the forces of the Republic.

The incredible series of manœuvres by which the States of Holland were induced to pass this Act belongs, we are happy to think, not to English but to Dutch history. Cromwell had simply to insist, and to decline to ratify the treaty until the Act should have been formally delivered to him. De Witt had to do the rest.

The plan of dividing the Dutch Republic in order to conquer it would be suggested to Cromwell by his experience in Scotland. There too in the Second Civil War he had found two distinct interests. By the side of the Parliament, just then guided by the Duke of Hamilton, there was the Church party represented by Argyle. The former was royalist, the latter not.

Cromwell after defeating Hamilton in the field had entered Scotland and had procured the exclusion of his party from public office. What Hamilton, closely connected with the royal family, had been in Scotland, that was the Prince of Orange now in the United Provinces; De Witt on the other hand was the Dutch Argyle.

2. The other difficulty with which Cromwell had to deal related to Denmark. The Baltic question was not only all-important to England as a naval Power, but to Cromwell, meditating a great Protestant union, it had also another bearing. Several Protestant states were accessible to England through the Sound. Here lay Sweden; here Frederick William of Hohenzollern, afterwards to be called the Great Elector, was rising in influence; Denmark itself was a Protestant state. Russia being still in the background, the Baltic might almost be regarded as a Protestant Mediterranean. Moreover Denmark had a royal House which, being closely connected with the Stuarts, inspired the same sort of misgiving as the House of Orange. Already before a clear prospect of peace opened he had adopted an important Baltic policy. To prevent Denmark from closing the Sound against England, there was an obvious plan, namely, to draw Sweden into the war, and on other grounds an alliance with Sweden, the country of Gustavus Adolphus, would be welcome to Cromwell.

In December 1653 Bulstrode Whitelocke had his first audience of Queen Christina at Upsala. The idea of a Protestant Union could have no charm for Christina, who was already secretly a Catholic. But hostility to Denmark was the very basis of policy to her House and to the state which Gustav Wasa had founded. With the help of the mighty British Power it struck her at once

that the old Danish quarrel could speedily be settled. She saw at once in vision what her successor Charles Gustavus was so speedily to accomplish. It seemed for a moment likely that the Dutch war, in which hitherto only three states had been concerned, would expand into a European struggle. The alliance of England and Sweden was by itself not less momentous than had been Richelieu's alliance of France and Sweden in the last generation. And meanwhile the Dutch were looking wistfully to France, where Mazarin had not yet fully resigned himself to the ascendancy of the British Commonwealth. But if France should come to the help of the Dutch, Spain almost of necessity would combine with England. Would a war grow up between France, the Netherlands and Denmark on the one side, and England, Spain and Sweden on the other? Queen Christina proposed to Whitelocke what she called a 'trinity' of these latter Powers. It was evident from his answer, in which he referred to the murder of Ascham and the backwardness of the Spanish Government in avenging it, that alienation was already beginning between England and Spain, and probably Whitelocke's master was more adverse to such a combination than Whitelocke himself knew. But the possibility of it was at least a good diplomatic instrument.

If the United Provinces already felt themselves overmatched by England, it was evident that Sweden, just then at the height of her military efficiency, was far more than a match for Denmark. And a glimpse of Spain in the background was enough to check any confidence that might be placed in France, especially as France was now in the throes of a civil war, and it was open to Cromwell to join hands with that

other general, whom alone Queen Christina would admit to be comparable to himself, Condé. Thus Cromwell had a commanding position in the negotiations of 1654.

He was therefore able not only to impose humiliating terms upon the United Provinces but also to enforce the claims of England upon Denmark. Denmark had complied with the Dutch in closing the Sound against England and in seizing English ships, and the Dutch stood stoutly by their ally in the negotiations. She had now to pay damages, which she was enabled to do by the help of Dutch wealth and credit. The peace of Cromwell was concluded in June 1654.

It marks a great epoch in British policy, when the Military State of Great Britain triumphantly takes its place among the states of the world. The struggles of the English Revolution now subside, and a new system is definitively established. The Cromwellian State was now the greatest Power in Europe, somewhat similar to Sweden in the days of Gustavus Adolphus but resting on a much broader basis of population and wealth. By the peace it emerges into a commanding international position. It has reduced the Low Countries to a sort of dependency, it has intimidated Denmark, and formed an alliance with the great Military State of the previous generation, Sweden. It is already the centre of a great Protestant Union.

England has several times since the sixteenth century made peace triumphantly, but never except in 1654 has she done so as a Military State. At other times she has laid down her arms gladly, with a sense of relief, and with no desire to take them up again. We have seen her peacefully disposed under Elizabeth, and so the peace which James I concluded in 1604 lasted

through his whole reign. So too in the eighteenth century, though war was so frequent, it was usually entered on with a feeling of despair, and it was more than once brought to an end by an uncontrollable outbreak of popular impatience. In 1654 it might certainly be thought that England had had enough of war, for she had scarcely known peace through a period of twelve years, during a great part of which time her own fields and homesteads had been devastated. But Cromwell has no more thought of giving the country repose than Napoleon when he made the Treaties of Lunéville and Amiens. Having rectified the confusion which had been introduced by the Long Parliament, having restored union to the Protestant interest, he proceeds almost at once to make a new war. He attacks the Spanish Monarchy. In the history of British Policy the Cromwellian period which extends over five years (1653—1658) falls into two parts. During the first part he is a Peace-maker, during the second he is an Aggressor and Conqueror. Napoleon's reign divides itself in the same way, but Napoleon arrived at supreme power when he was thirty years of age, and had therefore a long career of conquest. Cromwell was older by a quarter of a century when he reached the same stage, and accordingly death frustrated his designs. He had only time to conquer Jamaica and Dunkirk.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF CROMWELL.

CROMWELL had proposed to Queen Christina an offensive alliance against Denmark. But the proposal by itself was sufficient for the end he had immediately in view. While the Swedish negotiation went on the treaty of peace with the Dutch and with Denmark also made progress. Accordingly the active military aid of Sweden was not required, and the arrangement which was made at Upsala in 1654 contemplated a state not of war but of peace.

At the very same time occurred the abdication of Queen Christina. The Protector's envoy Whitelocke received from her the first communication which she gave of her intention, and was himself a witness, before he returned, of the ceremony of abdication. Her cousin, a son of Catherine, sister of Gustavus Adolphus, by a prince of the Palatine House, becomes King of Sweden by the title of Charles the Tenth. The Queen had no doubt more than one reason for retiring, but the reason she alleged to Whitelocke, namely, that the throne of Sweden could not properly be occupied by a woman, certainly appears to have been not merely ostensible. Sweden had long been, what England had recently be-

come, a Military State. The main function of its ruler was to command armies, and to tread in the footsteps of Gustavus. It was now at the height of its power, ready for new campaigns and new conquests. No sooner does the woman retire and the man fill her place than we see Sweden stand out as a conquering Power, the terror of the North. Charles Gustavus in Swedish history is *der dritte im Bunde* with Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII, and may be said to represent the culmination of the Military State, as Gustavus Adolphus represents the splendid rise, and Charles XII the lurid setting, of it.

Thus in the short period with which we now deal Cromwell and Charles Gustavus shine side by side. They are the Dioscuri of Protestantism. They appear almost together, and, as Charles Gustavus had but a short career, they are not far divided in their deaths.

Protestantism, as an active Power, attains now its highest point. The suicidal discord has been removed, and the forces of Protestantism are now gathered up in the hands of two great soldiers, who have both the power and the will to use them aggressively. What Sweden could do had been proved a quarter of a century earlier. What the British Military State could achieve was destined never to be fully known. It was but in the first stages of its great career when it was overset by a new revolution. But a Power so formidable has rarely been seen in the world. It had both a mighty fleet and a mighty army, a position almost impregnable, a growing colonial power, a trade capable of indefinite expansion. And the ancient rival of England, France, was at this moment paralysed by civil war.

Cromwell, having settled the partial war which he found raging, now fixes his attention upon the great

European war, and we too must now attend to this if we would understand his next step. Thirty-six years have gone by since the European war began, but it has passed through many phases and the actual phase of it is but six years old. In this phase it is a duel between France and Spain, between the Bourbon and the Spanish Habsburg. These two Powers had indeed been at war for nineteen years, that is, since 1635, but from 1635 to 1648 their war had been involved in the great complex which we call the Thirty Years' War. In 1648 the other belligerents had laid down their arms, the Emperor, Sweden, the Protestant Princes of Germany, and the United Provinces. A great pacification had been made, but it had not extended to France and Spain, which still continued to wage war.

Besides this Spain still waged war with Portugal, which since 1640, that is, for fourteen years, had been in rebellion against the Spanish Monarchy, and had set up the House of Bragança against the House of Habsburg.

Since 1648 the war had taken a new aspect. France seemed to be on the decline. Her first ascendancy, the great age of the Cardinals, reached its height in 1646. Truly alarming in that year was the power wielded by Mazarin. But all this ascendancy passed away when the troubles of the Fronde began in 1648.

Spain was now relieved of her war with the Low Countries, and by the Fronde she might seem to gain as much at the expense of France as France had gained at the expense of Spain by the rebellion of Portugal. And not only was France cleft in twain, but the old incurable wound was opened again, and all the work of the Cardinals seemed to be undone. Once more,

as in the time of the Religious Wars, the Government is resisted by the noblesse, headed by a prince of the blood, and this party is in open concert with Spain.

The duel of France and Spain was pretty equal ; as we have seen, it had been of great importance to England, for by paralysing both Powers for the purpose of intervention in England it had given free scope to the Military Revolution and to the reconquest of Ireland and Scotland by the military party. Nevertheless it had exhibited considerable fluctuations of fortune. The settlement of Westphalia had diminished the resources of France, but it had also diminished those of Spain. The former had lost the help of the Dutch, but the latter had lost the help of Austria, for the great alliance of the two branches of the House of Habsburg had been broken up by the peace of 1648. Then came the Fronde, and for a while the prospects of France darkened very ominously. Should she lose her strong Government, her strong national unity, the precious gift of Richelieu, what would become of her ? First she had four years of violent internal dissension, not unlike the troubles of the first years of the Long Parliament, and next in 1652 she entered upon formal civil war, as England had done ten years earlier. Mazarin had been driven into exile. The great soldier and prince of the blood Condé overawed the regency. But now the regency came to an end. Louis XIV attained his majority, and now Condé retiring from Paris deliberately called the provinces to arms and concluded at Maubeuge a treaty with the King of Spain. Condé was King at Bordeaux as Louis XIV at Paris, but to Paris Mazarin now returned. Henceforth a large part of France, controlled by one of the great commanders of the age, is pledged to procure for the King of Spain a good, just, and secure peace. Nor could

the restored Mazarin by any means count on the fidelity of that part of France which remained nominally loyal. Thus about the time when the first Dutch war began, France was indeed hard pressed and fortune seemed to incline in favour of Spain. In the summer of 1652 Condé and Turenne fought a battle in the Faubourg St Antoine itself. Mazarin had to retire a second time.

This was the condition of France at the moment when England for the first time stood before the world as a mighty Military State. The relative position of the two Powers, as it had been ten years before, was actually reversed. About 1644, when Condé was at the opening of his career, England was absorbed and paralysed by civil war, while France 'went forth conquering and to conquer'; now in 1654 it is the turn of France to be enfeebled by civil war, when England makes a triumphant peace which puts her at the head of the Protestant states, and has fleets that sweep the Ocean, an army that has conquered Ireland and Scotland, and a military government directed by Oliver Cromwell.

It is at this moment that the immense greatness which was reserved for Great Britain in a later age was, as it were, foreshadowed. Cromwell's fabric was extremely ephemeral, but it revealed for the first time the large possibilities of our state. It is a first sketch of the British Empire.

He looked at the duel of France and Spain from a certain distance, from which he could perceive that if France was much depressed—and there was nothing to show that she would speedily recover herself—Spain was still more deeply and irrecoverably sunk. For he looked abroad over the Ocean, and here Spain was in full decline. Fourteen years had now passed since the outbreak of the rebellion in Portugal. The first Portuguese king of the

House of Bragança, João IV, was approaching the end of his reign—he died in 1656. In the peninsula he had perhaps barely maintained himself; here in fact the struggle was still to come, for the war languished and was almost suspended from 1646 to 1656. But in general history the rebellion already appeared as a mighty and decisive event because of the change it had produced in America and Africa. The ancient Portuguese monarchy over a great part of the globe had revived. Every one of the foreign possessions of old Portugal, except Ceuta, had declared for the House of Bragança. This great revolution in the Oceanic world had one peculiarly strange circumstance. In Europe the Portuguese were naturally between 1640 and 1648 in sympathy with the Dutch through the common hostility of both countries to Spain, but outside Europe the Dutch had been for a long time the plunderers and conquerors of old Portugal so long as Portugal was lost in Spain. In particular they had conquered Brazil under the leadership of John Moritz of Nassau, and between 1640 and 1642 was seen the strange spectacle of the Dutch assisting the Portuguese in Europe and at the same time tearing from them their colonial possessions. In 1645 began a reaction. The Portuguese in Brazil, headed by João Fernandez Vieira, rose against their Dutch conquerors. By 1649 the vast possession was substantially recovered to Portugal, and about the same time they succeeded in expelling the Dutch from their old possessions on the west coast of Africa. The modern Portuguese Monarchy took its place in the world at the expense almost equally of the Spanish and the Dutch.

There had scarcely been witnessed so violent and confused a revolution in the colonial world since that colonial

world came into existence at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was the fall of the world-state which had been founded by Philip II; it was also a sudden and considerable decline of the Dutch colonial empire. And these changes were followed by the war of England with the Dutch, in which for the first time England displayed a certain maritime superiority. Cromwell, when he came to the head of affairs and began to consider foreign and colonial questions, could scarcely fail to see that a sort of interregnum had begun in the empire of the sea. It was also evident that the new Military State of Great Britain, with its fleet commanded by Blake, was as well qualified as any other state for maritime empire.

England had already taken indirectly some share in the oceanic revolution, since the success of Portugal against the Dutch in Brazil had been partly caused by the embarrassment which their war with England created for the Dutch. The reviving Portuguese Empire, opposed alike to Spain and the Netherlands, offered a natural lever by which England might raise her own colonial importance, and this she perceives somewhat later, but not in Cromwell's own time. He concludes however a commercial treaty with João IV, as indeed Charles I had done at the commencement of the Portuguese rebellion.

In this critical condition of the maritime world there were some obvious considerations which would tempt Cromwell to the policy he ultimately adopted of hostility to Spain. As the most Catholic and also the most intolerant Power, as the patron of the Inquisition, Spain was the natural enemy of Cromwell's party, which was at once strongly Protestant and by religious principle tolerant. Moreover hostility to Spain was the old Eliza-

bethan policy, by which England had grown great and which all England could understand. Perhaps we should add—it was a point very important for Cromwell, who was as unable as Charles I to hit it off with Parliaments, and therefore must always be in want of money—that war with Spain, as had been seen in Elizabeth's days, might be made profitable. Could Blake but once bring home a silver fleet, the Protectorate would be relieved for some time of all its financial embarrassments.

Nevertheless Cromwell, who was always disinclined to form long plans, does not at first look forward to war with Spain, and throughout 1654 his policy seems on the whole rather to threaten France. He appears to have principally at heart a league of the Protestant Powers of Europe. It was believed that he was about to summon a great Protestant Council which would declare the Pope to be Antichrist and open a grand religious war. This rumour was particularly alarming to the French Government, which had to reckon with the Huguenot party, protected by the Treaty of Nantes and accustomed from old time to look to England for countenance. Mazarin had all along expected this result from the success of the Puritan rebellion; he considered too that Henrietta Maria and the Dukes of York and Gloucester were actually living under his protection; he knew that since 1648 the inclination of England had been rather towards Spain than towards France.

It is certain that a party in England at this time were full of the idea of a great Protestant league. A Scotsman, John Dury, was the apostle of it. Samuel Hartlib interested himself in it. That it affected the Government is proved by Milton's State Papers and by some allusions in the speeches of Cromwell himself. It was held not to be merely desirable, but even necessary, for a great religious

war was thought to be at hand, which the Catholic Powers, reconciled by the Pope, would soon undertake for the destruction of Protestantism. The remark was made that in the Thirty Years' War Protestantism had been well-nigh ruined by the discord between Protestant Saxony and the Protestant Palatinate, and more lately Protestant England had gone to war with the Protestant Netherlands. This last discord had created great alarm in the Protestant Cantons of Switzerland. They had sent an envoy, Johann Jakob Stockar, to London, for the purpose of mediation. And now early in 1654 the Protector in his turn sent envoys to the Evangelical Cantons, one of whom was the apostle himself, John Dury, and the other was a mathematician, John Pell. This diplomatic activity of the Protector could not but alarm Mazarin. It was a new thing for England to interfere in Swiss affairs, and the interference was pointed somewhat threateningly at France, which at this very time was busy in renewing its old treaty with the Cantons. Pell was actually instructed to oppose this renewal.

The summer and autumn of 1654 were on the whole a moment of singular alarm and suspense. On the one hand the Protestant world was looking for the outbreak of a new religious war. On the other hand both Spain and France were in an anxious mood. Their duel had reached a critical point. In 1653 Mazarin had reestablished himself in power. His second period of good fortune had begun. He was once more all-powerful in the Government, as omnipotent, says Guy Patin, as God the Father at the beginning of the world. But the French Government itself withheld with difficulty the alliance of Spain and Condé. Its field of battle was not on the frontier, much less beyond it, but in Champagne and Guienne. Spain meanwhile, though pros-

perous on the Continent, was declining rapidly on the sea, and financially was quite exhausted. The result was that Cromwellian England held a most remarkable position, a position extremely advantageous for a Military State such as England then was, but quite unlike the usual position of England.

It was evident that with England lay the decision of the great duel. And no doubt at many later times England might have decided a European war by a sudden commanding intervention, but it has not been usual for England to speculate on such possibilities. Under Cromwell however she did so, for she was then a Military State.

In 1654 Cromwell was observed to be preparing two great fleets, although it was certain that England was in no danger of being attacked. That the Protector meditated some grand stroke was well understood, and yet no reason could be alleged that would have weighed with Elizabeth, not to speak of the Stuarts, why England should not enjoy for a long time the blessings of peace. Never has England since, nor had she for centuries before, been so aggressively disposed.

While Cromwell made his preparations the new king of Sweden, Charles Gustavus, was maturing a similar design. The two great captains of Protestantism occupied a similar position and acted, though independently, yet in harmony. For the moment their policy corresponded to their religion. The correspondence, as it soon appeared, was but accidental; for the moment however it realised the idea of a great Protestant League. As Spain in the West so Poland in the Northern system was entering at this moment decisively on the path of decline. The rebellion of the Cossacks had already broken out, and in this very year 1654 they formally put themselves under the

protection of Russia. The fall of Poland begins here. Immediately afterwards Charles Gustavus, who felt, as the aged Oxenstierna also felt, that the Swedish Government could not afford to be long at peace, plunged into war with Poland. A Catholic state suffered an overwhelming attack from a Protestant Power, and at the same time the Emperor saw the approach of a great danger. He could not be at ease while Sweden, which had already planted herself so firmly in North Germany and had given her guarantee to the Treaty of Westphalia, was moving her armies round and between the scattered territories of the Great Elector. To Cromwell therefore the war in Poland gave an assurance that the Emperor had his hands full, and would not be at leisure, whatever might happen in the West, to come to the help of Spain.

In this period of suspense Cromwell seems to form no definite plan. He meditates at the same time a league of Protestant states, by which England was likely to be drawn into a continental war, and an active maritime policy. Nor does he even later renounce either of these plans for the other, but continues to the end to push both forward at once. If in our history he is remembered chiefly for the impetus he gave to our maritime and colonial development, this is due not so much to his deliberate policy as to the fact that what he did in this direction proved lasting, while his continental schemes came to nought. The navy grew and prospered, and Jamaica was a permanent acquisition. The army was speedily disbanded and Dunkirk was given up.

From the beginning of the year 1654, while the peace with the States-General is in treaty, France and Spain are competing with almost desperate eagerness for Cromwell's alliance. Both kings offer him money. Fifty thousand

crowns a month is the subsidy which Spain is prepared to offer; some members of the Spanish Council record their opinion (April 12th) that, as the case is urgent and the whole fortune of Spain at stake, even a hundred thousand crowns would be no exorbitant subsidy. Mazarin offers four, or at need five, hundred thousand crowns a year, remarking that Spain always prefers to engage herself by the *month*, intending to make at most but one or two payments. But he also holds out the bait of Dunkirk, and adds that he will allow the Protector a free hand in the Indies, and aid him in seizing the two trade-fleets which are expected to arrive in August. For a long time however Spain seems likely to win the race for the Protector's favour. Her urgency, arising from her need, was greater; on the other hand war with France suggested itself more naturally to Cromwell's Government. France protected the Stuarts, and had Huguenots. One of her representatives in England, the Baron de Baas, is suspected of complicity in the plot of Gerard and Vowell, and is expelled by the Protector in June. On June 20th Mazarin writes, 'We shall perhaps be so unfortunate as soon to have war with England.' Meanwhile Cromwell prepares his fleets, and in October Blake sets sail for the Mediterranean bearing a Latin letter, couched in friendly terms, to the King of Spain.

There was in those days so little maritime police that the mission of Blake with a fleet of twenty-five ships, followed soon after by that of Penn with a still larger fleet, might be reasonably justified by the plea that 'the safety and protection of the trade and navigation of the people of this Commonwealth required it.' At sea England might almost be said to be already at war both with Spain and France, and a similar relation with Portugal had only just been

brought to an end. France was almost more alarmed than Spain by the appearance of Blake in the Mediterranean. He threatened to intervene at Naples against the French expedition of Guise, and would have done so had he not arrived too late. He then appeared at Leghorn, demanding an indemnity from the Duke of Tuscany and the Pope for injuries inflicted with their countenance on English merchants by Prince Rupert in 1650. He also demanded liberty for the Protestants to open a church at Florence. Here again the Protestant League shows itself. An indemnity was paid, the demand for religious liberty was answered evasively. Blake then sailed for the coast of Barbary, made similar demands, and on meeting with resistance read a lesson to the piratical states by bombarding Tunis. He then appeared successively at Malta, Venice, Toulon and Marseilles. So far the Military State of England merely displayed its power and asserted in general the rights of the Protestant states. It had not yet involved itself in any formal war.

So ended 1654, and the year began in which Cromwell was to make his momentous decision. But even in 1655 it scarcely appears that he consciously resolved to prefer France to Spain. Perhaps his only fixed intention was to vindicate the rights of England and of Protestantism wherever they might be questioned, and the rest followed of itself through the force of circumstances.

That Protestantism is about to suffer a great attack from the united force of the Catholic Powers is the burden of Protestant State Papers at this time, and seemed to receive a striking confirmation in the early days of 1655. In January the Waldenses of the valleys of Luserna, Perosa, and San Martino received orders from Charles Emanuel,

Duke of Savoy (he reigned from 1638 to 1675, and was father of the first King of Sardinia), either to conform to the Catholic faith or to quit their habitations. Through Pell and Dury at Zurich the Protector's Government had its attention immediately called to this. Piedmont was not far from France, the Waldenses were not widely separated from the Huguenots. And thus though the catastrophe in the Alpine valleys was still delayed for some months, the apprehensions of Mazarin that he would soon have to reckon with Cromwell received further confirmation.

But Cromwell's power threatened all non-Protestant states at once. That he menaced France and Tuscany and the Pope and the Barbary states did not prevent him from menacing Spain at the same time, for Spain and France alike, at that critical moment of their duel, seemed incapable of offering resistance to him. As early as November 9th, 1654, Bordeaux, who still remained in England to represent France, writes that he has learnt from a brother-in-law of the man who seems likely to be Cromwell's successor that 'the second fleet is to sail for St Domingo after having made a demonstration off La Rochelle in order to encourage the Huguenots.' He adds, 'When I asked what pretext the Protector would allege for such an undertaking against Spain without declaration of war, he laid down the principle that any one was free to establish himself in that country, adding that the said island was not entirely occupied by Spain; as to our affairs he thinks this Government has no design of breaking with France, but intends to continue carrying into effect the letters of reprisal, partly in order to further the maintenance of the fleet by the capture of our merchantmen, partly because he cannot believe that His Majesty means

to make good the losses suffered by the English, which they state at an enormous sum¹.

Thus all evidence concurs to show that Cromwell did not form the plan of taking the side of France against Spain in the European war. At the outset he threatens both France and Spain alike, and seems almost to make it a point of honour to threaten both equally. His plan is to stand forth as the head of a Protestant League alike in Europe and on the sea. His allies are Sweden and Holland and the Protestant Cantons and the Waldenses and the Huguenots. He makes no nice calculation of forces. He seems in his own mind to have hoped to find in the King of Sweden a new Gustavus Adolphus. We read that 'Cromwell is exceedingly intimate with the Swedish Ambassador, a person of great estimation; they dine, sup, hunt, and play at bowls together. Cromwell never caressed any man so much, nor sought the friendship of any so much as the King of Sweden.' The writer, Charles Stuart's Secretary, Nicholas, adds, 'Some say France will join these two, but I doubt it, for they will make themselves protectors of the Reformed Churches in Germany, France, &c.' Here is Cromwell's plan, or more properly his idea, for his was a mind which did not form plans, but was inspired by ideas. He was soon to find that Charles Gustavus was no Protestant Crusader, and was prepared to aid him only so far as to hold Austria in check. As to the West Indies also we discover no trace of any profound calculation. Here too Cromwell intends only to assert his rights and the rights of Protestantism. As Blake appeared in the Mediterranean so are Penn and Venables, commanding the other fleet, to show themselves in the Atlantic. But there is a difference. On the further side of the

¹ Cheruel, *La France sous Mazarin*, II. p. 380.

Atlantic Protestantism has a special grievance, for here the whole territory is claimed by Spain in virtue of a Bull issued by an ancient Pope of Rome. This Bull must be trampled under foot, Protestant Englishmen must assert their right of settling and acquiring territory. We are to observe that here too Cromwell regards his warfare as defensive. He is the leader of 'a company of poor men,' who are surrounded by a hostile world. In the instructions to Penn it is stated that the Spaniards have cruelly destroyed lawful possessions of the English in America and that it is to be supposed that they mean to destroy all the English possessions in those parts.

As a matter of fact, the Spanish ascendancy in the New World was in rapid decline, so that Cromwell's step strikes us rather as the deeply planned aggression of a conqueror. But he does not, as we might expect, concert measures with France or with Portugal. Perhaps he assumes that Spain, preoccupied by her war with France, will have no leisure for resistance. Otherwise he seems to waste no time in calculation, but rather to act as on the field of Marston Moor or Dunbar. He trusts in Penn's good fleet, and the good army of Venables, but chiefly, we may believe, in the Protestant cause and in the Lord of Hosts.

His action ought not to be judged by modern rules. The Spaniards had committed many violent acts against the English in the West Indies, and it will not be questioned that the Protestants had a right to disregard the famous Bull on which they relied. But the modern mind disregards all this, and asks why Cromwell wantonly plunged his country into a war with the Spanish Monarchy at a moment when she had scarcely emerged from a long, dark period of civil discord. The modern mind has forgotten, or scarcely

understands, that War of the Confessions in which Cromwell's life had been passed. It scarcely understands how critical the position of Protestantism still seemed to be, or how the example of Gustavus Adolphus influenced the course of Protestant statesmen. Hence it is tempted to put aside as hypocritical the religious considerations which Cromwell alleged, and to regard him as a sagacious politician who foresaw the future colonial greatness of England and who seized the opportunity of the decline of the Spanish empire to enrich England with its spoils.

But notions of trade seem at most but secondary in his mind, and deep plans foreign to his nature. He left the future to Providence, not only as a statesman but even as a general, so that in his campaigns there is little strategy. Accordingly his attack upon St Domingo seems to have had no remote object. It was simply a spirited assertion of the rights of Protestantism and of England, made by one who felt himself at the moment superior in force to his enemy and who washed his hands of the future.

But though he was no far-sighted schemer, Cromwell was astute, adroit, and, at need, double-minded in dealing with the difficulties of the moment. We can easily believe that he found it absolutely necessary to employ his fleet, which made him uneasy by its royalism, in some great, popular, and rather remote enterprise. An attack upon the Spanish Indies was in conformity with the old Elizabethan tradition. It also held out indefinite hopes of plunder. A single silver fleet captured would enable Cromwell to defy Parliament for a year or two. Such thoughts as these perhaps were blended in his mind with the Puritan's hatred of Popery and the Independent's hatred of intolerance.

The innovation however which he introduced did not

consist in inclining towards France but simply in breaking with Spain. The Long Parliament had leaned towards Spain, which indeed had been much more forward than France in favouring and acknowledging the Commonwealth. Cromwell bears himself as threateningly as the former Government towards France, but resolves at the same time to attack Spain. The negotiations with France in 1654 lead to nothing, but the new feature was that the treaty with Spain also unexpectedly fails, in spite of the strongest assurances on the part of Spain of support against the Stuart family, to which King Philip IV declares himself irreconcileably hostile. But, says Thurloe, 'Oliver always expressed an aversion to any conjunction with Spain.' The negotiations turned on the Treaty of 1630, and Cromwell urged (1) that in contravention of the first article of it 'the English were treated by the Spaniards as enemies, wherever they were met with in America, though sailing to and from their own plantations: (2) touching the Inquisition, the danger whereof all the English merchants trading in Spain were exposed to; in this it was desired that the English might have the exercise of religion in Spain without trouble, and that these words (*modo ne dent scandalum*) might be omitted out of the article, and that liberty might be granted to the said merchants to have and use in Spain English Bibles and other religious books.' Other stipulations were proposed which, says Thurloe, would have been granted but with respect to these two Don Alonso de Cardenas was pleased to answer that to ask a liberty from the Inquisition and free sailing in the West Indies was to ask his master's two eyes and that nothing could be done in these points but according to the practice of former times.

The Spanish Alliance was thus wilfully thrown away,

and Penn and Venables made their sudden descent on St Domingo. And yet no concert with France was arranged, though it was fully discussed and strongly recommended in the Council of State. On the other hand Cromwell's intention was to have war with Spain in the West Indies alone. In Europe there was to be peace 'unless the American fleet should be met with, which was looked upon as lawful prize'.

On the whole the memorable crisis of the early part of 1655 exhibits Cromwell in his characteristic attitude and at the height of his power. It is at this moment that he breaks with Parliament and suppresses royalism by means of the Major-Generals. It is at this moment that, after having united the Protestant world under his leadership, he deals a direct blow at the power of Spain without taking the trouble to secure the aid of France. Let us not think of him either as a friend of liberty or as a friend of peace. But he attains in a startling manner the Protestant ideal of his age. That conception of militant zeal which one poet embodies in the seraph Abdiel and another in Mr Greatheart, and which Cromwell himself saw embodied in Gustavus Adolphus, is here exhibited on a still larger scale than it could be exhibited even by Gustavus Adolphus.

We may see in the dedication which Morland prefixed to his book on the Waldenses what enthusiastic admiration this attitude of Cromwell excited in the mind of the ardent Protestant. But it is scarcely, as he thinks, similar to the attitude of Elizabeth, who, if she attacked the Spanish West Indies, did so only on extreme provocation, and who steadily refused to put herself at the head of a Protestant League. Cromwell follows not Elizabeth but Sir Walter Ralegh,

¹ Thurloe, i. 761.

who said of Elizabeth that she 'did all by halves'.¹ The expeditions of Blake and Penn at this time are strikingly parallel to that last expedition of Raleigh in the middle period of James I.² Raleigh too before striking across the Atlantic dallies with the French Huguenots; Raleigh too professes to be at peace with Spain, yet intends to occupy territory which Spain claims as her own, and Raleigh too hopes above all things that he may fall in with a silver fleet. The difference is that Raleigh has no distinct instructions, and runs the risk of being repudiated by his Government. This time it is the Government itself which is inspired by Raleigh's spirit. As Gustavus Adolphus furnishes the model to Cromwell in his European policy, so, it would seem, does Raleigh in his maritime policy.

Cromwell was not able to maintain very long the commanding position he occupied at the opening of 1655. Militant Independency did not long stand before the world 'bright as the sun, clear as the moon, terrible as an army with banners.' It reached its highest point when the question of the Waldenses became acute. Then it was seen that Cromwell, so far from seeking the help of France against Spain, was prepared, if not eager, to make war with both Powers at once. It must indeed be understood that already for some time past France and England had been rather at war than at peace. As Dunkirk begins now to become important to us, we may note that it had been but recently conquered by Spain from France (September 16th, 1652), and that at the critical moment Blake had interfered against France and had actually captured seven French ships sent to its relief. In Mazarin's correspondence of 1654—5 we find statements such as the following: 'The English plunder everything they meet of

¹ See above, p. 221.

² See above, p. 285.

ours, because we began first ;' or again, ' We hear from Brittany they [the English] continue their depredations on the king's subjects with unexampled insolence. It is even said that the people at St Malo have arrested all the English they could meet. If this goes on, it can scarcely be but that a rupture must take place.' Does not Cromwell, after forming the grave resolution of attacking Spain in the West Indies, at least see the necessity of restraining himself on the French side ? Does he not fear that the Catholic Powers may forget their differences and combine against the most powerful and threatening Military State that had ever arisen in the Protestant world ? Not at all. The massacre in the Alpine valleys now occurs, and though the principal culprit is the Duke of Savoy, the French Government is also implicated. Some of the troops employed against the Waldenses were French, and some Waldensian communities inhabited French territory. When therefore in May 1655 Cromwell put himself at the head of the agitation against the atrocities of the Duke he threatened France as well as Savoy. The rupture that had been so long dreaded seemed to come nearer. The negotiation of a treaty between England and France was for a time suspended, and Bordeaux was expressly informed that 'the great influence over the Duke of Savoy which the King of France possessed obliged the Protector to render this service to the Protestants and forbade him to sign a treaty at this conjuncture' (Bordeaux to Brienne, June 3rd, 1655)¹.

We see then that as late as the summer of 1655 Cromwell has not as yet adopted the compromise upon which he ultimately fell back. He is still possessed with the idea of the Protestant League, and thinks of all Catholic Powers

¹ See also Milton's Despatch of July 29th, 1655.

alike as belonging to an opposite system. In Europe however his policy is defensive. He does not think of attacking Catholicism, but only of asserting the right of his own religion to toleration. In the Indies he takes indeed the offensive, but here too he conceives himself only to assert an unquestionable right. He protests against the Bull of Alexander VI, which would consign for ever the whole Indies to the rule of the Inquisition.

Such is the second phase of Cromwell's policy. In the first phase he made peace among the Protestant states; in the second he rallies them against Catholic intolerance all over the globe. This phase too soon passes away, but it remains especially memorable as the commencement of an English policy which, whether wise or unwise, just or unjust, is not in the least degree *dynastic*.

As he made no advances to France, so perhaps he did not intend to begin a formal war with Spain. Rather he calculated that neither Power could at the moment afford to break with him. When Venables landed in St Domingo with not less than ten thousand men, his proceeding after all was not much more violent than that which the French had long submitted to from England on the sea. Cromwell seems to have contemplated war in the Indies but not war in Europe. While the two great Catholic Powers held each other in check England was to push boldly forward in all directions at the expense of both alike. Affairs however took a different turn, and by the end of 1655 Cromwell found himself involved in formal war with the Spanish Monarchy and entering into alliance with France.

That expedition of Penn and Venables does not seem from our present point of view to have been a failure. It was intended to assert the right of Englishmen to settle in the West Indies, and, as a matter of fact, it added Jamaica

to the British Empire. But at the moment it gave a great blow to Cromwell's military reputation. The force was at first landed in St Domingo, and here it met with a disastrous repulse and retired with the loss of a thousand men. On the return of the expedition Penn and Venables were committed to the Tower; their defeat alone was remarked; that before returning they had occupied Jamaica, which had then but five hundred Spanish inhabitants, scarcely attracted attention.

It would have been wise in Philip IV of Spain to have rested content with his victory in St Domingo. He had taught Cromwell a lesson. But Castilian pride has never been wise. He proceeded now to declare war in solemn form with the Protector. By doing so he sealed the doom of the monarchy of Philip II. But at the same time he caused considerable embarrassment to Cromwell, and forced him to take measures which perhaps he had not originally contemplated.

Mazarin allowed no such punctilio to disturb his policy. He temporised, as he had done ever since the establishment of the Commonwealth. During the summer Cromwell met with unexpected obstacles in dealing with the Piedmontese question. He was disappointed in the Protestant Cantons of Switzerland, which he had hoped to set in motion against the persecutors, for he now learnt from Pell that they were held in check by the Catholic Cantons. Switzerland was indeed paralysed at this time by internal disturbances. It had just emerged from a Peasants' War, and was about to enter upon the Wilmerger War, so called in Swiss history. On August 18th Mazarin arranged with the Duke of Savoy the Treaty of Pinerolo, by which the Waldenses received forgiveness and toleration, without however being restored to their homes. It seemed to the English Protestants 'a

lame and impotent conclusion'; Morland calls it a leper in splendid dress. But occurring about the same time as the disappointment in Switzerland and the outbreak of formal war with Spain, it had the effect of modifying the Protector's policy. Instead of a Protestant League he begins to meditate a policy similar to that which had saved Protestantism in the days of Henry IV and in the days of Richelieu, viz, alliance with France.

The Treaty of Westminster, signed on November 3rd, 1653, established by no means an alliance between France and England against Spain. But it brought to an end the condition of lawless maritime war between the two states, and it established by a secret article a satisfactory understanding with respect to the rebels and refugees on both sides. England ceased to protect the party of Condé, Mazarin ceased to shelter the Stuarts and their leading partisans. Cromwell however lost no time in proposing a closer alliance.

We are apt to see Cromwell's policy foreshortened, as it were, by distance. It was not his deliberate policy, we have seen, to side with France against Spain, though he ultimately did this. In like manner when he began to lean towards France he contemplated no such relation with her as was ultimately formed. It is true that owing to his interference the duel of Spain and France was decided within a few years in favour of France, and an age began of vast continental ascendancy for this Power, while Spain fell into irremediable decline and England became a great maritime Power but also for a long time a stranger to the Continent. No such result was contemplated by Cromwell to the last day of his life, and indeed it was produced, if in part by his policy, in part also by his death and the fall of his policy. To the end Cromwell sees England as the

leader of the Protestant Powers of Europe; to the last he labours as much and with as much success to establish English power on the Continent as in the New World, and the sudden progress of France is made not by his means but through the opening left by the abrupt fall of his system.

As Cromwell had been slow to make advances to Mazarin, so Mazarin was not at first eager for the imperious and dangerous help of the great Protestant and Republican Power. The year 1656 was passed by the two statesmen in learning to understand each other. Colonel Lockhart arrives at Paris in May as the Protector's representative. Will he share the fate of Ascham and Dorislaus? Mazarin receives his proposals with little warmth, and hopes for a moment that he may obtain peace with Spain without any further help from England. Hugues de Lionne negotiates at Madrid in July with Don Louis de Haro, while a new Don John of Austria, also a Bastard, assumes the government of the Low Countries. But at this moment the success of Condé against Turenne at Valenciennes gives new encouragement to the Spaniards. The war revives, and Mazarin is obliged after all to invoke the Protector.

The result is an offensive and defensive alliance signed at Paris on March 23rd, 1657. Its object is the conquest from Spain of the three maritime towns, Gravelines, Mar-dike and Dunkirk; for this purpose France is to furnish twenty thousand men, England six thousand men and a fleet.

Such is the definite shape which Cromwell's policy ultimately assumes. It bears always the same marked character. Among the many wars which England has waged in the same region it would be difficult to name any which has been more purely aggressive. The avowed

object of this enterprise is that England may acquire for herself the town of Dunkirk, a town which has not been hers before, and which seems intended to be a starting-point for further designs.

This treaty consummated at the same time a very violent change of English policy. In the abstract Spain might be a more strongly Catholic Power than France, but since the days of Charles I and his French queen France had been the great Catholic enemy to the Protestant party of England and had been almost identified with the Stuarts. Spain on the other hand had sincerely opposed the Stuart interest ever since the affair of Oquendo's fleet, and had nursed the good will of the Commonwealth with the utmost care. In the course of 1655—6 these relations were gradually reversed. As Cromwell was restoring monarchy at home, so he restored the international relations of the Monarchy. The new war with Spain revived Elizabethan times, and the new alliance with France called to mind the alliance of Elizabeth with Henry and the marriage of Charles with the daughter of Henry. It laid a foundation upon which the later Stuarts built, though they built a very different fabric, as in domestic policy also we find them more than once improving the Protector's hints.

But at the outset great confusion was produced. Both Cromwell in England and Mazarin in France raised new difficulties against themselves. The former had to face a convulsion in the world of English trade, the consequence of the reprisals he had provoked from the Spanish Government. Mazarin on the other hand created a ferment in French public opinion, which he would willingly have avoided, by giving his hand to the successful rebel, the Protestant Protector, and at the same time by abandoning

the cause of a French princess and the honour of the French royal family at a moment when royalism in France was just winning its victory over the republican movement. The disturbance extended further than mere opinion. It altered the position of the exiled English Court, and furnished it with a new opportunity. So long as it had been sheltered by the French Government, which was bent upon keeping the peace with the Protector, it had been unable to take any public action against him. But now that it was thrown into the arms of Spain, and Spain was at war with Cromwell, it became free to act. Charles II, who had long resided at Cologne, now transferred himself to Bruges, to be near his friends in England. Spain, through the same ambassador Cardenas who had so long courted the Protector, now concluded a treaty with Charles Stuart by which it promised to aid him with 6000 men in an invasion of England.

Some time before this revolution of policy the acquisition by England of a continental seaport town had been under discussion. It had been a question whether she should acquire Dunkirk by joining France or Calais by joining Spain. Now however that Cromwell found himself at war with Spain he began to have an additional reason for coveting Dunkirk. Dunkirk began to wear a threatening aspect, as the harbour from which Charles Stuart's expedition favoured by Spain was likely to set sail. The alliance of March 1657 therefore, though so strikingly aggressive, has a defensive aspect at the same time.

And thus in the course of 1656 the policy of the Protectorate assumes a new and final shape. While we contemplated it from a distance we were able to distinguish two broad phases in it, a phase of peace with the

Netherlands and then a phase of war with Spain. This latter phase too, contemplated from a distance, might seem Elizabethan. We see now more phases than two, and the phases are less simple. Cromwell is a sort of chameleon; his attitude and policy are ever on the change. This versatility is a feature of his domestic policy, so that what we loosely call the Protectorate is in fact four or five different governments, the government of a Lord-General with an Assembly of Puritan Notables, the Protectorate under the Instrument of government, Imperialism by means of the Major-Generals, Royalty under the Petition and Advice, and something further which died in the birth with the death of Cromwell himself. In foreign policy too he is a chameleon. Between the peace with Holland and the war with Spain we have now discerned another phase, the policy of the warlike Protestant League. This, we have seen, threatened Spain and France alike, and was by no means Elizabethan, but rather was compounded out of the continental policy of Gustavus Adolphus and the maritime policy of Sir Walter Ralegh. But the chameleon took a new colour in 1656, when the disaster in St Domingo had taken place, when Cromwell found himself, contrary perhaps to his calculation, at war with the Spanish Monarchy, and this now enters into active relations with Charles Stuart.

His policy now enters upon a new phase which may more justly be called Elizabethan. It corresponds to the phase of his domestic policy in which he tried to turn his Protectorate into a Royalty. When he met Parliament in September 1656 he evidently hoped to find a new basis for his authority in the great national war, waged at the same time against the Catholic enemy, upon whose defeat Elizabeth had founded the greatness of England, and against the Stuart. It might indeed have seemed a hopeless task

to turn the pure military imperialism of 1655 into a royalty purely civilian and pacific; but who shall say that the transition could not be made under cover of a great national war, in which the Lamberts and Fleetwoods might be compensated by commands in the Netherlands for the Major-Generalships they would be required to resign?

At least the tradition of hostility to Spain, Popery and the Inquisition might be used for the purpose of reconciling the people to commercial losses and inducing them to found a new dynasty, which should be, like the dynasty of Wasa, characteristically Protestant. And for this purpose it was advantageous for Cromwell that the rival House should have been driven into the arms of the national enemy.

These great designs were frustrated in two years by his death. In the meanwhile English Policy had been launched upon a new course, and the years 1655, 1656, witnessed a transition in our international history.

The War of Cromwell has a maritime and also a continental side. Our sea-king, Blake, *immensi tremor Oceani*, rode the waves again, but, what was more novel, the renowned army which had raised Cromwell himself to power now landed on the Continent, to measure itself against the Spanish infantry, against Condé and his Frondeurs, and against the English exiles. But for Cromwell's death this new beginning might have proved a rudiment of something great. The Military State was seen to advance majestically both by sea and land, but it was secretly undermined. It had but time to make one land conquest, and then disappeared. England remained a great and active maritime Power, but abdicated the position she had newly acquired in Europe.

For us at this distance of time to enter into plans which were so imperfectly realised is not easy. We see a great maritime war with Spain; we see a second great period in the history of the English navy. As Blake succeeds to Drake, so Cromwell seems to revive the policy of Elizabeth. But, not to repeat that Elizabeth's policy was defensive, whereas Cromwell's was aggressive, this view takes account only of one half of Cromwell's policy. While Elizabeth pointedly refused, under the strongest temptations, to be drawn into continental schemes, Cromwell went out of his way to form such schemes, entered upon them with energy, had conspicuous success in them, and may be supposed to have intended to pursue them much further. He acquired Dunkirk; what would he have done with Dunkirk, had he lived ten years longer? This question may suffice to show us the wide difference between Cromwell and Elizabeth, between the Military State and the Insular State.

From the meeting of Parliament in 1656 till Cromwell's death just two years later we see the steady ripening, and then the sudden decay, of a great national and Protestant monarchy in England. It is founded on a grand war, at once national and religious, against the Spanish Monarchy, with which now, most happily for Cromwell, the Stuarts are in alliance. He has reason to hope that in this war he may rally the whole nation round him, satisfy the army, and, pending the settlement of his difficulties with Parliament, obtain money by seizing the treasure-fleets of Spain. The design may be read in his speech of September 17th, 1656, 'You are at war with Spain....The Spaniard is your enemy, naturally and providentially, by reason of that enmity that is in him against whatever is of God....If you make any peace with any State that is Popish and subject

to the rule of Rome, *you* are bound and *they* are loose. We have not now to do [i.e., we are not now in alliance] with any Popish state except France; and it is certain they do not think themselves under such a tie to the Pope. Spain is the root of the matter; that is the party that brings all your enemies before you; for Spain hath now espoused that interest which you have all along hitherto been conflicting with—Charles Stuart's interest...with whom he is fully in agreement...And truly Spain hath an interest in your bowels; for the Papists in England have been accounted, ever since I was born, Spaniolised. They never regarded France; Spain was their patron.'

The war itself has two phases. As it began in the West Indies, so it continues for some time to be mainly maritime, but in the latter part of 1657 it becomes also continental. In 1658 a Puritan army stands in the Low Countries, and the Military State of England interposes between Bourbon and Habsburg as Sweden had done in Cromwell's youth.

Of the former or maritime phase the principal events are as follows:—

A fleet under Blake and Montague sailed for Cadiz. Against Spain it accomplished nothing, but it proceeded to Lisbon, and there compelled the founder of the new Portuguese Monarchy, João IV, now at the very close of his reign, to ratify his treaty with England. The understanding between England and Portugal, which was to last so long because it enabled either Power to balance Spain in the Oceanic world, begins here.

In October 1656 a squadron of this fleet, which had been left behind at Cadiz, under Captain Richard Stayner, fell in with a treasure-fleet of eight sail, and succeeded in destroying part of it and in capturing two ships with a considerable treasure.

In April 1657 Blake discovered the Spanish silver fleet in the harbour of Santa Cruz in the island of Teneriffe. He attacked and destroyed it, his greatest achievement and perhaps the most surprising naval achievement of that age. The Spaniards however succeeded in rescuing the silver.

Thus the fortune of the Protector did not desert him and the reputation of his government continued to rise. But Santa Cruz was Blake's last exploit. He died in August as his ship entered the harbour of Plymouth.

As 1657 is the great naval year, so is 1658 the year of victory by land, for the Military State.

How many times have English troops fought in the Low Countries in order to defend or to rescue that territory from the French! We are now to see English troops fighting in the Low Countries by the side of the French in order to partition the territory between England and France.

Three thousand soldiers under Reynolds were landed at Boulogne between May 18 and 24, were reviewed by Louis XIV at Montreuil, and joined the army of Turenne near St Quentin about June 11. On June 21 Turenne writes to Mazarin, 'I have seen the English; they are the finest troops possible.'

A great transition of European affairs was about to take place—so much was evident—but the nature of it was by no means clearly indicated by what next took place. The alliance of England and France had a great triumph in the summer of 1658, and of this triumph the most significant feature appeared to be that the British Military State, which already ruled the Ocean, now took fast hold of the European Continent. Cromwell, who went so far beyond Elizabeth, now drew our state out of that insularity to which Elizabeth had condemned it

when she submitted to the loss of Calais. The Protestant League still seemed to prosper, though it had been compelled to accept the aid of France. In concert with Sweden, courted by De Witt's government in Holland, in close intercourse with the Protestant Cantons, victorious on the Ocean, and now at last firmly planted in Flanders, Cromwell seemed a much more powerful person than Mazarin, and the triumph of 1658 seemed likely to prove the commencement of a universal ascendancy of England. But the appearance was delusive. The transition which now took place established the ascendancy not of England, but of France; it opens the '*Siecle de Louis XIV.*'

Now that we are led back to continental affairs we must take note of certain great events which happened at this juncture and which hastened on the universal change.

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the offensive treaty by Cromwell and Mazarin, on April 2nd, 1657, the Emperor Ferdinand III died. This was the prince who in his early days had turned the tide of the German war against Sweden and in favour of Austria by his victory of Nordlingen, and who had afterwards made the Treaty of Westphalia. The first demise of an Emperor after the Thirty Years' War was a most momentous event, and we are to observe that the vacancy continued for fifteen months. How would Cromwell, as the head of the Protestant interest, regard this vacancy? Would he not at least wish that it should not be filled by a Habsburg, the head of the Catholic interest in Germany, the cousin of his own enemy, the King of Spain? And so far the wish of Cromwell would be in agreement with the wish of Mazarin. But Mazarin would also have a positive wish. By the Treaty of Westphalia his own master Louis XIV had

taken, as guarantor, a place in the Germanic system almost equal to that held by the Austrian prince. Why should not the young king of France become a competitor with the young king of Hungary and Bohemia for the votes of the Electoral College? Why should not the Emperor Ferdinand be succeeded by the Emperor Louis?

But at least it seemed that the moment had arrived for bringing to an end the greatness of the House of Habsburg. While England and France in alliance humbled the Spanish branch in Flanders the Austrian branch might be deprived of the Imperial Crown. For a moment this latter result seemed certain to happen. Not only were France, England and Sweden opposed to the Austrian candidate, but the ecclesiastical princes of the Rhine, upon whom Austria usually depended, were at this time opposed to him. The Elector John Philip of Mainz (known later as a patron of Leibnitz) with his active minister Boineburg headed a party which favoured a purely German and more insignificant candidate, some Bavarian or Palatine prince.

It was therefore a surprising event that the Austrian candidate, Leopold Ignatius, king of Hungary, was after all elected in July, 1658, and so a new period of Austrian ascendency in Germany began. The explanation of this is to be found in that incurable discord among the Protestant Powers which all along had grieved the soul of Cromwell. His young hero, Charles Gustavus of Sweden, disappointed his hopes. Had Charles Gustavus proved indeed a new Gustavus Adolphus, or rather had he answered to that idealised conception of Gustavus Adolphus which dwelt in the mind of Cromwell, the year 1658 might have witnessed the downfall of the House of Habsburg and the victory of the Reformation along the whole line. But

the policy of Charles Gustavus was not religious, it was purely national. Instead of resuming he deliberately abandoned the German schemes of Gustavus Adolphus. He does not concern himself about the Protestant interest in Germany or in Europe at large, but sees before him only the two ancient enemies of his House, the king of Poland (with Russia in the background) and the king of Denmark. He begins a War of the North which from 1655 to 1660 rages by the side of the war of Cromwell and Mazarin just as later Charles XII's campaigns run parallel to those of Marlborough and Eugene. But in this war he takes his own course, which by no means corresponds to the course of Cromwell. For instead of uniting he divides in a most serious manner the Protestant interest. He attacks Denmark, a Protestant state, and wins victories which alarm the Protestant Netherlands and Cromwell himself lest Sweden should succeed in closing the Baltic; at the same time his victories over Poland are most alarming and embarrassing to the other great Protestant prince of the North, the Great Elector. The latter finds himself surrounded and hemmed in by Swedish power. He seems about to exchange a nominal vassalage to Poland for a most real vassalage to the Swedish conqueror who has the Polish state, if not the whole Baltic coast, at his mercy.

Cromwell's Pan Evangelical system, if we may call it so, was frustrated by the fact that the Great Elector was driven into the arms of Catholic Austria by this threatening inroad from Sweden. Cromwell just lived to see the election of Leopold decided by the vote of a Protestant Elector and the ascendancy of the Austrian House in Germany secured at a most critical moment for almost another century.

Mazarin's views were somewhat different from Cromwell's. It does not appear that he had very seriously endeavoured to procure the election of the king of France, but to exclude the Austrian had seemed to him essential, because so long as the Empire was under Austrian influence it would favour and aid the Spanish Power with which he was at war. Now therefore he resorted to another measure intended to guard in another way against this danger. He became a model to that other Italian who was to guide the policy of France in a later age. He created a Confederation of the Rhine. Out of the German party by means of which he had hoped to exclude Leopold he now composed a League, the nominal object of which was to guard the Treaty of Westphalia and so to prevent a reunion of the two branches of the House of Habsburg.

The election of Leopold occurred on July 18th. The act of the Confederation of the Rhine was signed by the three ecclesiastical Electors and some other German princes on August 14th; France adhered to it on the 15th.

In the summer months of 1658 great international events were crowded together. For just before these German occurrences, viz. on June 14th, a decisive event had occurred in Flanders, and soon after them, on September 3rd, another decisive event occurred at Whitehall,

The battle of the Dunes was won by Turenne near Dunkirk on June 14th. A few days later Dunkirk surrendered. It was solemnly entered by Louis XIV, and then in accordance with the treaty handed over to the English. Colonel Lockhart took possession of it for Cromwell on June 25th. Mardyke had been in English possession since October 1657.

These military occurrences were of inexpressible importance. At the battle of the Dunes the duc of France

and Spain, which had begun twenty-three years earlier, and had been the great war of Europe for the last ten years, was decided. The Treaty of the Pyrenees was the consequence of it, and by the Treaty of the Pyrenees it may be said that the greatness of the Spanish Monarchy was brought to an end.

It was a great triumph for France, and already the age of Louis XIV begins to exhibit its splendid features. The young king appeared in all his glory to take possession of Dunkirk. It had been difficult to restrain his martial ardour while the military operations proceeded, and when they were over it was quite impossible! ‘He wore a splendid military dress, and rode a noble white charger; never in the opinion of the court had he borne himself so proudly and grandly. M. de Bassecourt bowed the knee to him and said with a respectful reverence that he had but one consolation in his misfortune of having been unable to hold out longer, and that was that he had the honour of surrendering the place personally into the hands of so great a prince’¹.

Louis plays his part well, and the victory had been won by a French army commanded by Turenne. But at this moment the great man of the age was Cromwell, and it might appear that he gained more by the victory than Louis or than Mazarin.

Cromwell’s arms had met with a reverse in St Domingo three years before, and his position at home might often seem extremely precarious. But now he was seen on the morrow of Blake’s great naval victory taking a share in the decisive battle of the age and giving back to England by the acquisition of Dunkirk the continental position which she had lost just a century before when she lost Calais.

¹ *Gazette de France*, quoted by Bourelly (*Cromwell et Mazarin*, p. 232).

At the battle of the Dunes the English battalions, under the command of Lockhart and Morgan, had carried a dune against the Spaniards with conspicuous gallantry. A Spanish officer wrote that 'the English came on like wild beasts and that there was no resisting them'¹. This was in itself a great triumph for Cromwell and his Military State, but he had also the satisfaction of having driven the royalist party into the arms of the enemies of England. In the motley force which was defeated at the Dunes were to be found, fighting by the side of Don Juan, not only the great Condé, but also two Stuart princes, the Duke of York and the Duke of Gloucester.

From the domestic point of view Cromwell's power may seem in these last months of his life to have sunk to a very low ebb. The royal Protectorate had broken down; the Other House had proved a failure. He had dissolved Parliament, apparently in the blind petulance of despair. What could he do next? It may be, it has been held, that nothing but an opportune death saved him from ignominious ruin.

But looked at from the European point of view Cromwell's power had never been so immensely great as at this very moment. A Military State can find resources in war itself, as Sweden was showing in that very age. It is possible that the Battle of the Dunes, used as Cromwell would know how to use it, would have proved a turning-point in English history, a starting-point for the Protestant and Military Monarchy of Great Britain in the House of Cromwell. But this battle was fought in June and in September occurred the death of Oliver Cromwell.

Precisely a century had passed since the death of Queen Mary. And now in 1658 the situation of foreign affairs

¹ Bourelly, *op. cit.* p. 200.

was in some respects strikingly similar to the situation in 1558. England was again concerned in a war on the coast of Flanders. The same local names were again in men's mouths. At that time there had been a battle of Gravelines, and now again Gravelines was besieged and taken. At that time a great decisive battle between France and Spain had been fought at St Quentin in which the English force had distinguished itself, and which had been speedily followed by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. Precisely parallel is the decisive battle of the Dunes, which led to the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

These resemblances put in a striking light the great difference, namely, that in 1558 England aided Spain, while now she aids France. It is indeed true that as the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis founded that great complex Spanish Monarchy of which we have traced the history in this book, so the Treaty of the Pyrenees brought it to an end, and that England played a similar part then in establishing, and now in overthrowing, it.

But we seem to see another grand difference, which however proved transitory.

The policy of Queen Mary in assisting Philip was un-English and disastrous, and the immediate result of it was the loss of Calais and humiliation for England. The policy of Cromwell in assisting Louis XIV greatly raised the reputation of England, and the immediate result of it was the acquisition of Dunkirk. And indeed had Cromwell's power at home rested on a firm basis, or had he lived to turn his triumph to good account, an age might have opened for England if not of happiness, yet of vast greatness and ascendancy.

But as the death of Cromwell followed immediately, and as his Military State speedily crumbled away, his

European policy had in the end a result not very unlike that to which the policy of Mary had led. Dunkirk was lost again, and with it went all the great possibilities that depended on its possession. And as Mary had helped to found the ascendancy of Spain, so it was soon visible that Cromwell had merely founded an ascendancy of France. England retires into her insularity, and becomes once more comparatively a peaceful Power, while from this moment the greatness of France, which had been under eclipse since 1648, shines forth again, and the Roi-Soleil enters upon his long day of glory.

It is more natural to compare Cromwell to Queen Elizabeth than to Queen Mary. Elizabeth and Cromwell round off a complete century of policy ; they also stand out in strong contrast to the feeble politicians that came between them. Both confronted foreign Powers with a high courage; both gave England a high place among the Powers of Europe. And yet in one capital point they are sharply contrasted.

In Elizabeth, as we saw, action is at a *minimum*. She faces the world bravely, but she *does* as little as possible. By good fortune she enjoys a reign of forty-four years, in which all old wounds are healed, a sense of contentment and rest grows upon the minds of the people, and a deep and broad foundation is laid upon which immense things have since been built.

Cromwell is in this respect in the other extreme. He is the most audacious and original statesman we have had, but, as he began late and ended soon, too little time was allowed him. By far the greater part of his work perished with him, and yet it would not be fair to say that this fact stamps his work as unsound. Nor is it fair to charge upon

him some bad results which flowed from his policy. He laid a daring plan which he was not allowed to execute. What he left was a mere fragment, which it is not equitable to estimate as if it were a complete work.

Had five more years been granted to him, it seems possible that his triumphs abroad might have relieved him of his domestic difficulties. In this case he would have founded, as we said, a great Protestant and Military Monarchy which would have been as powerful as the Spanish Monarchy had been at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Dunkirk would have been a new starting-point for his Protestant League. There would have been new military enterprises which would have afforded occupation for his puritan army, and new triumphs which would have reconciled the people to a military domination, especially as they would have been triumphs on the one side for Protestantism, on the other side for Toleration. As Queen Christina said, he would have been the Gustavus Wasa of Great Britain.

We may most reasonably doubt whether such a result would have been in the long run happy for the country. English history would have been rolled into another course. Monarchy would have been restored on a new, a military basis, which would have given us glory and ascendancy instead of liberty and wealth. These results, good or evil, good and evil, would have been fairly chargeable upon Cromwell.

What actually happened was the result not of Cromwell's policy alone, but partly of that policy and partly of the policy which was substituted for it after the sudden and disastrous downfall of the Protectorate. Cromwell acted on the presumption that England had a powerful standing army, in discipline and tone the best army in the world

and also that England had a strong and determined government, which was in one way or another to be held independent of Parliament. He had been accustomed through life to leave much to Providence, but Providence, which had favoured his personal enterprises, suddenly withdrew its support. The strong Government disappeared, the strong army vanished with it. The Military State fell.

PART IV.

THE SECOND REACTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE RESTORATION AND CHARLES II.

THE expression ‘Growth of British Policy’ is intended to describe a series of changes, tentatives, or developments, through which British Policy arrived at its maturity, that is, at a fixed condition. This fixed condition may be said to have been reached about the time of Queen Anne, when by the union of England and Scotland our policy became definitely British instead of merely English, when it also assumed its predominantly commercial character, when its characteristic machinery, the Debt, the Bank, the Standing Army were in full play, and public opinion, expressed through Parliament, took the place of dynastic interest in foreign relations. From this time our policy has continued through all variation of circumstances to be the same in object and in spirit. The agency which thus brought our foreign policy to maturity was the same as

that which rendered the same service to our domestic constitution—it was the agency of William of Orange.

At the point which we have now reached, when the second of our three heroes, Oliver Cromwell, quits the scene, William, the last of the trio, is a child of eight years, and thirty years are to pass before he strikes the great stroke which is to cut so many knots at once. It remains for us to review the period between 1658 and 1688 and to cast a glance upon the new state of things which resulted gradually from the Revolution.

But as at the beginning of this Essay, when we dealt with the period before the accession of Elizabeth, so now when we come in sight of the end, we shall sketch somewhat more slightly than while we dealt with the century which is opened by Elizabeth and closed by Cromwell. The general course of development has by this time been clearly marked, and the reader will half anticipate the stages which remain to be traversed. It will be comparatively easy to show how the old state of things passed away, and as to the state of things which took its place after the Revolution, that cannot be completely described in this book. A complete description of it belongs less properly to the last chapters of a work on the seventeenth, than to the earlier chapters of a work on the eighteenth, century.

We have seen in general a dynastic policy giving way to a national. Elizabeth by refraining from marriage snaps all the dynastic threads which might have hindered the free expansion of the national interest. Then follows a reaction under the earlier Stuarts, during which a new dynastic web is woven. This again is violently broken by the establishment of the Commonwealth, and Cromwell lays on a grand scale the foundation of a national policy.

Under him the modern British Empire appears for the first time in a transient form.

Foreign writers have been more struck than English historians with this particular achievement of Cromwell. Ranke finds it to be his 'chief merit that he ruled the British kingdoms for a succession of years on a uniform principle and united their forces in common efforts.' He adds: 'it is true that this was not the final award of history; things were yet to arrange themselves in a very different fashion. But it was necessary perhaps that the main outlines should be shaped by the absolute authority of a single will, in order that in the future a free life might develope within them.' This view of Cromwell, though little familiar to English people, is so fully accepted in Germany that Mommsen in estimating the work of the Roman Sulla, which he remarks was indeed ephemeral yet a great and necessary work of unification, pronounces that 'the founder of Italian unity deserves a place below indeed, yet not much below that of Cromwell.'

Under Cromwell the union of the three kingdoms was for the moment realised, and as the country chanced to have not only a powerful fleet but also a disciplined army and a habit of war, the new Britain took the lead of all states, and seemed on the point of succeeding to the ascendancy so recently forfeited by Spain. At this moment Cromwell died, and forthwith the prospects of Britain were altered.

Before entering into detail, we can perceive at once some of the larger results of Cromwell's death, and we are now prepared roughly to interpret the well-known events of the next age so far as they bear upon British Policy.

There was after all to be no new dynasty of the Swedish type, founded upon Protestantism, directing a Protestant

League in Europe, and carrying Protestantism over all the seas and over all the American Continent. The old dynasty would be recalled.

This implied by itself a certain restoration of the dynastic system. True that the House of Cromwell also would have acquired in time dynastic interests, that its princes and princesses would have allied themselves with foreign royal houses and would have acquired foreign claims, as the House of Wasa had done, for example, in Poland. But the process would have been slow, and so for many years after 1658 England would have been as free from foreign entanglements as in the days of Queen Elizabeth. On the other hand the restored Stuarts were themselves almost Frenchmen, half Frenchmen by blood, and French too by the habits acquired in their long exile. Moreover they were likely speedily to make themselves still more foreign by marriage.

Accordingly, as we traced a dynastic reaction after the death of Elizabeth, we may expect to find a second similar reaction after the death of Oliver. And it is likely to be intenser, since the restored Stuarts were much more intensely foreign and also more tainted from the beginning with Catholicism than James I and Charles I had been.

We can also see beforehand the immense importance of that child who is growing up at the Hague. The House of Cromwell has failed to establish itself. The House of Stuart has become by this time too French and too much disposed to Catholicism to adapt itself permanently to the new national life which has been awakened in England by the Commonwealth. But the child at the Hague is also a Stuart on the mother's side, and on the father's side he is at least not French; he is the next thing to an Englishman, he is a Dutchman. And as to religion, what name

in all Europe is more proudly identified with Protestantism than that which he bears, the name of Orange? Without any supernatural gift of prophecy it might have been foretold at the time of the Restoration that the perplexities of the English question could only be solved by William of Orange. *Ille faciet*, might have been said of him, as it was said by King Charles of Sweden of the boy Gustavus Adolphus. It would have been more natural to expect too much than too little from William, for it might have seemed probable that he would found an Orange dynasty in England, to last through the eighteenth century, and to unite permanently the Netherlands to Great Britain.

This preliminary survey of the age we are now to consider shows it falling into three periods. We first see the House of Stuart superseding the House of Cromwell, and, as the restoration of Charles was effected in a peaceable manner and amid general enthusiasm, there could not but follow a period of reconciliation between the dynasty and the people. Then begins a new breach. The Stuarts adopt a new system more congenial to their French ways of thinking. Hence we have a new revolutionary period which ends with the expulsion of James II. But the English Revolution is not the brief struggle it is often represented to be. It is a long convulsion, and for ten years, from 1678 to 1688, it had almost the character of a Reign of Terror. The commencement of it however is earlier still. It may be placed in 1670, at the date of the Treaty of Dover. Thus we have three periods, the first extending from 1658 to 1670, the second from 1670 to 1688, and the third extending from the arrival of William to the consolidation of his system.

These three periods we shall now consider in a somewhat summary manner. We shall treat of the reaction

which followed the death of Cromwell, first the comparatively mild reaction of the early years of the Restoration, then the intense reaction introduced by the Treaty of Dover. We shall then consider in what way William III contrived to reconcile the ancient English Monarchy to the national system of policy which had first been founded by Cromwell upon the ruins of the ancient English Monarchy.

We know that Cromwell's system died with him, but from this we ought scarcely to infer that it was radically unsound and only practicable for a moment through the exceptional energy of a great man. The juster view seems to be that it was a system which might have become permanent, had the founder of it been allowed a few more years of life. The House of Cromwell might have reigned in Britain as long as the House of Wasa in Sweden had Oliver reached his term of threescore years and ten and been succeeded, let us say, by Henry instead of Richard. In that case we should have seen a dynasty resembling the Tudors rather than the Stuarts. We should have seen a Protestant Monarchy of a highly military and ambitious type, resting on three massive foundation-stones, the standing army, the Protestant religion, and the principle of toleration. As Oliver died and Richard could not support the burden of his succession, what alternatives were open to the country? Two forms of government had been found equally wanting. The old Monarchy, as administered by Charles I, had been found wanting, but those experiments, which had taken the name of Republic, had failed still more completely. While the Army, possessing, if not right, at least might, showed itself able to create something, the mutilated Parliament, possessing neither might nor right, afraid equally of the

people on one side and of the army on the other, had failed in '53, and now in '59 failed again.

There appeared to be only two paths by which the country could make its way back to a stable condition of things.

One lay through a restoration of the ancient system, under which the country had been glorious in the last years of Elizabeth, prosperous and happy in the first years of James. King and Parliament might now be reconciled, each being wiser and sadder than in the time of their mortal struggle, each having learned that King could not stand without Parliament nor Parliament without King.

At the same time it could not but strike Charles Stuart at least that another course was open, a course which to him personally would be preferable. Cromwell's new system had in many respects succeeded not less well than the old system of Elizabeth. It had been discovered that the country might be governed gloriously without the help of its ancient constitution. To learn the dead enchanter's spell might be difficult, but if occasion should serve, or if the other plan should fail, or threaten to fail, it was always worth while to remember how marvellous had been its operation, and it could not be forgotten that the most potent words in that spell had been 'Religious Toleration' and 'Standing Army.' We grasp perhaps the clue to the policy of the later Stuarts when we remark that they had always before their minds the splendid success of Cromwell. The Monarch of the Restoration would naturally desire to succeed to the mighty power of the Protector rather than to the feebleness of Charles I, or if he could not actually take over the position of Cromwell he would desire at least to engrave the Protectorate on the ancient Monarchy. And indeed it is the most obvious characteristic of the policy of

Charles II and James II that they try to appropriate to the Monarchy the advantages to be derived from religious toleration and from a standing army.

But while they have two rival examples for imitation, their father and the Protector, the influences and circumstances of their exile contribute more perhaps than any imitation to shape their policy. They have lived for years in dependence on foreign courts, especially the court of France. To the French court they are bound not merely by obligation but by family connexion and by the powerful influence of their mother. From the beginning she had observed English politics with the eyes of a Catholic and a daughter of Henry IV. She had seen her brother and her nephew establish absolute monarchy in conflict with turbulent factions and with Parliaments. Of this absolute monarchy the foundation had been laid by her father when he made his great recantation. Her own Catholic feeling was intensely strong. By her counsels and by their own observation of the fall of the Fronde Charles and James would be led to think of establishing rather an absolute and military than a parliamentary monarchy in England. At the same time they formed the habit of depending on the French court for money. And lastly they received a strong bias towards Catholicism.

There was one point of resemblance between Henry IV and Cromwell—religious toleration—for Henry IV was the author of the Edict of Nantes. It was natural therefore that the restored Stuarts, studying Cromwell on the one side and the Bourbon Monarchy on the other, should form a vague scheme of establishing in England a monarchy similar to that of Louis XIV by means of religious toleration. Such is the dream which floats before the mind both of Charles II and James II.

In foreign, even more than in domestic, policy the Monarchy of the Restoration must have been attracted by the example of Cromwell. He had put Great Britain in the very front rank of states, whereas under Charles I the English Government had been held in slight regard alike by Habsburg and the Bourbon. When on Cromwell's death Charles began to look forward to restoration he expected to take his seat not on his father's throne but on the first throne in Europe. But the prospect was at the moment as embarrassing as it was attractive. Cromwell's foreign policy had been wholly novel, and it had forced Charles Stuart into a position which was strange, false, and most perplexing. His family connexions attached him to France; a French alliance and a French marriage summed up the foreign policy to which both his mother and himself would have been naturally inclined. But Cromwell, reversing the foreign relations of the Commonwealth, had, as it were, taken violent possession of France. Accordingly at the moment of Cromwell's death Charles Stuart found himself on the side of Spain, residing in Spanish territory and sending his brothers and his followers into the field against the armies of the French king, his cousin Louis XIV.

From such a position it would require some agility to vault into the saddle which Cromwell now vacated, to take up Cromwell's French alliance and his war of conquest against Spain. Charles could indeed without much difficulty disentangle himself from that extremely close connexion with the Spanish cause into which he had latterly been driven; and so we see him in April, 1660, taking a somewhat hurried flight from Brussels, that is from the dominions of Philip IV, and establishing himself at Breda, from which Dutch town he issued the Declaration which was preliminary to his restoration. But altogether to

change sides, to pass over to France and to become an enemy to Spain—this was a doubtful and difficult policy. It was indeed agreeable to his own personal inclination so far as he was a Frenchman, nor could he think of inaugurating his reign by giving back Jamaica and Dunkirk to the Spaniard. At the same time war with Spain was unpopular in the commercial world of England, and Cromwell's policy as a whole was too essentially Protestant to suit a prince who had such close relations with Catholicism.

All these thoughts might have passed through the mind of Charles at the moment of receiving the news of Cromwell's death. In a year and a half from that time his position was defined by the particular manner in which his Restoration was accomplished. That he would be restored in some way had appeared extremely probable from the moment of the fall of the rival dynasty in the person of Richard. But between April, 1659, and May, 1660, it was decided by what parties and in what way he should be restored, a question upon which depended the position he would hold after his restoration.

Three modes of restoration, wholly distinct, were conceivable, besides various combinations of these three modes.

1. He might step at once into the place of Richard Cromwell, and so convert the Protectorate, which in Oliver's time had grown visibly more and more like a Monarchy, once for all into a Monarchy.

2. As the fall of Richard and the confusion which followed betrayed the failure of the whole revolutionary movement, Charles might return as a conqueror at the head of a foreign army, welcomed and supported by the whole royalist party of England, which would now force its way back to political power.

3. The Restoration might be accomplished wholly without the aid either of the party of the Protectorate or of the royalist party and of foreign Powers. It might be the work of that parliamentary party which had conducted the war with Charles I, intending only to reduce, not at all to destroy, the power of the Monarchy, and which at the moment when it seemed about to complete its work had been overwhelmed by the military insurrection.

By the first of these modes of Restoration Charles II would be a direct successor of Oliver, supplying the want of Oliver's personal genius by the legitimacy and splendour of the ancient Monarchy.

By the second he would take the place of his father, as his father would have been if immediately after the arrival of the Queen in 1644 he had won a great victory over the armies of the Parliament and so had crushed the rebellion.

By the third he would take the place of his father as his father would have been if the Treaty of Newport had been carried to a successful conclusion, with this exception that, while he would have made great concessions to the Parliament, he would at the same time have taken his seat on the throne not as a defeated but rather as a victorious Monarch.

In personal character Charles resembles his grandfather Henry IV, deducting the heroism and the inexhaustible energy. He resembles him particularly in the easy cheerful indifference to principle which had enabled Henry to be at one time leader of the Huguenots and at another to put himself at the head of the Catholic revival, while he shamed both Churches equally by his unbounded profligacy. In like manner Charles, son of the martyr of Anglicanism, had at one time taken the Covenant, and later on meditated putting himself at the head of the Catholic party.

It is not therefore impossible to conceive him succeeding Cromwell as the head of the military party, as we know that there had been at one time a serious negociation between this party and Charles I. When in the summer of 1659 the antagonism between Parliament and Army once more showed itself, the question rose again whether the Military State might not be saved at the last moment by the aid of the ancient Monarchy. In that case Charles would have appeared as Cromwell's successor, master of a great army, inheritor of the leadership of the Protestant party in Europe, and probably no religious or moral scruples would have caused him to hesitate. It seems possible that Lambert brooded over this idea. But it was a chimera, as Cromwell himself had found it to be a chimera in 1647. Even if Charles and Lambert could have come to terms, the party behind Lambert, the army, and the party behind Charles, the royalists, the Catholics and the followers of the Queen, could never have consented to so unnatural a coalition.

That it was impossible was a most momentous fact, for it caused the fall of the Military State. If the Army could not make the Restoration in its own interest, nothing remained but that the Army should be disbanded, and England, deprived of her redoubted army, must resign at once her position at the head of the states of Europe.

While Lambert perhaps meditated the first mode, the second mode of Restoration, that by a rising of the Royalists aided by foreign troops, was rashly attempted in August, 1659. In Surrey and Sussex, in Sherwood Forest, in Lancashire and Cheshire, the royalists rose. It is important to remark how much at this moment they depended upon French aid. Turenne was prepared to carry the Duke of York over to England and to furnish him with troops

and artillery. We see here the first outline of a policy to which the House of Stuart was henceforth to accustom itself more and more. This same Duke of York, how often in later life, when he was known as James II, would he crave help from Louis XIV! And, long after both Charles II and James II and Louis XIV himself had disappeared, Stuart Pretenders were to lean on France. As Turenne meditates an invasion of England in 1659, Saxe more than eighty years later designs to bring over from the Low Countries Charles Edward, the grandson of James II.

We see from Mazarin's letters to Turenne how he regarded English affairs at this conjuncture. On September 8th he writes, 'As to the affairs of England I am in some anxiety about the possible consequences of the resolution you have thought it right to take for the reasons you give, since...prudence compels us always equally to distrust those who have ever been considered irreconcileable enemies of France (he means here the Spaniards)...It is for this reason that I have used the utmost circumspection in the answers I have been forced to give both to the Queen of England and to Mr Germain (Jermyn), Montague, and others who keep writing to beg me to induce the King to aid the King of England at this crisis. It seems to me that even if His Majesty should be convinced, as I am convinced, that a king in England would be much better than a republic, and that for other reasons we ought to concern ourselves about the justice of the said king's cause, still before committing ourselves we ought to take good care and such precautions that at least we might be assured that the King of England will be obliged to us and will be a friend to us, and especially we ought to allow time, so that there may be nothing to arrange with respect

to the conclusion of the peace between the two crowns¹ (France and Spain)’.

Once more special reasons, we see, prevented France from striking in at a most critical moment of English politics. All along Mazarin had favoured Monarchy in England; nevertheless he had been forced to allow the Commonwealth to come into existence, and latterly he had been led to form a close alliance with it. Now that it seems about to fall, he is hampered by the fact that Charles Stuart has become an enemy of France, and is actually living in Spanish territory as an ally of Spain. Before we can help to restore the King, he says, ‘we must be sure that he will be a friend to us.’ Moreover, as it chances, his hands are full. He is winding up the war of twenty-five years with Spain which he inherited from Richelieu. He is making the Treaty of the Pyrenees. An age of peace is dawning; armies are to be disbanded; it is no time for new enterprises. Least of all can any plan be entertained which might endanger or retard the pacification.

This pacification began just after the fall of Richard Cromwell by the armistice which was signed on May 8th, 1659. A preliminary treaty was signed on June 4th. Lastly on November 7th the Peace of the Pyrenees was signed in the Isle of Pheasants.

Thus the negotiation occupied the very months when the affairs of England were in the utmost confusion. One consequence of this was that England, which had had no inconsiderable share in the decisive campaign of the war, had no share in the treaty of peace, and was barely mentioned in the armistice. But another consequence was that Mazarin abstained from intervention in England. He spoke indeed warmly of the necessity of putting down

¹ Chérull *op. cit.* III, 290.

the Republic (un exemplo tan escandaloso contra las monarquias); he received indeed most eager solicitations from Charles Stuart, who appears to have offered to himself personally, and to his heirs in perpetuity, the government of Ireland¹. At the moment when the treaty was about to be signed, and when the French and Spanish Governments had begun to regard each other as friends, Charles Stuart himself arrived at Fuentarabia, had an interview with Don Louis de Haro, and contrived that Ormond should have an interview with Mazarin. He asked only 4000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, with which he hoped to suppress a scandal equally distasteful to the King of Spain and the King of France, viz. the English Republic. But both Ministers turned a deaf ear, and Mazarin contented himself with renouncing by a secret article of the treaty his treaties of 1657 and 1658 with Cromwell.

Thus no foreign aid could be obtained for the royalist insurrection, and the insurrection itself, which had been intended to be universal, and which had broken out in Cheshire under Sir G. Booth, was put down by Lambert after a short engagement at Winnington Bridge.

Restoration in the second mode was not to take place. The third mode still remained to be tried.

A deadlock was produced in the latter months of 1659 by the opposition of the Military Power and the Parliament. The former had force but no legitimacy, the latter a certain shadow—only a shadow—of legitimacy, but no force. Cromwell had half succeeded in removing this opposition; but it had now returned and become irreconcileable. A sort of equilibrium had set in which made government impossible. But by the failure of the royalist insurrection and

¹ Valfrey, *Hugues de Lionne*, p. 312.

the inaction of foreign Powers the Commonwealth still retained one power, that of recalling Charles Stuart voluntarily, and, as it were, in its own way. Charles did not return by any kind of force nor by the action of his own adherents. The royalist party remained spectators of the Restoration. It was achieved by a combination between two sections of the party hitherto opposed to the King, the presbyterian section of the parliamentary party and the section headed by Monk of the military party. Until the last moment the King was not named, and, strangely enough, the euphemistic term, adopted by those who wished to avoid the word 'King,' was 'Parliament'; men called for 'a free Parliament.'

On the other hand the enemy vanquished at the Restoration was that political Army which had invaded English politics at Pride's Purge. The grand principle asserted by Monk in the bosom of the army itself was this, that the army must be subject to the civil power. This carried with it the whole system of legitimacy, including the Monarchy.

But the Army could not thus be vanquished without being also disbanded. If Military Government were to cease the Military State itself must fall.

Thus at the very moment when the military state was acquiring an unrivalled organisation in France,—for Turenne was made Marshal-General about this time, and about this time the whole programme of Louis XIV's age was arranged,—in England on the other hand the Military State was dissolved. Charles II, when he compared himself with his cousin at Paris, must have bitterly regretted that he was condemned to a Monarchy without an army, all the more because the army had been there, and he had himself seen it melt away.

When we consider the Restored Monarchy with respect to foreign policy, we make this remark first,

That England ceases again to be a Military State. She is indeed in the full tide of victory. She has received a mighty impulse towards colonial expansion. And she will remain a great and enterprising naval Power. But in the process of forming a great army, through which she might have given the law to Europe, she has been suddenly arrested. A dread and dislike of standing armies are henceforth deeply implanted in the English mind.

But we remark also,

That the Restored Monarchy is singularly free from foreign entanglements. A King, who in his exile had been dependent on the subsidies of foreign courts, is now unexpectedly restored without foreign aid. No foreign Power had any share in the English Restoration. 'This,' says Ranke, 'is one of the most important of all *negative events*, if such an expression may be used.' For the moment it was open to Charles II, especially as he was still unmarried, to take his own course in the European politics of the day.

As the domestic aspect of the Restoration concerns us here but indirectly, we note as briefly as possible the further developement which took place necessarily as soon as the Monarchy had been reestablished, and modified even its foreign policy. By the help of the King the Parliament, as we have seen, had quelled and at last dissolved the revolutionary army. But it could not recall the King without recalling the royalist party. Charles would not this time be a Covenanting king. The Restoration, though not made by the royalists, necessarily fell into their hands, nor could the Presbyterians, who had made it, find in it even an asylum. Intended as a reaction against the military movement of 1648, it developed into a reaction against

the movement of 1642. The Act of Uniformity was passed, the Anglican Church issued victoriously from its long struggle, and the party of Falkland, led by Chancellor Clarendon, obtained control of English policy.

This change, succeeding the fall of the army, destroyed the Protestant State along with the Military State. All sympathy with foreign Protestant Churches vanished. England returned to that middle path in religion to which she had first grown accustomed under Elizabeth. While the instrument of Cromwell's European policy, the army, disappeared, his principle, his Panevangelicalism, disappeared too.

It was involved in all this that the expediency of retaining Dunkirk was called in question.

Meanwhile, monarchy being restored, royal marriage recovered the momentous importance that belonged to it in the monarchic system. Charles Stuart entered London on his thirtieth birthday. His marriage was henceforth one of the greatest political questions of the day.

The occurrences which mark the transition of British Policy from the age of Cromwell to the second Stuart period are these two, the marriage of Charles II to Catharine of Bragança and the sale of Dunkirk to the King of France.

Considered together they mark, first, the fall of the Military State together with the maintenance of the Naval and Colonial State (for Dunkirk represents Cromwell's continental plans, and this is abandoned, while the retention of Jamaica and the alliance with Portugal indicate the adoption of Cromwell's maritime policy); secondly, an ominous revival of the dynastic system. Once more after long disuse the method is revived of attaching the foreign interests of England, her commercial communi-

cations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, her relations with foreign Powers, to the marriages of the royal family.

This reaction after Cromwell reminds us of the reaction, which was considered above, after Elizabeth, the unmarried, childless, kinless Elizabeth. We have recognised however that the dynastic system, cautiously handled, might do little harm, and that in a few cases it had been known to produce splendid results; for had it not brought together Aragon and Castille, England and Scotland? The Bragança marriage might seem to afford a favourable specimen of the system; it remained for time to decide whether the second reaction would on the whole be harmless or even beneficial, or whether it would be mischievous, as the first had been, or even far more mischievous.

We obtain a sort of general formula for the period before us when we remark (1) that the later Stuarts were exposed by their dynastic position to a peculiar danger, that of being absorbed and lost in a French alliance, unnational and catholicising; (2) that at the outset the danger was both manifest and easily avoidable, the Restoration having been accomplished without French aid. Thus we distinguish two phases in the period. At first the Stuart policy is on the whole independent, at particular moments energetically independent, of France, though from the outset France exerts a strong attractive power. Then comes the phase of dependence on France, during which again opposite tendencies occasionally prevail. This phase however grows at last so decided that the Stuart king himself ends by retiring to France, where he passes his latter days as a pensionary of Louis XIV. The transition from one phase to the other is pretty clearly marked by the Treaty of Dover.

In delineating these phases we may keep almost exclusively in view the relations of England and France.

As the Stuarts ended in the dependent alliance upon France against the nation, it is notable that they began with hostility to France with the nation. Cromwell's French Alliance had not been openly brought to an end, and Charles was fresh from fighting on the side of Spain against France, when the Restoration took place. And so the first steps of his policy after the Restoration indicate hostility to France. He treats the French ambassador Bordeaux rudely, and sends him notice to quit the country, which at last on July 7th, 1660, he is forced to do. It might have seemed at this moment that Charles was about to reverse the foreign policy of Cromwell, to carry England back from the side of France to that of Spain.

Such a course was indeed open to him, and there were not wanting considerations which might recommend it. If it began to appear that Dunkirk could not be kept, and was indeed, now that the Cromwellian army was disbanded, not worth keeping, ought it not to be restored to the Power from which it had been taken, that is, to Spain? Did not English interests at the same time require that in the Low Countries France should be held in check, and was there not a danger, now that Spain had been fairly vanquished in the European war, that the tide of French aggression would sweep over Flanders to the Dutch frontier? Moreover, Cromwell's war with Spain had never been popular in England, where it interfered with trade. Upon the restoration of Dunkirk then might be founded a reconciliation with Spain which the country would welcome. It was true that a restoration of Jamaica was out of the question; still England had at that moment

much to offer which Spain at that moment could scarcely afford to refuse. The Spanish Monarchy had just confessed its decline by the Peace of the Pyrenees, and that peace itself was no peace. It might justly be called *Pax infida*, for it was an arrangement under cover of which for forty years Louis XIV preyed upon and despoiled the Spanish Monarchy until he made it a possession of his family.

Had England at this moment not only restored Dunkirk but thrown her weight into the Spanish scale, that is, had Charles married into the Spanish House and guaranteed the Low Countries against further French aggression, the aggressive policy of Louis XIV would have been checked in its commencement, and a position would have been given to England which in some respects would have suited the feelings of the nation.

The surrender of Dunkirk, not to Spain but to France, and the marriage of Charles, not into the Spanish but into the Portuguese House, mark the deliberate rejection of this policy. At the same time they mark a new understanding between the French and English governments, that is, in some respects an adoption by Charles, instead of a reversal, of the policy of the Protector.

It seems to have been by his own fault that the King of Spain lost this last chance of arresting the decline of the Spanish Monarchy. Charles II might have healed the wound that Cromwell had given, and the negociation had fairly commenced. A Spanish match for Charles II was discussed in the summer of 1660, as for his father in 1623; it was broken off in much the same way. As then the Infanta Maria was refused to Charles I, and married the Emperor Ferdinand III; so now the Emperor Leopold was preferred to Charles II for the Infanta Margaret.

But, if not into the Spanish House, Charles must marry into some House hostile to Spain, and so England, instead of protecting that monarchy against French aggression, must assist France in spoiling it. For at the moment when the Infanta was refused to Charles his hand was eagerly courted by the Portuguese Court, and French marriages were also proposed to him; all these proposals alike meant ruin to Spain.

Louis XIV had promised in the Treaty of the Pyrenees to give no further assistance to the rebellion of Portugal, and he tells us that he set 'his pledged word above the greatest interests,' but he adds frankly that the case of Spain constitutes an exception. Between France and Spain there subsists a kind of permanent enmity, and so, he continues, 'whatever specious clauses may be put in treaties about union, friendship, about procuring for each other all sorts of advantages, the true sense which either party quite well understands for his own part, by the experience of so many ages, is that there shall be abstinence externally from every kind of hostility, every public display of ill will; but as to secret infractions which do not come to light, either expects them from the other by the natural principle I have mentioned, and only promises the contrary in the same sense in which the other promises it. And so it may be said that in excusing ourselves equally from the observance of treaties, we do not strictly speaking violate them, because the words of the treaties are not taken literally, although no other words can be employed, as with the language of compliment in society, which is absolutely necessary for intercourse but has a meaning which falls much short of the sound of it.' (Louis XIV, Instructions to the Dauphin.)

This passage, in which Louis probably repeats a lesson

given him by Mazarin, furnishes the clue to much which now took place. The Treaty of the Pyrenees showed Louis externally in a generous light. In Article 60 he engaged 'upon his honour, on the faith and word of a king, not to give, either directly or indirectly, to the kingdom of Portugal any aid or assistance, public or secret, in men, arms, ammunition, etc. etc.' It was this engagement which mainly tempted Spain to accept the peace. Philip IV signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees in order to recover Portugal. But the engagement, we see, was not serious; it was the intention of Mazarin and Louis that Philip should lose Portugal. And this intention produced a great effect upon the policy of Charles II.

In our ancient system alliances, we have seen, depended mainly on royal marriages. But again the marriages themselves depended mainly upon the dowry that might be expected with the bride. This was peculiarly the case at the moment when Charles II reestablished this system among us. He was in dire want of money, and till the end of the year 1660, or so long as the Convention Parliament lasted, he felt himself in the hands of Presbyterians. He was already accustomed to depend on foreign Courts for his livelihood, and now, as a King, he felt that only foreign aid could save him the intolerable yoke of a half hostile Parliament. But at least he was now no longer a mendicant. His immediate predecessor, Richard Cromwell, had begged money of Mazarin; Charles needed not to beg, for he could offer his hand, and with his hand one of the greatest alliances in the world. The Spanish King, with Spanish Quixotism, had refused all this. There were others waiting to accept it.

In Portugal the second king of the House of Bragança, Alfonso, a minor, had been reigning since 1656. But the

monarchy was almost at its last extremity. In April 1659, about the moment of the fall of Richard Cromwell and of the first steps towards a pacification between France and Spain, a Portuguese envoy, Count de Soure, came northward to seek the aid of France and England. France could not help him, at least openly, for, as we have seen, Mazarin found himself compelled to renounce the cause of Portugal in the Treaty of the Pyrenees. At the moment that this treaty was signed, Charles Stuart began confidently to prepare for his restoration in England. A few months later he was seated on the English throne and considering how he might bestow his hand to most advantage.

We see then what was likely to be his course when Spain refused him her Infanta Margaret. A little earlier the other great bridegroom of Europe, Louis XIV, had engaged himself to the other Spanish Infanta, Maria Theresa. There remained for Charles the Portuguese Princess, Catharine, sister of King Alfonso. It was certain that the Portuguese Monarchy and nation in their extremity would purchase the hand of Charles Stuart with the largest dowry their empire could furnish. And they possessed precisely the kind of wealth which would tempt a king of England—colonies and maritime trade. In fact the very acquisitions which a Spanish Infanta might have brought, as presents from Spain, would come equally well with a Portuguese Infanta, as spoils of Spain. The Commonwealth and Cromwell had fairly launched England on the career of New World trade; to this fact Charles II always showed himself keenly alive. Nothing therefore could be more interesting to him than his relations to the New World Powers. If an advantageous alliance with Spain was not to be had, the best alternative was such an

alliance with Portugal. If the former might throw open the whole New World to English trade, the latter might at least open to it half the New World. And the latter was so far preferable that it was an alliance with a humble and necessitous, whereas the former was an alliance with an arrogant, Power.

Thus a marriage between Charles II and Catharine of Bragança would commend itself as a first-rate measure of foreign policy, as foreign policy was understood in that age. But the measure had another aspect which looked towards France. For there was no measure which would give more satisfaction to Louis XIV. He tells us himself that he was especially bent upon assisting Portugal in spite of the engagement he had taken in the Treaty. Nay he goes so far as to say, ‘the very clauses by which they forbade me to assist that monarchy, as yet so insecure, proved by their unusual character, by their repetition, and by the precautions with which they were accompanied, that it had not been believed that I ought to abstain from rendering aid.’ The conclusion he draws is that ‘all he was bound to was only to intervene in case of necessity, with moderation and self-restraint; and this could be managed more conveniently by the interposition and under the name of the King of England, if he were once brother-in-law to the King of Portugal.’ He narrates that he sent a special envoy (that is, La Bastide de la Croix) with instructions to win Clarendon by a large bribe, that the bribe was refused, but that Clarendon declared himself in favour of the Portuguese match, and that the envoy had a secret interview with the King.

The Queen-Mother of Portugal, who held the regency, hailed the proposal as life from the dead to her country, and in the winter of 1660–61 the negotiation advanced

considerably. But Spain now took alarm. Perhaps Philip IV repented of his reckless arrogance. At any rate his Government now made new proposals. They offered Charles a Princess of Parma with the dowry of an Infanta.

At the same time they threatened to treat the Portuguese match, if it were concluded, as an act of war. A serious threat, for Charles had hitherto been free from foreign complications, and war with Spain could not but be most inconvenient to a trading Power! At that moment too Spain and France stood before the world united by a recent family alliance. Might not war with Spain involve war with France also?

Louis XIV says, '*I caused* the offer of the Princess of Parma to be rejected,' and after stating a new offer which Spain then substituted, he continues, '*I managed* affairs in such a manner that the second proposition was rejected as well as the first, and even hastened on the arrangement I desired for Portugal and the Infanta.' And it appears from other evidence that Charles received assurances that his Portuguese match was regarded by Louis with approval, and also very large promises of secret assistance in carrying it into effect. In May, 1661, Charles announced in Parliament his intention of marrying the Infanta of Portugal.

On the principles which have been developed in this book the marriage of Charles II is not to be regarded as a mere personal or family occurrence, but as one of the great events of English history. It belongs to a series of events of the same kind which have had an incalculable importance, from the marriage of Margaret Tudor with James of Scotland, which led to the union of the kingdoms, and that of Henry VIII with Catharine of Aragon, which led to the Reformation, to that of William and

Mary, which paved the way for the Revolution. In this series it is not indeed among the most important, nevertheless its importance is by no means slight. Like the marriage of Philip and Mary and that of William and Mary, it proved childless, accordingly it established no permanent complication of English and Portuguese affairs, created no claims upon Portugal for the English, nor claims upon England for the Portuguese, royal House. But it had the following positive results.

In the first place, Catharine being a Catholic, it carried forward into a new age the peculiar Stuart usage that England, though a Protestant state, should have a Catholic Queen. After the period of the Commonwealth, in which the Protestant feelings of the country had had free scope even in foreign affairs, it marked a considerable reaction that the restored dynasty should connect itself, not, as has since become the custom, with some Protestant House of North Germany or Scandinavia, but with a Catholic House of Southern Europe. It was a step deliberately taken in the direction of Catholicism.

But secondly, by this marriage England was committed to a comprehensive European policy. She was pledged to a new concert with France against the Spanish Monarchy. Mazarin had died on March 9th, 1661. The age of the personal government of Louis XIV had begun for France, and everything there was taking a new aspect, as England had suffered transformation in the year before. The alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin against Spain had receded into past history, when suddenly the same policy revived in a somewhat new form. This was an event of the first European importance. In 1661 the Spanish Monarchy was not so irrecoverably sunk but that a different decision on the part of England might have saved it.

Had Charles adopted the watchword 'Balance of Power' and put his sword into the Spanish scale, perhaps Portugal would have been reduced to submission, the progress of Louis would have been arrested in the Low Countries, Dunkirk would have been handed over to Spain, not to France, and the War of Devolution would never have been waged. But the Portuguese marriage of Charles II with its consequences gave the *coup de grâce* to the Spanish Monarchy. Charles bound himself to assist the Portuguese with 2,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 10 ships of war. Meanwhile Louis, evading his engagements, allowed Marshal Schomberg with 600 French officers to pass into the Portuguese service. The result was that Spain lost all that she had promised herself from the Treaty of the Pyrenees. When in 1663 their army under Don Juan took the town of Evora, and Lisbon itself was in despair, the Portuguese monarchy was saved by the victory of Almexial, won, according to one account, mainly by the valour of the English auxiliaries. In 1665 the Portuguese won the decisive battle of Villa Viciosa, and finally, in 1667, the efforts of Spain were rendered hopeless by the outbreak of a new war with France, which, now mistress of Dunkirk, threatened the Low Countries. Thus was Portugal finally lost, and with Portugal half the New World, to the Spanish Monarchy. What the alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin began was thus consummated by the concert between Charles II and Louis XIV.

We shall find great results following from this adoption, which was on the whole unexpected and accidental, of the Cromwellian system by Charles II. Meanwhile we must hasten to remark how widely that system was altered, while it was adopted, by Charles II. In the alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin, Cromwell took the lead, and he

meditated great designs of European policy. He took the lead because he controlled a military state, while Mazarin at that time was hard pressed by the Spaniards and Condé. Moreover, Cromwell was possessed by his pan-evangelical idea. Charles II had no such idea, and he had disbanded his army. If he adhered to the French alliance, we have seen what his motives were. He was tempted by the great dowry which the Infanta Catharine would bring, to take the course which, as it happened, France wished him to take. Having been thus drawn into the system of France he was led to take a further step. He sold Dunkirk to the French king. Meanwhile his sister Henrietta was married to the French king's brother, Philip Duke of Orleans. Thus he formed a relation to France which, though it was not as yet dependent, was scarcely equal.

For at this moment France underwent a new and startling transformation, which perhaps had hardly been foreseen when the restoration of Charles II took place. At that date the reign of Louis XIV, in the full sense of the phrase, had not yet begun. France was then still governed by Cardinal Mazarin. The king was almost a *roi fainéant*, and the system of government by a minister had after forty years taken such deep root that it was now doubtful whether the king could, even if he would, take the reins into his own hand, while it seemed scarcely doubtful that he would not even if he could. Louis XIV began, properly speaking, to reign in France a year later than Charles II began to reign in England, and his assumption of the government was a kind of *coup d'état*, involving the sudden, violent, and carefully prepared overthrow of the man who pretended to the succession of Mazarin, namely, Fouquet. But what made this revolution especially me-

memorable was the fact that it followed so closely upon the Treaty of the Pyrenees. For that treaty, taken together with the violation of the article of it relating to Portugal, raised France to an easy superiority over the other states of Europe just when Louis XIV acquired his personal supremacy in France.

The moment of the appearance of Schomberg in Portugal, of the announcement of the marriage of Charles with Catharine of Bragança, and of the assumption of the government in France by Louis himself, marks a turning point both for France and for the Spanish monarchy, and so for the whole of Europe. Here ends once for all the ascendancy of Spain, here begins the ascendancy of France. Here and not earlier, for the earlier disasters of Spain might seem reparable. She had been brought low enough in the lifetime of Richelieu, but from that depression she had risen again at the outbreak of the Fronde, and when the great Condé seceded from the French cause and began to direct Spanish armies. Later the hostility of Cromwell outweighed by far the adhesion of Condé, and the defeat of the Dunes might be thought a final catastrophe for Spain. But Cromwell died, and the Treaty of the Pyrenees followed, which seemed at the moment rather a stroke of good than of evil fortune for Philip IV. At least he would now have leisure to recover Portugal, an easy task, apparently easy since there was at last peace in the Low Countries and since the French king, his son-in-law, had engaged not to put any hindrance in the way. Thus Spain had still a prospect.

But the last hope disappeared when this promise was seen to be hollow, when it became clear that France and England did not intend that Philip should recover Portugal. Then at last the feeling of irreparable decline, of incurable

exhaustion mastered the Spanish Government. From this date it may be said that the great Monarchy of Philip II, which began to take the lead of Europe at the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, has fallen, or has ceased to be the same Power.

The moment is not less decisive in French than in Spanish history. We have remarked how closely entangled with the French the Spanish Monarchy, representing the old Burgundy, has been from the outset. We have remarked that the internal constitutional struggles of France have all along been the consequence of this entanglement with Spain. The king of Spain has all along been the head and leader of the party of the noblesse in France. Henry IV had known this to his cost, and what had been so plainly proved by the history of the League, was equally visible in the regency of Marie de Medicis. It is the characteristic of Richelieu's career that he makes war at the same time on Spain abroad and on the noblesse at home, and the explanation of it lies in the fact that these two enemies of the French Government were really one. Lastly, Mazarin had to learn the same lesson ; the Fronde leant on Spain as the League had done, and Condé follows in the steps of Guise.

In 1661 the double struggle comes to an end. Now at last the Spanish Monarchy is paralysed and at the same moment all domestic opposition to the French Government comes to an end. Louis XIV is henceforth absolute at home because he has decisively overthrown Spain abroad.

As France so suddenly rises England in the department of foreign affairs descends to a lower place. Charles II as a European potentate can bear no comparison with Cromwell, not merely from personal inferiority, but from

his position and from the want of an army devoted to his person. His restoration had been up to a certain point triumphant, and he had another triumph in 1661 when a new Parliament relieved him of his presbyterian gaolers. He was now able to surround himself with his own royalist party and the reestablished Anglican Church. But he had no army, and he was dependent on a House of Commons which, though friendly to him, did not wish to see him the head of a military state. The result was that he could adopt but half of Cromwell's policy, the maritime half—he could maintain a great fleet—but Cromwell's continental schemes must be abandoned for want of an army.

Jamaica might be held; but what would now be the use of Dunkirk?

Money was his principal object; how to find ways and means independent of parliamentary votes. From this point of view his marriage had been a master-piece. It had brought him two million crusados, and to the realm acquisitions which might compare with the conquests of Cromwell, the station of Tangier on the African coast and the island of Bombay in India. Had he anything else besides his hand by which he could make money?

Cromwell had laboured under a similar difficulty; towards its close the Protectorate had seemed to be on the verge of bankruptcy. But Cromwell having an army, had possessed a resource which Charles wanted; he was impelled in the direction of conquest and spoliation. He might thrive, as the Netherlands had thriven, upon the plunder of the Spanish Monarchy. In such a system Dunkirk appeared as an important possession. It might lead to further acquisitions in the Low Countries.

All such schemes were dissipated when the Cromwellian army was dissolved. Dunkirk now appeared in an opposite light. It was a useless possession, by the sale of which a great sum might be realised. No longer valuable to the English Government, it was of the greatest value to Spain or, if not to Spain, to France. Either Power would give a great price for it, but by a sale England would realise more than this price, for she would at the same time be relieved from a great expense. When Charles by his marriage had chosen his side against Spain, France presented herself as the purchaser of Dunkirk.

By acquiring Dunkirk Louis XIV, powerful enough already, would become more dangerously powerful still. England had already aided France materially to become the first European Power; by yielding to her this new position would she not destroy the Balance of Power in favour of France and in a manner most dangerous to herself? But as in the case of the Portuguese marriage so here, the indirect consequences, however momentous, were far less considered than the immediate profit. The measure seemed to belong rather to finance than to foreign policy. We are also to consider that the danger of a French ascendancy was new, and had not yet become familiar to English politicians. To favour France, to procure advantages for her, had been the system of the Protectorate, when England advanced by the side of France and at an even greater rate. As it were automatically, the same system continued to work, though England meanwhile had ceased to be a military state.

The sale of Dunkirk was completed near the end of 1662. The French king bought it for 5,000,000 livres, and by the abandonment of it an annual expense of £120,000 was saved to the English treasury.

The new relation between the French and English Courts which grew up through this affair and the common intervention in Portugal may be considered later. At present we remark only that the dangerous ascendancy of France was thus promoted, and that from this time Charles II begins to tend towards a position of dependent alliance with respect to Louis XIV.

Bolingbroke has accused Cromwell of having unwisely nursed the French ascendancy which was soon to cause England so much anxiety and so much war. But the outline that has now been given enables us to see clearly that the alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin did not of itself lead at all necessarily to that ascendancy. It was caused by a series of occurrences of which that alliance was perhaps the first. For the first occurrence he is indeed responsible. But he is not responsible for the second, which nevertheless was equally necessary to the result, namely, his own death and the downfall of his system. Even when this had taken place, when the king had been restored, the unbounded ascendancy of France might still have been prevented. The balance might have been redressed if Charles had come to the rescue of Spain and parted with Dunkirk to Spain and not to France. The immediate cause of the French ascendancy is to be found in the position which Charles in the second year of his reign found himself compelled, chiefly by the want of money, to take up.

CHAPTER II.

THE FRENCH ASCENDENCY.

FRANCE was at length relieved from the pressure of the feudal party at home in concert with the Spanish Monarchy abroad. She had emerged from a struggle which had occupied almost a century. But she gave herself no rest. The period upon which she now entered was also a period of struggle. The transition she makes is not from war to peace but rather from defensive to aggressive war.

In the age of the Cardinals, which now lies behind us, France does indeed often appear as a conquering Power ; she acquires territory both at the Treaty of Westphalia and at the Treaty of the Pyrenees. But her wars in that age had been in their origin defensive ; they had been undertaken in order to shake off an oppression ; they had seemed almost necessary. They had also been full of vicissitude. In Richelieu's time Paris had been threatened by the Spaniard ; in Mazarin's time and long after the triumphant Treaty of Westphalia there had been battles in the heart of France and at the gates of Paris, battles in which Spain had been at least indirectly concerned.

The wars which now begin, over which Louis XIV in person presides for half a century, are of a wholly different character. They are aggressive in the fullest sense of the word on the part of France. It might perhaps be alleged that some of them had, at least in part, a national object, but it could not be alleged that they were in any degree necessary. For now at last the old standing cause of war, which Mazarin had inherited from Richelieu, and Richelieu from Henry IV, that is the oppressive ascendancy of the House of Habsburg, was removed. France was henceforth perfectly secure, or at least had nothing to apprehend from the Spanish Monarchy.

It might no doubt be argued that a satisfactory settlement had not yet been reached. Spain was indeed henceforth disabled, but she remained in possession of much of the territory which had been her basis of operations against France. She had still the bulk of the Catholic Low Countries and Franche Comté, and in the neighbourhood of this territory Lorraine still remained outside the French Monarchy and was governed by its sovereign duke. So far back as 1646 Mazarin had urged that all this territory ought to be annexed to France, since 'by this means'—so he wrote—'criminals, discontented and factious persons would lose an easy means of escapé; they would also lose a convenient means of creating disturbance and forming cabals with the help of the enemy, for it is obvious to remark that all rebellious parties and all conspiracies have been usually organised in the Low Countries, Lorraine or Sedan'.¹

It certainly was a position of unstable equilibrium

¹ Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV*, I. 178.

when these detached territories were seen to lie in the immediate neighbourhood of France, while the Power that had hitherto defended them, Spain, was in manifest decline, France herself being at the height of success and military efficiency.

But the dynastic system still prevailed. As it had been restored in England, so it was triumphant in France, where the fall not only of the Fronde but also of the Ministerial system constituted a revolution very similar to the Restoration in England. Louis XIV after the death of Mazarin and the fall of Fouquet was a restored monarch almost as much as Charles II. Accordingly French policy may be expected, like English, to turn on royal marriages rather than on national interests, or at least to cover national interests with a drapery of royal marriages. This is strikingly the case. No royal marriage, except perhaps that from which Charles V sprang, is more memorable than that which formed the principal article of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, the marriage between Louis XIV and the Spanish Infanta Maria Theresa. Not only did it give rise directly to two wars, that of 1667 between France and Spain and the mighty European war which opened the eighteenth century, but it may almost be said to dominate the whole diplomacy of Western Europe for half a century.

This marriage raised again in a new form the question which, as we have just seen, considerations of policy and ambition had already raised. If it was natural for Louis XIV to desire to annex the Low Countries and Franche Comté, this marriage gave him a dynastic interest in those very territories.

It is in the early sixties that the new dynastic web is mainly woven.

Louis XIV and the Infanta were married in the summer of 1660.

The Dauphin was born in 1661.

Charles II and Catharine of Bragança were married in 1661.

The Emperor Leopold and the Infanta Margarita; contract of marriage signed in December 1663.

Finally, Philip IV of Spain died on September 17th, 1665.

The great controversy of the Spanish Succession, which was the principal consequence of the marriage of Louis XIV though it was distinctly foreseen, nay, deliberately prepared by Mazarin himself, did not come into the foreground of European politics till a much later time. The immediate heir of the Spanish Monarchy, the child whose frail life alone held it from breaking out, lived on, contrary to all expectation, till within a month of the end of the seventeenth century. During forty years Louis XIV nursed the expectation of acquiring for his family the whole Spanish Monarchy, while at the same time he continued to regard the Spanish Monarchy as the traditional enemy of his House. It was to be attacked and dismembered province by province until the time should come when his dearest interest should lie in keeping it whole and saving it from dismemberment!

Accordingly, pending that claim upon the whole Monarchy which would not arise until the heir of Philip IV, the prince Charles, should die, he urged a claim upon certain parts of it, arising immediately on the death of Philip IV himself. As this event took place in 1665, we find that the aggressive schemes of Louis XIV and the new series of French wars take their origin from this year. The war of France and Spain, which had occupied

a quarter of a century when it was brought to a close by the Treaty of the Pyrenees, breaks out again after a short interval, during which the decline of Spain has advanced another stage through her failure in Portugal. It is now an aggressive war on the part of France, the object of which is to annex territory in the Spanish Low Countries. The policy of this war requires no explanation, but a dynastic pretext for it was considered to be also necessary. This was found in the doctrine of devolution. It was maintained that on the death of Philip IV while the bulk of the Spanish Monarchy descended to his only son, who became Charles II of Spain, some districts in the Low Countries were subject to a peculiar rule of succession and ought to descend by local custom not to Charles, who was the child of a second marriage, but to the Queen of France as the eldest child of the first marriage of Philip IV.

The legal pretext need not delay us for a moment. What concerns us is that here begins that absorption of the Spanish Monarchy, which was the great work of Louis XIV. It begins at the death of Philip IV, whose reign of forty-four years (1621—1665) witnessed the fall of the great Power which had been founded by Philip II. Hitherto its decline had neither been uninterrupted nor irretrievable; but after 1665 the Spanish Monarchy is a passive prey, supported only by the policy of the Sea Powers, and experiencing no revival until it passes into the hands of the House of Bourbon.

We are now at the crowning moment of the Bourbon Monarchy. French genius had perhaps been more original a little earlier, in the days of Descartes and the youth of Corneille and the youth of Condé. It was more universally recognised a little later, about the date of the

Treaty of Nimeguen (1678). But in the sixties, in the age of Colbert, Lioneer, Molière, the youth of Racine and the maturity of Turenne, when it had not yet lost its freshness and when France had a golden moment of triumphal peace, the zenith was perhaps reached. At this moment jealousy or dread of French power was not yet awakened. She enjoyed as yet the friendship of the United Netherlands, which owed to her in a great measure their freedom, and also of England, where Charles II had revived the cordial understanding established by Cromwell.

These two Powers are now seen to advance to the foreground of politics, the Spanish Monarchy having become passive. From henceforth to the end of the century the international game lies in the West between these two and France. They are the two Sea Powers, for the total result of all her revolutions has been to leave England much greater as a Sea Power than she had been before the days of the Commonwealth. She is now equal or superior as a Sea Power to the Netherlands. The two Sea Powers, as they are not yet jealous of France, are not yet friendly to each other. Before long they will become both, and their union against France will be embodied in a person, no other than that boy who is growing up at the Hague.

What now lies immediately before us is to trace summarily how these two Powers gradually become alive to their common danger from the growth of France, and how in consequence their old discords give place to a common understanding. This is the brief formula of international history from 1665 to 1688.

We must remind ourselves that the relations of England and the Netherlands are not determined purely by national sympathies and jealousies, affinity of race, agree-

ment in religion, or rivalry in trade, but that here too the dynastic system is in operation. For the Netherlands too have a dynasty. The House of Orange has become at the same time of royal rank and closely connected with England by the marriage of which the young William is the fruit. The continual interaction of English and Dutch affairs was remarked above. It was remarked that the fall of the House of Stuart in England was speedily followed by the fall of the House of Orange in the Netherlands. The Act of Exclusion of 1654 was the crowning measure by which Cromwell put down the party adverse to him in the Netherlands after he had crushed it in England, Scotland and Ireland. From that date De Witt presided over a Dutch Commonwealth and the young William became, like his uncle, a Pretender.

But from this it follows that the Restoration in England would tend to produce a Restoration in the Netherlands, and would be incomplete without it, that the House of Stuart, reestablished itself, would seek to reestablish the House of Orange.

Within twelve years after the English Restoration England and the Netherlands waged two wars. These wars are caused in part by commercial rivalry, but in part also by dynastic influences. As the first Dutch war had arisen partly from the fact that the Stuart-Orange interest had at that time been predominant in the Netherlands while the opposite party was supreme in England, so the second and third wars now arise from a reversal of this contrast, from the restoration of the Stuarts in England following upon the fall of the Stuart-Orange interest in the Netherlands. As Cromwell in the former case had desired the establishment of a republican Government, so Charles II now desires the fall of that Government and the restoration of his nephew.

Accordingly at the moment when France establishes an ascendancy, which Spain can no longer hold in check, and which it is the true interest of the two Sea Powers to restrain, hostility breaks out between those very Sea Powers, who thus become less capable of resisting the encroachments of France. Such is the scene presented at the critical moment of the death of Philip IV, on the one side Louis making ready for a war of conquest, on the other side England and the Netherlands at war with each other.

We saw the Netherlands reduced to a sort of dependence on the English Protectorate. At the same time we saw a Government established there which was out of sympathy with the people and might therefore seem incapable of supporting itself except by foreign aid. When therefore in the autumn of 1658 the boys in Amsterdam sang that 'the devil was dead' they might seem to prophesy the fall of the Government of De Witt, and when within two years the Stuart returned to England it might seem that the restoration of the House of Orange also was close at hand. But De Witt was still to hold his own for twelve years, and, what was yet more surprising, he was to obtain for the Dutch state a commanding position, and to win for it military triumphs over England and diplomatic triumphs over France before the inevitable catastrophe, fatal both to himself and to his system, arrived.

The explanation is that the Orange party, though incomparably more popular in the country than the party of De Witt, were yet necessarily disabled so long as the Prince of Orange was a child. De Witt therefore might count upon a respite. The sixties belonged to him, as the seventies, it might already be foreseen, would belong to William. Already when the English Restoration took

place his position had been strengthened, at first by the aid of Cromwell, and between the death of Cromwell and the Restoration by a great triumph, won indeed in conjunction with England, yet so that the principal share of honour fell to the Netherlands.

We have already had some glimpses of the Northern policy both of the Netherlands and of England. Free access to the Baltic was matter of life and death to both states alike. In the first Dutch war the Dutch in alliance with Denmark had hoped to crush England by closing the Baltic to her. England after escaping this danger had guarded against a recurrence of it by forming an alliance with Sweden. From the young king of Sweden who ascended the throne at that very time Cromwell had expected much aid in his Pan-evangelical schemes. Charles Gustavus had indeed done great things, but not precisely the things which Cromwell wished. In the interval between Cromwell's death and the Restoration he convulsed the Baltic with military achievements which alarmed the Dutch and the English Governments equally.

It was one thing for a modest State like Denmark in concert with one of the Sea Powers to close the Baltic against the other, and quite another thing for the Baltic to become a mere lake in the dominions of a great king who might defy both Sea Powers together. Charles Gustavus now appeared as a tyrant of the whole North. He had well-nigh dissolved the Polish State, reduced the Elector Frederick William to the position almost of a vassal, and he now turned his irresistible force upon Denmark.

In these circumstances the Netherlands and England were driven to act together against him. The concert was very similar to the coalition we shall see them forming

later against Louis XIV. The object of it was to keep the Baltic open to that trade which was absolutely essential to every naval Power. In the summer of 1659 peace was imposed by force upon the king of Sweden. It was a proceeding of a new kind, which, as we shall see, speedily became a precedent. It was arranged in three acts, signed at the Hague and commonly called the First, Second, and Third Concert of the Hague. France, England, and the United Netherlands were the parties to this arrangement. But though an English fleet under Admiral Montagu appeared in the Baltic, it had retired again in consequence of the disturbed condition of England before the decisive blow was struck in November. De Ruyter's fleet and an army composed of Dutch, Danes and Brandenburgers took Nyborg with a garrison of eleven Swedish regiments. The event closed the stormy career of Charles Gustavus, who died within three months of it, and it led soon after to the pacification of the North by the Treaties of Copenhagen, Oliva and Kardis.

This energetic intervention raised the reputation of De Witt's Government just at the time when England was forfeiting the military superiority which Cromwell had given her. Thus the Dutch state was restored to the position it had held before its first war with England, and its republican Government began to take root, resting henceforth on its own success rather than on English aid. The Orange party lost as much as the republican party gained. But now followed the Restoration in England, which necessarily altered again the relation between the two countries. De Witt, who had regarded the English Government at first as a patron, and then as a friend, henceforth could not but regard it as secretly hostile. Whereas Cromwell had been the leader and patron of

De Witt's party, Charles II was henceforth the leader and patron of the Orange opposition to De Witt. A second war between the two states came into prospect, now that there was added to their old commercial rivalry a new antipathy between their governments. Henceforth the position of De Witt was evidently undermined, England having changed sides, while De Witt's adversary the Prince of Orange wanted nothing but manhood. It was however for the moment a commanding position. His fall could be predicted, but he might achieve great things before his fall.

The change produced in Dutch politics by the English Restoration is perhaps most strikingly shown by the terms of the resolution of the Estates of Holland, by which on Sept. 29th, 1660, they revoked the Act of Exclusion, on which De Witt's government had hitherto rested. On what ground do they now replace the young Prince of Orange in the position of his ancestors? They state that the exclusion of the prince had been exacted by Cromwell, but they add, 'considering that God and the English people have recalled Charles II to his kingdom, and that by this event the authority which had imposed that act is extinguished, we revoke it and regard it as cancelled.'

Such expressions show how peculiarly intimate was the connexion between the Netherlands and England, and how much closer it had been drawn by the intermarriage of the Houses of Stuart and Orange. The three Dutch wars of 1651, 1664 and 1672 mark a limited period of our history, and they are followed by a close alliance between the two states, which lasted almost a century. When we consider these wars together, we see that they are inseparable from our domestic revolutions, in which the Netherlands were concerned almost as necessarily as

Scotland. Commercial rivalry is indeed a powerful contributing cause, but in each case we can distinctly perceive a revolution in England extending to the Netherlands. The first Dutch war is an extension of the Revolution of 1648, which established a republic in England, and accordingly it establishes in the Netherlands the republican government of De Witt. The second and third Dutch wars are to be regarded as constituting one struggle, and it is an extension of the Restoration. Accordingly it ends in the downfall of the republican government of De Witt, and in the restoration in the Netherlands of the quasi-monarchical government of the House of Orange.

Altogether we see a singular revival of the monarchical principle. About 1651 monarchy seemed disappearing in all the three great states of the West, in England, in the Netherlands, and even in France, where the Fronde was then successful. Now the Stuart is restored in England, Louis XIV takes all power into his own hand in France, a little later the Prince of Orange, royal on the mother's side, is brought to the head of affairs in the Netherlands.

But in this process a dramatic entanglement is produced by the coincidence in time of the second struggle of England and the Netherlands with the first ambitious encroachment of Louis XIV in the Low Countries. If at the moment of the death of Philip IV of Spain there had been a cordial understanding between the English and Dutch governments, it would have been possible, even easy, to check the ambition of Louis XIV in its first tentative stirrings. No such understanding was possible (except for a passing moment) while Charles II reigned in England and De Witt marshalled the republican party in the Netherlands. Accordingly the ambition of Louis had

scope, and a Bourbon ascendancy began to take the place of an ascendancy of the House of Habsburg.

The War of Devolution was the first essay in aggression of Louis XIV. It could be undertaken and could succeed because of the bitter discord which just then prevailed between England and the Netherlands. The same discord still prevailing in 1672 made it possible for him to strike his second and still more alarming stroke.

But in the middle of this period (1665—1672) a new policy suddenly emerges with Temple's Triple Alliance. It appears only to vanish again, but is a sort of prelude to the system which was later to be embodied and represented by William of Orange.

The new prospect of European affairs which opened from the moment when the fall of Spain left the Netherlands and England face to face with France, and when all eyes began to turn towards the Catholic Low Countries as the probable scene of war, is best shown from a memoir by De Witt dated March, 1664. Here is a passage from it¹.

'We must assume that in any case the king of France will try to make himself master of the Low Countries, which are still subject to the king of Spain, and by that means will become a neighbour to this state, no Power in Europe being able to hinder this result. For Spain, distant and enfeebled as she is, will not be able to hinder it, since it is certain that, had France not been pleased to grant the Peace, all that remains to the king of Spain in the Low Countries would have been conquered in two campaigns, although France, exhausted of men and money after a war of twenty-four years, was at that time full of malcontents who disapproved the conduct of the First Minister, whereas now there is no one but loves and

¹ Mignet, *op. cit.* i. p. 268.

reveres the king, while His Majesty has more money than Henry IV had when he formed a much greater design than that of conquering what remained of the Low Countries; and on the other hand Spain has neither men nor money to maintain the war against France, and scarcely a man fit to command an army. The Low Countries themselves, fatigued and afflicted after so long a war, entirely Catholic, and speaking French almost everywhere, as they formerly made part of France, desire only to be reunited to her, and want nothing but rest and a prince able to maintain their religion and to defend them against all the foreign Powers that may wish to attack them.'

This was the situation which gave rise to the next chapter of international history. De Witt hoped for some time to deal with the question of the Low Countries by negociation and to enter into peaceful arrangements both with France and England. In 1662 he concluded a treaty with the Government of Charles II, and another with that of Louis XIV. Philip IV's reign was evidently drawing to a close; what should be done with the Low Countries on his death was now debated between De Witt and the French ambassador at the Hague, d'Estrades. That knotty question of the Low Countries, which after fifty years of uncertainty and struggle was solved by giving the territory to Austria and assigning a barrier of fortresses in it to the Dutch; now for the first time comes into the foreground of diplomacy. Shall the territory be partitioned? shall an independent Catholic state be set up there? shall it pass entire to France? But in the course of 1664 a maritime war of England and the Netherlands came in prospect, and under cover of this Louis XIV might hope to settle the question of the Low Countries with a high hand in his own favour.

The second Dutch war broke out actually in 1664, though the declaration was not issued till March, 1665. It was brought to an end by the Treaty of Breda in July, 1667.

Meanwhile the death of Philip IV took place in 1665. The pretext of devolution and of the rights of the Queen was put forward, and in May, 1667, that is before the Dutch war was ended, and about the time when the Dutch ships appeared in the Medway, Louis XIV invaded the Low Countries. At the beginning of 1668 he occupied Franche Comté. In May, 1668, this war was brought to a close by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Such is the bare outline, which in a history of the period would be filled in by a minute narrative of the maritime campaigns of the Dutch war and of the invasion of the Low Countries and of Franche Comté. An essay like the present allows room only for certain general observations on the two wars.

First let us remark how dangerous is at this time the position of the Netherlands, and how well-nigh desperate is De Witt's own position in spite of any momentary successes he may win. In considering the first Dutch war we remarked what immense damage was caused to a state which depended exclusively on maritime trade by war waged, successfully or unsuccessfully, with a maritime Power such as England. We remarked that as England grew in commercial wealth the Netherlands could not but decline. By the time of the outbreak of the second war their commercial prospect had been darkened by another cloud. In France Colbert was now developing his system. That is to say, France was now doing what England had done by the Act of Navigation. She was attacking the Dutch monopoly, she was

aspiring to be a maritime Power. She too had now her Navigation Act and her great commercial companies ; she was rapidly forming a great fleet. Against such approaching dangers what measures could be taken that would have an efficacy more than temporary ?

And, still more, what could De Witt do to save himself ? The day of ruin for the country was evidently approaching ; it would arrive about the same time as the manhood of his rival, the Prince of Orange. He himself would fall in the catastrophe of his country. The event of 1672 could already be predicted.

But, placed as the state was, its only chance lay in alliance with one of the two Powers which threatened it. With the help of France it might resist England ; with the help of England it might resist France. Should England and France combine against it, what could save it from destruction ?

We shall see that De Witt took a course which indeed procured him a great military triumph in 1667 and a great diplomatic triumph in 1668, but which at the same time inspired first England and then France with the bitterest animosity against his Government. He had the satisfaction of sending his fleet into the Medway and also of arresting Louis XIV in his career of encroachment, but for all this a day of reckoning could not but speedily come. It came in 1672, the transitional year of the United Provinces, when their greatness had a sudden end, when De Witt perished miserably, and the state itself, if it was saved from destruction by a third William of Orange, sank for ever to a lower level of importance among the Powers of Europe.

Looked at from the English point of view the second quarrel with the Dutch is similar to the first. It has the

same character of a quarrel between relatives. As then the English Commonwealth first offered incorporating union and then went to war, so now Charles II begins as a Dutch party-leader, demanding the appointment of his nephew to the offices formerly held by his family, and proceeds in time with reckless violence to force on a war. In both cases the war is truly national, and not a mere war of governments. England has by this time assumed the character of a Commercial State, and therefore by the side of the political dispute between Charles and De Witt there is a fierce commercial rivalry between the two peoples. The restored Stuarts have not yet set themselves in opposition to their people. The second Charles, unlike the first and unlike his grandfather, has some real grasp of the conditions of political action; he does not expect ends without means, effects without causes. In this part of his reign his policy is not wanting in vigour and is for a time enthusiastically supported. The Restoration needed to be confirmed by victory; the restored Monarchy had now drawn the nation, if we should not rather say been drawn by the nation, into a promising war; success in this would most effectually repress the disaffection which had been rising since the Act of Uniformity, when Anglicanism had so unexpectedly reaped what Presbyterianism had sown.

The war itself, though short, falls into two parts. It commences in 1664 and through the greater part of 1665 it is simply a war between England and the Netherlands. But Louis XIV was bound by his treaty of 1662 to come to the aid of the Netherlands, if attacked. Charles had hoped that this obligation would be evaded. In the course of 1665 however Louis attempted to mediate, and when his proposals were not accepted, at last declared war.

Thus in 1666 England is at war not only with the Netherlands but also with France. The Dutch also procure in this year the help of Denmark. England on the other hand is isolated.

The sudden surprise by which in 1667 the Dutch entered the Thames has left an impression upon later generations as if the debauched Government of Charles II had reduced England to a miserable condition of inefficiency, as if we were forced to make peace because we had no longer the virtue or the valour to make war. This seems quite groundless. Under Charles II the English people displayed great energy, and in this particular war naval historians find much to admire in the behaviour of the English fleets and admirals. Of three great naval battles, that in Southwold Bay (1665), the Four Days' Battle, and that off the North Foreland (1666) two were won by the English, and if the Four Days' Battle was lost, it 'increased,' in the judgment of a French critic¹, 'the glory of the English seamen, owing to the intelligent boldness of Monk and Rupert, the talents of some of the admirals and captains and the skill of the seamen and soldiers under them.'

The victory off the North Foreland, followed up by an attack upon the Dutch coast itself, reduced De Witt's Government almost to extremity. Orange plots were rife; a revolution seemed at hand. 'To provoke internal dissensions,' writes De Witt, 'is a great feature of English policy, and one which it requires dexterity to parry.' So far Charles II had success in his war. But the Plague and the Fire of London at home and the hostility of France and Denmark abroad reduced England in turn to extremity.

¹ M. Chabaud-Arnault, quoted in Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 126.

Other momentous events were evidently approaching. Philip IV was dead; Louis was preparing an invasion of the Low Countries. In these circumstances the negotiations for peace began at Breda. England certainly stood in great need of peace, but she was in no sense beaten, on the contrary she had had the advantage in the war, and the situation of the United Provinces was far more critical and dangerous than her own. But when the negotiations had begun, the English Government, in order to diminish the overwhelming expense of the war, began to lay up ships. De Witt took advantage of this, and finding the English coast undefended sent a fleet of sixty-six ships to the mouth of the Thames. The blow was as crushing as it was sudden. The English negotiators at Breda were instructed to yield the points still at issue with the Republic, and peace was signed on July 31st.

In the narrow seas England had long played the tyrant, and the time was still recent when Blake had made her the greatest naval Power in the world. It was therefore indeed a most startling humiliation to her pride that a foreign fleet should dictate peace to her almost at London itself. And it might almost seem that this disgrace ruined the reign of Charles II and drove the restored Stuarts into that perverse course upon which we shall shortly see them entering.

Nevertheless the cause of it was not any national decline in valour or patriotism, but simply an unfortunate mistake of which a watchful enemy took advantage. And the causes which had led England even earlier to seek peace were principally calamities which could not have been foreseen and which might as well have happened under Cromwell as under Charles II—the Plague and the Fire.

In the peculiar circumstances of the time however

these occurrences could not but appear in a different light. The Stuart Government was judged by a public strongly influenced by Puritanic ideas, and almost as much disposed to condemn it for the Plague and the Fire, as marks of Divine anger, as for the defenceless condition of the Thames. The religious party had recently been driven from power, a king had begun to reign who embodied rather strikingly all the vices that Puritanism had protested against. Forthwith there come pestilence and fire, and the king 'flecs three months before his enemies.' As Cromwell had so often pointed to his successes as evidence that his Government was 'owned of God,' these calamities, so closely crowded together, seemed a sort of visible damnation, branding the Government as reprobate and profane. There is indeed evidence that the demoralisation of the Court was diminishing the efficiency of the services; but this is not the explanation of the failure of 1667; in the second Dutch war Englishmen still fought well, and still overcame their enemies.

And accordingly though the Dutch Admiral De Ruyter won the laurel of the war, though England lost one great naval battle out of three, and though at the last moment she exposed herself to such a humiliating surprise, yet she made at Breda by no means a disadvantageous peace. On the contrary this treaty marks an important stage in the advance of her colonial dominion. New York was acquired at this time, and received its name from the prince who had commanded in the first great battle of the war. It was the greatest acquisition which had been made since the conquest of Jamaica, opening quite a new prospect to our North American colonies. Henceforth New England would be no longer separated from Virginia, and our possessions in North America acquired quite a new

character of solidity, remaining closely connected with the mother-country.

Our rival at the same time ceased to be a North American Power. Nor could De Witt derive much consolation from his achievement at the mouth of the Thames. For England could not be expected to forgive the humiliation, and yet the United Provinces could not afford at that juncture to make a mortal enemy of England.

Meanwhile a new war had begun, overlapping the war of England and the Netherlands. Louis XIV's army had already invaded the Spanish Low Countries before the Treaty of Breda was signed.

In other words the long struggle, which specially marks the middle of the seventeenth century, the struggle between France and the Spanish Monarchy, had begun again after an interval of seven years. But this time it had a new character. Spain is now almost helpless, a passive prey. In former stages of the struggle France, even when she assumed the offensive, had had an object more or less defensive; this time she makes war as an ambitious conquering state. Louis has little apprehension that Spain can withstand him, his only fear is that he may meet with opposition from other Powers jealous of French ascendancy, especially the Netherlands and England.

An extremely favourable opportunity presents itself to him just now. Philip IV dies in 1665 and thus a moment arrives which in the dynastic system of policy is proper for war. It is to be remarked that his own mother, Anne of Austria, who had favoured friendship between France and Spain, died shortly afterwards, in January 1666. And now the two Sea Powers, who might have had both the will and the power to check any advance of French power in the Low Countries, were disabled for interference by

their war. In this war France played a certain part, and was therefore able without exciting suspicion to make military preparations and to assemble forces in the neighbourhood of the Low Countries.

Spain herself had little power of resistance, and it was easy to paralyse her by lending aid to Portugal, which now after the victories of Almexial (1663) and Villa Viciosa (1665) required but little further support to establish her independence. And from England, now that she began to be in distress and applied to Louis for his mediation, it was easy to exact as the price of mediation neutrality in the war of France with Spain. Charles II declared in a letter to his mother which was read to Lyonne ‘que je n’ai pris jusqu’ici et ne prendrai d’unc. année entière aucune nouvelle liaison avec aucun roi, prince, ou potentat, qui soit ou puisse être contraire à la France ou par laquelle je puisse être engagé contre ses intérêts.’

The invasion began in May, 1667. Several fortresses fell into the hands of the French. Charleroi was taken on June 2nd; then Tournai, Douai and Courtrai; then Lille. Turenne directed the occupation of the Low Countries. In February 1668 Condé occupied Franche Comté, taking Besançon and Dole.

It was by this alarming aggression, undertaken under cover of the war of England and the Netherlands on the one hand and of Spain and Portugal on the other, that the French ascendancy was first revealed to Europe. Long before, as we have seen, for example about 1646, the power of France had been alarming enough, but at that time Spain had speedily rallied and France had fallen a prey to domestic disturbances. It was now no longer possible to imagine Spain recovering herself, and the Government

of France was now settled and secure, as it had scarcely been before since the days of Francis I and Henry II.

A transition had manifestly taken place in Europe, of which it behoved politicians everywhere to take note. Ever since Charles V's time the power of the House of Habsburg, especially of the Spanish branch of it, had been the central fact of international history. This power had indeed gradually dwindled, but scarcely before the Treaty of the Pyrenees could it entirely cease to inspire anxiety. Now seven years after that chapter was closed a new chapter visibly began, the ascendancy of the House of Bourbon.

This ascendancy was to advance steadily for more than twenty years; it did not meet with a decisive check until the Sea Powers were firmly united against it by the link of a truly personal union, the Prince of Orange being at the same time Stadholder in Holland, general and admiral to the United Provinces, and King of England, Scotland and Ireland. This firm alliance made a nucleus of opposition, to which other Continental Powers attached themselves, and so the ascendancy of France was checked by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, and again still more decisively in the war of the Spanish Succession, in which William's system was maintained after William himself was gone. Such was the solution which time was to bring. In 1667-8 the problem was still new and obscure even to those who recognised that there was a problem, while to do as much as this was a proof of exceptional intelligence. It is therefore a striking fact that early in the year 1668, that is, in the very freshness of the new situation the question was grasped and the solution discovered, nay for a moment adopted, by Dutch and English diplomacy. Temple and De Witt now apply to Louis XIV the

pressure which a few years before had been applied in the same place, that is, the Hague, to Charles Gustavus of Sweden.

Between France and Sweden we remark for about a century a singular parallelism. They occupy corresponding positions, as opponents of the House of Habsburg, in the West and North. They rise together on the ruins of Habsburg greatness to ascendancy in the West and North. Usually they act in concert. Gustavus Adolphus and Richelieu, Turenne and Wrangel, Mazarin and Charles Gustavus, represent at successive periods this concert. The Treaty of Munster answers to the Treaty of Osnabruck, and in some degree also the Treaty of the Pyrenees to the Treaty of Oliva. At a much later time we still observe the same correspondence, when the Western Powers coalesce against Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession, and at the very same time the Northern Powers combine against Charles XII in the War of the North. The correspondence therefore between the concerts of the Hague which in 1659 restrained Charles Gustavus and the Convention of the Hague, followed by the Triple Alliance, which in 1668 restrained Louis XIV is only one of a series of correspondences.

The achievement of Sir William Temple, for so we are apt to conceive this affair, has been somewhat idealised. Temple is an interesting literary person, and when he appears in the midst of the unsatisfactory reign of Charles II, nay at the very moment when that reign was darkening in a most ominous manner, and guides our policy in the very direction which it was afterwards to take with so much success, it is not unnatural that we should give him credit for an insight and an influence almost prophetic. The affair is an isolated episode. It shows England and

the Netherlands acting in intelligent concert to restrain France immediately after their disastrous discord and immediately before another war between them, in which England was allied with France against the Netherlands. It is therefore in startling contrast to what preceded and what followed it, and it also stands in relief upon a dark background, for Temple was employed by the so-called Cabal. All this requires explanation, and the most obvious hypothesis is a rare personal merit in Temple, which hypothesis is confirmed by the noble style of his despatches.

It was by no means clear at that moment that the interest of England lay in checking the progress of France and in supporting the Dutch. Even Cromwell had supported the French in a campaign which might well have ended in the complete conquest of the Spanish Low Countries; and Cromwell was at least desirous of defending the Netherlands so far as it was a Protestant state. Charles II might, like Cromwell, consent to see France aggrandised in this region, on the same condition, viz., that England should have a share in the conquests made. And then Charles II cared little for the interests of Protestantism. At this very moment we begin to see Catholicism reviving at the English Court, and the very Minister with whom Temple is in correspondence, Arlington, is himself a Catholic. And naturally at that moment the strongest feeling of the English nation in general was a vindictive animosity against the Dutch. They had an insult to avenge, a disgrace to wipe out. Moreover their rivals, their enemies, in trade and on the sea, were the Dutch, not the French.

It is startling that a few months after England had received from the Dutch the most mortifying blow she

ever experienced, she should be found with, to all appearance, the most serene statesman-like forethought concerting with these very Dutch a plan for checking the encroachments of France in the Low Countries. But Temple was certainly an unusual man. His letters rise most strikingly above the average of diplomatic correspondence. He stands out among diplomatists almost as Bacon does among politicians. Are we then to credit his genius with the startling result?

Three courses were open to the Government of Charles II. It might offer aid to France. As we have just remarked, this was the Cromwellian system. It was a system by which England might acquire great gains, either a share in the spoils of the Low Countries which with her help would probably be torn entire from the Spanish Monarchy, or some advance at the expense of Spain on the sea and in the New World. It was a system which had in addition what at that moment was the very strong recommendation that it would also inflict a deadly blow on the Dutch. It would bring France and England close to the Dutch frontier, and would make De Witt feel as Charles II had felt when foreign ships entered the Medway. How naturally this course would suggest itself we shall soon see when we find it actually adopted by the English Government only four years later.

Another course was to join Spain against France. The old feeling of hatred for France and preference for Spain was by no means dead in England¹; the Commonwealth had favoured Spain until Cromwell reversed its policy, and Charles II had been on the side of Spain in the campaign of 1658. English trade felt the need of friendly relations with Spain, and the extremity of Spain was at

¹ Pepys, s. a. 1663.

that moment such that the help of England might be offered at a high price. For saving the Spanish Monarchy England might exact special trade privileges in the New World.

The third plan was that which was actually adopted, of forming a concert with the Dutch to restrain the ambition of Louis XIV. This was a new and strange system, for which there was no precedent except those concerts of the Hague of 1659. It seemed the more unnatural because in that age the Dutch were regarded as the special enemies of England, whereas the relations of England and France had been on the whole friendly, and Louis and Charles had a close family relationship. Of all the three courses this must at the time have seemed from the purely English point of view the least recommendable; if it strikes the modern reader quite otherwise this is because he looks back upon it through the vista of later history, through a century of alliance between the Sea Powers against the ambition of France. Time and experience approved the policy, so that the first adoption of it in 1668 looks now like a stroke of original genius.

If we shake off this prepossession and try to look at the situation through the eyes of Charles II himself or of his minister Arlington, we remark two things:

First, to check the advance of Louis XIV, though perhaps not necessary to the interest of England, was absolutely necessary to the Dutch. The Dutch were convinced that if the Low Countries became French, their own greatness and independence would be at an end, especially as the mouth of the Scheldt would be thrown open and Antwerp would enter speedily into competition with Amsterdam.

Secondly, a concert between England and the United Provinces to prevent this result might be regarded in two

different ways by the English Government. It might of course be regarded as a grand application of the old principle of a Balance of Power, with which the English mind was deeply imbued. And so Arlington writes to Temple, ‘Generosity and the keeping the balance even between the two crowns would be points that might by witty men be talked out of doors.’ And Ruyigny, who arrived in England as French Ambassador after the Peace of Breda, writes, ‘Minds are so imbued with the old idea that the more feeble of the two Powers must always be supported, by maintaining the balance between France and Spain, that it is to be feared there is a general disposition to assist the Spaniards.’ But we are also to bear in mind how bitter the feeling against the Dutch necessarily was at that moment in England, and that France and the United Provinces had been allied against England in the war just brought to an end. The concert proposed would have the effect of breaking this alliance. It would create hostility between Louis and the Dutch Government, so that when England should think the time come to avenge the bombardment of Sheerness her enemy would not again be aided by France, nay, might perhaps have to meet the attack of France at the same time as that of England.

This actually took place in 1672. It may seem capricious that England should in 1668 combine with the Dutch to check the ambition of Louis XIV, and four years later combine with Louis XIV to overwhelm the Dutch state. But in a scheme of vengeance upon the Dutch for the affront suffered by England in the Thames in 1667 the former of these two measures has its necessary place as much as the latter. It was necessary to isolate the Dutch before overwhelming them. Not that we are

to attribute to the English Government in general any deeply-laid Macchiavellian design. Temple at least had no ulterior objects, the English Parliament had no ulterior objects. Charles II after wavering between the three courses above described, after making proposals to Louis, at last yielded to the popular wish. Only in doing so he was probably at least as keenly sensible of the injury he inflicted on the Dutch as of the service he rendered to Europe by maintaining the Balance of Power.

In December 1667 Charles was negotiating with France and Spain at once. Through Ruvigny the new Ministers who had supplanted Clarendon offered an alliance to France, and at the same time Lord Sandwich (the Admiral, the 'My Lord' of Pepys, now transformed into an Ambassador) made proposals at Madrid for an alliance with Spain.

To France he offered assistance, or at least neutrality, in the war with Spain; in return he asked for a share in the spoils, Ostend and Nieuport, besides advantages in the New World; he asked also for French aid against the Dutch in the case of a new Dutch war.

To Spain he offered assistance against France at the price of a large money payment and a great share in the American trade.

From the latter offer much less was expected than from the former. But an alliance with France, such as would bring maritime acquisitions and could at the same time be easily turned against the Dutch, a combination in fact similar to that which was actually formed in 1672, was perhaps more agreeable to Charles himself than any other solution. He could not however obtain it from Louis, who considered that for mere neutrality—positive aid was not distinctly promised—too high a price was asked,

and who had at this time no ground for abandoning his friendly relation to the Dutch. Meanwhile English public opinion took its ordinary traditional course. It was jealous and distrustful of France; it was unwilling to see Antwerp fall into French hands. Public opinion therefore wished to see the progress of France arrested in some way. And yet a direct interference in favour of Spain was more than could be attempted, and the Spanish Government did not warmly welcome the proposals made through Lord Sandwich. Thus even at the moment when the hatred between the English and the Dutch was at the highest point a concert between them for the purpose of arresting France began to be favourably considered. It would gratify public opinion. Arlington, the Secretary, had a Dutch wife, and behind Arlington came Temple. And to Charles the Macchiavellian reflexion might occur that such a concert would indirectly ruin Holland, for it would expose her to the wrath of her great friend, Louis XIV.

The story of Temple's share in the achievement, of his first unofficial discussions with De Witt in September 1667, of his mission to the Hague in December, of his return to England, of the instructions given to him on January 1st, 1668, of his return to the Hague in a royal yacht, and the storm that delayed him, of his momentous conversations with De Witt, of his unceremonious visit late at night to the Swedish Ambassador, Count Dohna, of the contrivance by which the cumbrous constitutional forms of the United Provinces were eluded, of the concert arranged in four days, all this need not be narrated again. What is essential is that we should form a distinct conception of the concert itself and of the importance of it.

As we have seen that for the Dutch at this moment to

cross the path of Louis would be most dangerous to them, so we remark that in this treaty they carefully avoid seeming to do anything of the kind. Hence some modern writers have absolutely refused to admit that the Triple Alliance had in any degree the character or the importance which was attributed to it at the time. They remark, what is perfectly true, first, that it imposes no terms upon Louis which he had not already declared himself ready to accept, and that these terms were extremely favourable to Louis; secondly, that the Powers actually guarantee these terms to Louis and undertake to induce Spain to grant them 'by reasons and other effectual means.' In another place the treaty uses the expression 'more effectual means,' (*media majoris efficacie*) with reference, be it observed, to Spain, not to France. It is true that the ostensible treaty wears the appearance of favouring France and of securing to France the principal acquisitions made by her in the war. It imposes no restraint upon her except so far as it forbids her to make new claims, and takes out of her hands the function of enforcing any further by arms the claims advanced by her already.

So far the treaty is only remarkable as being one of the earliest examples of that system which has attained such a height in the nineteenth century, the interference of neutral Powers for the purpose of bringing a war between two European states to an end. Even so to affirm that it accomplished nothing which would not have been accomplished without it is extravagant. We have already seen that Louis held a treaty with Spain to be a mere polite formality. Had he punctually performed the engagements he had taken in the Treaty of the Pyrenees? If not, it was a most important thing that the conditions of the new treaty soon to be concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle should not

be left to his own sense of right but should be watched over and guaranteed by three neutral Powers.

But further: besides the ostensible treaty, four secret articles were signed at the Hague on the same day, that is, on January 23rd, 1668. It is the third of these secret articles that makes the Triple Alliance so remarkable, as furnishing, as it were, a programme of the age of international history then opening.

The third article runs as follows: ‘But if beyond all expectation the Most Christian King should entertain such thoughts as shall induce him to refuse the promise that he will sign the treaty of peace as soon as the Spaniard shall consent to give up all those places which have been acquired by him in his last expedition, or such an equivalent as shall be agreed by mutual consent; or in case he shall not accomplish his promise, or shall disallow or reject the cautions and provisions that are expressed in the said treaty, which are so necessary to obviate the fears and jealousies that are most justly conceived of the Most Christian King’s intentions to make a further progress with his victorious arms into the said Low Countries, so often already mentioned: In all these cases, and also if he should endeavour by any subterfuges or oblique practices to hinder or elude the conclusion of the peace; then England and the United Netherlands¹ shall be bound and obliged to join themselves to the king of Spain and with all their united force and power to make war against France; not only to compel him to make peace upon the conditions aforesaid; but, if God should bless the arms taken up to this end, and favour them with success, and if it should be thought expedient to the parties concerned, to continue the war till things shall be restored to that

¹ Sweden acceded to the treaty somewhat later.

condition in which they were at the time when the peace was made upon the borders of both kingdoms in the Pyrenean mountains.'

In these last words a system is sketched out similar to that which it was the work of William's life to consolidate and which he handed on to Marlborough. In this place it will suffice to note its general character; other opportunities will occur for examining it more in detail.

The result intended by this concert was attained. Louis had offered to Spain the choice of yielding the towns in the Low Countries which he had conquered or, as an equivalent, Franche Comté with some other towns. He now in February overran Franche Comté, the delay of three months which he had allowed to Spain having expired. But in May the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was concluded between France and Spain under the mediation first of Pope Clement IX, but also 'of the Ministers of several other Kings, Potentates, Electors and Princes of the Holy Empire, who have kindly offered their endeavours and good offices to accomplish this grand affair.' By this treaty Spain yielded the places taken in the Low Countries, and Louis undertook to 'withdraw his troops from the County of Burgundy, commonly called the Franche Comté.' And thus tranquillity was restored.

But a new age of international history had opened in a most conspicuous manner. A French ascendancy stood revealed to the world, not this time a predominance of France momentarily acquired by the fortune of war, but an ambitious purpose avowed by Louis of asserting his superiority among the European states, and sustained by an evident superiority in fact. As early as 1663 we find Temple speaking of 'this great comet that is risen of late, the French king, who expects not only to be gazed at but

admired by the whole world.' Now in 1667 and 1668 the helplessness of his neighbour, the Spanish Monarchy, the rival of France for so long a time, had been made evident. And it had now become generally understood that Louis intended to claim the succession of the whole Spanish Monarchy for his House as soon as the feeble Charles II of Spain should die without heirs. Thus a startling prospect suddenly opened before the eyes of Europe. Louis XIV, who had already been king of France for fifteen years, now assumed a position which no king of France had ever held before.

We may judge from the *Consilium Aegyptiacum* of Leibnitz what an impression this new phenomenon produced. The philosopher foresees clearly the course which Louis is likely to take, and what devastating wars threaten Europe; the only remedy in his view is to divert the king's ambition to Egypt, which he represents as easily invaded and easily conquered. He sends to Louis an exhortation which was lost upon him, but was taken to heart more than a century later by Napoleon Bonaparte.

But this first war of Louis was striking chiefly by the prospect it opened. Turenne's campaign in the Low Countries was not much admired: thus Temple writes in October, 1667, 'Upon the whole never any campaign was perhaps worse managed on both sides, through default of order here and of resolution among the French.' In the same way the Triple Alliance was far more significant by what it indicated than by what it was. Much may be urged in disparagement of its importance, and, if the result which it aimed at was attained at Aix-la-Chapelle, perhaps Louis was influenced by other considerations than the dread of its threats. In English history it is damaged by the context in which it appears. Not only was it soon

abandoned for an opposite policy. It may be said indeed of Temple himself and of the English Parliament and people that they had an honest meaning in it. Temple contemplates a hearty union of the English and the Dutch, a union which is to endure and to oppose an effectual barrier to the ambition of Louis. But Charles himself sees it throughout in a different light. He has recourse to it suddenly because his offers to France have been rejected, and having thus, as it were, taught Louis a lesson, he returns to the French alliance as soon as he conveniently can. In this course we may discern that kind of indolent Macchiavellism so characteristic of him. He was aware, as we may see that De Witt was aware, that this alliance, if it were abandoned again, would almost cause the ruin of the United Provinces by making France their enemy. To Temple when he first proposed it De Witt said, ‘he doubted the States would think it like to prove too sudden a change of all their interests, and that which would absolutely break them off from so old and constant a friend as France to rely wholly upon so new and uncertain a friend as England had proved.’ At another time he said, what Continental statesmen have often repeated in later times, that unsteadiness of counsels in England seemed a thing fatally inherent in our constitution; he could not judge from what ground, ‘mais depuis le temps de la reine Elizabeth, il n’y avait eu qu’une fluctuation perpetuelle dans la conduite de l’Angleterre, avec laquelle on ne pouvait jamais prendre des mesures pour deux années de temps.’

In this particular instance these remarks proved only too true, and De Witt himself experienced it too fatally. While all the world was hailing the Triple Alliance as a masterpiece, Charles himself may have regarded it as a

masterpiece in quite a different, and a less honest sense. By means of it he succeeded in 1672 in avenging the disgrace he had suffered from the Dutch in 1667, in destroying De Witt, and almost in destroying the Dutch state.

CHAPTER III.

REVIVAL OF THE DYNASTIC SYSTEM.

EVEN before the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in January 1668 it may be said that England had entered upon a new revolution.

We are in the habit of conceiving the Revolution of 1688 too simply as a movement of constitutional resistance to the perverse bigotry of king James II. As James II only began to reign in 1685, this view of the Revolution requires us to think of it as commencing not earlier than 1685. Yet it cannot but occasionally strike us that at least the later years of Charles II are marked with all the violence and terror of revolution. The period from 1678 to 1685 makes one of the most terrible and thrilling chapters of English history. The Popish Plot, the Exclusion Bill, and the Rye-House Plot, are successive spasms in a convulsion which is almost as violent and more shocking than the Great Rebellion. And the panic which procured credence for the wild stories of Oates and Bedloe was itself the result of other occurrences that carry us several years further back, of the war with Holland and the stop of the Exchequer in 1672 and of the Treaty of Dover in 1670. Is it satisfactory to say that as there was

a revolution under James II, so there might have been and almost was *another* revolution under Charles II, he being, like his brother, perverse and only a degree less wrong-headed? Was it not rather one and the same convulsion which, beginning in the middle of Charles II's reign, passed on into the reign of James and ended in the change of Government of 1688?

The proof that the Revolution which was consummated in 1688 really began far back in the reign of Charles II, lies in the fact that the definite design which was announced and undertaken so frankly by James is identical with that which was undertaken without being announced by Charles. It was not a mere design to establish absolute government, but something much more definite, viz., a design to found a strong monarchy upon the reestablishment of Catholicism by the aid of a standing army and of a French alliance. This design was expressed as clearly in the Treaty of Dover of 1670, though that was kept secret, as in the public acts of James II. As the design was the same throughout, the opposition to it ought to be regarded as one movement, which is as much as to say that the Revolution of 1688 ought to be held to have commenced at least not later than the year 1672, when the first overt steps towards executing the design were taken, and also that the Revolution cannot be clearly treated without going still further back to the Treaty of Dover and to the occurrences which led Charles to conclude the Treaty of Dover.

The Treaty of Dover has a character as wild and startling as any act of James II. We perceive that as early as 1670 the English Monarchy has begun to desert all precedent, and is entering upon a course far more strange and portentous than had ever been deliberately

chosen by Charles I. And as soon as the country became dimly aware of this fact, that is, in 1672, English politics are visibly troubled, so that we may fairly say, ‘the Revolution has begun.’

But then the question arises, What led the Monarchy in 1670 to form so wild and desperate a design? And thus we are led to take a further step backward. We must ask ourselves, what had happened between the Restoration and 1670 to drive the Monarchy into new courses. And to this question the answer presents itself readily. Evidently the fall of Clarendon in the last months of 1667 marks the fall of the original system of the Restored Monarchy. And the fall of Clarendon was evidently caused by the great disasters of 1666 and 1667, by the Dutch invasion inflicting such disgrace on the administration, and following so closely upon the Plague and the Fire of London.

These disasters make the next great epoch in our history after the Restoration. They close the prosperous period of the Restored Monarchy, and they introduce a new revolutionary period, the second English Revolution of the seventeenth century.

Thus regarded, this second revolution seems as long and difficult a labour as that which filled the reign of Charles I. It is found to occupy about twenty years.

But when compared as a whole with the first revolution it exhibits a striking difference, which is peculiarly important in this book.

The first revolution was on the whole a remarkably insular movement. Though it was watched with much interest by Continental statesmen, yet for various reasons, which have been noted above, they seldom found themselves in a condition to influence it or take a part in it.

The second revolution is in this respect in the opposite extreme. It is swayed throughout by the most potent continental influences. In truth it may be said that the leaders in it were two foreign princes. For Charles and James on the one side were alike subordinate to Louis XIV, who from the outset financed the project of his royal cousins, and who in the end interfered with fleets and armies and with the whole force of his kingdom. On the other side William Prince of Orange still more conspicuously takes the lead of the revolutionary party. And thus while the first revolution in all its crises alike, both at the fall of the Monarchy and at the Restoration of the Monarchy, left England free from foreign complications, the second revolution involved England necessarily and immediately in a great European war which lasted not less than nine years.

The disasters which marked the failure of the Clarendon system would naturally suggest the question whether the Restored Monarchy could not be put upon a wholly different basis. We remarked above that Charles II was restored by no means in the only possible way, nor yet in the way he liked best. But he was restored triumphantly, and had enjoyed some prosperous years. Now when this prosperity came to an end and the Monarchy was once more in imminent danger, those other possible systems, and especially the system which Charles himself had always secretly preferred, naturally came up for reconsideration.

What were those other systems?

There was the system which may be called Cromwellism. Cromwell had shown how the country might be governed strongly and gloriously by means of a standing army, and how on this system money might be raised

without consent of Parliament. It was a lesson which could not be thrown away on one whose *métier* it was to be a king, and Charles would remark that this form of imperialism was inseparably connected with a grand principle, which was attractive to many minds, the principle of religious toleration.

There was another system of which his mother, Henrietta Maria, was the chief representative. He might govern England by the help of France, by French subsidies and, if necessary, by French troops. This system had been inculcated upon him by the necessities of his long exile. He had grown used to the practice of it. It was indeed a humiliating system for an English king to adopt, but Charles was half a Frenchman by birth, and besides, as he saw it represented in its mother, it had a religious justification. It favoured Catholicism, and, if Catholicism was after all the true faith, duty might require an English king in spite of patriotic feelings to adopt the system.

These two systems were in themselves extremely dissimilar, but yet they might be blended together, and Charles had another example before his eyes to teach him how this might be done. His cousin Louis XIV., the great example of kingship in that age, ruled at this time on the principle of religious toleration. He had an Edict of Nantes, and the great soldier who with the title of Marshal-General was then organising the army which was to establish the European ascendancy of France, Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, was himself a Protestant. The Edict of Nantes had been issued by another great soldier, the grandfather of Charles himself, Henry IV. Cromwell's toleration had not extended to Catholics, but logically it ought to do so, and now that a king reigned in England, whose mother and wife were alike

Catholic, and now that the principle of toleration had been long preached and had met with some acceptance, it might seem possible to imagine an Edict of Nantes for England which should grant toleration to Catholics as well as Dissenters. This Edict would be issued by the king personally in virtue of his ecclesiastical supremacy. It would be a Declaration of Indulgence, and would place all the Dissenters of England in a direct relation to the king. They would become the king's vassals, and if then an army could gradually be formed in which they should form the preponderating element, a Monarchy would be established which would have all the force, independence and military power of that of Cromwell and would be on equal terms with that of Louis XIV across the Channel.

All this would take time. In the meanwhile for a scheme which promised so much advantage to Catholicism he might ask support from France. He had already fallen into alliance with France against Spain—here again Cromwell had been his model—the alliance suited him personally, for it was a family alliance. Louis in his schemes of ascendancy needed the countenance or at least the neutrality of England. For this, and for the interest of Catholicism, Louis must be content to pay subsidies. And thus we have a complete scheme for the regeneration of the Monarchy, enfeebled and endangered by the disasters of 1666 and 1667.

This is the programme which, adopted covertly for a moment and then partly withdrawn by Charles, caused the terrible convulsions of the latter part of his reign, adopted more openly and persistently by James, led to the Revolution of 1688. The scheme involves an abandonment of that national system of policy which the Commonwealth had introduced and which had on the whole been accepted

by Clarendon ; it involves a revival of the dynastic system, being founded on the family connexion of the sons of Henrietta Maria with Louis XIV. It is this family alliance of the two royal Houses which makes the second English revolution so much more important in international or European history than the first. From the English point of view it was this which caused the change of 1688 to be achieved by a foreign prince landing in England at the head of a foreign army and to be followed by a great war between England and France. And from the European point of view it is not difficult to see that the whole ascendancy of Louis XIV was based upon the family concert between the Bourbon and the Stuarts.

We have brought Louis upon the stage in his new character, and we have seen him receive his first check from the Triple Alliance. Even this first aggression of his, the War of Devolution, was preceded, we saw, by an engagement on the part of Charles not to interfere for a year. The Triple Alliance, we saw, though devised with so much circumspection, yet produced an immediate and profound effect, so that the nascent ascendancy might well have come to a premature end had England's policy moved steadily upon the lines laid down by Temple. But just at this moment the new family alliance was arranged, and the result was that the ambition of Louis XIV had full play in Europe for twenty years.

And what ultimately set a limit to that ambition ? We are in the habit of thinking of the Revolution of 1688 as the event which saved our liberties and settled our constitution. But that event, unlike the chief occurrences of our Grand Rebellion, is not less, perhaps more, important in European than in English history. It defeated the plans of Louis XIV in Europe not less really though less

manifestly than the plans of James II in England. From that moment the tide of French encroachment began to recede, and in the course of the third war of Louis (1688—1697) it became clear to French politicians that England's change of sides had vitiated the calculations upon which their scheme of ascendancy had been based. We may say, '*Momentum fuit mutata Britannia rerum.*'

Such then in general is the second English Revolution. We have seen that it begins with a step in foreign policy, the Treaty of Dover. Shortly before this event comes the fall of Clarendon, which is to Charles II what the death of Mazarin had been to Louis XIV. It gives the king freedom to adopt a policy of his own. Hitherto he has been in the hands of the experienced statesmen who have re-established and consolidated the monarchy—Southampton, Clarendon, Monk and Ormond, statesmen who have throughout taken a national and a Protestant view of the Restoration. Southampton now dies, Monk dies a little later in 1670, Ormond is deprived of his Irish office in the spring of 1669. But Clarendon had risen to an eminence far above any of these, an eminence which can only be compared to that of Mazarin. He was father-in-law of the heir to the throne, father of the future queen, grandfather of the royal children, and besides all this leading Minister, restorer and nursing-father to the Anglican Church, and Chancellor.

In this very year 1667 the brother-in-law of Charles, Alfonso, King of Portugal, who had been brought into public contempt by his vices, was deposed by his brother, who reigned successfully under the title of Pedro II. It almost seems as if Charles for a moment apprehended a similar fate. He too had shocked public opinion by his vices, and disasters had now happened which might be

interpreted as marks of Divine displeasure. He had a Catholic wife, who brought him no children. Meanwhile his brother, the Duke of York, was a man of business, and recently in command of the fleet had defeated the Dutch; moreover he had children and an English wife; nor had he or his wife as yet broken with public opinion by publicly adopting Catholicism. The position was dangerous for Charles, the more so as the greatest statesman of the day, the master of the policy of the Restoration, was father-in-law and Mentor to this formidable brother.

Charles steered himself safely through these dangers with his usual indolent adroitness. He took advantage of the popular outcry which made Clarendon responsible for the mismanagement in which he had no share, and also of the offence he had given to large classes by his exclusive Anglicanism. The attack upon Clarendon was made in Parliament; Charles seemed only to give way, slowly and gradually, before it. But he reaped the benefit of it; his brother became less formidable when Clarendon had been driven from the country. And soon after James ceased to be formidable to him at all by adopting Catholicism, so that this particular danger passed away and was forgotten.

Relieved from Clarendon's control the king begins to display those personal preferences which hitherto had been held in abeyance. Hitherto he had been always in leading strings, like Louis XIV in the lifetime of Mazarin.* He had been a Covenanting King in Scotland in 1651; in 1660 he had been restored in England mainly by Presbyterians; in 1662 Anglicanism had gained the upper hand. But it had been visible all along that this third phase of the Restored Monarchy was little more to the monarch's mind than the second had been. He did not want an intolerant Anglicanism; he wanted toleration in a form

which should confer lustre on the Crown and at the same time should include Catholics. Nor did he want Parliamentarism, whether the majority in Parliament were Anglican as since 1661 or Presbyterian as in 1660, he wanted Cromwellism, a Government founded upon military force. Lastly he did not want a national system, but a dynastic policy ; he hankered after a family alliance with France.

On January 25th, 1669, Charles held a meeting of leading Catholics, Lord Arundel of Wardour, Lord Arlington, Bellasys and Sir Thomas Clifford, in the room of the Duke of York, and there announced himself a Catholic and desired their advice on the best means of re-establishing the Catholic religion in the country. We are told that he remarked that there was no time to lose, that he expected to meet with great difficulties in the execution of his plan, and that on that account he chose to take it in hand while he, as well as his brother, were in the vigour of their age. We are told that he spoke with much spirit and with tears in his eyes.

From this time began the violent course which led to the third war with Holland and the Stop of the Exchequer. Charles had conceived and entered upon an undertaking precisely similar to that which his brother afterwards took up at the cost of his crown. But he dropped it again in 1674 without having betrayed to the public the grand secret. Suspicions had been aroused, and his brother, the heir to the throne, had declared himself a Catholic. But the design which had been formed, and which in 1670 had taken shape in the Treaty of Dover, remained unknown. It was unknown not only to that generation but to many succeeding generations, so that the unity of the whole movement, which, beginning

in 1669, resulted in the change of Government of 1688, has never been quite firmly apprehended among us.

Perhaps in all English history there is to be found nothing so wild as this design, nothing so portentous as this plot. That Charles or James or both should adopt Catholicism and feel bound to announce their conversion to the world was not in itself wonderful. Queen Christina had done so. But then Queen Christina had abdicated. The enigma is that Charles, who often gave proof of a keen intelligence, should have supposed it possible, sixty years after the Gunpowder Plot, thirty years after the Irish massacre, when aversion to Popery had become in the English mind a sort of mania, to reverse the whole drift of things and make the stream, which had long since swelled into a great river, flow backward to its source. Nor is the enigma even partially solved by remarking that he contemplated reserving certain liberties, even after the restoration of Catholicism, to the Anglican Church.

A certain blind obstinacy may explain the conduct of James, but Charles was a politician, and often showed himself an adroit politician. Even if we suppose that in his nature the Stuart alternated with the Bourbon, and that his Macchiavellian insight was interrupted at times by fits of helpless bewilderment, the hypothesis besides being difficult does not appear sufficient.

But let us remark how closely connected in his mind are these religious ideas with his family relationships. His Catholicism is not a speculative conviction, but a family bias, an inclination to the religion of his mother and of that other Henrietta, his favourite sister, and of that kindred court across the Channel which then gave the model to all courts. This observation leads us once more to think of the prodigious importance in our ancient

political system of royal marriage. Something similar had been seen in the sixteenth century when Mary Tudor, Spanish by her mother and afterwards Spanish by her husband, showed herself quite out of harmony with the people she governed. It appears that the foreign marriages of a royal family might produce, besides the direct effects we have so often had to notice, strange indirect effects upon the mind and way of thinking of royal persons.

The Stuart Kings of England had hitherto been Protestant but their Queens were always Catholic. In consequence the royal family differed from most other English families by its exceptional connexion and familiarity with Catholicism. This gave a peculiarity to its way of thinking, a peculiarity all the more dangerous because for some reasons they might be tempted to be proud of it. And in that period the peculiarity was greatly heightened by the fact that the foreign and Catholic element in the royal family greatly outshone the insular and Protestant element. While Charles I suffered captivity and death Henrietta Maria retired to France and lived as a daughter of France upon a pension granted to her by the Government. During the long exile of the sons their mother had assisted them with money, while they had grown accustomed to the habits and ways of thinking of her country. Her family on the French throne had enjoyed splendid success, and it was natural for Charles II, when he thought of his ancestors, to dwell with more complacency upon Henry IV than upon James I and to prefer the splendour and power of his cousin Louis XIV to his own position in England. France now took the lead in Europe, and Charles might be proud to feel that he was a Frenchman.

In the particular matter of religion he might easily feel himself exceptionally enlightened. While the atmo-

sphere of Catholicism in which he had always lived even in England prevented him from understanding how deeply Protestant the country was, he knew some things which most English people did not know, so that he might easily regard his subjects as insular in feeling. He knew that the current of thought in Europe was setting in the direction of Catholicism, that the Huguenot party was declining in France—the great Turenne himself recanted, as Henry IV had recanted—he may have been aware that even the severe strenuous earnestness which was the boast of Puritanism had now shown itself at Port Royal in the bosom of Catholicism. There had been a time in France too when Protestantism was powerful, a time of confusion. That confusion had passed away, and Protestantism was passing away with it. A splendid and secure Government had been founded, and how? The ultimate cause seemed to lie in this that a French king, his own grandfather, had solemnly abandoned Protestantism and made his peace with the Church.

If this chain of reasoning led Charles to a conclusion which seems to us almost insane, and which probably he himself in the course of 1673 perceived to be wholly mistaken, it becomes at least intelligible when we take account of the atmosphere of Catholicism which he had always breathed. His mother was a bigoted Catholic, his wife was a Catholic; they were surrounded by Catholics; the younger Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, was a centre of the brilliant Catholic society of France. And all this was the natural result of the system of royal marriage, which after the long interval of Elizabeth's time had been revived by James I. It had introduced a fatal misunderstanding between the royal House and the English nation.

But it introduced also the family alliance which issued

in the war of 1672 and all that flowed from it. Hence this system of royal marriage is the root not only of the second English Revolution, but also of the ascendancy of Louis XIV in Europe, which always depended upon the countenance or neutrality of England. We know how the War of the Spanish Succession resulted from the marriage of Louis XIV and the Infanta Maria Theresa. It is not less true that the War of 1672 and the whole disturbance of Europe which was not composed till 1697 resulted indirectly from the marriage of Henrietta Maria to Charles I.

The suddenness and abruptness with which the new revolution commenced in 1670 has been concealed from view partly by the secrecy in which the king's proceedings were so long veiled, but partly also by other circumstances.

The first of these is the fact that the formation of the Triple Alliance, the most famous act of foreign policy of Charles II's reign and the most hostile to France, actually took place after the fall of Clarendon, and after the king had begun to enter upon his revolutionary course. Throughout the year 1668 Charles enjoyed the honour of the Triple Alliance; Temple represented England at the Hague; and even as late as August 1669—that is, long after Charles had expressed to Louis his passionate desire for a French alliance, and even some time after he had broached to Louis his grand project—the Triple Alliance is not only active but seems to grow more and more imperious. In that month a deputation, of which De Witt was a member, presented itself at the Hague before Pomponne, the French Ambassador, to complain in the name of the States-General, England, and Sweden, of certain infractions of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. ‘This is the first time,’ writes Pomponne, ‘that the Triple Alliance has spoken all together.’

But we know how Charles himself regarded the Triple Alliance. To him it recommended itself as a means, and it proved a very effectual means, of making Louis, who had been a friend of the Dutch, their mortal enemy.

The other circumstance is this, that to the modern reader it appears as if Charles had at least gone to work very cautiously. We compare his secrecy with the bluff and blundering frankness of James, and draw almost unconsciously the conclusion that he only played with his grand project, or at least that he regarded it only as a distant ideal, and that he was well aware, as an intelligent man, that such a proposal as the restoration of Catholicism must be approached very circumspectly and, as it were, broken gradually to the English people. True it is that he was prudent enough, when he saw in 1673 how profound an alarm his first steps had caused, to draw back, and that from this time to the end of his reign the grand project fell into abeyance. But it is important to notice that his original plan as he announced it in 1669 was not less insane, almost more insane, than any plan of James II. He actually intended to announce himself a Catholic and to introduce Catholicism by royal authority supported by military force. There can be little doubt that such a plan was even more infatuated in 1669 than it was in 1685 when James tried to carry it into effect. In 1685 the people had had time to grow familiar with the idea, and they were also exhausted and discouraged by the reign of terror that had prevailed since the panic of the Popish Plot. How the plan would have been received in 1669 it may be difficult precisely to say, but surely the downfall of Charles himself must have followed almost instantaneously.

On November 9th, 1669 Charles said to the French

Ambassador, Colbert Croissy, to whom the secret had recently been confided—‘that he thought that after reading the papers I must have judged that he himself and those to whom I had entrusted the conduct of the affair were mad to think of reestablishing the Catholic religion in England; that indeed every person informed about the affairs of his kingdom and the temper of his peoples must have such a thought, but that nevertheless he hoped that with the support of Your Majesty the great undertaking would succeed; that the presbyterians and all the other sects hated the Anglican Church even more than the Catholics; that all these sectaries aspired only to the freedom of exercising their religion, and will not oppose his change of religion if they obtain that, which he intends to grant them; that moreover he had good troops, well disposed to him, that if his father had had as many he would have stifled in the birth the troubles which caused his ruin; that he meant to augment as much as possible his regiments and companies under the most plausible pretexts he could find; that all the arsenals were at his disposal and well supplied; and that he was assured of the principal places in England and Scotland, that the Governor of Hull was a Catholic, that those of Portsmouth, Plymouth and many other places which he named to me, among others Windsor, would never fail in the obedience they owed to him; that as to the Irish troops he hoped the Duke of Ormond, who had retained a great reputation there, would always be faithful, and if the Duke should fail in his duty, disapproving his change of religion, Lord Orrery, a Catholic at heart, and still more influential in that army, would lead it wherever he had orders; that the friendship of Your Majesty, of which he had the most obliging proofs in the world in the answers

you have made to his proposals, with which he professed himself perfectly satisfied, would also be a great support to him; lastly he said that he was forced both by his conscience and by the confusion he saw daily increasing in his kingdom, which tended to the diminution of his authority, to declare himself a Catholic, and that beside the spiritual advantage he should gain from doing so, he also considered that it was the only way of reestablishing the monarchy.'

If this is infatuation, the last clauses show that it is partly the infatuation of despair. But such was Charles' plan, and the caution which afterwards withheld him from taking this desperate course was suggested to him not by his own reflexions, but by this very Colbert Croissy and by Louis XIV, who urged that the declaration of war with the Dutch must precede the public adoption of Catholicism.

We may say then that at this moment a struggle began which was not decided till 1688, and even then was by no means ended. The period from 1669 to 1688 makes one chapter in English history. It is one in respect of the subject-matter, which is a design on the part of the Monarchy to reestablish Catholicism, one too because in the main the persons who took part in the struggle were the same under Charles II and James II. No doubt when the last act of the drama began at the accession of James some of these had been removed. Shaftesbury and Lord William Russell, as well as Charles II, had disappeared in England; Condé, Turenne, and Colbert had disappeared in France. But Louis XIV and the Prince of Orange, Monmouth, Danby, Halifax and James himself, took a prominent part in the struggle of both reigns alike, and their conduct in the second reign cannot be under-

stood but in connexion with their conduct in the first. Through the whole period prevails the same violent and overstrained complexion of politics, but certain large phases may be distinguished.

As, contrary to the original intention of Charles, secrecy was maintained on the principal point, the English people did not at once become alive to their situation. The war with Holland, in spite of the strange violence with which it was commenced, gratified some interests and feelings, and seemed a national war. But suspicion was excited; the Declaration of Indulgence raised general distrust; every one was aware of a mysterious apparition of Catholicism on the public stage. Hence a violent ferment, partially allayed in 1673 by the king's concessions and the passing of the Test Act. In King Charles the politician now awakes, and the frantic scheme is practically laid aside. But the public disquiet cannot be fully allayed so long as the family alliance with France continues, and the disgraceful terms of it cannot quite be concealed, nor can the fear of Popery subside since the heir to the throne has avowed himself a Catholic. Affairs look so wild that a terrible convulsion cannot long be avoided. It breaks out in 1678 in the form of an uncontrollable popular panic. A reign of terror, unique in English history, begins. From this time till the death of Charles, or for seven years, the condition of affairs is revolutionary, though no actual change of Government takes place.

In the short reign of James II the original scheme of 1669 is revived. A struggle begins which, as it is frank and open, is on the whole less shocking than the terror of the latter years of Charles, and a satisfactory solution is found in 1688.

The whole movement has many aspects. The religious

aspect attracts perhaps most attention, and after this the constitutional aspect. We have to deal here with a third aspect, that which it wears towards foreign policy. This is equally startling, since the scheme now launched by Charles led England into wholly new international relations and profoundly modified the whole system of Europe.

If we take account of the despair he betrays in the passage quoted above, and then recollect his habits formed in exile and the vague ideas suggested to him by Cromwell's example, the scheme, startling as it is, explains itself to us. How to get money had been from the outset his perplexity. It had led to his marriage and to the sale of Dunkirk, even in the time when he had been able to count on the help of Parliament. But the disasters of 1666-7 had undermined the whole system which Clarendon had constructed for him, and Clarendon himself was gone. He thought he saw his monarchy crumbling away, and he was forced, he the indolent and debauched, but at the same time adroit and audacious man, to devise something new, to find a new foundation for his power. He must make himself independent of Parliament; this was possible, for Cromwell had shown it to be so. A military force was needful, and for this purpose a war must be undertaken, and it must be such a war as would be acceptable to public opinion.

Two courses were open to him. He might pursue the course into which he had been led by Temple. He would thus anticipate the part afterwards played by William of Orange. In alliance with the Dutch he would oppose a bar to the encroachments of Louis XIV and defend what remained of the Spanish Monarchy in Northern Europe. This policy would gratify the English people, who had by

no means forgotten their inherited enmity to France, and who had always held it a main object to prevent France from obtaining possession of the cities of Flanders and the port of Antwerp.

But if he wanted a war in order to obtain a military force it was perhaps not clear that he would gain his end by this course. It might lead to peace, for even the young Louis XIV at the head of his brilliant army and commanding the services of Turenne and Condé, might shrink from defying a coalition of England, the United Provinces, Sweden and the Spanish Monarchy. In any case it was opposed to all the inclinations, all the family notions of Charles. One of his strongest feelings was hatred to the Government of De Witt, by which his nephew was excluded from power, and which seemed to him like a relic of the Commonwealth. He had also a strong sense of kindred with the French royal House. If his father had been able to see nothing in the Thirty Years' War but the interest of his nephew the Elector Palatine, it was still more natural that he himself should lean in continental affairs to the side of his mother and of his favourite sister and of his splendid cousin, the great monarch of the age. And he might do so without running counter to public opinion and without startling it.

England had grown accustomed in Cromwell's time to a French alliance, and had learned to understand that by conniving at French encroachments she might purchase advantages for herself both in the Low Countries and in the New World. And if there was an inherited enmity to France there was a much keener, fresher and more intense enmity to the Dutch, our rivals in trade, and lately the invaders of the Thames and the Medway.

If Charles should now throw himself suddenly and

energetically on the side of France he might achieve not merely a success but a great and overwhelming result. For the Triple Alliance had fulfilled his sinister design, it had established a bitter animosity between Louis and the Dutch Government. All that remained for Charles was now suddenly to join France in an overwhelming attack upon the Dutch Republic. In this way he might bury their trophies of 1667 in the ruins of their state, and raise England once for all to the position of the great and sole maritime and commercial Power of the world.

So far the plan is daring and unscrupulous enough. But it would have gratified the passions and the interests of the English people; whether, thus limited, it might not have proved successful, is a curious speculation.

But this is but the lesser half of the scheme which Charles devised. The other half consists in a plan of restoring Catholicism in England. By adding this he gave a kind of revolutionary wildness to his whole policy. The name of religion however served as a decent cloak for its Macchiavellism, and gave him a pretext for demanding of Louis great sums of money. At the same time this unnecessary addition ruined in the end the whole project, ruined the Stuart family, and plunged England into Revolution and Europe into war.

But when we regard the scheme as a whole, its audacity, comprehensiveness, and ingenuity astonish us no less than the enormous miscalculation it involved. Charles II certainly does not show the feebleness of conception that had marked his father. It is true that he was indolent and effeminate. In the end he failed and sank into a position so humiliating, that we hardly give him credit for any higher gifts than a certain vivacity and adroitness. In truth he had not vital force enough to

be, like Henry IV, a great statesman and a great sensualist at the same time. He was also capable, as we see, of committing almost incredible blunders. Nevertheless he was not a mere Stuart. He was in some respects one of the great Macchiavellians of history. Statesmanship of this type, so diabolically ingenious and remorseless, has never been at home in England. It belongs rather to the country of Catharine de Medicis, Richelieu, Mirabeau and Napoleon. But even where, as in Charles II, it was marred by defects so as to prove unsuccessful, it implies certain extraordinary mental qualities. In the whole period under review, from Tudor times to William and Anne, we find no other example of this kind of statesmanship.

We have remarked that these ideas first entered English politics with Henrietta Maria. She died about this time, but her place was taken by her daughter Henrietta Anne, Duchess of Orleans. This person, the child of the reunion of Charles I and Henrietta Maria after their long separation at the beginning of the Civil War, represents most completely the preponderance of the French and Bourbon element in the royal family. Not only by her marriage but by her education and religion she belongs to France. Like Mary Queen of Scots, she was at home in French court life. Now in May, 1670, she met her brother at Dover, and the compact was arranged which remained so long unknown to the world, and even at the moment was concealed from some of the principal Ministers.

One scheme was wrapped up in another, the latter being such as could be published, such as might have succeeded and at any rate contained no germ of revolution. This consisted in an alliance with France against the Dutch. The Triple Alliance was nominally maintained, but for the future England and France were to march

together and to take vengeance on the Dutch. For this purpose Louis was to grant Charles a subsidy. Such a policy was not very unlike that of the Commonwealth and of Cromwell. The Commonwealth had made war with the Dutch, Cromwell had allied himself with France. If the subsidy would make Charles independent of Parliament and if a Declaration of Indulgence was also contemplated, Cromwell too had been independent of Parliament and he too had been tolerant.

It was in this way that Ashley Cooper and Buckingham regarded the new treaty and the new policy. The Clarendonian system being at an end, some such policy seemed the only alternative. It might arouse some opposition, but it was likely to be in the main popular promising an advance on the one hand in trade and maritime power, on the other hand in religious toleration.

But glimpses were soon obtained of the other policy that was wrapped up in this. The Treasury, which had been in Commission since the fall of Clarendon, was now given to a strong Catholic, Sir Thomas Clifford, and in conversation the King and the Duke began to betray their Catholic opinion. The English public was as keenly sensitive on religious questions as it was indifferent about foreign policy. In these suspicions lay the germ of revolution.

Charles II may be said to have been a man of one deed. The Treaty of Dover followed by the war of 1672 was this one deed. Earlier he had been in leading-strings and later, when he became alive to the error he had committed, he fell back into a defensive attitude, which he maintained on the whole till the end of his reign. He exhausted himself in this one grandiose and Macchiavellian

combination, which he had courage enough to take in hand but not force enough to persevere in. It is easy to condemn him from the moral point of view, and also to pronounce that in the long run he failed, but we must not overlook that immediately and as far as the ostensible part of the scheme is concerned he achieved a great success.

Did he want satisfaction for the affront done him by the Dutch ships in the Medway? Did he want to overthrow the republican Government in the United Provinces and to restore his nephew to the position held by his ancestors? Let us pass in review what took place in 1672.

It was the most startling event that had happened in Europe for a long time. Louis took the field with an army of more than a hundred thousand men, Condé commanding one division and Turenne having practically the command of the other. He avoided as much as possible the Spanish Low Countries and advanced to the Rhine chiefly through the territory of the Bishop of Liège, who was also Elector of Cologne and his ally. He then, while the Dutch expected him on the Yssel, after capturing four fortresses garrisoned by the Dutch upon the Rhine, crossed that river into Dutch territory. The Dutch taken by surprise divided their army, which united was greatly inferior to the French. The result was that they were able to make little resistance. Nimeguen and Utrecht fell into the hands of Louis, while the fortresses of the Yssel were occupied by his allies, the Bishops of Münster and Cologne.

But the United Provinces were a maritime state, the life of which lay in its seaports and its foreign trade. It seemed then to seal their doom that the other Sea-Power,

England, declared war against them at the same time, or rather without declaration of war fell suddenly upon their commercial fleets. Except in the Napoleonic age no such crushing attack has been made with such suddenness upon a great state as this combined attack upon the Dutch state by France and England. How it was resisted, we shall inquire later. Suffice it here to say that a new Prince of Orange now appears upon the scene.

The immediate result of this attack was the downfall of the system of Government which had prevailed in the state for twenty years. As early as June 21st an attempt was made to assassinate John De Witt, and four days later his brother Cornelius was also threatened with assassination. Then began an agitation for the revival of the Stadholderate.

Orange op, Wit onder was an inscription which appeared at Dordrecht, De Witt's own town, under two flags, the higher orange-coloured, the lower white, which were exhibited on the top of a tower. In July the Prince found himself restored to the position of his ancestors.

The reaction does not stop here. Cornelius De Witt is arrested on the charge of being implicated in a plot against the Prince of Orange. In August John De Witt resigns the post of Grand Pensionary of Holland. Now takes place the trial of Cornelius. He is put to the torture. He is condemned to the loss of all his offices and dignities and to perpetual banishment from the provinces of Holland and West Friesland. The sentence is dated August 20th. John De Witt visits him in the prison and is detained there. The populace rise against the brothers, drag them out of the prison, intending to put them to death upon the scaffold. But in the street Cornelius is

murdered with daggers, hatchets and the butt ends of muskets, John with guns. He falls amid cries of 'Behold the downfall of the Perpetual Edict! You pray to God! You do not believe there is one. You have long since denied Him by your treason and your villanies.' The bodies are stripped of their clothes, hung on a gibbet, then mutilated. One man boasts, 'I bought one of John De Witt's fingers for two sous and a pot of beer.'

When we think of the share which England took in all this our minds are influenced by later events. We see a Protestant Power overwhelmed by a Catholic king, and England taking the wrong side. It is to be added that even on the wrong side she does not much distinguish herself. De Ruyter is the hero of the naval war, and at the battle of Southwold Bay he probably saved his country. The French appear to watch with pleasure the losses suffered by the English navy. At the time however the English nation thought of earlier events, which we have forgotten, and had no knowledge of that later history which influences our minds. The Dutch were then our greatest enemies and our most dangerous rivals, and we had a recent disgrace to avenge upon them. We had fought in alliance with France under Cromwell; we had not yet fully learned to regard her as an ascendant and dangerous Power, and up to that time she had usually aided 'the Protestant cause in Europe. Not till the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes did the religious question come into the foreground and France identify herself with Catholicism. In these circumstances the disaster of the Dutch would seem a great triumph for English policy. And indeed though they were to have another age of greatness and glory yet their decline begins

from this time, and in particular their naval power declines. As early as 1688 it is remarked that 'the Dutch navy was incalculably decreased in strength.'

To the whole English nation, it is to be feared, this decline would give unfeigned satisfaction. But to the Macchiavellian on the English throne the occurrences of 1672 must have caused unbounded exultation. He had obtained a personal victory. He had overthrown the republican Government of the United Provinces and had raised his nephew to the head of affairs. He had done this by means of that very Triple Alliance which had procured so much empty glory for the unfortunate John De Witt.

By this revolution in the United Provinces the revival of the dynastic system was consummated. Charles must have felt that now for the first time he was completely restored. What a change since 1651! In that year there had been a Republic in England, a Republic in the United Provinces, and a republican movement which seemed not unlikely to succeed in France. Now Monarchy had risen higher than ever in France, had been definitively restored in England, and entered the United Provinces in a more threatening form than ever. That quasi-monarchy which was composed of the union in one person, whose claim was grounded on his birth, of the command of the army and the fleet with the Stadholderate was now restored. The new Stadholder already displayed all the imperiousness and genius for Government of his ancestors. But, unlike any of his ancestors, he was a person of royal rank. The power which in them might be called a quasi-monarchy, was in his hands almost monarchy itself. And this new monarch was nephew to Charles II of England.

Thus the last remnant of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate was swept away, and the House of Stuart extended its power henceforth, in some sense, not only over the three kingdoms but over the United Provinces also. The dynastic system was completely revived.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RISE OF A NEW OPPOSITION.

HITHERTO we have contemplated the new policy as much as possible from the point of view of the Government which adopted it. As it appeared to those who, like Ashley Cooper and Buckingham, were privy to but half the Treaty of Dover, as it appeared to the eyes of the world in 1672, this policy might seem a return to the system of Cromwell from the system of Clarendon. A Declaration of Indulgence was issued at the same time that an aggressive alliance with France was announced. Toleration and concert with France had been characteristics of Cromwell's system.

The ulterior plans of Charles were at this time almost entirely concealed, for though the Catholics were mentioned in the Declaration, they were not put on the same footing with the Dissenters. To the latter public worship was to be allowed, to the former only private.

There was indeed one vast difference between this system and that of Cromwell. Cromwell's alliance with France had been directed against the Spanish Monarchy,

the new alliance was pointed at a Protestant Power, with which Cromwell had made peace, the United Provinces. It is to be observed however that, if not Cromwell, the Commonwealth had made war with the Dutch, and that at this moment England had a defeat and disgrace to wipe out.

Thus it might seem that by means of a successful national war, in the course of which an army would be formed, and subsidies would come in from France, the English Monarchy might acquire the principal characteristic of the Cromwellian Government, that of resting on an army and becoming independent of the Parliament. The war was commenced in 1672 during the prorogation of Parliament, and to obtain money the violent measure was adopted which is known as the Stop of the Exchequer.

Had the king launched this policy frankly in the spirit of Ashley Cooper, being himself a staunch Protestant and at the same time a sincere friend of toleration, we can imagine that it might have made way gradually in spite of the stubborn Anglicanism of the Parliament. But the ulterior scheme, though so carefully concealed, and though after a time it was practically abandoned, was from the first shrewdly suspected. Clifford was known to be a Catholic, the Duke of York, nay Charles himself, had at least not the bearing of convinced Protestants. As for Charles, even when his marriage was first discussed, it had been remarked that he was quite impatient of the thought of marrying a Protestant¹. The time had lately been when Protestants might hope to see some day a Protestant queen, for the wife of the heir to the throne was daughter to the model Anglican, Lord Clarendon. But Anne Hyde

¹ Halifax, The Character of King Charles II.

became a Catholic before her husband, and then died. The Duke was now to marry again; he selected a Catholic princess, who had French connexions—for her mother was one of Mazarin's nieces—Mary of Modena. In spite of opposition in Parliament this marriage was concluded in 1673, and it could not but add greatly to the alarm which began to prevail. By this time it had become known that the Duke himself was a Roman Catholic; it now appeared that in the next reign the Court would be far more intensely Romanist than in any period since Philip and Mary; and what could be expected of the next reign after that, when probably a king would be on the throne, whose mother had been Romanist by breeding and his father Romanist by conversion?

Thus in the two years of the Dutch war (1672–1674) the ostensible scheme of a national war against the great commercial rival and of a French alliance in the style of Cromwell could not hide the real scheme, which was so different. It flashed upon the English mind that the war was really against Protestantism, and that England, deserting all her traditions, was now on the wrong side, that the Lord High Admiral, the Lord Treasurer and the Secretary of State, perhaps even the king himself, certainly the queen and the future queen, were all alike Roman Catholics, and that the Declaration of Indulgence must therefore be intended not so much to relieve the Dissenters as to introduce Popery.

Accordingly opposition began. Charles II found himself, like his father, confronted by Parliament. His Declaration of Indulgence was treated as an infringement of the Constitution, and in order to prevent the power of Government from passing into the hands of Roman Catholics a Test Act was introduced.

And it soon became clear that Charles II had no intention of treading in the footsteps of Charles I, however he might desire to follow the example of Cromwell. He did not mean to set up a tyranny on the legal ground of the ancient rights of the Crown. When the legality of his Declaration was questioned, he first appealed from the House of Commons to the House of Lords, and when the Lords declined to countenance his claim he frankly cancelled the Declaration. It also became clear that he had not inherited the blindness, the incapacity of grasping realities, which had been so fatal to his father. The hallucination that the English people might be induced to consent to the reestablishment of Popery seems to have left him. He accepted the Test Act, and in consequence the Roman Catholic Clifford resigned the Treasurership, and the Duke of York resigned the office of Admiral. Since 1669, when he had actually thought of declaring himself a Catholic, Charles had arrived in 1673 at a very different state of mind. Arlington, himself a Catholic and privy to the king's original scheme, had become alive to the great feebleness of the Catholic party in England, and there is every reason to think that from this time the scheme of changing religion was entirely laid aside. Perhaps the only occasion on which, after Parliament had declared itself, Charles betrayed his inclination to Popery was that of his brother's second marriage in 1673.

The Revolution, as we have said, had been planned in 1669 and had begun in 1670. Had it been, like the movement in Charles I's time, purely insular, it might have subsided and come to a quiet end in 1673. It was however essentially a continental movement, which had only reached England at all because the English royal family was so strongly tinged with French ideas and

feelings. That Parliament had stood firm and had passed the Test Act was therefore not sufficient to put the public mind at ease. The future king, and now the future queen, were avowed Catholics, and the strength of the Catholic cause was to be measured not by the importance of the party in England but by the power and wealth and ambition of Louis XIV himself. For Louis was not merely a foreign ally but actually entered into English politics as Philip of Spain had done in the reign of Mary. He furnished the Government with money ; he began to marshal his votes in the House of Commons.

In the year 1668 Louvois effected his reorganisation of the French army, and from this time France assumed a position among European Powers wholly different from that which she had held when she had been in alliance with Cromwell. In those days England had had a disciplined army, while the French army was only in the making. But henceforward, as was revealed to all the world in the campaign of 1672, France was the greatest military Power that had appeared in modern Europe, whereas England had ceased to be a military Power. Richelieu and even Mazarin had achieved their triumphs in a great degree by diplomacy, by alliances, while they had had to contend with a strong internal opposition. Now under the personal Government of Louis XIV France entirely changed her character and became tenfold more formidable, when she attained to complete internal unity and when this tremendous military instrument was put into the hand of her Government.

But what object had France in view ?

Not merely the conquest of the Spanish Low Countries, and Franche Comté, and Lorraine ; not merely the establishment of her eventual claim to the Spanish succession.

It began to be perceived that she meditated another conquest.

She had acquired internal unity, and with unity ascendancy in Europe. But there remained one trace of her old disunion, all the more unsightly and incongruous because it was left alone. Now that there was no more Fronde, now that the Parliaments had been tamed, the nobles turned into courtiers, Condé himself reduced to a mere distinguished general, it seemed intolerable that there should still be Huguenots in France. The Edict of Nantes was still in force, though the circumstances that had suggested it had wholly passed away. It had been granted when the Government was weak and the Huguenots were strong, as the only means of bringing civil war to an end. But since Richelieu's time the Huguenots had quite ceased to be formidable, and now the Government was omnipotent. And public opinion in France was as decided as ever against Protestantism.

The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes took place in 1685, only three years before the English Revolution. But we may say of it, as of the Revolution, that it was the result of a movement which had begun many years before. It was no more the result of a caprice of omnipotence on the part of Louis XIV than the Revolution was the result of a fit of blind obstinacy in James II. The Revocation was vehemently demanded by the clergy and welcomed enthusiastically by public opinion. The tide had been visibly setting towards it for many years. It was but the last of a series of measures directed against the Huguenots; the Great Emigration of 1685 had been preceded by smaller emigrations, and as early as 1665 it can be shown that the catastrophe had been foreseen.

This movement in France becoming observable at the

time of the enormous growth of her military power was a fact of the most serious importance when the family alliance between Charles and Louis came to light and at the same time the English Government suddenly took a Catholic complexion. The movement towards Catholicism in the English royal family, so strongly French in its connexions, seemed like a ripple in the general Catholic movement of French society. A few years earlier Cromwell had said that France, if Catholic, was tolerant, and was to be favourably distinguished from Spain. It begins now to be perceived that this is no longer true. When Parliament met in the autumn of 1673, just after the marriage of James with Mary of Modena, Sir W. Coventry made a speech in which he said, 'In former days Spain was more rigorous in religion, but now France. The papal nuncio has received the order not to oppose the progress of the French arms.'

This was the France which in 1672 made an overwhelming attack upon a great Protestant Power, and did so in conjunction with England! This was the France from which Charles II received subsidies at the moment when his Treasurer was a Catholic and when the heir to his throne went over to the Catholic Church!

Taking all facts together, we see that the events of 1672 showed that a great religious crisis was at hand, in which the king of France would play the part which in former times had been played by the House of Austria, that Protestantism was threatened by the greatest Power in the world, alike in France, in the United Provinces and in England. It could be perceived that the struggle in which Charles had been baffled by the Test Act was but a preliminary affair, that the main body of the army which had to be resisted was on the Continent under the orders

of Louis XIV, that troubles were approaching for England which would not be, like her former troubles, insular, but would affect her and other Protestant states at once.

The old biographer of Shaftesbury tells us that he, who had actually supported the Dutch war and had applied to our commercial rival the words *Delenda est Carthago*, becoming aware in the course of 1672 that Charles was a Roman Catholic, ‘expressed his trouble at the black cloud which, he said, was gathering over England.’

The phrase fitly described the vastness and vagueness of the danger. How to avert it? We were indeed well practised in resisting the illegal encroachments of a king. But precedents drawn from the Great Rebellion were at that moment most unacceptable, and they were also scarcely applicable. The king might be resisted in Parliament, and resistance might be pushed to civil war and the destruction of the Monarchy. But that generation had learned by experience that a civil war creates a military power and that in such circumstances a revolution leads inevitably to imperialism. They were not prepared to abolish Monarchy a second time only twelve years after they had found themselves forced penitently to reinstate it. Moreover if Parliament could withstand Charles II, could it resist Louis XIV? For it was the army of France and the treasury of France, possibly aided by the force and wealth of the other Catholic Powers, which, when the Dutch had been subdued and the Huguenot party crushed, would be placed at the service of a Catholic Government in England.

Such was the danger. On the other hand it seemed likely that time would be allowed for a system of opposition to form itself, since the indolent Charles had apparently exhausted his courage and his will in one effort. It was

now perhaps rather James than Charles that was to be feared, and as Charles in 1672 was but forty-two years old the day of James would not speedily come.

Certain outlines of the necessary plan of opposition were already visible. In the first place foreign affairs must now come into the foreground of politics. It was a first interest of England that the encroachments of France should be arrested, and that the Dutch should be saved from destruction. The rivalry of English and Dutch must cease; the two Sea Powers must combine in opposition to France. And some plan must be devised for purging the Monarchy of Catholicism without abolishing it. The Test Act must in some form be extended to the Crown.

And now as men began to turn their attention to foreign affairs they saw a great rift in the cloud which had seemed at first to cover the whole heaven. There would have been little hope for Protestantism had France with her immense power been aided in her attack on it by the other Catholic Powers. All along it had been saved by disunion among the Catholic Powers, by the singular fact that France, so steadfastly Catholic at home, had aided the Reformation in her international policy. What could save it henceforth, as this was ceasing to be the case? Nothing but an opposite change—and this actually took place at the same moment in the policy of the other Catholic Powers. The tyrannic Powers of a former age, which had been discrowned by France, the Spanish Monarchy and the Austrian Monarchy, began to favour the Protestant states just when France ceased to do so.

In August, 1673, occurred a great international event, the formation of a new coalition against France. The first coalition, the Triple Alliance, had fallen practically into abeyance by the defection of England; it was replaced

by a new one, in which the two branches of the House of Habsburg allied themselves with the Dutch.

That the House of Spain should take this step requires no explanation. Though a Protestant Power, the old enemy of Spain, had been attacked by Louis in 1672, and though France began to assume the part of an enemy of Protestantism in general, yet Spain had still more to fear from France than any other Power. The first object of France was still, as in her recent war, the acquisition of Franche Comté and the Spanish Low Countries, and her chief reason for attacking the Dutch had been that they had hindered her from making these acquisitions. Spain began to feel herself isolated and helpless in her Low Countries when in 1672 the French army swept over the Dutch territory behind her, and in 1673 she was still more directly threatened when Maestricht was taken by the French. How great her danger was may be seen by noting the final result of this war, which is somewhat misleadingly called the War of Holland. At the peace of 1678 the Dutch lost nothing, and yet France acquired more than in any other of the treaties made by Louis XIV. Her conquests were made at the expense of Spain, which ceded Franche Comté.

But the Austrian branch, which since the Peace of Westphalia had fallen into the background, now came forward again, and joined the coalition of August, 1673, against France. The Emperor Leopold acted thus after much hesitation. He, as well as Charles II, had been assailed by the active French diplomacy. He already felt himself the rival claimant to Louis for the Spanish succession, being the husband of the Infanta Margaret as Louis of the Infanta Maria Theresa. Louis had proposed to him an amicable arrangement of their claims. In January,

1668, just when Temple was so busy at the Hague, a secret Partition Treaty had been signed at Vienna—the first of many attempts to solve that portentous question of the Spanish Succession—according to which the Emperor should have Spain, the West Indies and Milan, and the French king the Netherlands, Naples and Sicily.

This treaty had been an important part of the great web of diplomacy which preceded the war of 1672, and in which first the Dutch and next Spain seemed to have been entangled. As the cooperation of England on the one side, so the neutrality of Austria on the other seemed to be secured. Nevertheless after witnessing the events of 1672 and the siege of Maestricht in 1673, after much negociation with the Great Elector, interested for Cleve, the Emperor at last presented an ultimatum to France, and in August concluded his treaty with the Dutch Republic at the Hague on the same day on which Spain also concluded a similar treaty. The object was the restoration of the former state of things. In the Spanish treaty mention was made in a secret article of a mediation between the Republic and England.

It was the second step in the resistance of Europe to Louis XIV. A maritime combination had first been formed by Temple, and now a continental coalition was formed. The former had fallen into abeyance. The latter, as we shall see, had little success. It did not prevent Louis from attaining one of his main objects, the conquest of Franche Comté, nor from rising to an ascendancy which for a time seemed irresistible. But two modes of coalition had now been shown to be possible, and there was no reason why these two modes should not be combined. After 1688 Louis found himself confronted by a system which had been formed by compounding the Triple Alliance

with the Coalition of 1673. The founder of this mighty and invincible union, which regulated the international system of Europe for the eighteenth century, was that first royal Stadholder who had risen to the head of affairs in 1672, William III of Holland and afterwards of England.

It is rather with the alliances of 1673 than with the Triple Alliance that the more modern arrangement of Europe begins. From this time France is the aggressive Power, which it is the common interest of Protestant and Catholic Powers to hold in check, and ever since, except for about thirty years before the French Revolution, France has been thus dreaded and watched.

But there still remained at the close of 1673 one trace of the old state of things which we are about to leave behind us. England was still in active alliance with France, as she had often been before in Elizabeth's time, in Cromwell's time. The period is soon to commence when France and England will belong to opposite systems, when concert between them will begin to be extremely rare and the old rivalry of the two neighbour nations will break out again and lead to a new Hundred Years War.

Early in 1674 the first step towards this new arrangement was taken. The Treaty of Westminster was concluded between Charles II and the States-General, and England retired from a war in which she had cooperated with France against a Protestant Power and against the liberties of Europe. In this treaty, as in the treaties of August, 1673, it may perhaps be said that the most potent influence at work was that of Spain. It was indeed Spain which was most interested in opposing a barrier to French aggression and in saving that very Dutch republic against

which she had made war for eighty years. She had been able to influence the kindred Power of Austria, and now she was able to influence England. As it was a maxim in Spain that there ought always to be peace with England, so in England in those times we always remark a great reluctance to have war with Spain. For war with Spain involved the greatest possible hindrance to trade. The Dutch war had been at the outset in 1672 to a certain extent popular, though the suspicious behaviour of the Government had damped even then the public enthusiasm. The misfortunes of the Dutch, what Temple calls 'the fall of the Republic,' in that year altered the situation. Even the king might feel that one object at least was gained when he saw his nephew rise to the head of affairs and De Witt fall. And the situation was still more seriously altered when Holland gained great allies, and particularly when Spain, the great New World Power, appeared among the belligerents.

The treaty was concluded with much ease, but it makes a land-mark in the history of English policy. It is the first step towards that alliance of the two Sea Powers which became the keystone of the system of Europe in the age of William and Marlborough, which lasted on into the middle of the eighteenth century and was revived after the French Revolution. Here too begins the separation of England and France which was to have such memorable results.

With the Treaty of Westminster a certain comparative quiet is restored to English politics. The Revolution has indeed begun, and does not cease to make progress, but for four years from this date, that is, from the Treaty of Westminster to the Panic of the Popish Plot, the storm is somewhat less violent.

We have already marked some periods in Charles II's reign. There was the constitutional period, in which Clarendon is the prominent figure, and the first revolutionary period, which is commonly labelled with the unsatisfactory name of the Cabal. We have now before us a third period, which has also a prominent figure. The Cabal is now dispersed, for Clifford is dead and Shaftesbury has gone into opposition. But Thomas Osborne, made Earl of Danby, has become Lord Treasurer, and gives a character to the period, which may be called the age of Danby.

It is a new period, since the wild scheme formed in 1669 has now been laid aside, frustrated at home by the Test Act, abroad by the Treaty of Westminster. It lasts however but four years, for in 1678 the aspect of affairs changes again, when at the same time the European War is brought to an end by the Treaty of Nimeguen and at home the revolutionary storm breaks out again with the Panic. Immediately afterwards a new change is introduced by the dissolution of the Parliament, the Long Parliament of the Restoration.

Accordingly these four years have a character of their own. The king, if he had failed in much, had gained one important point, namely, the establishment of his nephew in supreme power over the Dutch. Parliament too had successfully asserted its right. The country had peace again, and might have thrown off its anxieties if it could have forgotten that the heir to the throne had now avowed himself a Catholic and had married a Catholic wife.

Nevertheless a Revolution was visibly proceeding. The Monarchy had lost the respectability which, at least as a public institution, it had maintained in the days of

Clarendon. Just as in 1659 the Commonwealth had appeared to be a failure, so now the Restoration Monarchy. New constitutional changes would after all be necessary. The country had had to acknowledge that it could not do without a king; it now began to confess that this king, or a king altogether of this kind, would not suit it either.

Charles II's own preference for Catholicism was now veiled again, and he soon began to derive a certain personal advantage from the fact that his brother was known to be a Catholic while he himself still passed for an Anglican. The Panic, which in the long run was the inevitable result of the sinister practices of 1669 and 1670, had not yet broken out. But even in this comparatively quiet interval the course of Charles II's Government was so unprincipled and treacherous that it afforded the presage of new convulsions. He had all along balanced between two opposite systems, the constitutional system of Clarendon, and a Cromwellian system which would make him independent of Parliament. He had launched a singularly audacious scheme with this latter object in 1672, but he had now abandoned it again. We find him next occupying a sort of middle position. The question is, how to obtain money. There are two paymasters to whom he may apply. The one is Parliament, the other is Louis XIV. In these years he sets himself up to auction. As the feeling against France is constantly growing in Parliament, it becomes a principle with Charles that by opposing Louis he can obtain money from Parliament, and on the other hand that on condition of restraining, thwarting or proroguing Parliament, he can obtain money from Louis. During this period Louis is contending against a great Coalition. It lies with Charles to decide the

issue of the European war, which is particularly dependent on him. He has ceased to aid France; what if he should strike in on the other side? If Louis does not wish to see this happen, Louis must pay! And so in return for the prorogation of Parliament for fifteen months which took place in November 1675, Louis pays £100,000. Again, in 1677 when Parliament presents an address 'representing the danger from French aggression and imploring the king to strengthen himself by such alliances as may secure Flanders and quiet the fears of the English people,' Parliament is prorogued again, but this time Louis has to pay £180,000. On the other hand at the beginning of 1678 when Charles demands £600,000 from Louis for a similar service and meets with a refusal, Charles begins to decide upon war and obtains a grant of £600,000 from Parliament 'for enabling his majesty to enter into actual war against the French king.'

This perhaps is the most characteristic part of the reign of Charles II. In the audacious scheme of 1669 his Macchiavellism has almost a sort of greatness, but he was unable to maintain himself at such a high point. In the last dark period of his reign he is under the pressure of danger, as in the first period he had been in leading-strings. Between 1674 and 1678 he is about at his average, unprincipled and adroit but without greatness, without indeed any definite object but to obtain money without yielding his whole prerogative to Parliament.

The Monarchy was demoralised. It had no sympathy with the nation, even on the subjects on which the nation felt most strongly, viz. the advance of Popery and the advance of French ascendancy. It had also neither honour nor honesty.

In these years the nation began to feel its way to the

solution of that dangerous problem, how to reform the Monarchy without destroying it.

The mischief lay not precisely in the individuality of Charles, in his want of principle and of morality, nor yet in any hankering after absolute power, for he did not so much want to usurp an absolute power as to prevent the power he had from being lost in the encroachments of Parliament. It lay rather in his family connexions, in the fact that he was by birth and breeding half a Frenchman and that therefore his ideas both of religion and of foreign policy were French. In one respect this made the mischief more serious. Not being personal to Charles, it would not pass away with him; on the contrary his successor would be more frankly Catholic and therefore of necessity more attached to the French connexion than himself. And by the hereditary nature of monarchy the mischief was likely to become perpetual. But in another respect there was hope in the thought that it lay in family connexion. For the royal family had other connexions that were not French and not Catholic. Even in England the family was not yet entirely Catholic. True, Charles was but nominally Anglican and the Queen was avowedly Catholic, the Duke was avowedly Catholic and his first wife had died a Catholic, while his second wife, the future Queen, was avowedly Catholic, and foreign, partly French, in her connexions. The evil had spread very far, and it was not unlikely that there would soon be a second heir to the throne who would be a Catholic from the cradle. But in the meantime the persons nearest after the Duke of York to the throne were two princesses who were Protestant and grandchildren of the great Anglican, Lord Clarendon. It was little to depend on, but such as it was the Protestant faith of these two children might

still be guarded from the influence of their father and step-mother, so long as Charles himself, intimidated by the growing agitation, desired to pass with his people for a faithful Anglican.

And among the connexions of the royal family were there no Protestants? The Houses of Bragança, Modena, Orleans were all alike Catholic, and all alike in the Bourbon interest. But there was another House, the House of Orange.

The third William in the line of Stadholders is in this respect chiefly to be reckoned among hereditary kings that from the very marriage of his parents his whole existence was consciously planned and arranged for great public purposes. He is unlike some other great European statesmen who have passed over our scene, such as Richelieu, Cromwell and Mazarin, in this that he did not rise to greatness or make a place for himself, but found a place assigned to him from his birth so great that he proved himself a great man merely by filling it. He was not only the lineal successor of four men in whose lives almost the whole history of the Dutch state was bound up, the Liberator William, the great commander Moritz, Frederick Henry, in whose time the state had risen to its zenith of prosperity, and the second William, in De Witt's opinion the ablest of the House, who had been cut off in early manhood. He rose above all these in this that he was also of royal rank and a member of the royal family of England. If Charles was half a Frenchman, William was half an Englishman, and whereas the difference, in those days the antipathy, of the English and French races was marked, the English and Dutch felt themselves to be closely akin. We have seen how the Dutch had throughout concerned themselves as relatives

in our civil troubles, how William's father had been a kind of head of the English royalist party, how Cromwell had treated William himself in his infancy as one of the most dangerous of his antagonists. Thus as he grew up the eyes not only of the popular party in his own country but also of the royalist party in England were fixed upon him. In both countries he represented Monarchy, in Holland his rise in 1672 had been the fall of republicanism, and in England his name had been identified from the first with opposition to the Commonwealth and to Cromwell. But like all his House he was a Protestant. He stood forth at this time as the great representative of the Protestant cause in Europe.

In him therefore the royalist party in England had, as it were, a second string to its bow. If the reigning branch of the House of Stuart disappointed it through French and Catholicising notions, there was another scion of the House at the Hague, who was firmly Protestant and who was the champion of his country against French aggression. Beside the two Protestant princesses at home, Mary and Anne, they could place their hopes upon William beyond the sea.

Thus William was the hope of two nations at once. They were nations which for some time past had been divided by commercial rivalry, which had waged war three times in twenty years. But affairs now wore another aspect. These two commercial nations had begun to feel that they had a common interest in resisting the encroachments of France. They had concluded the Treaty of Westminster. Their sense of common interest drew them together more and more. And thus a still greater place was made for William. Not only did he now appear born to save the independence of Holland and to save the Monarchy in

England, but at the same time to weld the two nations together in an indissoluble alliance against France.

More than a century earlier, when Edward VI was on the English throne and the child Mary was Queen of Scotland, there had sprung up an eager desire to unite the two kingdoms for ever by a marriage between the two young sovereigns. For in those times it was by royal marriage that states were most naturally welded together. A similar process of thought would lead now to the idea of marriage between William and Mary. The Princess Mary (for the present at least) embodied the hereditary principle, and she represented Anglicanism in religion. William represented the Protestant cause in Europe and the European opposition to French ascendancy. He came of a line of Protestant heroes, and was personally the most eminent by far of the rising princes of Europe by his achievements and by the commanding firmness of his character. Could he be brought nearer to the English royal family and receive an important position in English political life he would assuredly do much to counteract that demoralisation of the Monarchy which was beginning to be so dangerous.

And such a plan would be welcome to the royal family itself. It would be positively welcome to Charles, who after the failure of his grand plot saw the necessity of giving new pledges to Protestantism. The Test Act had deprived him of his Catholic counsellors; he had now in Danby a Lord Treasurer who depended upon Anglican support; a Protestant marriage would greatly strengthen his new position. Nor would the marriage be positively unwelcome to James, who might well be alarmed at the storm of unpopularity that was rising against him. And both the brothers would re-

member that William was their nephew, that his mother had been their sister and his father a principal supporter of their cause.

The marriage, which took place in the autumn of 1677, falls in Danby's administration. That powerful, but unscrupulous and, as it were, *thick-skinned* statesman (Queen Mary afterwards described him as 'one to whom I must ever own great obligations, yet of a temper I can never like')¹ had a large share in deciding one of the greatest events in English history. But perhaps Charles himself had the largest share. For we see him in these last years of the war meditating once more a comprehensive policy. He gives forth another flash of Henry IV. He substitutes now for the wild designs of 1669 a new plan, which is also large and striking and which stands midway between the Triple Alliance and the great European policy of William in 1689. For the Family Alliance of Stuart and Bourbon he substitutes a Family Alliance of Stuart and Orange, the object of which will be to bring about by mediation a European Peace. As in the Triple Alliance, a certain gentle pressure is now to be applied to Louis, but at the same time he is to be generously treated. England is to appear as arbitrator of the European dispute, and the cause of Monarchy is to reap the benefit. An army is to be raised for a purpose which Parliament will enthusiastically approve, and this army will perhaps make Charles independent of Parliament; in the Dutch state William, who is already almost a king, will perhaps by means of his new royal connexions succeed in openly establishing a Monarchy.

And thus we arrive at one of the greatest of the royal marriages which have determined the course of inter-

¹ Doeblin, *Memoirs of Mary, Queen of England*, p. 29.

national history. The vast results of the marriage of William and Mary were developed later. What was visible at the moment was that it afforded a solid nucleus for the gathering opposition of Europe to the ascendancy of France.

CHAPTER V.

THE LAST PHASE OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION.

THE Danby period closes with the restoration of peace to Europe by the Treaty of Nimeguen, which was concluded in the summer of 1678. At the end of that year occurred the exposure, which led to the fall of Danby; the dissolution of Parliament speedily followed, and this together with the Panic gave quite a new aspect to English politics. Both in the reign of Charles II and in the reign of Louis XIV, both in English and in European history a period comes to an end.

Another stage is completed in the progress of the Second Revolution, and we remark once more the peculiarity of this movement that, unlike the Great Rebellion, it is at no stage purely insular, but at every stage alike is also the English part of a European movement. As it began in 1670 with a treaty between the English and French kings, and proceeded by a joint war of those two kings upon the Dutch Republic, a war which convulsed the whole European system, so between 1674 and 1678, though England had retired from the war, the agitation which still prevails in

English politics is both caused by continental events and in great part fomented by foreign politicians. A special feature of the Danby period is the prominence of foreign affairs in the deliberations of Parliament. Since the days of the Commonwealth Parliament had acquired a new kind of permanence. There is now always a Parliament, which may be adjourned or prorogued, but which is still there and is the same Parliament. Accordingly foreign Governments begin to take account of it, to enter into dealings with it. The art of managing Parliament has been introduced by Clifford and is practised by Danby, but it is a novelty that the foreign Ambassadors now practise it also. As the grand topic is now the European war, as the standing matter of deliberation is whether England shall remain neutral or shall strike in, and if so, on which side she shall strike in, and since for the belligerent Powers everything depends on the course which England may take, these Powers make eager efforts to influence Parliament. It is not enough for Louis to bribe Charles, he must also bribe the Parliament, and on the other side Spain, which is now fighting for life, must not neglect the same means of obtaining the aid of England.

Hence there arises a wild confusion. To understand the parliamentary debates of this time you must ascertain not only the opinions nor only the party connexions of the members, you must also know what gentlemen have received gratifications and from what quarter, since there are now several paymasters, and money may be had from the French Embassy or from the Spanish Embassy as easily as from the Treasury. The confusion reaches its height in 1678 as the negotiations at Nimeguen approach their end. The chapter of our history which closes with

the Treaty of Nimeguen offers a labyrinth of mystery and secrecy similar to that which leads to the Treaty of Utrecht, and the Danby period has a certain resemblance to the famous last four years of Queen Anne. We abstain here from telling a story which could not be told shortly, and content ourselves with remarking first how exceptionally strong at this crisis are foreign influences in English politics, next how abruptly in the course of 1678 this phase of affairs gives place to another and a very dissimilar phase.

Ever since 1672 English politics have been violent and rancorous. We see the Whig and Tory parties taking shape under the leadership of Shaftesbury and Danby respectively and under the pressure of unusual alarms and disquietudes. The thoughts of men are growing revolutionary. Nevertheless as yet there has been no open disturbance. Shaftesbury indeed has had to sit in the Tower, but no party has taken arms, nor has the scaffold been set up. The Danby period, compared with the period which followed, may be reckoned to the prosperous part of Charles II's reign.

But now begins a wilder time, which, compared to the average of English history, may be called a Reign of Terror, and which ended after ten years in a change of Government, a civil war in each of the three kingdoms, and a war with France. Convulsion follows convulsion, from the Panic of the Popish Plot, through the wild agitation of the Exclusion Bill and the Rye House Plot, to the accession of a Popish King and Queen, and thence through the Rebellions of Monmouth and Argyle, and the Bloody Assize, to the expedition of William of Orange and that consummation of the Revolution, which is commonly spoken of as the Revolution.

The cause of the sudden change in 1678 is manifest enough. The religious question breaks out again. In 1672 there had been but suspicions and apprehensions, which the Test Act had been sufficient to allay. Had Charles stood alone they need never have revived. They could not be put to rest, while his brother remained heir to the throne and avowed himself a Catholic. Hence the new period opens with a wild outcry of Popery, and through the whole of it Popery is the enemy, first as giving birth to plots, next as threatening the country in the successor, then as actually forced upon the country by the king.

But in this period more than ever we are to remark that the movement is not insular. It is neither purely insular nor merely connected with the Continent by the subsidies from France which the English king receives.

The religious question had indeed first emerged in England, when Charles II made the grand proposal which led to the Treaty of Dover. At that time, that is in 1660, the settlement of religion in France had not been shaken. But now nine years later, when the Panic brought religion once more into the foreground in England, a change was taking place upon the Continent. At the moment when the Treaty of Nimeguen had established French ascendancy in the most alarming manner, the religious question began to break out in France too, and in such a manner as to make the danger in England tenfold more alarming. And then as affairs darkened here they went on darkening there. Accordingly we form no just conception of the so-called English Revolution if we confine our view to England. If we do so, we become aware merely of a perverse king whose designs are rather embarrassing than really dangerous, and who has no means of realising them,

but the money which Louis may judge it politic to grant him. On the other hand if we take a large European view we see a universal advance of the Counter-reformation threatening the final extinction of Protestantism. We are struck by the coincidence that the very year 1685, which saw a Catholic king and queen begin to reign in England, witnessed the final and appalling catastrophe of Protestantism in France. We see that if a religious war threatens England, it threatens also all Western Europe. And as Louis XIV is at the very height of his ascendancy when he thus proclaims his crusade, there is every reason to fear that the ruin of the Protestant party in France will be followed by that of the Protestant Republic. And we remark that as 1685 so 1688 marks a great event on the Continent as well as in England. As here it is the date of the Revolution, so there it is the year of the outbreak of another great European war.

On the Continent we are to note not only the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, but another great occurrence, the advance of the Turks upon Vienna two years earlier. These things, the last Turkish invasion and its repulse, the downfall of Protestantism in France, the culmination of French ascendancy in the seizure of Strasburg and Luxemburg, finally the outbreak of a European war, all these things crowded into the years of the struggle with Popery in England make up a continental convulsion which is more violent than most revolutions. This convulsion is not merely simultaneous but closely connected with the movement in England. The English Revolution is but a part of a great European convulsion, as is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that it is achieved not by any Englishman but by the Dutch Stadholder himself bringing a Dutch army to England on board a

Dutch fleet, and that it is opposed by Louis XIV with French fleets in the Channel and with French troops in Ireland.

If we enter at this late stage upon so crowded a period, our design cannot be to narrate even slightly such occurrences as the rescue of Vienna from the Turk, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the aggressions of Louis XIV and his third war, or the Revolution in the Three Kingdoms. If we review these stupendous things, it will only be to show how closely they belong together, and especially how inextricably involved is the English Revolution with the continental convulsion, how peculiarly and exceptionally at this crisis the history of England is lost in the general history of Europe.

We have before us a drama of which the scene extends from the Turkish frontier to the further limits of Scotland and Ireland. The chief actor in it is Louis XIV, whose influence is felt everywhere at once, who directs the course at one time of the king of England, at another time of the opposition in Parliament. He provokes an opposition which also is found in all countries, including England, but which is most concentrated nearest the scene of the last war. Of this opposition the most conspicuous leader is throughout William of Orange, who however is leader purely in the character which he has inherited from former Dutch Stadholders and not in virtue of his connexion with the English royal house. But when this struggle after ten years breaks out into open war on the Rhine, it is suddenly transferred by a stratagem of William to English ground, and our islands and seas become the theatre of a decisive European conflict. William now assumes a double character, and taking advantage of his connexion by birth and marriage with the House of Stuart

unites in his own person the two Sea Powers and makes them the nucleus of a European opposition to France which proves irresistible. In this struggle the English Revolution, so memorable in constitutional history, appears but as an incident. In the eyes of the two men who directed the struggle and necessarily best understood it, William and Louis, the change in the English Government appeared but a means to an end; it was a decisive military measure, which indeed proved decisive not of one war only but of a long series of wars.

It must be our object then to draw an outline of the period as it appeared from the point of view of Louis XIV.

We have marked with some care the successive stages in the advance of French power; a new stage was completed at the Treaty of Nimeguen. An ascendancy was now manifest similar to that of Philip II about 1588 or that of the Allied House of Austria about 1628. Let us consider the elements of which it consisted.

By the Peace of Nimeguen another province, Franche Comté, that is, the Free County of Burgundy, had been taken from the Spanish Monarchy. The grandson of Louis, born at this time, afterwards Fénelon's pupil, received the title of Duke of Burgundy to mark the complete recovery of the Burgundian territory by the Crown of France. Henceforward only the Catholic Low Countries remained to the Spanish King from the inheritance of Charles the Bold. Once more fortune has declared for France in the duel of France and Spain, and the opinion begins to gain ground among Spanish politicians, which was ultimately acted upon in the matter of the Spanish Succession, that the only chance for the residue of the Monarchy would lie in the friendship

and protection of France. In reserve Louis holds the great pretension, and the reigning king of Spain was a languishing life, so that in 1678, at the opening of the period before us, it might be expected that the Dauphin would soon succeed to the whole Spanish Monarchy and bring it into a position of tutelage to France.

Next, in the Empire Louis has the position which was made for him by the Treaty of Westphalia. With Sweden he is joint-guarantor of the Treaty. This means that he has about as much influence within the Germanic Body as the Habsburg Emperor himself. For the purpose of consolidating this influence a Confederation of the Rhine has been formed. Louis has also during the late war improved his relations with Sweden, which, no longer thwarting France as in the Triple Alliance, has received subsidies from her and has drawn the sword in her quarrel. In Germany too there are prospects of succession. If the Emperor Leopold should die, who would have a better chance than Louis of being chosen as his successor?

Thirdly, if Louis may look forward to sitting on the throne of the Cæsars and to seating his son on that of the Spanish Monarchy, he has already a cousin on the throne of England. He has been able once to make use of the aid of the English King against the Protestant Republic, but the turbulent Parliament marred this plan. The neutrality of England however he finds it usually possible to secure by fomenting discord between King and Parliament. The heir to the English throne has now become a bigoted Papist; as such, he will perhaps feel compelled, once seated on the throne, to depend on French aid against the disaffection of his subjects.

Thus the constellation of 1672 is not unlikely to be seen again. The next time Louis sets his mighty power

in motion, whether to absorb the Low Countries or to consolidate his ascendancy in Germany or to crush the Protestant Republic, he may be able to obtain not merely the neutrality but the active cooperation of the king of England. And that he has such ulterior plans is not doubtful. Never, not even in the interval between the Peace of Lunéville and the Campaign of Austerlitz, has the air of Europe seemed more thunderous than in the ten years between the Treaty of Nimeguen and September 1688. The menaces and encroachments of Louis fill the whole period ; but when the leaders of the European opposition, William himself or the Great Elector, forecast the catastrophe which is evidently approaching, all is seen to turn on England. Should England stand aloof their task will be extremely difficult, and that England should come to their rescue could not for a long time seem reasonably probable. But the fatal contingency, which would almost exclude hope, would be that England should strike in against them.

Thus all who on the Continent resisted the advance of Louis XIV from the Peace of Nimeguen onward felt the most anxious interest in the English party struggle which in the very year of the Peace entered upon so wild a phase. It is not in James but in Louis XIV that the danger centres which provoked the Revolution of 1688.

Louis had a position of overwhelming advantage. His claim upon Spain and the conquest he had just made from her of Franche Comté, the control of German affairs which the Treaty of Westphalia gave him, the dependence upon him of Charles II of England, and, we may add, since 1675 of the young Victor Amedeus of Savoy, and his alliance with Sweden—all this, supported by the consummate organisation which Turenne and Louvois had given

to the French army and the naval, commercial, and financial reforms of Colbert, constituted his positive force, while his negative advantage lay in the want of union among his antagonists which had come to light at Nimeguen. Advised by a Richelieu or a Mazarin, he must have proved irresistible.

The statement that he was now his own Minister is not to be taken too literally. After all, the department which he reserved to himself was perhaps, as M. Rousset says, only the department of *signature*. If errors of policy were now committed, they were not the personal errors of a sovereign intoxicated with power and flattery, they were the errors of a minister, of Louvois, who stamps his character on this part of the reign almost as distinctly as Mazarin on the minority. They are the errors of a statesman who directs policy from the war-office, who cuts every knot with the sword. Under Richelieu, even under Mazarin, the army had been secondary. It is now at the height of its organisation, and the Minister who has elaborated the instrument naturally loses no opportunity of using it. The Dragonnade comes into fashion.

The diplomatic school of Mazarin seems to disappear after the Peace of Nimeguen, and French policy is henceforth, not perhaps more unscrupulous than before, but obtusely, blindly violent. The wars of 1668 and 1672 had been prepared by a masterly labour of diplomacy, which had enabled France to isolate her enemy, in the first case Spain, in the second Holland. After Nimeguen this method is abandoned; diplomacy is thrown to the winds; all Powers at once are recklessly insulted.

There is a pause at this time in the development of the Spanish question. The young Spanish king has been married. His wife indeed is of the House of Orleans, so

that the marriage may be regarded as the first step taken by Spain in her new policy of dependence on France. But the succession question is hung up until it can be known whether heirs will yet be born to the Spanish House of Habsburg. Meanwhile France turns her eyes in another direction. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, that is, now for thirty years, the French Government has concerned itself little with Germany or with Austria. It is a great turning-point in the career of Louis when after Nimeguen he begins to threaten the Germanic Powers, and to threaten them more directly even than Spain or than Holland.

He had lately conquered Franche Comté and his troops still occupied Lorraine. It was natural for him therefore in these circumstances to take in hand the whole question of the frontier of France towards Germany and of the consolidation of her three great conquests, that is, the Three Bishoprics (conquered by the Valois Henry II), Alsace (conquered in his own minority), and Franche Comté newly conquered, and Lorraine at least occupied. But beyond this definite and necessary question of the frontier lay the vast indefinite question of the position he was to take up within the Empire. Was he ultimately to be Emperor? Was he to take immediate steps to become Roman king?

Four of the eight Electors lay close to that frontier which now engaged his attention so much, namely, the three Elector-Bishops of Cologne, Trèves and Mayence, and the Elector Palatine, who resided in the palace above Heidelberg. These four votes were probably to be won by a judicious mixture of force and conciliation. Further the protection of the Protestant interest in Germany had been placed by the Treaty of Westphalia in his hands, and by a

judicious use of this he might hope to secure the vote of the Protestant Elector of Brandenburg. Saxony also was Lutheran. There were means too, as a later age showed, of conciliating Bavaria. And thus the only electoral vote which he could not hope to obtain was that of Bohemia.

Partly in order to overawe the Rhine Electorates Louis resolved to get possession of Strasburg, which was then a free Imperial City, and Luxemburg, a fortress included in the Spanish Low Countries. Strasburg and Luxemburg, first to be acquired, then to be retained, are a principal object of the later wars of Louis XIV. Meanwhile the arrangement of the frontier, and the establishment of the absolute power of Louis in regions where by the Treaties of Munster and Nimeguen he had acquired only limited rights, proceeded steadily.

It was a task for a Richelieu or a Mazarin ; it fell into the hands of Louvois. What might have been successfully achieved by negociation and conciliation backed by overwhelming power was undertaken in quite another spirit and by wholly different means. Litigation and chicane were substituted for negociation, and reckless violence for conciliation. At Metz for the Three Bishoprics, at Besançon for Franche Comté, at Breisach for Alsace, territorial claims were laid before the local Parliaments or before Chambers of Reunion constituted for the purpose, and the decisions so obtained were enforced at once by military occupation. Thus the whole frontier region from the Low Countries to Switzerland became indeed a Land Debateable. What was new in this policy is not so much its unscrupulousness as its obtuseness. Statesmanlike considerations are entirely neglected. Friends and enemies are trampled on alike with unceremonious violence.

For example :

The German policy of France had long been based on the alliance of Sweden. In the late war Sweden had aided Louis with an important though unsuccessful diversion against the Great Elector, and at Nimeguen the French Government had seemed deeply sensible of its obligation. But in 1681, when Charles XI of Sweden claimed the succession to the vacant duchy of Zweibrücken (Deux Ponts) and disputed it with another relative of the deceased duke, the Chamber at Metz suddenly interfered, and the duchy was declared united to the crown of France. Thus a great alliance was senselessly thrown away, and a military king, son of Charles Gustavus and father of Charles XII, alienated and embittered.

Again :

There was no person in Europe whom it was more important to conciliate than William of Orange, and Louvois himself in 1679 made extravagant offers in order to obtain the friendship of the Dutch, yet in 1680 William's principality of Orange was occupied by order of the French Government and the town dismantled.

As both Charles XI and William were Protestant leaders, these examples show how entirely the French Government had abandoned its old position of patron and protector of the Protestant interest in Europe.

A third example is found in its treatment of Strasburg.

In the treaty of Westphalia the French King appears as a champion of Germanic liberties against the Emperor. And indeed the Emperor,—King of Hungary and Bohemia and cousin of the King of Spain—was scarcely more a German than Louis XIV himself. If Louis were to supplant him, the way, so a statesman might think, would

be by winning from him the hearts of the German nation. Louvois is blind to all such considerations. He simply seizes a great Imperial City, and annexes it to the dominions of the King of France. On Sept. 30, 1681, when the French troops entered Strasburg, no German could possibly receive them as friends. It was felt everywhere that Alsace was finally lost, and that Germany was thrown open to the armies that had so lately overrun the Low Countries and Holland.

France henceforth, the France of Louvois, has a position in Europe wholly different from that of France under Richelieu. Instead of being the head of a great system of alliances, the representative of great universal interests, she begins now to be isolated, and to take a pride in overawing all Powers together by sheer superiority of military force and organisation. Considerable fragments of the old diplomatic fabric however still remain ; it is still by policy that she obtains at one time the aid, at another the neutrality, of England, and the Great Elector, who in the late war had been active against her, has been disposed since the Peace of Nimeguen to seek his interest in adhesion to her.

But the French Government now takes another, and a most ill-omened step in this new course. Louis gives his authority, and Louvois the impress of his ruthless system, to a religious revolution within France itself.

About the time when the Panic of the Popish Plot broke out in England, it began to appear that an event was approaching on the Continent which would take rank in the history of Christianity with the great religious changes of the sixteenth century. What was called in France the Religion (R.P.R.—Religion Prétendue Reformée) seemed about to come to an end. The sect which, holding

its ground through thirty terrible years of civil war, had wrung from the Government an Act of Toleration under which it had since lived in security for more than half a century was drifting towards a new catastrophe.

We must distinguish the catastrophe itself, which may be said to commence in 1681 and which proved so monstrously violent, from the long and slow decline which paved the way to it. The Religion had lost its political importance in Richelieu's time. From 1629 to the death of Mazarin in 1661 it had played no important part in French politics ; it had had no share in the Fronde. 'I have no complaint to make of the little flock' (*Je n'ai point à me plaindre du petit troupeau*), says Mazarin. Louis XIV, in his review of the difficulties with which he had to contend on assuming power, makes no reference to the Religion. During this period it gave to France some most distinguished names,—Turenne himself, Duquesne, Schomberg. It contributed its share to the Académie Française. In some parts of France at least its members enjoyed easy and equal intercourse with the Catholics. Nor are we to suppose that all this was suddenly changed by a stroke of omnipotence proceeding from Louis XIV. Between 1661 and 1678 the decline of Calvinism was such and so visible, and seemed so necessary a part of the great process which was making France one, that the Edict of Nantes began to seem an obsolete instrument. .

Turenne himself conformed, and in an age when royal favour seemed the highest good, noblemen who were Protestant would be tempted to sacrifice their religion for it as well as their feudal independence. Meanwhile the humbler Protestants were assailed with bribes, the king establishing in 1676 a fund for the conversion of heretics (*caisse des conversions*).

Meanwhile the Catholic Church in France showed vitality enough to satisfy religious-minded men, and it even offered religion of a type similar to that of Calvin. In Richelieu's time St Cyran had introduced at Port Royal a kind of Catholic Puritanism, and in Mazarin's time the Catholic Pascal had roused a flame of moral indignation against the Jesuits. The written eloquence of Pascal had been succeeded by the pulpit oratory of Bossuet. In 1668 had been established what was called the Peace of the Church, by which the school of Port Royal was reconciled to the reigning orthodoxy, and after this Arnauld and Bossuet were seen directing at once their different styles of eloquence and different types of zeal against Calvinism. The result of all this was to convey the impression to the public that Calvinism was finally defeated, and that it must go the way of all the disintegrating influences which under the name of Fronde had now given place to the perfect unity of France under Louis XIV.

The affair was brought to a head by the war of 1672—1678. This was in the first instance a war against a Protestant state, in which Louis could not but feel that he had not the sympathy of his Protestant subjects. Moreover he wanted money, and in France the clergy had the right of voting subsidies to the Crown in their Assembly. Like all money-granting assemblies, the Assembly of the French Clergy expected something in return for their grants; and what should they ask but the suppression of heresy? This was the cause always at work, which tempted Louis, instead of allowing Calvinism to perish by gradual decay, to interfere actively for the destruction of it.

But in explaining the English Panic of 1678 ought we not to take account of this portentous drift of things in

France? Those glimpses of Charles II's design of re-establishing Popery in England were infinitely more alarming when it was perceived that it corresponded to a design, which every day became more public, of destroying Protestantism in France, and also to an overwhelming war of France against the Protestant Republic. The attack upon Protestantism in England, which by itself might seem scarcely formidable, could not be regarded by itself. Any one who took a comprehensive view must perceive, as Burnet perceived, that for all the world at once a new chapter of the Counter-reformation was about to open. The agitation in favour of Popery that had appeared in England in 1672 was not isolated; it was the faint exterior ripple of a great disturbance which had its centre in France. Protestantism might still be strong in England, but it would certainly have to meet a most dangerous attack in Holland, and it was on the point of perishing in France. Charles Stuart or his brother the Duke of York might be somewhat insignificant persecutors, but as Mary Tudor had been backed by Philip of Spain and the whole power of the House of Habsburg, so now the Catholicising Stuarts were but generals of division in the host of the Counter-reformation, of which the Commander-in-chief was Louis XIV, the greatest potentate that had been seen since Philip II.

There was here abundant material for a great panic, and panic reigned through most of the Protestant world. As early as the sixties there had been a considerable emigration of Calvinists from France, and in Holland there had been a fiery trial in 1672. England took the infection somewhat later and in a somewhat different form. Here, where the danger was considerably less, there was much more mystery. Glimpses had been obtained of the Treaty

of Dover, and of strange money dealings between the French and English courts. An open attack was not to be feared, but there was considerable reason to suspect a secret plot. And the time for raising the cry of a Popish plot arrived with the Peace of Nimeguen, for that event brought home to all the world the alarming power of Louis at the very time when the downfall of Protestantism in France began visibly to approach.

The year 1678 is an epoch for all Europe on account of the Treaty of Nimeguen, and an epoch for England by the outbreak of the Panic. The alarm of French ascendancy increases along with that of Popery. On the Continent the former is the more intense, in England the latter. For a short time English affairs now attract our attention most, since the age of Danby is succeeded by a struggle of three years which is most intense and strange, and which has left an indelible mark on English history. It is more terrible than many revolutions, though it did not actually amount to a revolution. It gave rise to a party division, which may fairly be said to have lasted half a century, and which nominally and in common belief has never since ceased to exist in England. In the whole revolutionary period between 1670 and 1688 the most intense phase except the three years of James II's reign is that between 1678 and 1681, in which the Long Parliament of the Restoration fell and two short Parliaments sat, while the great parliamentary question was the Exclusion Bill and the great popular question the Popish Plot. It left the nation divided into Whigs and Tories, and was followed by a sullen repose of five years, during which no Parliament sat. In 1681 the centre of interest is transferred again to the Continent.

We touch this memorable struggle only to remark how

closely English affairs continue to be entangled with the affairs of the Continent. The Panic itself looks to the Continent. The narrative of Oates tells of deliberation of the Jesuits at St Omer and Valladolid, of dealings with Père la Chaise and with the Pope. Coleman's correspondence also looks to the Continent. The ground alleged in the Exclusion Bill for the exclusion of James is that 'the emissaries, priests and agents of the Pope had seduced him to the communion of the Church of Rome and prevailed on him to enter into negotiations with the Pope and his nuncios, and to *advance the power and greatness of the French king*, to the end that by the descent of the crown upon a papist and *by foreign alliances* they might be able to succeed in their wicked designs.' But the prevalent belief that foreign influences were at work in English politics was a small matter in comparison with the undoubted fact.

Charles II's relation to foreign Powers had altered very much since the Treaty of Dover and the War of 1672. At that time he had been more active than his cousin Louis in promoting the Family Alliance. He changed his mind towards the close of the European war. About 1677 he developed a policy wholly different. He had now another Family Alliance. The Dutch state had ceased to be a hostile Republic and had become almost a Monarchy under the rule of his nephew William. This nephew was now married to the niece who might some day become Queen of England. Charles had been awakened by the Test Act to the impossibility of reestablishing Catholicism. With the help of Danby he had framed a new policy. He now aspired to come to the aid of his nephew. He would impose peace upon France. In this plan he would be supported by Parliament, and might hope to obtain

first the one thing needful, which with him was always money, secondly the great thing desirable, that is, a pretext for keeping an army on foot.

As his former grand stroke had created a wild excitement in England in 1672, this equally reckless new system excited the Continent. Everywhere it excited the Catholic party, whose hopes Charles had so recently roused and now disappointed. Thus is explained the peculiar form which the Panic of 1678 assumed. Charles, who had deserved to be personally the object of the wild suspicions of his Protestant subjects, finds himself considered to be in danger of assassination from the Papists. He finds himself a sort of representative of Protestantism, standing between the people and his Catholic brother. He who a dozen years earlier had perhaps been somewhat afraid of that brother, henceforth enjoys a new consciousness of popularity grounded on the conviction that at least no Protestant would kill him to make James king. He, the audacious contriver of the restoration of Catholicism, now falls with easy tact into the position, which his bewildered people almost force upon him, of the bulwark of his people against Catholicism. This is the result of the fact that the Panic did not break out in 1672, when he was in alliance with France against the Dutch, but in 1678, when he had been acting in concert with William against France.

But this same change in his attitude produces another most important result. He is now opposed by Louis. In the last months of the war it is the chief object of Louis to break up Charles' concert with William and to frustrate his design of intervening to dictate a peace to France. And Louis has learnt to use against Charles the weapon of parliamentary influence. Accordingly we have to note

another foreign influence which is at work in our politics. Beside those Jesuitic machinations which excited such alarm there is another machination much more real yet which attracted much less attention. And it remained actively at work long after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nimeguen, indeed until Charles dissolved his last Parliament early in 1681. The three years we now consider contribute one of the most crowded and memorable periods to our parliamentary history. But who was the leader of Opposition in the last session of the Long Parliament, or in the two short Parliaments which followed, before the final Parliament at Oxford? Perhaps we ought to say, The leader was Louis XIV.

On the surface the object of the Opposition appears to be at first the overthrow of the Anglican Minister Danby, and the disbanding of an army which Charles was suspected of intending to use for unconstitutional purposes; then the dissolution of a Parliament which was strongly Anglican and which had been so long subjected to royal corruption that it was called the Pensioned Parliament; next, after the Panic had broken out, the Exclusion Bill. Such is the programme of Shaftesbury and his followers, and there is no doubt that in the case, for example, of Lord William Russell it had been adopted on honest conscientious conviction. But it was also the programme of Louis XIV, intended to promote his ambitious policy, and supported by his ambassador, as was long ago brought to light, with a lavish expenditure of French money. In the first place it was of great importance to Louis to overthrow Danby, the author of the Family Alliance of Charles and William, and to procure the dissolution of the Parliament which he controlled. Later, when the Peace of Nimeguen had been concluded, and Louvois' system of encroachment

had been brought into play, it was essential for French policy that the English should have their hands full. So long as the Exclusion Bill occupied the turbulent islanders, and those profound half-mystical questions concerning the Monarchy and divine right which had occupied their fathers perplexed their minds, so long the armies of Louis would have free play on the Germanic frontier, and might enter Strasburg and blockade Luxemburg and enforce the decisions of the Chambers of Reunion. For all along the condition of French ascendancy was the neutrality of England. We have memorials from the Spanish Ambassador and from the States-General in which this is pointed out, and complaint is made that the King of England is debarred by the internal dissensions of his realm 'from attending either to his own interest or to that of his allies,' that he has 'tied up his hands by dissension with his Parliament and thought proper to sacrifice the welfare of Europe for so uncertain a matter as a future succession.'

So long as Charles was disposed to act in concert with William, it was the policy of Louis to paralyse him by parliamentary attacks; but Louis might aim at a result which would suit him even better, namely, to force Charles to change sides again. For it was always open to Charles, if the Opposition pressed him too heavily, to fall back upon his earlier system, and to sell his neutrality, or even his support, to Louis at the price of a subsidy. In that case, provided only the subsidy were large enough, he might be able in an extreme case to dispense with Parliaments altogether.

The brief history of these three years is this: Charles engages in a desperate parliamentary struggle with the party headed by Shaftesbury. That party is successful in

overthrowing Danby; but it becomes divided on the question of the Exclusion Bill, and partly owing to this schism, partly owing to the king's adroitness, it suffers a disastrous defeat by the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March, 1681. But who emerges victor from the strife? Scarcely Charles II, for he must abandon the foreign policy which alone made him respectable in Europe. He is henceforth a humble dependent upon Louis XIV.

The victor is Louis XIV himself, who obtains all that he desired. He has broken up the Family Alliance of Charles and William. He can henceforth pursue his ambitious course without any fear of meeting England in his path. For three years he had held her at bay, but henceforth he need not give himself that trouble. Charles is dependent on his subsidies, and after Charles, it now appears, will come James, who, as a Catholic, will be still more absolutely dependent on him. And so for some years to come we need scarcely inquire after English policy. No such thing exists. It is time for us to ask again how Louis XIV himself is occupied on the Continent.

The year 1681 sees Louis reduce in this manner the English Government to dependence, it sees him also, as we find, adopt the system of Dragonnades in dealing with the Calvinists; it sees him on the same day occupy Strasburg in Alsace and Casale in Italy. Thus the catastrophe of Europe and of Protestantism approaches visibly nearer.

Up to this point the designs and career of Louis XIV have been comparatively easy to follow. The growth of his power has been steady and on a vast scale. He now seems to have almost within his grasp both the Empire and the Spanish Monarchy. Henceforth it is otherwise.

Something impedes him, but what the obstacle may be it is not so easy to discover. All that appears on the surface is that seven years later, in 1688, he kindles another European conflagration, which after raging for nine years leaves the relations of the Powers not much altered. The Germanic schemes of Louis fail, and what in 1681 looked like an overwhelming inundation appears to have been only a high tide, which at the date of the Peace of Ryswick (1697) is visibly on the ebb. And yet in 1681 he seemed to have everything in his favour. He had paralysed England, and the system of the Triple Alliance appeared to be dead. It is also to be remarked that since the Peace of Nimeguen he had reduced to a sort of dependence another powerful prince. The Great Elector in despair had attached himself to the French interest. What then can henceforth withstand Louis? The seizure of Strasburg and Casale, the blockade of Luxemburg, seemed but the commencement of a boundless conquest. What actually happened in the next ten years fell very far short of what might have been expected in 1681.

It is indeed evident that great events occurred in those ten years. In 1683 the Turks advanced to Vienna, and the deliverance of Christendom was wrought by the united force of Charles of Lorraine and John Sobieski, king of Poland; in 1685 occurred the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; in 1688 a new European War began, and immediately afterward occurred the Revolution in England and the entrance of England into the European War. These occurrences are indeed on a scale such as might have been expected from the situation of 1681, but they seem disconnected. It is not immediately obvious how an irruption of barbarians into Germany, an alteration in the religious settlement of France, and the fall of a king in

England can belong together or can belong to the same series of events as the successive encroachments, which we have hitherto traced, of Louis XIV.

Ever since 1673 he had had occasion to consider the best means of making war on the Austrian Habsburg, who had come to the aid of his Spanish cousin and of the Dutch. Now he could attack Austria not only directly in Alsace but also indirectly by setting in motion against him the Transylvanian Prince and the Turk. This observation at once suggests to us that it is hardly a mere coincidence if in 1683, just at the moment when he brought his force to bear more than at any previous time upon the Germanic Powers, a Turkish army of more than 200,000 men advanced upon Vienna. Nineteen years earlier when Montecuculi defeated the Turks in the great battle of St Gothard, the French auxiliaries under Coligny and La Feuillade had played a conspicuous part in the defence of Christendom. But in the war of 1672—1678 France had fomented the Hungarian rebellion against the Emperor, and that rebellion depended at the same time upon Turkish aid. Thus France and the Porte played into each other's hands. Emerich Tökoly, the Transylvanian Prince, took part in the Turkish invasion of 1683 (as Zpolya had taken part in the invasion of Solyman) and Tökoly had been long in the habit of receiving aid from France. Louis in his attack on the Germanic Powers calculated upon the embarrassment which they would suffer from the simultaneous attack of the Turks in their rear; and in like manner Kara Mustafa took account of the French advance upon the Rhine in planning his invasion of Austria. So much is plain even if we leave open the question of a positive understanding between Louis and the Turk.

The steady growth of French power up to 1681 has been already traced. We now see that it was favoured even after this by an event of the first magnitude. Germany did not show any great power of resistance at the time of the Peace of Nimègue, when the Great Elector was already in despair. But in the course of the year 1681 it began to be perceived that Germany was about to suffer a great invasion from the infidel. When this should happen what power of resistance to Louis would she have? The invasion took place in 1683, and proved no less formidable than could have been expected. It is true that Vienna was saved, the tide of invasion was rolled back, and a war in which the Turk had been the assailant ended in destroying for ever his ascendancy in the east of Europe. But the war lasted fourteen years, and was none the less exhausting for Germany because it proved so glorious. If Louis had been almost irresistible before it began, how could the Germanic Powers withstand him when their forces were thus year after year draughted off to their eastern frontier and into the plains of Hungary? The situation strikingly resembles that in which the Powers of Germany found themselves in their war against the French Revolution. They were paralysed on the Rhine by the fact that they had to wage war at the same time in Poland.

The result was that after 1681 Louis had still about three years of uninterrupted success. He reaches his zenith in the summer of 1684.

Germany and Austria had entered upon a new age of vigour and glory with the deliverance of Vienna. Nevertheless they were not in a condition at the moment to wage war with France while the struggle in Hungary occupied them. In such circumstances the solution

adopted was a truce. Strasburg and the territory taken from the Empire by reunion before August 1st, 1681, were to remain in the hands of Louis for twenty years. The truce was concluded at Regensburg. But at the same time Louis entered into possession of Luxemburg.

In 1682 Louis had raised the siege of this important fortress on the nominal ground that he did not choose to press his claim at the moment when a Turkish invasion of Christendom was impending. In September 1683 however, that is at the moment when Vienna was besieged by the Turks, he marched his armies into the Spanish Low Countries. Spain, in order to obtain the aid of her allies, declared formal war with France in November. But it was found impossible to revive the coalition that had been dissolved at Nimeguen. William could not induce the Dutch to take up arms; the city of Amsterdam declared that sooner than consent to war it would desert the Union. And, as we know, the Great Elector had thrown in his lot with France. The Emperor, needless to say, had his hands full. On June 4th, 1684, Luxemburg fell, and at Regensburg along with the Truce a Treaty was signed in which Louis, while he resigned some of the conquests he had made from Spain, retained Luxemburg.

Charles II in these last years of his reign remains dependent upon France. Since the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament he has not the courage to summon a new one, and his only alternative is to purchase subsidies from Louis by subservience. He evades all demands for his interference in behalf of Luxemburg; he promises his guarantee for the Truce of Regensburg, and then again refuses it. This is the last scene of all in the foreign policy of Charles II; it is 'second childishness and mere oblivion.' He had opened his reign with ostentatious

independence of France, had then glided into an understanding with her; next, in 1672 he had joined her in a deadly attack upon republican Holland; then again he had separated himself and for a time had stood stoutly by his nephew's side against France. But in 1678 had begun the Panic and the Reign of Terror; from this desperate struggle he had emerged in 1681, victorious indeed but at the price of complete dependence on France. He saw Louis XIV reach his zenith; he saw Europe in dismay; but he found himself helpless.

In 1683 however he married the Princess Anne to Prince George of Denmark. It was something that this was at least a Protestant marriage. So much wisdom, we may suppose, he had learned from the Panic. He did not now, as in his own marriage or in the second marriage of his brother, prefer, as a matter of course, a Catholic House. Insignificant as Prince George personally was, considerable results followed from his marriage to one who was in due time to reign over England. They were results of a negative kind. The marriage carried with it no dangerous entanglements, either religious or political, and this was of the utmost importance in a reign which was to see Great Britain take the lead in Europe as never before. At the moment, and in the eyes of Charles, the match was eligible because the King of Denmark adhered at this time together with the Great Elector to the French party in Europe.

Charles II died at the age of 55, in February, 1685, a few months after the Truce of Regensburg, and European affairs entered almost immediately upon a new stage. Their aspect was already sufficiently portentous, and so indeed was the aspect of English affairs. Though Charles had defeated his domestic enemies, yet the Revolution

visibly raged on, and there still prevailed something like a Reign of Terror. The Popish Plot was indeed by this time discredited, but at the same time the party of Shaftesbury had been driven to the verge of rebellion. Its leader fled the country and died in exile; its most prominent members, Russell and Essex, as well as the Republican Algernon Sidney, died violent deaths. In Scotland the Terror was still more intense and unintermittent.

But in England there was a lull in the religious storm. The Panic had subsided, the Duke's daughters were safely married to Protestant princes, the King had proved his sincere intention of protecting the Anglican Church. He was not old, and the day when a Catholic would reign in England did not yet seem to be at hand.

On the Continent the ascendancy of France was indeed alarming, but here too the religious question had not yet become so prominent as to absorb all attention. The year 1685 brought in England the accession of a Catholic King, and in France the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

It seemed as if the final and decisive struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-reformation was now to begin.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STUART DYNASTY AND THE NATION.

AT the accession of James II England had long been in a revolutionary state; France on the other hand had long enjoyed a profound internal tranquillity. But now while the revolution in England and Scotland grows suddenly more intense, there commence in France too disturbances of the most terrible kind. And it is the same convulsion which spreads over both countries at once. It is a struggle of the confessions, a revival of the great religious convulsion of the sixteenth century. The Dragonnades may be said to have commenced as early as 1681, but it was in 1685 that they were practised on a grand scale. While such horrors were seen in France there was civil war on this side of the Channel, Monmouth's rebellion in England, Argyle's rebellion in Scotland. In the autumn the Bloody Assize was proceeding here, and on October 22nd the Edict revoking the Edict of Nantes was registered by a Commission of the Parliament of Paris.

It is needless to say that the catastrophe of Protestantism in France must have immeasurably enhanced the anxiety with which we saw at the same time a Catholic

King triumphantly establish himself on the throne of England. But there was also a reaction of the English event upon France. Perhaps Louis would have hesitated formally to revoke the Edict of Nantes had not England at that moment passed under the sceptre of a Catholic King. The Huguenots of France had leaned upon England in Elizabeth's time, in Charles I's time, and in the time of the Protector. Even Charles II in his last helplessness would perhaps scarcely have thought it safe to witness in silence or without some kind of intervention the cancelling of an edict so important to the whole Protestant world. But a unique crisis had arrived in England by the accession of James II, which gave Louis a free hand against his Protestant subjects.

The Revocation was not the commencement but rather the consummation of the downfall of Protestantism in France. The decline of the Religion had been proceeding for twenty years; since the Peace of Nimeguen Government had turned its attention to the subject; the number of conversions in the first half of 1685 was prodigious. An appalling proof was thus offered to the English people of the power which might be exerted by a Government controlling a military force, and this at the moment when they themselves passed under the rule of a king who, like Louis, was Catholic, whose ideas were military, and who struggled to get possession of a military force. That a religious community which was supposed to number almost two millions, which had subsisted more than a century and had lived almost a century under the protection of a special law, should be thus easily dissolved by the French Government, must have given the English people a wholly new conception of what was in the power of Government.

It might strike an English observer that the crisis of 1588 had reappeared, and that Louis was about to effect what Philip II had almost succeeded in effecting. He wielded a much greater military power than Philip, he had already in 1672 reduced the Dutch state to extremity, and since that year his power had greatly increased. The King of England was now a Papist and his cousin Louis had destroyed Protestantism within his own dominions. When next he took the field, would he not destroy it in the United Provinces, and at least enable his cousin to establish Catholicism on a solid basis in Britain? In this enterprise would he not have the enthusiastic support of all the Catholic Powers of Europe, and be hailed as Emperor by their united voice on the next vacancy?

So it might well seem from the English point of view. It might well seem that the world was passing under the dominion of Popery and arbitrary power. But we have overlooked a distinction which proved to be all-important. The religion of which Louis made himself the champion was indeed Catholic in dogma, mortally opposed to the Reformation, and as ruthless in its methods as Rome could wish. But it was not strictly Popish. Louis was at this moment the most dangerous enemy to the Roman See that had arisen in Europe for a long time. While with one hand he struck down Protestantism, with the other he dealt blows which seemed equally crushing at the Papacy. And in consequence his grand enterprise was not supported by the Pope nor by the leading Catholic Powers. Here we come upon the great impediment which began at this time to retard the progress of his ascendancy. It was a matter of course that the Revocation should unite the whole Protestant interest of Europe against him. For this

he must have been prepared. But when the moment came for him to strike the decisive blow he found himself firmly opposed by the Catholic as well as the Protestant Powers. The enterprise which was to make the world Catholic was opposed not only by William of Orange and by the Great Elector, lately a supporter of France, but also by both branches of the House of Habsburg and by the Pope himself.

The cruelties of the Dragonnades naturally remind us of many other cruelties instigated by what we call Popery. Instigated they were by a clerical power devoted to Catholic dogma, but the clergy of France at the moment when they demanded the destruction of the Religion were so strongly disaffected towards the Papacy that they seemed on the point of plunging into a new schism. The event of 1685, the Revocation, ought to be considered in conjunction with the event of 1682, which was the assertion of Gallican liberties in the Four Articles drawn by Bossuet. Opposition to the Papacy is indeed a uniform characteristic of Louis XIV, and at this conjuncture, the zenith of his reign, it is pushed so far that he seems on the point of playing the part of our Henry VIII. We may almost say that the schism was fairly begun. Louis occupied Avignon, Pope Innocent XI (Odescalchi) refused institution to a number of bishops who adhered to the Gallican principles. Had not Louis been soon after warned by his first taste of ill success we may suppose that in no long time an independent Gallican Church would have stood forth by the side of the Anglican, and that Louis XIV would have claimed an ecclesiastical supremacy similar to that which had been asserted in England by Henry VIII and Elizabeth.

It was this nascent Gallican Church, and not Popery,

which brought about the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In general an overwhelming tendency to national unity characterises France in this age. The reaction against the Fronde was sweeping away everything individual or peculiar whether in life or in thought. In this whirlpool the independence of the rights of the noblesse, the Parliaments, and Port Royal disappeared one after another. How should the Huguenots escape? But the eddy which carried them away was not a Catholic movement embracing all Christendom but a purely French movement which was adverse to the Papacy for the very same reason as to the Huguenots, that is, because it was not purely French. Not the Pope but the King profited by the Revocation, and the demand for it, which was a sincere and truly popular demand, declared that all Frenchmen ought to be of one religion, and asked whether it could be endured that there should be Frenchmen who did not approve the King's religion or whose religion the King did not approve.

But in the universal dismay that began to pervade the Protestant world in 1685 this distinction was not at first perceived. The objects of Louis and of James seemed to be identical, though indeed their language was as different as possible. They were allies in the cause of the Counter-reformation, which by us was called Popery and associated with memories of the Marian persecution. That Louis was strongly opposed to Popery in the strict sense of the word, and that James anticipated modern Liberalism in proclaiming the inalienable rights of conscience and in announcing the abandonment of all penal laws, did not prevent them from seeming allies, as indeed it did not prevent James from betraying his approval of the Revocation and from expressing to Barillon the hope that he

might be able in concert with Barillon's master to do great things for religion.

The accession of James produced in English politics a change similar to that which the ascendancy of Louvois had produced in the government of Louis. Tact and adroitness disappear with Charles II. James commences with the suppression and ruthless punishment of armed rebellion. The scaffold is set up. The Bloody Assize is contemporaneous with the Dragonnades, and the rebellions of Monmouth and Argyle are made a pretext for keeping on foot a military force. Behind the army of Hounslow Heath, which begins to be partially officered by Catholics, appears the army of Ireland, remodelled by Richard Talbot.

Louvois, who had at the outset regarded the Huguenot question with indifference, took it up in its later stages and handled it in his characteristic military fashion. The highly organised army which had given Louis his ascendancy abroad, enabled him now under Louvois' guidance to settle the religious question at home with a peremptoriness which had been quite beyond the reach of Richelieu and Mazarin. In the proud fortresses of Calvinism, La Rochelle and Montauban, where the Religion had maintained itself so firmly in former times against the government, it was now almost stamped out in a few hours. And at the very moment when this short military mode of dealing with religious questions proved so effective in France, a Catholic King in England was seen struggling to obtain possession of a standing army.

A revolution had long been in progress in England, and after the accession of James it soon began to hurry towards its consummation. But another revolution, infinitely more portentous, hung over all western and central Europe, and

with this the English Revolution was inextricably connected, from this it derived most of its greatness and its momentous importance. This connexion is the one point which we have space to deal with.

The European Revolution does not appear in history, because it was averted at the last moment; it was averted by the very fact that the English Revolution was consummated in 1688.

What was the precise danger which Europe escaped?

France had possession of Strasburg and Luxemburg and all the vast territory which it had acquired by reunion. The Truce of Regensburg had secured these acquisitions to her for a time. Meanwhile the Germanic Powers, principally the Emperor, were occupied with a war against the Porte, a war none the less burdensome because it was so glorious. The interest of Louis required that before the war should come to an end he should obtain complete and definitive possession of all this territory, that the truce should be converted into a peace. This point once gained and the conquered territory once put in full military preparation, his ascendancy would be complete. He would become master of the Spanish Low Countries even before the demise of the Spanish Crown should give him the occasion of claiming the whole Spanish Monarchy for his House. He would also acquire an influence in Germany greatly superior to that of the Emperor. But behind this territorial revolution there could be discerned also a religious revolution. He would establish himself as the head of an independent Gallican Church the limits of which would extend with the limits of his dominion. And as he had already perceived that he could only carry the Gallican clergy with him in this schism by undertaking to destroy heresy, it was likely that he would attack Cal-

vinism in the Dutch Republic as he had attacked it in France. The Dutch therefore might look forward to a renewal of the French invasion of 1672. These designs of Louis were the more alarming because his power was so vast and because his success had hitherto been uninterrupted. James in England assumed a position equally alarming as far as his own subjects were concerned. It was evident at least that he meant in some respects to set aside the constitution of the country. But his design was perhaps much less far-reaching, and it was also doubtful whether he had the means of carrying any such design into effect.

If we could separate in our minds what James attempted in England from that which Louis was attempting at the same time in Europe, it would appear perhaps not so very formidable. It does not seem that James had formed any coherent scheme, or that the obstinacy which marked his character ought to be taken for serious resolution. He intended no doubt to procure toleration for the King's religion. It seemed to him both reasonable and possible to procure the repeal of the Test Act, as it had been found possible to defeat the Exclusion Bill. But, though his subjects had every reason to resent his contempt for law, and there was much to alarm them in the military force they saw him preparing, particularly when it was considered in connexion with what was in preparation on the Continent, yet James does not seem to have contemplated giving an ascendancy to Catholicism in England, but only making room for it as a church among other churches. If his perverseness had such vast consequences, this was owing to the connexion which happened to exist between these English events and much greater events beyond the Channel. It was not so much because

he claimed a dispensing Power or because he interfered with the appointments of Magdalen College, Oxford, that he fell. It was rather because in the desperate resistance of Europe against Louis XIV the aid of England could not be spared, and yet so long as James was on the throne England would certainly not give aid, and might possibly, as formerly in 1672, intervene on the side of Louis. Hence it was that James was overthrown, not like his father by a rebellion organised by Parliament, but by the appearance of a Dutch fleet commanded by William of Orange.

In order therefore to understand the fall of James it is above all things necessary to study his foreign policy. If he could only have brought himself to take the side of Europe against Louis XIV he would not have fallen, not at least when and as he did fall. William was not king in the United Provinces. However therefore in his manifesto he might profess that he came to England in order to protect the rights of his wife endangered by the arbitrary proceedings of James, yet he could not have brought with him a Dutch fleet and army, of which he was only admiral and general, unless he had been able to convince the States that the interests of the Dutch people were concerned as well as the interests of the Princess Mary. He was able to do this because the Dutch people were threatened by Louis, and James appeared to be in concert with Louis.

Why was James, if not really in concert with Louis, yet wholly neutral and indifferent in the great crisis of Europe? It was not in the traditions of English Monarchy to regard with indifference the annexation of the Low Countries by France. Is the answer to be found in the fact that James, unlike other English kings, was a Catholic?

Precisely this consideration brings home to our minds the singularity of the course he took. It may be our first impression that, as a zealot, he would be impelled by religious enthusiasm to take the part of the destroyer of Protestantism in France, the possible destroyer of Protestantism in Holland. On closer examination however we find that a convert to the religion of the Pope was not tempted at that crisis to side with Louis. The religious policy of Louis was directed *against* the Pope. It was regarded with horror by the other Catholic Powers, and the Pope himself, Innocent XI, had to suffer almost as much from the French ascendancy of Louis XIV as Pius VI from the French Revolution or Pius VII in the latter days of Napoleon. Louis represented that very principle of royal supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs which James, as a convert, rejected. Another royal convert to Catholicism was living at that time, Queen Christina. How was she impressed by the Dragonnades and by the Revocation? She writes thus from Rome on February 2nd, 1686: "Nothing assuredly is more laudable than the endeavours to convert heretics and unbelievers. But the method they adopt there is very new, and since our Lord did not take this way to convert the world, it cannot be the best! I regard this zeal and this policy with astonishment and admiration, it transcends my comprehension! Indeed I am glad to think that I don't understand it. You think then that it is opportune to convert Huguenots and turn them into good Catholics at a time when there is such open rebellion in France against the respect and obedience we owe to the Roman Catholic Church. And yet I suppose that is the one foundation of our religion; only to that church has our Saviour given the glorious promise that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. Meanwhile never has the

scandalous liberty of the Gallican Church come so close to the verge of rebellion as now. Those late Four Articles, adopted and promulgated by an assembly of French clergy, are of such a nature that they have afforded to heresy an only too manifest occasion for a song of triumph."

In these circumstances what would have been more natural for James, as a Catholic King of England, than to range himself in European politics on the same side as the House of Habsburg, the side which had the sympathy of the Pope himself? By doing so he would have given the best proof that a Catholic could be a true Englishman and that the interest of England might be safe in the hands of a Catholic king. By doing so he would have placed England in the position—which she would have liked to take and which all Europe expected her to take—of guardian of the Balance of Power. Had James stood forth to guarantee the Truce of Regensburg and to protect the Low Countries by reviving the Triple Alliance, he would assuredly not have seen his dominions invaded by a Dutch fleet. Yet it is not very easy to understand what prevented him from taking this course.

Still more perplexing is the course he took in respect to the Revocation. Why did he shock the feelings of his people by openly betraying his sympathy with the persecutor and his antipathy to the persecuted Huguenots? As we have seen, the persecution was not the act of a Popish Power, nor was it approved by the Pope; it was the act of a new Henry VIII, who desired to give proof of his dogmatic orthodoxy at the moment that he took the lead in a new national schism. As a Papist therefore James was under no obligation to countenance the Dragon-

nades and the Revocation. But further he had taken up a position in ecclesiastical policy which absolutely required him to discountenance them in the most emphatic manner ; nay, he might almost have felt indebted to his cousin of France for giving him the opportunity of showing once for all how much he detested persecution. For religious toleration was the principle to which his whole reign was devoted. He was soon to stand before his people hand-in-glove with the Quaker William Penn, and his assertions of the barbarous and unchristian wickedness of all penal laws and exclusions on the ground of religion are so sweeping that they remind us of Cromwell and Milton, and might for a moment tempt us to regard him as a sincere and admirable, if too unpractical, enthusiast. Never had a royal apostle of religious toleration a better opportunity than in the year of the Dragonnades and of the Revocation, which was also the year of his own accession. And he did begin by favouring the charitable collections that were made in England for the Huguenots. But soon after (in May, 1686) he caused the book of the Huguenot Claude, in which the story of the wrongs of his community was told, to be burnt by the hangman, alleging in Council that kings were bound to stand by one another. He also contrived to defraud the Huguenot exiles of the relief which English charity had provided for them by requiring them to qualify themselves by taking the sacrament according to the forms of the Church of England.

In the first year of his reign James II stood before the world as a prince who had shown such steadfast resolution and had come triumphantly through such severe trials that it was possible to regard him as a great man destined to do great things. He seemed to represent the

principle of toleration, which since Cromwell's time had taken deep root in England and was beginning to be the watchword of all intellectual men everywhere, revolted by the horrors of the Dragonnades. The Huguenot refugees could not plead their own cause without acknowledging at the same time that James had a right to claim toleration for the Catholics in England. Bayle from Rotterdam blessed the new reign in these words : " This new king's wise behaviour moderates alike the fear and the hope of the different parties. He adheres openly for his own part to the Roman Catholic Church, but at the same time promises to leave to the Anglican Church its property and rights. This is the dignified attitude of a king who follows the dictates alike of his own conscience and of justice and equity to others. Here we see courage blended with a sagacious policy." These reflexions were suggested by the event of the second Sunday after the death of Charles II, when James caused mass to be celebrated with open doors in the chapel of Whitehall. We may see that to the philosopher James seems to exhibit a striking and admirable contrast to Louis. The latter is at once intolerant and schismatic, and both in an extreme degree; the other claims for himself personally the right of belonging to the church which had the title of Catholic ; but allows Anglicans to be Anglicans, as later he proposed to allow Dissenters to be Dissenters and even Quakers to be Quakers.

This was indeed the right course for James. In the strength of hereditary right he had already defeated the Exclusion Bill. He possessed another talisman in the principle of toleration, and by means of this he might have hoped in due time to repeal the Test Act. It was perhaps not impossible for him to achieve the

establishment of the Roman Catholic Church as a tolerated and influential sect in England under some general system of toleration. But the indispensable condition of success was that he should distinguish his policy sharply from that of Louis XIV and place himself at the head of the opposition to Louis in Europe. What the English people vaguely called Popery contained in reality two systems not only different but at that crisis openly hostile to each other. The one was not properly Popery at all but Gallicanism, and the head of it was Louis XIV; the head of the other might be said to be Pope Innocent XI, and the principal members of it were the Emperor and the King of Spain. This latter system was just at that moment more inclined to toleration than Popery has usually been. Let us imagine James attaching himself resolutely to the party of the Pope and the House of Habsburg. In that case he would have made it the main object of his foreign policy to maintain the cause of Christendom against the Turk, whom the Germanic Powers were at that moment engaged in driving out of Hungary. It was open to him to render a most important service to the cause of Christendom by bidding Louis desist from pushing his encroachments in the season of common danger upon the Rhine and in the Low Countries. This course would have been at the same time most agreeable to English and also to Roman Catholic feeling. It would have saved the Roman Church from a new schism and at the same time it would have saved the Protestant Republic from destruction. It would have led to a close and cordial family alliance between James and William and Mary. It would have made James necessary to the Dutch. In these circumstances even the English people would have forgiven a good many minor encroachments upon their liberties.

to a sovereign who would have been the champion of the Balance of Power and the protector at the same time of the Reformation and of the Pope, the more so as, being the champion of toleration, he would have gratified their feelings by eagerly relieving and protecting the Huguenots. The downfall of James was due not simply to his being a Papist or to his openly maintaining the cause of Popery. It was due to his adopting the French system of Catholicism, which ought not to be called Popery, and to his leaning on the whole to the French side in the European struggle.

If we take the insular view of the reign of James, it falls evidently into two periods. For there is the period when he endeavours to introduce Catholicism by means of the Anglican Church, and this is followed by a period in which he breaks with the Anglican Church and tries to introduce Catholicism by means of the Dissenters and under cover of a general toleration.

In like manner if we take the European view of the reign we find it falling into two periods. There is first the period in which it seems possible that James may see his true interest and take the side of Europe and the Pope and William against Louis. This is followed by the period in which this hope is abandoned, when James is seen to favour France on the whole, and when suspicion, as was natural, goes beyond the reality and represents him as engaged in an actual conspiracy with Louis against the liberties of Europe.

It soon appeared that the obstinacy of James was not accompanied by any distinctness of views. He was not clever enough to disentangle his religious policy from the family policy to which he had grown accustomed. We are to remember that he was by birth half a Bourbon, that he

had imbibed his religious ideas in a great degree from French people, from his mother and his sister, that his brother had set him the example of endeavouring to introduce Catholicism into England by means of a French alliance, and that his brother had shown him that the way to defy public opinion was to lean on the French king. That he should abide by this system, to which he was accustomed, after his accession to the throne, shows only that he was not observant or intelligent enough to perceive that the world was altered since the days of the Treaty of Dover. Charles had been quick to perceive such things, and we can imagine that, had he lived to see the decisive struggle of Louis against Europe, he would have been found on the side of William and the House of Habsburg. James no doubt differed from Charles in being an avowed Catholic, and probably reasoned that, being committed to a struggle with his people and Parliament, he could not do without the aid of Louis. That the Roman Catholic world, headed by the Pope, was opposed to Louis, that the author of the Revocation was in reality not a good Roman Catholic but a schismatic, and that therefore, by a rare good fortune, it was open to the King of England to appear as a good Englishman and as a good Catholic at the same time, such refinements seem to have been beyond the comprehension of James. He was surrounded by Jesuits of the same school as those who were leading Louis into schism, for it is a remarkable fact that the Jesuit order in this period is found working against the Pope—and accordingly he does not succeed in making himself really a Papist, but only a sort of Gallican. It is a singular spectacle. The Pope looks on coldly and quarrels with James' representative, Lord Castlemaine, though James offers to bring England back to the fold of the Church,

just as at the same time Louis, offering French Calvinism as a sacrifice to Catholic unity, is regarded by the Pope as a most dangerous and cruel enemy of the Church.

The crisis in Europe was rapidly approaching. It might almost seem that nothing remained for Louis but to pluck the ripe fruit that hung within his reach. He had but to choose his opportunity and decide upon his pretext. He was far stronger now than in the days of Nimeguen, when he had already seemed irresistible. For now he had possession of Strasburg and Luxemburg and of the reunited territory. Now too all the military force of Germany was drawn off eastward to fight the Turks in the plains of Hungary. What shape the final crisis would take was evident enough. A new European war would begin. The armies of Louis would take the field again, and a war would commence which would leave Louis supreme in Germany, perhaps also in the Low Countries, and would reduce the Dutch to dependence.

The danger was extreme, and yet there were some signs that Louis had already allowed the favourable moment to pass by. Already he was not quite the supreme figure in Europe that he had been before 1683. Why had he allowed King John of Poland to relieve Vienna? Why had not the armies of France marched in 1683 against the infidel, as twenty years earlier they had taken a conspicuous share in Montecuculi's great victory at St Gothard? The title of Roman Emperor had been associated from of old with the defence of Christendom against the barbarian. It would have been well earned by a victory of Louis XIV over Kara Mustafa under the walls of Vienna. But now Christendom had been saved, and Louis was not there! Nor only so. Ever since 1683 the war against the Turk had proceeded, and it had pro-

duced for the first time in three centuries a series of triumphs of the Cross over the Crescent. This series, which began in 1683, was to extend over fourteen years, until by the Treaty of Carlowitz a wholly new relation was introduced between Christendom and Islam, and the decline of the Porte began. The Germanic Powers with Austria at their head achieved this great triumph. Louis XIV had no share in it, but took advantage of the war to push his encroachments on the German frontier. Practically he acted as an ally of the Turk against Christendom. At the moment before us he was entering upon this course. His power was certainly at its height, but his glory was already tarnished. An age had begun in which the great victories were not those of the king of France, but those of the Germanic Powers in Hungary.

Now came the Dragonnades and the Revocation, giving quite a new aspect to the French ascendancy. Coupled with the attack of Louis upon the Pope, which was simultaneous, they made him seem a public enemy, a scourge at once to the Protestant and to the Catholic world. One very definite effect was speedily produced. After the Peace of Nimeguen the Great Elector had been won to France. This was not very surprising at a time when Louis was still looked to by Protestant Powers as a patron. From Louis the Hohenzollern hoped for aid against Sweden, his closest enemy. But his views were changed by the Revocation. He made his country an asylum for French refugees whose influence has perhaps ever since been more perceptible at Berlin than in any other capital. He reconciled himself speedily with the Emperor, and Louis XIV lost the only great ally he still possessed—except the King of England.

The European crisis actually arrived in 1688. It is

always difficult to discern in history the events which did not happen, though they were intended to happen and seemed at the moment almost certain to happen! What the reader sees is only that Louis, so incorrigibly ambitious, made in 1688 some new claims which led to a general war, but that at this time he was somewhat less successful than formerly, and that after nine years he made peace on terms which left the system of Europe much where it had been. This was indeed what happened, but it was far different from what was intended by Louis to happen. It is our business here to point out the chief cause of his failure.

The crisis arrived precisely in the manner that might have been expected. We have been accustomed hitherto to think of the French and Spanish Monarchies as the two great rivals in Europe. It is otherwise now. Since the Reunions France stands face to face with the Empire. The encroachments of France have been so successful that they are not likely to come to an end with the Truce of Regensburg. Louis assuredly will advance new claims, and it may be anticipated that he will advance them soon, for Austria is rising every year in power and pride, as she wins new victories over the Porte. A process begins which has often been witnessed, which has been witnessed in our own age. France and the Empire drift with a fatal rapidity towards war, and everything which either party does to prevent war has only the effect of bringing war nearer. A demise takes place in the Palatinate, which gives Louis a pretext for advancing territorial claims in behalf of his brother, the Duke of Orleans, married since the death of Henrietta Stuart to the Palatine Princess Elizabeth Charlotte. The new Elector Palatine, of a collateral branch, exerts himself to rally the Germanic

Powers in resistance to this claim. The Emperor is his son-in-law. A League of Augsburg is formed, in which some Germanic princes unite with the Emperor for this purpose. Even within the Empire it is but a partial union, for the Great Elector himself is not a member, nor does it extend beyond the Empire, since the King of Sweden, though a member, adheres to it only in respect of his Germanic possessions. But this union provokes Louis to make new aggressions, to build new fortifications, and to demand the conversion of the Truce into a definitive peace. The Empire however is no longer in fear of the Turk, and the great Hohenzollern has returned to a national policy. The Germanic Powers begin to feel that they have made concessions enough. The French demand is rejected, and war approaches visibly nearer.

Everything now depends on England, and as we have seen, James II ought, not only as King of England but even as a Catholic prince, to have stepped forward eagerly in defence of Europe against France. He did not do this, but neither does he appear to have decided upon the opposite course. He seems to have no policy adapted to the special emergency, but to abide by the policy which his brother had originally devised in 1669, when all the circumstances were different, and had fallen back upon again in 1681 simply because he could not help it. We see him still forming an army, which he officers with Catholics, in other words defying public opinion. But to defy public opinion, that is Parliament, with success he needed the support of France. And so the great continental politicians, who were anxiously preparing for the European crisis, could not but come to the conclusion that in that crisis James would not oppose France and therefore might probably assist France. An opinion grew up that Louis

and James had a close secret understanding. They judged of the coming event by the event of 1672, and believed that when the armies of France took the field the English fleet would cooperate with them.

The maxim 'He that is not with me is against me' is necessarily adopted in extreme crises. James however does not seem really to have formed any resolution or to have had any distinct intention. He continued from habit to favour France in the main, but as to the coming European crisis his mind seems to have been, if we may judge from his occasional utterances, to abstain from interference. Preoccupied with the domestic struggle upon which he had entered, he did not feel able to interfere with effect. And though he by no means regarded himself as a vassal of France, yet opposition to France seemed peculiarly impossible to him. Accordingly his action, where he is forced to action, leans to the French side, and this seemed so unnatural in an English king in the then circumstances of Europe, that the general suspicion of a secret alliance was strengthened. Thus in May, 1687, the Emperor invites him to guarantee the Truce of Regensburg. At the moment that truce was on the point of being set aside by the strained interpretations of Louis and by his new encroachments. James consults Louis on the proposal, and is told that the guarantee will be welcome provided it is given in such form as to confirm all the strained interpretations contained in the French declaration of March. He frames his answer to the Emperor accordingly; it is rejected as derisory, and conveys the impression that in the great European question of the day the King of England goes with France.

In any case it was clear that he would not oppose

France. Now the active opposition of England to French encroachment was wanted, and might fairly be counted on if only the king's influence were removed. The Great Elector had been gained already; he had been decided by the persecution of the Huguenots, and the same event had roused the English people to indignation. It was certain that any Parliament that could be summoned in England, whether it were Anglican or a Parliament of Dissenters convoked to repeal the Test Act, would call with equal ardour for resistance to France. Could but the English nation have its way, and the times of Cromwell or of Elizabeth return, it might be hoped that the danger which hung over Europe would be averted. For these aggressions of France since 1668 had been made possible only by the connivance of England; they would probably be checked as soon as that connivance should cease.

It thus became the interest of half Europe that a change of government should take place in England. For many years the condition of that country had been revolutionary, but the revolution which had begun in 1670 had from the outset received its impulse from abroad. There came now from abroad an overwhelming impulse to decide it in a particular way. The leaders of this second English revolution were not, as of the first, members of Parliament and popular agitators, but foreign statesmen. The plan of it was devised in consultations between the Dutch Stadtholder and the politicians of the States-General or the States of Holland or the town of Amsterdam, or between the Dutch Stadtholder and the Great Elector and the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and the representatives of the House of Habsburg and of the Pope.

To this predicament has the English Monarchy been brought—by what cause? Not purely by the Catholicising

disposition of Charles II and James II. This disposition by itself, when it became so headstrong as it appeared in James II, would certainly have created a vast disturbance, perhaps a rebellion. But it would not by itself have brought about precisely the Revolution of 1688. For it would not by itself or necessarily have driven James to lean to the side of France in the European crisis. It might just as easily have inclined him to take the opposite side, in which case William could scarcely have made his memorable expedition.

In truth the Catholicising disposition itself was only one effect of the family atmosphere in which both Charles and James had grown up, and the same atmosphere inclined them to a family alliance with France. Thus the ultimate cause of the Second English Revolution is to be found in the marriage of Charles I to Henrietta Maria, which gave to the next generation of our kings a tinge not merely of Catholicism but of French Catholicism. From this marriage came the reaction, which, after a national policy had been sketched by Elizabeth, and established for a time under the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, restored that older form of policy which we call dynastic. England sees herself approaching a European crisis, and knows perfectly well what part she ought to play and would like to play in it. But she has a government which has wholly different ideas. And these ideas, when we examine them, are found to be traceable to family influences. The royal family is intimately connected with the House of Bourbon, has imbibed its religious views, is accustomed to look to it for aid and advice. Unfortunately the time has arrived when the House of Bourbon is no longer regarded by Englishmen as in the time of Mazarin or of Henry IV. Its position in Europe has been wholly altered. Almost

all English parties, the Catholics included, now regard it with animosity. Almost all desire to see England arrayed against it in the approaching struggle.

The time has therefore arrived when the national policy and the dynastic policy are violently opposed to each other.

PART V.

WILLIAM III AND THE COMMERCIAL STATE.

CHAPTER I.

THE REVOLUTION.

FOR about half a century we have found the condition of England for the most part revolutionary. Between 1638 and 1688 there had been very few years, only perhaps a year or two in the age of Clarendon, when the people could enjoy a feeling of security. A second Revolution had visibly commenced only ten years after the Restoration of the Monarchy, and between 1670 and 1688 there had been but occasional pauses in the dangerous and portentous struggle. The fickleness and turbulence of the English nation had become proverbial in Europe, and contrasted remarkably with the profound internal repose, the unity growing ever more complete, of the French. The English, says Torci, are a nation *dont la légèreté est connue; ils changent souvent d'idées.*

This peculiarity was now to disappear. A state of things was to emerge which would be definitive. The lightness, the disposition to change, was henceforth to be

confined within strict limits, and a framework both of institutions and policy was to be devised which would remain for a very long time exempt from violent or sudden change.

It was as if the period of growth came to an end and the fixed and mature stage of national life began. In constitutional history the Revolution of 1688 is recognised as the all-important epoch. It is scarcely less so in the history of policy. The growth of policy is completed at the same time as the growth of the constitution.

It remains to us then only to mark the change produced by the Revolution upon policy, and to point out how decisive the change was, and how definitive the new state of things introduced by it.

Our thread of narrative has long been growing thinner and thinner almost in proportion as occurrences have grown more multitudinous and intricate. In the confused revolutionary history of the period between 1670 and 1688 we have fixed our eyes upon one point only, and have contented ourselves with remarking how exceptionally close throughout is the connexion between English and Continental affairs. Now that we reach the consummation of the Revolution, commonly called the Revolution itself, by the expedition of William, we renounce not only the pretension of giving a full narrative but even the attempt to give any narrative at all. This concluding part will consist simply of such observations on the change of government effected by William, and the new state of things introduced by it, as our peculiar point of view suggests.

This point of view presents to us a characteristic of the Revolution which is overlooked by those who take the constitutional point of view. How often is this second

English Revolution compared to the first, and the points of difference between them reckoned up! ‘It was bloodless, it was final. It introduced a long period of prosperity. All these happy characteristics it derived from the moderation with which it was conducted and from the care with which innovation was restricted to the strictly necessary and the new was grafted on to the old.’ So much we see from the insular point of view. But from the international point of view we perceive another momentous characteristic of a wholly different kind. This second Revolution involved us in a great war with France, which lasted eight years and proved the first of a long series of similar wars with France.

There is no greater transition in our whole international history than this, the last transition we shall deal with. In the long period we have traversed war between England and France, in spite of the tradition of rivalry handed down from Plantagenet times, has been extremely rare; the normal relation between the two states has been one of concert. During the same period a state of war has been on the whole unusual for England, and her wars have rarely lasted longer than a year or two. We enter now upon a different age. From this time through the whole eighteenth century and in the nineteenth down to the fall of Napoleon, England and France wage war periodically, and their wars are on a great scale and of long duration. In this age England is more usually at war than at peace, and her principal enemy is almost always France.

This transition was made at the Revolution of 1688, and was as much the effect of it as the settlement of our constitution.

In what way the Revolution could produce this effect will have been made clear to the reader by our examination

of the reign of James II. Had it been provoked simply by the inclination of James to Popery and arbitrary power its results might have been simply internal and constitutional. But we have shown that James blended together two ideas which had no natural affinity, an inclination to Popery and an adhesion to France at the very moment when the greater part of Europe was leagued together in a desperate resistance to France. The result was that the English struggle was inextricably blended with the European struggle. The change of government in England at the beginning of 1689 has therefore two wholly different aspects. Looked at from the insular point of view it seems like a happier repetition of the Great Rebellion, an assertion of English liberties made with remarkable success and with praiseworthy moderation. But look at it from the European point of view, and it makes a surprisingly different impression. It now appears to be a struggle inside a struggle. The question at issue now appears to be not the liberties of England but the liberties of Europe, not the cause of Protestantism in these islands but the cause of Protestantism all over the world. The tyrant resisted now appears to be not James II but Louis XIV, of whom James is but a subaltern. In this resistance William takes the lead not simply because he is the husband of her who claims the succession to the English crown, but because he had long been the champion of Protestantism and of the liberties of Europe against French ascendancy. And his expedition to England now appears not as the first act of an English drama, but as the second act of a European drama, as a strategic measure belonging to a universal war which had broken out two months earlier, when Louis after four years of delay struck at last the decisive blow and poured his armies into

Germany. This being perceived, we are prepared to find that the English Revolution is, not so much followed by as indistinguishable and inseparable from, a grand war between England and France.

James had probably no fixed purpose of aiding France, but in the extreme tension of all international relations at that moment it was impossible for him to maintain a middle or neutral position. He was first suspected of adhering to France, and then the suspicion itself left him no choice but to adhere to France. In his flight from England at the Christmas-tide of 1688 and again in his flight from Ireland after the Battle of the Boyne he retires to France as to his home. He attaches himself to the House of Bourbon as a poor relation. He passes his latter years and dies in France, as his mother had done before him. In the struggle against the new Government of England he plays on the whole quite a secondary part; it is against Louis rather than against James that William and Mary have to defend their crown.

How James regarded continental affairs may appear from the following passage in his Memoirs, in which he gives his reason for holding aloof from the gathering coalition: ‘The King (besides the little inclination he had to fall out with a Prince his near relation and ancient friend) having the prospect of enjoying a perfect peace and free trade, when all his neighbours should be engaged in war, made him give no ear to the earnest solicitations of the Emperor’s and King of Spain’s ambassadors, who pressed him violently to enter into this confederacy; besides his Majesty looked upon the imagination of a universal Monarchy (with which they strove to fright him as a thing aimed at by France) as a fantastical dream, both impolitic and impracticable, as appeared by Charles V and Philip II,

but that were it otherwise, the situation of England still secured it so well against a French, or any other encroachment, that neutrality was its true interest; which made his Majesty grasp at this occasion of eating out the Dutch, the kingdom's rivals in trade, rather than to eat out his own people's bowels in the defence of that Commonwealth, which never failed to leave their allies in the lurch at the least faint appearance of advantage by it.'

Even this view is so frankly indifferent to the interest of Europe and hostile to the Dutch that it might have led the Dutch people to regard a complete change of policy in England as necessary to their safety; and accordingly James goes on to say that William 'persuaded the Emperor and the King of Spain that there was no other mode of forcing the King of England into the League, and that he had no further aim in the undertaking,' and again that 'all those fair pretences of asserting the people's liberties and securing their religion were but introductory to and a cloak to the real design of executing the ends of the confederacy in general and to serve his own ambition and insatiate thirst after empire in particular.' But in fact there were serious reasons to fear that James would not rest content with thus 'eating out the Dutch' by supplanting them in trade while they waged war with Louis, but would actually join Louis against them.

As early as the summer of 1686 a paper recommending a joint attack by England and France upon the United Provinces, such as that which had been made in 1672, was brought to the notice of James. It did indeed excite his indignation, but at least it betrayed what thoughts were passing through the minds of those who considered international affairs.

At this time too the quarrel between the royal House

of Denmark and its younger branch of Holstein-Gottorp was beginning. The question concerned the sovereignty of Schleswig. The King of Sweden, as so often in a later age, sided with the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. He threatened to invade Denmark with 20,000 men. Denmark was at this time in close alliance with France, and, as we have seen, had lately allied itself by marriage with England. Sweden on the other hand was now opposed to France, and allied with the Emperor and with the Dutch Republic. It was usual for England to consider herself closely interested in these disputes, which might affect the freedom of her access to the Baltic. Hence there was talk of a joint interference of England and France in favour of Denmark. As the Dutch would be on the opposite side, this affair seemed likely to furnish the occasion for the apprehended repetition of the combined action of 1672 against the Dutch.

Many signs appeared to indicate the approach of this event. Early in 1688 James, instigated by Louis, recalled the English regiments which had remained in the Dutch service since the year of the Treaty of Nimeguen. These regiments were the only remaining vestige of that family alliance of William and Charles which in 1678 had caused so much anxiety to Louis. The recall of them seemed a significant step in the gradual process by which England was passing over to the side of France.

There must surely be a secret understanding between the two Powers! If any foreign politician, William or the Emperor or the Great Elector, still doubted it, must not his doubts have been removed when on September 9th, 1688—just as war was on the point of breaking out—D'Avaux on behalf of Louis presented at the Hague a memorial declaring that ‘the bonds of friendship and

alliance were so strict between his Most Christian Majesty and the King of England that he thought himself not only obliged to assist him, but should look upon any act of hostility done either by sea or land against his Majesty of Great Britain, as a manifest rupture of the peace with his crown.' In this note, presented before William's expedition, we see the first indication of the grand war, which was approaching, between France and England. At the same time it could not but convince all Europe that, so long as James reigned, he would commit England to a policy, not of mere neutrality, but of active concert with France. It made a revolution in England necessary to the cause of Europe. And thus William acquired quite a new and much greater position. His right to interfere in the domestic politics of England had been at the outset purely personal. It could not of course be questioned that, as a member of the English royal family and as husband to the heiress of the three kingdoms, he had a right to protest against conduct on the part of James which might endanger his wife's rights and his own, and in the extreme case to interfere by decisive action. But he was not a King in the United Provinces.

The Dutch army and the Dutch fleet were indeed under his command, but they did not belong to him. They could not be used for his personal or family objects, as the French army and fleet, for example, not only could be, but habitually were, used for the honour and glory of Louis XIV. It would seem then that if he took action in the English question he must act as Monmouth had so recently done. He must appear in England at the head of a few personal followers and trust almost entirely to the support he might receive from the English malcontents. For such an expedition the fate of Monmouth afforded an evil omen,

and Monmouth's invasion had itself furnished the King with a pretext for keeping on foot a considerable army. In the face of this army it was not so easy for the malcontents to make a successful rising. James had actually attained a position not wholly unlike that of Cromwell, whose military force raised him far above the fear of a popular insurrection.

The prospect would be different if William could enter England at the head of a considerable military force. Such a force would hold in check the army of James, compel it to assemble at a given point and detain it there. This would give room and opportunity for insurrection to break out in all parts of the country, and if in this way the country should declare itself in favour of the invader the King's army might probably take the infection of the universal feeling. How then could William obtain the control of an army and a fleet?

An army and a fleet were there, and he was already in command of them. But they belonged to the Dutch. And at this critical moment of the Republic, when it was expecting the last irresistible attack of Louis XIV, the force would scarcely be handed over to the personal use of the Stadholder. The Dutch assuredly wanted for their own protection all and more than all their military and naval force. Yes, but the movement in England and the movement in Europe were inseparably connected; they were one and the same. The overthrow of James, so ardently desired in England, was desired by the Dutch too; nay more, it was even more urgently necessary to the Dutch than to the English. In England the tyranny of James was not unendurable, and the country had learned heartily to dislike revolutions. But in Holland it seemed indispensably necessary that James should fall; no other

event, they thought, could save them and their religion from destruction. And thus, by a marvellous coincidence, William, as an English prince and as consort of the heiress of England, desired for family reasons and for English reasons to appear in England at the head of an armed force and at the same time the United Provinces saw no hope for their independence and religion but in invading England with their fleet and army, and of this fleet and army William himself happened to be the commander.

Still great difficulties remained to be surmounted. At first it appeared that such strategy was too circuitous in such a moment of extreme need. Louis stood there, about to give marching orders to his overwhelming force. In a week or two the Rhine might be passed as in 1672 and the Provinces overrun by French armies. Ought they to find the country denuded of troops, the Dutch army and the Dutch general engaged in England and perhaps unable to make their way back ? It might seem that the English expedition must be postponed, and yet to postpone it might be equivalent to giving it up.

This difficulty was removed in a manner which wore the aspect of a divine intervention, yet which is after all explicable enough. Louis, who had just made so imperious a declaration at the Hague, opened the European war in the same month, but opened it not by an attack on the Dutch but by pouring his armies across the German frontier. Though it was in his power by a single well-aimed stroke to frustrate all the designs of William, he not only did not do so, but involved himself so deeply in another war as to lose the power of acting against William. The sequel no doubt proved this step to be an irreparable blunder. But, as our narrative has shown, a

war with the Empire, and not a war with the Dutch, was the goal towards which Louis had been steadily travelling ever since the Peace of Nimeguen. This had long occupied his mind, and had been practically commenced by the Reunions and by the seizure of Strasburg. From this mighty results were to be expected, nothing less than an unbounded ascendancy of France in Central Europe; this too would not brook much delay, but must peremptorily be taken in hand before the Germanic Powers should have settled accounts with the Turk. This war too was in a ripe state of preparation, all the preliminary steps had been taken, the pretexts chosen, the legal case presented to Europe, and diplomacy was now on the point of making way for strategy. There was not only the pretension of the Duke of Orleans to a share in the succession of the Palatinate but a really important dispute about the election to the archbishopric of Cologne, a dispute so important that Louis could hardly have refrained from urging it by arms without tacitly abandoning the attitude which he had now maintained for ten years towards Germany. At that moment and from his point of view this German question could not but seem to him immeasurably larger than the question between William and James. He was indeed alive to the dangerous possibility that lay in that question, but such an unheard of event as the dethronement of an English king by a foreign invader could scarcely seem more than a possibility. In the circumstances it is almost surprising to observe not how insensible but how keenly alive to the danger Louis showed himself. He committed no oversight. He sent Bonrepaux to England in this very month of September to offer an alliance of mutual defence against the Germans and the Dutch. A little later he

offered to abandon the siege of Philippsburg, which was formed, and to throw his whole force upon Holland. Actually he declared war upon the Dutch Republic in the month of November.

The fault lay with James rather than with Louis. James came to the throne with a character for decision and firmness which gave the impression that at least he knew his own mind. He seems indeed to have persuaded himself that his brother had owed his trials and his father his ruin to their facility in making concessions. Accordingly he adopted a system of obstinacy. But behind the resolute pose which was so new in the Stuart family was concealed the same want of grasp, the same helplessness, that had marked Charles I. The indistinctness of view, which had already led him to confuse adhesion to Popery with adhesion to France, led him now at the critical moment to embarrass himself between two irreconcilable courses of action. His brother had known how to avail himself at need of France against his people or of his people against France. James tried to obtain the aid of both at once, and found himself accordingly in his extremity left without aid. He who had yielded so much to Louis, was now eager to prove himself a true English King. He took offence at D'Avaux's note, which seemed to represent him as depending on French protection, he rejected the proposal brought by Bonrepaux. He was most unseasonably bent upon proving that no secret understanding existed between himself and Louis, when matters had already gone so far that only French aid energetically given could save him. The result was that both his subjects and the Dutch acted with the energy of despair, as though they had to do with a conspiracy of the two kings, and meanwhile there was no conspiracy

but only a kind of general agreement, the habitual sympathy of relatives.

We arrive at the memorable occurrence which is commonly described as the Revolution, that is, the sailing of the Dutch fleet from Helvoetsluys at the beginning of November, its arrival in Torbay, the formation of the association at Exeter, the king's refusal to call a Parliament, his arrival in his army at Salisbury on November 19th, his retreat towards the capital, the defection of Churchill and Grafton, the universal insurrection, the decision of James to summon a Parliament for January 15th, the sending of Commissioners to negotiate with William at Hungerford about the conditions under which the new Parliament shall meet, the despair of James and his determination to take refuge, with the Queen and the Prince of Wales, in France, the flight of the Queen and Prince on December 9th, the flight of the king on December 10th, his detention and second flight, his arrival in France on Christmas-day.

This well-known story is not to be narrated again here; it comes before us only that we may consider it from the international point of view.

It is the close of that adventure into which Charles II led the House of Stuart when in 1669 he made the proposals which were embodied a year later in the Treaty of Dover. As was remarked above, the original idea of Charles was even wilder than that which James attempted with such disastrous results to carry into effect, but it was substantially the same. And between 1669 and 1688 this idea never ceased to occupy the minds of English politicians.

When we look at it from the constitutional point of view, we call it Popery and arbitrary power, and perhaps

attribute it to a certain incurable hatred of liberty which came to these kings with their Stuart blood. Perhaps in reality their views were somewhat more defensive, somewhat less aggressive, than this theory assumes. If they clutched at a military force and a dispensing power, this was perhaps rather from the extreme difficulty of retaining any power at all than from a desire for unlimited power. However that may be, the constitutional point of view only reveals to us half the phenomenon. The other half of it, equally observable at the commencement in 1669 and at the catastrophe in 1688, is the steadfast gravitation of both these kings towards France. And this bias is evidently a family feeling, which comes to them from their mother, and which carries with it an inclination to their mother's religion.

But when we survey the whole period we see that the bias towards France was one thing under Charles and quite another under James.

Charles in 1669 found that by the disasters of the Dutch war, followed by the fall of Clarendon, his monarchy had been undermined. He felt compelled by necessity to devise something new. He formed a grandiose Macchiavellian scheme, which however included one prodigious miscalculation. Now for the first time the Stuart Monarchy began to lean, as we find it still leaning in 1688, upon Louis XIV. But in 1669 Louis XIV was still comparatively at his commencements. His ascendancy in Europe was not yet universally felt; his peculiar religious policy was not yet developed; the tradition of the alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin was still recent. Charles was a keen politician, and as little troubled by principles, whether moral or religious, as his grandfather Henry IV. If he had a sincere preference for Catholicism

he had no intention of being a martyr to it; rather probably he expected to save his throne as Henry IV had done, by a great recantation. But he soon became aware of his error; the recantation is dropped; only a family alliance with France remains; and even this, when once the immediate object of crushing the republican government in the United Provinces has been attained, is readily abandoned or regarded only as a second string to the bow. If he falls back upon it in the last period of his reign, this is but an expedient of despair.

James on the other hand is the very reverse of a politician. The course he takes on his accession is not in any sense a scheme adapted to the actual condition of the country or of Europe. It is but the old scheme, though the aspect of Europe has by this time entirely changed.

In his view there is indeed one grain of common sense. He means to take advantage of the grand victory which has been won for his cause by the defeat of the Exclusion Bill. Parliament has pronounced decidedly for the hereditary principle. A Papist has been allowed to mount the throne, and without limitations imposed on his power. If a Papist may be king, surely inferior offices ought to be tenable by Papists, surely the king's religion ought to be tolerated, the king's worship ought not to remain illegal. And the courage with which the king confessed his faith before men, the frankness with which he took in hand to give it a position in the country, commanded respect. Many thinkers and philosophers all over Europe favoured him so far. He was applauded by Bayle and by William Penn.

But what had all this to do with adhesion to the side of France? James blended together two things wholly distinct, to all appearance simply from habit and because

fifteen years earlier his brother had devised a plan for introducing Popery by the aid of France. His mind, we must suppose, had no penetration or grasp. It takes no hold of the stupendous things which the Continent now presented to it.

The alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin had now receded into a very dim distance. Louis XIV had now grown, chiefly by the sufferance of England, into a potentate similar to Charles V or Philip II. He seemed about to subdue with one hand the German Empire, in which the Treaty of Westphalia had given him a commanding position, and with the other the Spanish Monarchy, to which he had acquired a pretension by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. He had already given a deadly blow to the Dutch Republic, which would probably sink into complete dependence upon him as soon as the Spanish Low Countries should be swallowed up.

It was a good deal for James to ask the English people to repeal the Test Act and give toleration to the Catholic worship. But why ask them at the same time to favour, or at least not to oppose, these advances of Louis to universal monarchy? The first appeal was based upon the abstract principle of religious toleration. James professed to find all forcing of conscience manifestly and shockingly unchristian. He professed also to have no hostile designs against Protestantism. But was France a tolerant Power? The Dragonnades were taking place at this very moment, so that the ascendancy of France now appeared to involve the destruction of Protestantism on the Continent, and yet James calmly inculcates toleration as a Christian duty upon the English people and at the same time connives, and forces them to connive, at the establishment of French ascendancy abroad.

'But he was a fanatic, and could think of but a single thing, the advancement of his religion.' Even this statement does not adequately describe his policy, or want of policy. It was not a single thing that he thought of, but two opposite things which he thought of as one. For it must be repeated that France was at this very moment breaking up the unity of the Catholic faith, and introducing a Gallican schism. This fact was forced upon the notice of James by the bearing of the Pope himself, who, so far from rejoicing in the victory of the Church in France, as the Popes of the Counter-reformation would have done, stood before Europe in the attitude of a martyr, pointing to Louis as to the great modern tyrant of the Church and exclaiming, 'Plead thou my cause, O God.' If James could not see this he must at least have been aware that Innocent included *him* in the distrust and disapprobation with which he regarded Louis.

Under Charles the Stuart policy had had two factors, Popery and concert with France, but the latter in larger quantity; indeed the former had speedily disappeared. Under James Popery was made prominent again, but it was still blended with the French concert, and the mixture was this time infinitely more mischievous and monstrous. Strictly speaking, it was the French concert, and not Popery, that caused the fall of James. In one word had he but sided with the Pope, he would not have fallen, at least when and as he did. For the side of the Pope was at that crisis the side of William and the Great Elector and the Emperor and the King of Spain. It was the part of James, precisely as a Catholic King of England asserting the right of English Catholics to toleration,—it was his part to protest energetically against the Revocation and also against the treatment of the Pope, it was his part

to guarantee the Truce of Regensburg, and to prevent Louis by resolute intervention from invading Germany. In all this he might have counted on the enthusiastic support of Parliament. At the same time he would have rendered himself necessary to the leaders of the European Coalition, including William. Holding this position in Europe, a position at once truly English, and strictly Catholic, nay even Popish, he would on the one side not have been deserted by his people, so tired of revolutions, on the other side he would not have been attacked by William nor by a Dutch fleet and army.

But thus to disentangle two things which had so long been entwined together demanded a clear understanding, a firm will, even an elevated character. A person so ordinary as James alike in understanding, will and character, did not even perceive the inconsistency of sympathising at the same time with William Penn and with the author of the Dragonnades, with the Pope and the modern Philip the Fair who was trampling on the Pope, with the Emperor who was driving back the Turk and the king who was so mischievously playing into the hands of the Turk. And so he was left with scarcely a friend in the world but Louis XIV. At home the Tory Danby signed his name by the side of the names Russell and Sidney to the invitation to William: abroad Catholic and Protestant Powers agreed in desiring his fall.

This is the one point in the Revolution of 1688 which concerns us here. When we see that James was ruined mainly by his concert with Louis we perceive on the one side the unity of the whole movement from 1669 to 1688, on the other we understand why the Revolution led, as a matter of course, to a long war between England and France.

The inclination to Popery and the inclination to France both in Charles and James were but different aspects of the same family feeling, which was inbred in the sons of Henrietta Maria and the grandsons of Henry IV. And so the whole second Revolution of England may be traced to the French marriage of Charles I, and may be regarded as the resistance to a revival of dynastic policy. Alike in 1672 and in 1688 the cause of discord is fundamentally this, that the people call for a Protestant and an Anti-Gallican policy, while the king feels himself drawn by family ties to the House of Bourbon. This fact at the same time explains what followed the change of government. There is in one respect a sharp contrast between the first and the second English Revolution. In the first Revolution nothing is more remarkable—we have called attention to the fact above—than its insularity. It is indeed full of the interaction of the insular kingdoms, it is mainly a settlement of the relations of England to Scotland and Ireland. But foreign States, especially France, have on the whole remarkably little influence upon it and receive little influence from it. England has no share in the Westphalian settlement; on the other hand neither France nor any other Power contributes much to bring about the Restoration. Just the contrary in the second Revolution. From first to last this is mainly a disturbance in the foreign relations of England. It takes its rise in a treaty with France, the Treaty of Dover. It first comes to light in a war with the United Provinces. In the long parliamentary struggle which follows foreign relations are the main topic, and foreign states through their Ambassadors marshal votes against each other in the House of Commons. At last the knot is cut by a foreign prince, who crosses the Channel with a

foreign fleet, lands an army in great part foreign upon the English coast, and exhibits on his flag the words *Pro libero Parlamento et Protestante Religione*, and underneath the Orange motto, *Je maintiendrai*.

As a foreign prince heads one party in the contest, we should be prepared to find another foreign prince heading the other. For in the question at issue even William was not so decidedly the head of one party as Louis XIV was head of the other. James had fallen, as we saw, not so much in the cause of religion as in the cause of Louis XIV. Accordingly when all hope for the present is lost he does not take refuge with Dundee in Scotland or with Tyrconnel in Ireland, but he goes after wife and child to France, as to his home.

As Louis XIV had taken a leading part through his secret influence in the parliamentary struggle of Charles II's time, because the struggle in England was but a part of the European struggle, so for the same reason he must take part in the English Revolution which broke out in 1688. It is Louis who has been attacked by William in England; Louis therefore must resist him in England. And thus a war of England and France sprang by inevitable necessity out of the Revolution.

That is, it seemed necessary at the time, though the sequel may be thought to show that Louis would have provided better for his own interests if he had abstained from intervening in the English question. He had his hands already more than full on the Continent. It would have been for him a great point gained if England would but remain neutral. And he might conceivably have enjoyed that good fortune if he had not himself forced England to join the European Coalition. For the convulsion of the change of government would paralyse

England at least for a while. A reaction visibly set in when such questionable steps were taken as the dethroning of a king and the making of another king by the Act of Convention. It was most doubtful whether William could maintain himself, and so long as he had to struggle with disaffection here, he and his military force were subtracted from the total of force against which Louis had to contend abroad. He would wish no doubt to bring his new subjects to the help of his old countrymen; but so long as France afforded no pretext for war, would he not endanger his precarious throne by making the suggestion? Would not the party of reaction, the clerical party and high Tories, already full of misgiving at what had been done, make an unnecessary and uncalled for war with France a reason for totally deserting his cause?

But this is a retrospective view. At the point of view where Louis stood at the end of the year 1688 no such artful forbearance could seem possible to him.

In the first place he had pledged himself to intervene by his declaration of September. Pledges of this sort Louis was the last person to leave unredeemed. He belonged in general to an active, adventurous, undertaking school of politicians. He had of late carried this system to such a length that he had issued a separate defiance to almost every Power in Europe, to the Emperor, to the Germanic Body, to Sweden, not to speak of the Spanish Monarchy and the United Provinces, which had long since felt the full weight of his pride. He had defied the whole Catholic world by his treatment of the Pope, and then the whole Protestant world by the Dragonnade and the Revocation. Why should he make a single exception in favour of England?

Mazarin indeed had had a wholesome fear of England,

but the English army of Mazarin's day had been dissolved, and Louis himself had hitherto not found it so difficult to deal with England. It was, like Poland, torn by factions, and his experience taught that a little money judiciously distributed between the Government and the Opposition effectually disabled it for the purpose of foreign policy. There was as yet no reason to think that this disease was likely to be healed. On the contrary faction was now wilder than ever in the three kingdoms. Who could for a moment believe that the enterprise of William, so unprecedented, could succeed at least within any moderate period? Little therefore would be risked by intervening openly in favour of James. He was bound to it in honour, and to honour was added knightly compassion when a distressed queen carrying a disinherited prince appeared before his throne.

He had been at war with England before, in 1667, and had thought little of it. He had no suspicion that he was now drawing France into a series of mighty duels with her old rival, which would cover much more than a century. On the contrary he contemplated an easy, inexpensive war. For was not William already surrounded by enemies? France had but to furnish officers and a little money, as formerly in Portugal; the rank and file would be furnished by Ireland and by the clerical party in England. Moreover William could not do without a Parliament, and a Parliament would take French money.

True, these calculations were quite uncertain. It was possible no doubt that William might carry everything before him, as indeed for the moment he appeared to do. Louis might see his most resolute enemy, an experienced statesman and general, at the head of one of the greatest

states. But in that case too intervention would be politic, or rather prompt and decisive intervention would be urgently necessary. For everything ought to be hazarded in order to avert the danger of seeing English fleets and armies put at the service of the Coalition, which already included most of the Continental Powers. It could already be seen that everything depended on the course which England might take in the European question, and thus the whole fortune of Louis was staked upon the success or failure of the English Revolution.

These calculations were plausible, and such as were certain, when we consider the character of Louis XIV's government, to prevail. Nevertheless they were not just, and at the same time they were so important that they altered the whole course of European history and had a main share in determining the international character of the eighteenth century.

In one word this French intervention, intended to overthrow the Revolution, proved to be the one thing which was capable of consolidating it, and at the same time it had the effect of creating a new rivalry of England and France such as had not existed for centuries, and which was henceforth for a long time the dominant fact of international politics.

To bring England into the field against Louis was no doubt an object which from the outset had lain much nearer the heart of William than to set the English crown on his own head. Yet he had not the slightest chance of attaining this object by influence or persuasion. Had he hinted at such a thing the reaction against him would speedily have become overwhelming. The utmost he could by himself accomplish was to prevent England from joining, as under James it might have done, the side of

France. This possibility no doubt was extinguished once for all by the Revolution. But there was in England so much insular indifference, and so much natural ill-humour against William himself, there was so much to do at home in a time of revolution, that neutrality in the European struggle might seem the course England would now be most likely to adopt. A very serious probability, since in that case the European cause would simply have lost by the effect of the Revolution, at least for a long time, its ablest champion, William himself, now detained in England !

This difficulty was removed in the most obliging and effectual manner by Louis himself. Whether England would, or would not, come to the rescue of Europe, was a question which she was never called upon to decide or even to discuss. No choice was allowed her, unless she was prepared to cancel all that she had done after full deliberation, at the dictation of Louis XIV. For he did not think twice, as Mazarin had done in the first Revolution. Without hesitation he adopted the cause of James, equipped him for Ireland, and took an active share in arranging the dangerous civil war which now began.

The question was raised above what cause or causes may have checked the progress of French ascendancy, which between 1678 and 1684 had been so irresistible, and yet thirteen years later at the Peace of Ryswick appeared plainly to be an ebbing tide. Those causes begin now to appear, and we can perceive that, after James II himself, scarcely any ruler was ever more misguided than Louis XIV at the same period, while he took the advice of Louvois. The old statesmanship of the age of the Cardinals has fallen out of use at the very time when the harvest of their vast ideas falls to be reaped. Louis has

defied almost all states at once and both religions, and now at the crisis of his career, when in September 1688 he strikes the decisive blow, we can perceive signs of conscious embarrassment. He doubts whether after all he is really a match for all Europe at once! He has been led too far! He is no Richelieu, no Napoleon, and his great adviser, Louvois, is a mere military specialist.

He began a war which lasted nine years, and which almost ruined France. It is the beginning of the decline of the House of Bourbon. Probably he entered upon it in the hope of gaining his objects, both in Germany and afterwards in England, immediately and in a single campaign. He had just this chance. If he should meet with steady resistance, he must fail in the end, and his failure would be disastrous. But there was a possibility that his opponents would give way at once.

We see Europe assuming a new shape, but a shape it was to retain for a very long time. The King of Spain has altogether lost his preeminence, and has given place to the King of France, as Saturn to Jove. On the other hand the commencement of European war on a grand scale in 1688 and 1689 is remarkably similar to the commencement of the great revolutionary war in 1792 and 1793. In both cases France overruns the ecclesiastical territory on the Rhine and takes Mainz; it also advances into the Catholic Low Countries; a little later it is found also at war with England.

France is now at the height of military efficiency and reputation. For some time to come she will outshine her opponents and win victories. But this will avail her nothing unless she can speedily bring the war to an end. For her resources are overstrained, and time is against her.

And first in Germany the indications are unfavourable for France; Louis has let his opportunity slip. Forty years have passed since the Peace of Westphalia, and a still longer time since Germany was ruined and depopulated in the Thirty Years' War. As late as 1681, when Louis seized Strasburg, she had shown little power of resistance, and in 1683 the Turk had encamped before Vienna. But now there was a new Germany! She had overthrown the Turk, and won for herself and for Christendom the great victory of the age. Belgrade was captured at this very moment. Moreover the Hohenzollern was now reconciled to the Habsburg, and that internal discord which a few years earlier had paralysed her, as it paralysed her again in the age of the French Revolution, was appeased for the time.

Accordingly when the army of Louis, beginning with the capture of Philippsburg, proceeded to overrun the Palatinate, to occupy Heidelberg and Mannheim, and then, entering the ecclesiastical region, seized Mainz, Bonn and other towns, what followed? The Germans were in time to save Coblenz and Cologne, but the loss of so many important positions was a blow which a few years earlier might have inclined them to submission. Now however they exerted themselves most successfully. The Elector of Brandenburg retook Bonn with Rheinbergen and Kaiserswerth, and the Duke of Lorraine formed the siege of Mayence, and captured it with a French garrison of more than 10,000 men. It began at once to appear that the French were not prepared for resistance of this kind. The devastation of the Palatinate was a confession of weakness in the characteristic manner of Louvois. How could France find troops enough to hold so many positions, especially if she was to have a war with England too? If

she could not hold them, she could destroy them, and so Worms, Spiers, Mannheim, Heidelberg, with countless villages were reduced to ruins.

But would England resist? Here at least Louis might hope for an immediate and overwhelming success. For the country was convulsed with Revolution; it might seem impossible that it should long acquiesce in the rule of a Dutch conqueror. Ireland was already in adhesion to James, who had there an army so numerous that Schomberg did not venture in 1689 to risk a battle. An embittered struggle of Whigs and Tories took place in the Convention Parliament, so that William was obliged to dissolve it suddenly in 1690. We are to bear in mind that England was in those days so far from being mistress of the sea that she was hardly considered equal as a naval Power to France, which had recently been raised by Colbert to the highest point of naval efficiency, and which had now a most ambitious Minister of naval affairs in Colbert's son Seignelai.

Perhaps in the whole long period we have reviewed there has been no moment, not even that of the Armada, so critical for England as the summer of 1690. William went to Ireland early in June. Shortly afterwards the Battle of Beachy Head was fought. It may be regarded as the commencement of the long series of naval actions which ended at Trafalgar. But it was a victory for France. About the same time Luxemburg defeated Prince Waldeck, commander of the Dutch in William's absence, at Fleurus. What made these disasters so portentous was the fact that the new Government had taken no root in England, and that an overwhelming reaction was but too probable. Thus writes Queen Mary, 'I believe never any person was left in greater straits of all

kinds....I never wanted those who put me perpetually in fear, Lord President himself (Danby, now Caermarthen) once asking me the question the king had put to me before he went, what I would do in case of any rising or disturbance in the City, *which they both thought likely to happen....*I had prepared myself for the worst, and when the king went believed it was likely we should never meet more....I knew there was nothing for me to trust to, humanly speaking, when the king was gone. And certainly if any rising had happened upon the appearing of the French fleet, or had they landed after ours was beaten, I had been in a very bad condition.' In this situation we have only to suppose one more disaster, a defeat of William in Ireland, or his defeat and death, and a strange vista opens!

France might thus have obtained, on the side of England at least, that rapid success which, as we have seen, was necessary to her. James might have been restored, and England might have made a humiliating peace. At the same time the fall of William might have caused a revolution in the United Provinces, which might have obliged them too to make a humiliating peace.

At this moment William struck, with a directness and rapidity unusual in the military operations of that age, a stroke which, though by no means decisive of the whole war, was decisive of one part of it and restored his cause in public estimation. Landing in Ireland on June 14th, he advanced straight upon Dublin with an army of perhaps 36,000 men. James had about 23,000 men, and wished to avoid a battle. But a somewhat confused battle was fought at the passing of the Boyne, after which the Irish army was enclosed between two divisions of the English. It was impossible to maintain Dublin. James

abandoned his whole Irish enterprise, and made his way back to France. In Ireland, where shortly before the Protestant cause had so desperately maintained itself at Derry and Enniskillen, such a transformation took place that the Catholic cause was now in like manner shut up in Limerick. Little over a fortnight passed between the landing of William and the embarkation of James.

It does not appear that James fled in despair. That was the moment of the battle of Fleurus and the battle of Beachy Head. For his cause he must have been full of hope. But he wanted to be king of England, not king of Ireland, and had perhaps become dimly aware that the more his cause prospered among the native Irish population, the more his English subjects would be alienated from him.

Meanwhile this short campaign strikingly showed how little insular, how truly European, was the struggle for which our islands then furnished an arena. The Battle of the Boyne can scarcely be called an English battle. Not only did about half of the rank and file in William's army consist of foreigners, Dutchmen, Danes, French refugees, but the principal officers too were foreign. After William himself the eye rests upon Marshal Schomberg and his son Meinhard Schomberg, who executed the most important military operation; beyond these we see Count Solm, Prince Ferdinand Wilhelm of Wurtemberg, and several other foreigners. On the side of James too the best troops were the French corps under Count Lauzun.

It would perhaps have been well for Louis if the Battle of the Boyne had not been half-hidden from his view by his victories of Fleurus and Beachy Head. His triumphs were a fatal will-o'-the-wisp to him. They reconciled him to a war which, whether waged successfully or

unsuccessfully, was a burden far too heavy for France to support. Mere victories were of little use to her, she needed speedy and overwhelming victories, which might give her peace. Such victories did not arrive, but for a long time they seemed about to arrive, and in the meanwhile Louis accustomed himself to a position in Europe which he had never occupied in his early prosperous days and could not maintain long without exhausting France. We have seen how his ascendancy had grown up since 1668 entirely through the connivance or neutrality of England. Now as the years passed and William did not fall, he found himself contending against the old Coalition of the last war reinforced by England.

England had not yet begun to defeat him in the field, but the mere fact that she was against him made his task hopeless. So long as England had been neutral he could throw all his force upon his northern and eastern frontier, and here he had the superiority. But now he had to employ his force on both sides at once, to ride the Channel with his fleets and to feed the Irish rebellion with troops, officers, artillery, and subsidies. So much even while he had the upper hand against England. The case would be much worse should the English naval power revive as in the days of Blake and Monk. In that case the long coast-line of France would be exposed to attack, and a great proportion of her force must be withdrawn from the Rhine and Meuse in order to guard it.

But the will-o'-the-wisp long danced before him. In 1692 it seemed almost as likely as in 1690 that William's throne would fall before a direct stroke. William's party was breaking up; the Princess Anne and her Marlborough were deserting him. He was himself absent in the Low Countries, whither the English troops were to follow him.

An army of 30,000 men under Bellefonds, convoyed over by a fleet under Tourville, would succeed as certainly as half that number of men had succeeded under William four years before. It was the frivolous fashion of the English to try experiments in government, but it had been shown in 1660 that they returned in the end to their natural king. The enterprise however did not end according to these expectations. It resulted not in a new English Restoration, but in the Battle of La Hogue.

This battle has often been called great; it has been compared to Lepanto. It was rather perhaps significant. In itself it was scarcely a more decisive defeat for the French than that of Beachy Head had been for the English. Nevertheless it proved to be a turning-point in naval history. The great maritime rivalry of France and England was now beginning. At the outset the French were the superior naval Power. They had defeated the English in the Channel, landed troops freely in Ireland; it would even seem that they ought to have prevented William from landing in Ireland in 1690. In the long period which lies behind us we have not met with a naval victory of England over France. Yet such victories recurred almost uniformly in the frequent wars of the eighteenth century. The series begins at La Hogue, and though no decided naval predominance of England can yet be spoken of, on the other hand the naval superiority of France is at an end from this time.

In order to estimate the disaster which France suffered at La Hogue we must make a remark which applies to the whole war. She lost much more by her defeats than she gained by her victories. She was the ascendant, assailant Power. Her opponents, who were fighting for life and independence, were prepared for many defeats

from a Power far superior to any of them in military efficiency and resource. To them each defeat was as a lesson which they might profit by. To Louis on the other hand anything short of a complete victory was as a loss, and a great defeat was a loss almost irreparable. Half the work of Colbert was thrown away at La Hogue; and for what purpose? For the satisfaction of restoring James II to the throne of England.

Louis suffers no such defeat by land. Luxemburg defeats William more than once in the Low Countries. In campaign after campaign France has the advantage, although she stands alone against almost all Europe. But Louis had not gone to war in order to show, while his people bled to death, that he was a match for all Europe. His object had been to convert the Truce into a Peace, and to assert his supremacy within the Empire so as utterly to eclipse the House of Habsburg. But as the war advances we can perceive that his object becomes much more modest. Long before the Peace of Ryswick he recognised that he had failed. The last campaigns are in reality defensive. He fights on only in order to secure Strasburg and Luxemburg. He has quite ceased to be the tyrant of Europe. English fleets bombard his seaports. The Duke of Savoy invades France from the south. He maintains indeed a certain superiority up to the time when the negotiations begin at Ryswick. But how? He purchased the defection of Savoy from the Coalition by yielding Casale and Pinerolo, that is, by abandoning the ascendancy in Italy which he had been at such pains to establish.

This measure, which enabled him to transfer his Italian army to the Low Countries, was indeed decisive. It brought on the Treaty of Ryswick. But by this treaty

he did not retain Strasburg and Luxemburg, but only Strasburg, and at the same time he yielded the whole point in debate between himself and England by undertaking not to aid any revolutionary movements in England.

When for liberty or independence a nation has waged for nine years an exhausting war, and then lays down its arms, impoverished perhaps and exhausted, but free, such a nation will deem itself successful. The French nation was now indeed exhausted; the economical mischief was done for which no remedy could ever be found while the House of Bourbon reigned. But for this great effort what had France to show? Simply this, that she had lost Casale, Pinerolo and Luxemburg, and that she saw England which had been an obsequious ally, henceforth a jealous rival, more than a match for her by sea.

Such was the disaster of Louis XIV's reign in the age of Louvois. The principal author of it disappeared in 1691, and we begin to perceive from this time among French politicians some at least who are touched with a profound misgiving. The splendour is fading from the reign, though not yet so manifestly that all the world can see it. Europe however breathes again. That universal catastrophe which ten years before seemed inevitable is no longer dreaded. In 1697 Europe has forgotten the feelings that tormented her in 1687.

These summary remarks on the great war have been made in order to complete our view of what has been called here the second English Revolution. For as that Revolution begins not with William's expedition in 1688 but with the Treaty of Dover in 1670, so it ends not with the flight of James in 1688 but with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. At least the struggle of twenty-

eight years between those two dates is essentially one and the same. From first to last the enemy of the English people is not so much their king as the French king, and the evil they apprehend is rather dependence on France than the growth of the prerogative or of Popery at home. In the last nine years this fact is patent. England wages war by sea and land against France; it is by French ships and troops and money that James hopes to be restored; and his restoration would have involved the dependence of England on France. But what thus became manifest in 1689 was equally the case earlier, between 1669 and 1689. It was only because they were backed by Louis that either Charles II or James II had been in the least degree formidable, and Louis, it is needless to say, backed them for his own ends.

As the attack on English liberties came really from France, so the vindication of them reacted on France, and that in the most decisive manner. We saw that it was purely through the dependence of the English Government on France that Louis became the tyrant of Europe. But for this there would have been no War of Holland, no triumphant Treaty of Nimeguen, no Reunions or seizure of Strasburg; nay more, there would have been no Dragonnades and no Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It is naturally therefore not less true that the cessation of this dependence by the accession of William and Mary saved Europe not less directly than it saved England. It involved the fall of the ascendancy of Louis along with the fall of James II.

The idea of a Balance of Power was already an old English tradition. It had been boasted of Henry VIII that he held the balance between Charles V and Francis I. William now, as king of England, in a still more

effectual manner restored the European balance. Louis, attacked now on both sides at once, found his offensive speedily dwindle to a defensive; and even his defensive ruined France. He had recklessly increased the number of his enemies before 1688; he had lost the support of Sweden and of the Great Elector. But he committed his irreparable blunder when at the beginning of 1689 he actually forced England to take the field against him. From this time it was certain that, if he did not speedily crush the English Revolution, if it could but maintain itself against him, then there was an end of his ascendancy in Europe. He was henceforth overmatched.

In international history the second English Revolution is thus infinitely more important than the first. It was an event which decided the whole subsequent course of European history, and was speedily perceived to have done so. It is in this respect the unique event of the history of England. Both before and since, in Elizabeth's time and in Pitt's time, the immovable stability of England has made her serve as a breakwater to some European deluge, in the former case the Counter-reformation, in the latter the French Revolution. In this case it was not her stability but her mobility that had a decisive effect. In this one instance only the disturbance of Europe, instead of being rejected from our shores, actually overflowed into the British islands and overturned the British throne, until the decisive battle of European civilisation was fought under the leadership of Dutch, French and German warriors by an Irish river.

CHAPTER II.

THE WORK OF WILLIAM III.

To the growth of British Policy, as it is considered in this book, three persons mainly contributed, Elizabeth, Oliver, and William III.

We have found Elizabeth, not so much by her action as by abstinence from action, maintained with invincible patience and courage through a long reign, drawing England out of foreign entanglements and laying a deep foundation for the great insular and maritime state.

We have found Cromwell with restless energy and enterprise creating a state which for the moment was the most powerful in the world.

We found this state anticipating in several respects the British Empire of more recent times. But we found it necessarily ephemeral, as resting on a basis strong indeed for the moment, but, as it were, accidental, the army which had been created only for the needs of a revolutionary time.

We have now contemplated another most imposing developement, represented by a third great person.

The work of King William III in the world was on a vast scale. It is seldom contemplated as a whole, because

it embraces many countries at once, while history has the habit of considering each country separately. Here we are to consider his place in British Policy, but he has a place not less eminent in European and in Dutch policy than in British, and in justice to him we ought to mark this immense range of his activity before we concentrate our attention on that division of it which concerns us most.

He was called upon in earliest manhood to play the great part which was hereditary in his house. But he had to deal with a crisis more extreme than had tried any of his predecessors except William the Silent. The enemy, France, was a Power much greater and more energetic than Spain had been in the days of his grandfather Frederick Henry or his great-uncle Maurice. And he had to restore a spirit and an organisation which had fallen into decay during the Stadholderless time. If we suppose that William had died at the end of his first or Dutch period, about 1678, how would he appear in history? It would be said of him that in a life of less than thirty years he had earned for himself a place among great national deliverers, and the United Provinces would reverence him as their great restorer and second founder.

In the latter part of his life he appeared as the great European statesman of his age. A great Alliance had to be founded and held together. Never had Europe seen such a great and complicated Coalition. It had to be held together in spite of many failures through nine years of war, and then four years after the Peace it had to be reconstituted and made ready for a second trial more tremendous even than the first. All this was done, and the great League went through the second ordeal with triumph. The work of William ended just when this

second struggle began, but the vast preparation for it was made by him. Marlborough wielded the weapon which William had forged, or we may say that he lived in a house which William had built. It is true that Europe has since seen coalitions still greater and more victorious, but when we compare the resistance of Europe to Louis XIV with that which was offered to the French Revolution and Napoleon we are struck by this difference, that in the later and larger struggle there is no person on the side of Europe answering to William III, no presiding statesman to hold everything together. It is impossible to find a greater achievement in international statesmanship than this of William's.

He who had ruled and saved his country in youth rules, in a sense, and saves Europe in middle age. Two such achievements in a short life! But we mention them only to dismiss them. We are concerned here with quite another aspect of this short life, and with other achievements, namely, those which he performed in Britain.

His work here too falls naturally into two parts. We all know that he settled our constitution upon a permanent basis. But it is not only our constitution, it is also our policy, our definitive position among the states of the world, that we owe in the main to him.

Now that we have traced through so long a period the gradual growth of English policy we are in a condition to describe shortly the decisive modification introduced into it by the Revolution.

A kind of disease in the body politic had made it restless ever since 1669. Monarchy had been restored, nor was there any general inclination to repeat the experiment which under the name of a Commonwealth or Protectorate had given us in reality only a Military State. There was

however a general feeling that something was terribly wrong. The evil was perceived only in partial glimpses. At one time it appeared that the Monarch aimed at arbitrary power, at another time that he was secretly inclined to Popery, and always that he leaned too much on France. Our analysis has led us to regard these as so many symptoms of an evil which lay deeper, an evil which was by no means new. Monarchy could scarcely subsist without intermarriage with other monarchies, and it had long been known that such intermarriage might have immeasurable consequences. What strange results had flowed from the marriage of Henry VIII and Catharine of Aragon! And still more fatal results had been on the point of following from the marriage of Philip and Mary. Accordingly the redemption of England in the sixteenth century had been achieved by a sovereign who abstained from marriage. Owing to the fact that her reign was very long, this remedy had proved sufficient. But it did not remove the evil. In general kings and queens must marry; they would be likely to marry into other royal houses; it would be their interest to select the greatest houses; and so the danger would return which had been seen in its extreme form when the Queen regnant of England had wedded the King of Naples and Sicily, who in due time succeeded to half the thrones of Europe.

The danger did return when Charles I married Henrietta Maria; but it returned more gradually and in a form less easily recognisable. The result of this marriage was that in the next generation we had two kings in succession who felt not only as foreigners but as Frenchmen, that is, as members of a race markedly different, almost antipathetic, to our own, and at the same time prodigiously influential. Their ideas of government, morality, religion, were the

ideas of the French court of the time. They leaned on the French court, as it were, instinctively, and even when on their own principles they ought not to have done so. Moreover they themselves made marriages calculated to increase the evil. Both married Catholic princesses.

And yet the evil seemed inseparable from Monarchy, and that generation was convinced that it could not dispense with Monarchy.

By a marvellous combination of circumstances it happened that the same person who had been able to save the United Provinces, and who in later years was able to marshal all Europe against French ascendancy, possessed the remedy which alone could cure the disease which troubled Britain.

Everyone knows the details, how he was married to the heiress of James II, who was at the same time English on the mother's side and a staunch Protestant, how he was himself a Stuart on the mother's side and also a staunch Protestant, and how owing to these circumstances he was able to place himself and his wife in the seat of James II. The remedy was adapted with curious nicety to the need. As nearly as possible the strict monarchical principle was respected, but at the same time the Monarchy was purged in a great degree of its alien and unnatural character. Mary might be called an Englishwoman, William was partly English, and was in any case not French. Meanwhile for the first time since Queen Elizabeth the people could look up to a Monarchy, which they could feel to be staunchly Protestant, while it represented at the same time the two chief forms of Protestantism known in Britain, Mary being Anglican, William Calvinist.

It was attempted to perpetuate the reform of the

Monarchy thus introduced by a Coronation Oath. Naturally, as James II had made it his object to repeal the Test Act, the nation answered him by extending the Test Act to the Crown. But in reality it was not enough to make the Monarchy Protestant; the problem was to make it national. And when we compare the period since the Revolution with the period before it we see that the problem has been to a respectable degree solved, but not by means of the Coronation Oath. We see that in the first place the queens of England since the Revolution have been invariably Protestant, whereas before it they were, almost as a matter of course, Catholic. In the second place we see that the sovereigns of England have never since the Revolution sought wives or husbands in the greatest royal Houses of Europe, but always in those of secondary rank and Germanic or Scandinavian blood. This new system was strikingly inaugurated in the next reign. Under Queen Anne English policy was more active on the Continent than almost at any time before or since. Anne was not indeed like Queen Elizabeth unmarried, but her marriage to a younger son of the House of Denmark had no political importance, and left British policy unaffected. Under the first two kings of the House of Hanover the Monarchy was no doubt once more felt to be in a certain degree alien. Still there is a broad distinction between the Hanoverian policy of George I and George II, which was at least disavowed, denied, and kept secret, and the foreign predilections, avowed and paraded, of the Stuarts.

So far we see royal marriage curing the disease which royal marriage had caused. What had been caused by the marriage of Charles I to Henrietta Maria was cured by the marriage, first of the Princess Mary to William II

of Orange, then of another Princess Mary to William III. When the storm of the Revolution had subsided and William had been succeeded by Anne, it might be said that the Restoration was consummated. The Monarchy was now completely reconciled to the nation. Its foreign taint was purged away. Without personal ability Anne enjoyed a prosperous reign, as being an Englishwoman and a Protestant. The Monarchy was now national, until in her last years the old difficulty threatened to return (and in a modified form it *did* return) owing to the death of her children.

So far in short we see William applying to English Monarchy precisely the needful remedy. But the Revolution did not simply set things right. It modified in a most important manner, and in a manner which we cannot without qualification call beneficial, the whole position of England in the world.

This modification appeared at once when it was perceived that the Revolution had drawn us into a great European war. As it was a reaction against a foreign influence, the Revolution might perhaps have seemed likely to make us more insular and more indifferent to continental affairs than ever. It had precisely the contrary effect. It gave us a policy which was indeed Protestant and national, but at the same time far more entangled in foreign alliances and continental affairs, and therefore far more warlike, than the policy of the Stuarts. This modification might have seemed at first to be only temporary, but in fact it did not disappear at the Peace of Ryswick. When the new Government was securely established, England did not become peaceful and insular again. She entered upon a period of great wars, which lasted through and beyond the eighteenth century, and

during all this long period she was more closely connected than she had been before with the Continent.

We have seen Elizabeth extremely averse to intervention, James I peaceful, Charles I, after the short age of Buckingham, peaceful also. We found the Commonwealth and the Protectorate more warlike. Charles II appeared to have enterprising views, partially borrowed from the Protector; but we found him unable in the long run to carry them into effect. We have seen James II expressing the coldest and most complete indifference to the dangers which threatened the Continent in his time. England, he thinks, will run no risk, England will only profit by the ruin of the Dutch. The Revolution introduces a wholly new way of thinking. Henceforth intervention is neither disapproved as rash and ambitious nor approved as a spirited policy, but simply adopted under pressure of compulsion. It is not now a matter of choice but of necessity. England in self-defence makes common cause with the Continental Powers that are united in resistance to France. The struggle is severe and lasts several years. When it is over England has adapted herself, as never before, to a condition of war. And then new circumstances arise which make a second war and a second European Coalition necessary. In this way we drift into a new international system, and the eighteenth century is for England a century of great wars.

This is one of the greatest transitions, and it is the final transition discussed in this book. William may be said to have steered us through it, since he not only conducted the first of our great wars, but also made all the arrangements and preparations for the second. But a transition so irrevocable must evidently have been decided by very large causes, of which William could be

little more than the instrument. We ought now to be able to indicate these causes. In fact the connexion between the Revolution and the first great war has been indicated already. But it gradually appeared that the immense developement of France had altered permanently her relation to England.

We have traced that developement in outline. We have seen her struggling in Richelieu's time against the two allied branches of the House of Habsburg, how that struggle, originally defensive, became offensive, and ended first in a victory over the Austrian Branch in the Peace of Westphalia, then in a still more decisive victory over the Spanish Branch in the Peace of the Pyrenees. Both of these victories opened for France an immeasurable prospect. The Bourbon might wrest from the Austrian Habsburg the Empire, and he might supplant the Spanish Habsburg on the throne of Spain. But the opportunity must be patiently awaited. The first two wars of Louis, that of Devolution and that of Holland, are but preludes with which he solaces the long years of expectation. His harvest-time begins later. In the year 1688 he strikes for the Empire; again at the end of the century he takes possession for his House of the Spanish Monarchy.

After so many preliminary flourishes, after such a brilliant overture, the piece proves disappointing. In both these grand enterprises he meets with much failure. Perhaps in the war of 1688 his failure was really more complete, though he won so many victories, than in the war which witnessed the defeats of Blenheim, Turin, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet. We have already analysed this failure, and have seen that the principal cause of it lay in the fact that Louis at a moment when he had all Europe on his hand, engaged also in a quarrel

with England. It was such a quarrel as England could not in honour evade or compromise. We were offered the choice of sinking into humble dependence on France or resisting her dictation, and in the circumstances to resist meant to throw ourselves with all our resources, naval, military and financial, into the European war.

It was a severe trial for us, partly because we were so much divided, partly because France was then so immensely powerful, and powerful by sea as well as by land. In order to meet it we had to make many legislative changes. If the reign of William witnessed a great internal transformation and the appearance of many new institutions,—the Army, the Bank, the National Debt—this was the effect rather of the great European War than of the Revolution itself.

But was not the war quite an exceptional occurrence? England had seen nothing similar since the days of Elizabeth. Why should anything similar be seen again, when once the dictation of France had been successfully repelled? Peace would come, and then the army would be disbanded, as at the Restoration, and the Debt would speedily be paid off. Such was the calculation, but it proved erroneous. The old state of things was never to return. The new institutions were to take root. The new aspect of the State was to become permanent, and England was to go through the whole eighteenth century with an Army, a Debt continually increasing, and a war with France almost always on hand or in prospect.

How did the temporary state of things thus change its character and become permanent?

The principal cause was this, that no sooner had Europe and England with immense effort and labour repelled the first grand attack of Louis than the time

came for him to make his second. That very year, 1697, which witnessed the Peace of Ryswick, witnessed also the clearing of the stage for the still greater drama of the Spanish Succession. This second struggle concerned England much more closely than the first. There had been indeed some cynical philosophy in the indifference with which James II had regarded the continental encroachments of Louis in 1688. The interest of England was indeed only indirectly concerned in the question whether the Truce of Regensburg should be converted into a definitive Peace. A Richelieu or a Mazarin would probably have known how to secure the neutrality of England at the crisis of 1688. Only by a blunder of the same transcendent kind as that involved in the Revocation had England been not tempted, or allowed, but actually forced to enter at that time into the continental war. It was quite otherwise when the second struggle began, just at the opening of the eighteenth century, just at the close of the life of William. The question was now not of territory on the Rhine and Neckar or of influence in North Germany, but of the Spanish Monarchy, that is, not of the Continent, but of the Ocean, the scene and home of all English commerce, enterprise or ambition. When the House of Bourbon took possession of the throne of Spain, as it did in November 1700, Louis seemed practically to enter into possession of Antwerp and the Low Countries, and to be about to obtain Spain for France, and to exclude England from the American trade. In other words, on the succession in Spain depended the whole commercial future of England.

It had been by an almost inconceivable good fortune that William had been able to bring England into the first war. And when that war was over the principal

topic of Toryism and Jacobitism was the expense and bloodshed that had been brought on the nation by William and his Revolution through the European war. Now in his last days William had to bring England into another and still greater war. He succeeded again, though with difficulty. Or rather England again resolved upon war, for in both cases William could only *laisser faire*, *laisser passer*. In the first case honour and self-respect, in the second case interest, left her no choice.

But the effect was that the new war-institutions, the Debt and the Army, had to be maintained for another term of years, and the country grew yet more accustomed to war with France. Military glory was now acquired, victories were won such as had been unknown to England in the seventeenth century. But, as the House of Bourbon after all retained possession of Spain and the Indies, that is, of the maritime region, even at the end of this second war, the spirit of rivalry between England and France that animated it was by no means allayed. France appeared henceforth drawing Spain in tow. The two Bourbon states had a family alliance, as the two Habsburg states had had in the seventeenth century. But that alliance had been continental, the Bourbon family alliance was mainly maritime, and for that reason it pressed far more uncomfortably upon England. And in this way the hostility of England and France, which had been accumulated during two great wars, was not allowed to die away, but lasted on and became a cause of periodical wars through the whole eighteenth century.

In international history the grand difference between the seventeenth century and the eighteenth is this, that, whereas in the former France and the Spanish Monarchy are standing enemies, so that, as Louis XIV himself told

us, no treaties between them can have any force, in the latter on the other hand France and Spain belong together, so that discord between them is quite exceptional and their normal relation is a family alliance. But this standing concert, since Spain is a maritime and oceanic Power, creates between France and England a chronic discord, so that, whereas in the seventeenth century France and England had been for the most part friendly, in the eighteenth—except in the time of Fleury and Walpole—their constantly recurring wars convulse the world.

These are the large causes, independent of the personality of William, which brought about the transition. But it was owing mainly to William that the transition was effected so successfully as to make England under the new system strong and triumphant, so that she was able in the long duel of the eighteenth century to hold her own against France. We have seen her in her extreme danger and feebleness at the time of the Battle of Beachy Head. How could a country so torn with faction and so unprepared for war resist the commanding unity and military efficiency of France? But the country adapted itself, though slowly, to the new conditions. In the second war, though not in the first, it was able to defeat France in the field, and thenceforward throughout the eighteenth century it exhibited a solidity, a stability, an uninterrupted prosperity, which carried it through all the vicissitudes of the duel. A fixed state of things succeeded when once the storm of the Revolution itself had subsided. After this, except in the last four years of Queen Anne, when a new experiment in succession gave for the moment a revolutionary tinge to our politics, there are scarcely any more violent fluctuations. The period of growth in policy seems to be over.

Such solid, permanent results remind us of those achieved by Queen Elizabeth. That a foreigner, who brought a mind preoccupied with continental ideas, whose taste, training and knowledge qualified him for Dutch rather than English affairs, and who had little sympathy with English people, should leave a mark so absolutely indelible upon English history, is very surprising.

His birth and marriage, as we have seen, enabled him, and him alone, to heal the disease which afflicted English Monarchy. He had another immense felicity. We have traced through a long period the relations of the English and the Dutch, remarking how exceptionally close they were and how that very closeness sometimes introduced discord. The Dutch had asked Elizabeth to be their sovereign. The English Commonwealth had offered to the Dutch an incorporating union. Charles II had scarcely regarded his restoration as complete until the republican government could be overthrown in the United Provinces too. Two such nations were made to be linked together in personal union, and, so linked, they would gain vastly in international influence. Just at the moment when it became their interest to unite against Louis they found themselves also united in the person of William of Orange. He who was almost a king to the Dutch became quite a king to ourselves. Thus the alliance of the Sea Powers was cemented in the firmest manner and the military policy of the two states lay thenceforward in the same hand. Sir William Temple saw the union of which he had sown the seed become a mighty tree, and round this nucleus grew the Great Alliance which in Marlborough's days gave the law to Europe. It is a curious speculation what would have happened had William and Mary left a son. But in fact the union thus established

lasted more than half a century. Much later another Prince of Orange married another English princess, and in another war with France between 1744 and 1748 England and Holland stand side by side.

It is easy to see how many advantages William gained from his birth and his marriage. He was born to be the saviour of his own country, he was born and married to be the saviour of England and of the English Monarchy and to unite the Sea Powers in an indissoluble alliance. So much was done for him by fortune. His personal merit consisted in this, that he did not mar his great opportunities by superfluous action, while he always had energy and promptitude enough to avail himself of them. He was rapid and decisive in his English expedition, rapid and decisive in his Irish campaign. But the main reason why his work has proved so strangely durable is that it was never excessive. He had that wise parsimony in action of which we found so striking an example in Queen Elizabeth.

We see in Louis XIV how difficult it is to husband wisely a great inheritance of political power. Why indeed should he be sparing who possesses so much ? The great King fancied himself omnipotent. Hence those prodigious blunders, the Revocation, the intervention in England. How easy, how almost inevitable, might it seem for William to misunderstand his position on the throne of England ! For though we identify his name with liberty, he had hitherto seemed to himself and to his countrymen the great representative of the monarchical principle. His rise in 1672 had been the fall of a republican system, he had frequently been spoken of as a tyrant, and under him the stadtholderate had become scarcely distinguishable from monarchy, the more so as he was himself of

royal birth. Now that he was king indeed, and needed all the force of England for his European war, how natural would it have been for him to aspire to a sort of Cromwellian monarchy, a monarchy at once military and protestant! His training had been military; he had commanded armies when he was but twenty-two years old. And the cause was that of religion, and there was in England, he might know, a fund of pent-up Protestant feeling.

What was not done, easily escapes notice; and yet the masterpieces of the statesman's art are for the most part not acts but abstinence from action. William abstained from the policy of Cromwell. He did not attempt to inspire the English people with his own ideas, or to lead them upon a Protestant crusade. Though he took the royal office with a determination that it should lose no power in his hands, yet he allowed it to lose a certain degree of power. He did not force England into war, but allowed her of her own will and for her own interest to enter into war. In his reign that National Policy which had long been an ideal, which had been realised for a time in the latter years of Elizabeth and partially realised under the Commonwealth, but had hitherto seemed scarcely compatible in ordinary circumstances with Monarchy, was brought finally within the sphere of practical politics.

Under William there was far more war than under the Stuarts. He conducted to the end one mighty war, and made all the preparations for a second. These wars suited his views, they were the fulfilment of all his wishes. Yet it cannot seriously be maintained that by some high-handed exercise of royal prerogative or royal influence he drew the country into them. He never had a position

which could enable him to do this. Regarded coldly as a foreigner, dependent upon Parliament by the very circumstances of his accession, malignantly watched by a vast adverse party, he was condemned in this matter to wait upon public opinion. It would have been fatal to him to take the initiative. In both cases the war was made necessary by the conduct of Louis XIV, and was freely accepted by the people. In both cases the merit of William consisted in reserve and self-restraint. He did not mar his good fortune by needless or precipitate action.

He had the bearing and behaviour of one who lays solid and durable foundations. A man who has received this mission commonly feels himself an instrument, and shows a certain impassiveness, a certain fatalism. William was taciturn, phlegmatic, dry in his manner. In his pose he offered a marked contrast to his rival Louis XIV. He thought not so much of himself as of the forces which worked in and through him. His chief study seemed to be not to do or to say too much, not 'to do anything good or bad of his own mind.' He was the *pius Aeneas*, who bears the weight of destiny, but as the hero of a poem may perhaps create disappointment.

We may perceive however that his training had peculiarly fitted him for the part he had to play on the throne of England. His continual struggle with parties in the country he had saved may be depressing in history, but it was not new to him, or essentially unlike the struggle he had maintained all his life among the Dutch. It has been said of him that 'he was king in Holland and Stadholder in England,' and the latter half of this description contains an important truth. He took up in England much the same position that he had held, and

that his ancestors had held before him, in Holland. But that position was after all royal, only the royalty was rational and political, not feudal. Among the Dutch a monarchy had gradually grown up, evolved by a natural process and meeting a practical need. It was a sort of hereditary guardianship of the country against the foreign enemy, for the main function of the Prince of Orange was that of general and admiral, rather than that, which gave him his ordinary title, of Stadholder. Accordingly when the United Provinces were at peace, the Prince of Orange, as we remarked in 1648, found his occupation gone, and as soon as war broke out again, as in 1672, he returns to power.

It had been the good fortune of William in 1672 to assume the guardianship of the country in a war which was undoubtedly defensive and necessary. He had not made the war, but he conducted it. It was also an immense good fortune for him when he found himself King of England that this country too had to fight for its independence. Had William had a peaceful reign in England, it is difficult to imagine that he could have had much success, and yet in those days the normal condition of England was peace. The House of Orange did not understand peace; their specialty was war. Throughout his life William lived and breathed in war. When he was not commanding armies in the field, he was negotiating great military alliances. But as it was the pleasure of Louis XIV that England in 1689 should fight for her independence, William at once found himself in his element. Where a war of independence was waged there a Prince of Orange was at home. For eight years this war continued, and gave William an ample opportunity of displaying all his great qualities, that is a kind of

defensive heroism, invincible constancy, inexhaustible patience, a statesmanship firmly based on grand and simple ideas.

Between 1689 and 1697 William does for England what between 1672 and 1678 he had done for his native country. He presides over a war of independence, in which he bears up manfully against defeat and attains his end at last. He repeats for the benefit of England the performance for which the princes of the House of Orange were celebrated. He does once more what had been done by William the Silent, by Maurice, by Frederick Henry and by himself. Had not Louis afforded him an opportunity of playing this part, had the Revolution of 1688 been followed in England by a period of insular peace, the Monarchy under William must have sunk very low and perhaps he would have been unable to maintain his position.

This reign has a very unique character in international history. It is wholly occupied with international events of the most momentous character, first the great war, then from 1697 to 1700 an unparalleled negociation, in which England and France undertake to transform the whole map of Europe, lastly the preparation of a new European war. In fact the European system is undergoing transformation. Great Britain is now a mature and stable Power with a national policy, adapted for war by new military and financial institutions, and she takes up a position of direct rivalry to France such as she had not occupied under the Stuarts.

The reader is by this time familiar with the expression the second Revolution and with the view that this was not a single occurrence belonging to the year 1688, but a long development beginning many years before and

ending considerably later than 1688. We have laid it down that the end of it cannot be placed before the Treaty of Ryswick, that is before 1697. But we have laid it down also that with the second Revolution ends the period of growth in British Policy, after which there opens a fixed condition of affairs, the policy of the mature British Empire. If however we try to define this transition we shall perhaps find that it cannot be said to have been completed even so early as 1697. It is time therefore to state more particularly in what precise sense it may be said that about that time and as a result of the Second Revolution the period of growth gave place to an adult or fixed condition. 1697 is the year in which the revolutionary throne of William was established by the cessation of the enmity of France, and when the war with France which had grown necessarily out of the change of government made in 1688 came to an end. This may be called the close of the second Revolution so far as that was throughout determined by France and her relations to England. On the other hand it is by no means the date of a complete change in policy, of the completion of a great period. It was followed within five years by another war, a war with France and so far a war of the Revolution that it was in a great degree occasioned by Louis XIV's recognition of the Pretender. We must look on a few years further, when we shall indeed find a decisive turning-point, the commencement of a fixed condition, when our policy was established in its main outlines almost for the whole eighteenth century. First, it is evident that the accession of the House of Brunswick in 1714 constitutes a sort of Revolution which must be regarded as supplementary to that of 1688 and equally necessary to the establishment of the monarchy in

its revolutionary form. Next the Union with Scotland in 1707 settled one of those larger internal questions concerning the mutual relation of the insular Kingdoms which from the outset of our troubles had been closely involved with the question of constitutional liberty. Further still the war of the Spanish Succession leading up to the Barrier Treaty and to the Treaties of Utrecht was necessary to settle those foreign controversies which had caused the wars of the later Stuarts, and to fix our relations with France and our maritime and colonial relations with Spain as well as our highly important relations to the Power which since the sixteenth century had interested us so closely, the United Provinces. It is to be added that the settlement of the Irish question in a manner which was to satisfy the eighteenth century was also effected by Acts of Parliament, some of which fall later than the reign of Anne. But when Anne had been peaceably succeeded by George I, a most comprehensive settlement of all affairs which come under the head of policy had certainly been arrived at. Not only was Dynastic Policy at an end, but it had been abandoned with full conservation of monarchical government, so that a dynasty had begun to reign to which the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were to belong. The two parts of Britain had also been united in a manner which was to prove permanent. Ireland had found a settlement which, however unsatisfactory, was to last without fundamental change for nearly eighty years. Accounts had also been settled with the House of Habsburg and the House of Bourbon. The Protestant interest had been successfully maintained. For the first time Protestant Powers had taken the lead in a great settlement of Europe. It might be said that the Counter-reformation had run its course

and the great Power which all along had represented the Counter-reformation, Spain, had passed under the rule of the House of Bourbon.

To Britain the result of all this was in one respect unsatisfactory. She had advanced greatly in internal union and liberty, in wealth, in maritime and colonial power, even in military strength. But her policy became more warlike than it had been in former times. Under William and Anne she had taken a leading part in vast European wars. She had fought battles in the heart of Spain and in the valley of the Danube. Nor could she henceforth quit this path. Her standing army could not be a second time disbanded. The eighteenth century was to be for her a period of wars, and the scene of those wars, more remote than ever, would sometimes be the banks of the Ganges or of the St Lawrence. A new financial problem would occupy her statesmen, the problem of paying for wars so vast and distant and of dealing with an unheard-of debt.

But, if more warlike, our policy is henceforth fixed and uniform, or, as we say, the period of growth is over. On the surface of the eighteenth century the steadfast tranquillity of British affairs is apparent. Henceforth no more revolutions, no more reigns of terror such as between 1678 and 1688. We are no longer the turbulent nation of Europe, the nation *dont la légèreté est connue*. All the great questions seem to have been settled; religion itself has become so rational and sensible that it loses its awful character and looks like an exhausted volcano. The surface is so smooth that perhaps few people in George I's reign could foresee that England had still before her a Roman career and that she was to become the centre of a boundless dominion.

This essay does not deal with that further development. It closes where the agitations of the seventeenth century subside. It does not look at all beyond the arrival of the dynasty of Brunswick, and it discusses even the reigns of William and Anne only so far as may be necessary to show how the afterswell of the second Revolution led naturally to the decisive turning-point in policy, the close of the period of growth which has been described. For this purpose it is desirable to consider for a moment how much was absolutely involved in the Revolution itself which nevertheless could not be accomplished but after a good many years.

The Revolution is usually considered only from the constitutional point of view as an assertion of liberty against absolutist pretensions. We, regarding it internationally, have laid more stress upon the opposition which was involved in it to French ascendancy. We have treated it as an assertion of national against dynastic policy, in which however the monarchical principle was carefully maintained. Even this formula however is by no means comprehensive enough. The change had still other aspects and involved several other minor changes.

To proclaim the throne vacant and then to place William and Mary upon it was indeed much in a generation so possessed with the mystical view of monarchy and so unwilling to repeat the error of those who overthrew Charles I. It was much also for a state that was no longer military to defend the new settlement in a war of eight years against France. But much more remained to be done. In the first place it was not enough to make a new king or a new queen. Monarchy required not merely a king but an assured succession of kings. For the moment we had been fortunate enough to obtain for our

king the ablest statesman in Europe, who was already quasi-king in a state which had an exceptionally close connexion with our own. But it soon appeared that he was not to have children. Accordingly only one succession could be clearly foreseen. The Princess Anne had indeed children, sixteen or seventeen. But when all these died in succession, it began to seem as if half the work of 1688 was to do again. Parliament must again engage in the questionable enterprise of making a king, and this time it must break even more decidedly than before with the mystical school which had such an ascendancy over the English mind. It appeared that another revolution must be made in order to ratify the revolution of 1688. Another prince must cross the sea and receive the crown of England. The change of 1714 appeared to be necessarily involved in that of 1688.

But the second Revolution had again another and a wholly different aspect by which it strikingly reminds us of the first Revolution. For it had not been a mere resistance of the English people to tyranny and popery but a resistance of three insular states at once, of the English, Scotch and Irish, to the common sovereign who had pursued the same innovating policy in all alike. Throughout the seventeenth century our civil troubles had been complicated by this triple character of the insular community. Especially in the first Revolution had the interaction of the three communities been incessant and striking, so that we even ventured to lay it down that that disturbance had really its origin in the necessity of revising their mutual relations. The second Revolution is not indeed in this respect wholly similar to the first. It looks far more towards France and less towards Scotland and Ireland. Nevertheless, it also is by no means a mere

English revolution, but British, or more even than British — a revolution of the British Isles. As far back as the controversy about the Exclusion Bill it had been a serious matter for consideration that James, even if excluded from the English, could not by an English Act be excluded from the Scottish throne. And when the struggle actually began the scene of it was rather in Scotland and Ireland than in England. The naval part of this civil war was indeed English, but by land the battles are Scotch and Irish, at Killiecrankie and Dunkeld, at Enniskillen and Derry, at the Boyne, at Limerick and Aghrim. Politically too the Second Revolution involved a complete reconstruction not only in England but separately in Scotland and in Ireland. It is one evidence of the immense extent of William's performance that he marks a great turning-point in Scotch and in Irish as well as in English history. This is still more visible if we contemplate the reigns of William and Anne together, as indeed they belong together. The reign of Anne finished in general what that of William began, and even Marlborough is in statesmanship as it were a pupil of William. But in these two reigns Scotch and Irish affairs took the definitive shape which they were to keep through most of the eighteenth century. Ireland received the penal code. Scotland obtained her ecclesiastical settlement and finally that Union upon which her modern prosperity has been based, and if we examine the circumstances which made the Union possible we shall find that they arose directly out of the Revolution itself.

The second Revolution has still another aspect. It is not merely a rebellion, even a triple rebellion, against Popery and arbitrary power; it is also in its very nature and origin, as we have shown, a resistance to French

ascendancy. The British movement cannot be separated or considered apart from the European movement, nor can William's policy as king be separated from his policy as Stadtholder. Thus in the first place the European war rose by necessity out of the English event of 1688. But we are now also to observe that a second and greater war was equally unavoidable. This second war began within five years of the peace of Ryswick. It was the War of the Spanish Succession, and England took an even more leading part in it than she had taken in the War of the Revolution. Though when the second war began William was no more, it bears his stamp, and especially in this that it is based upon that close alliance of the two Sea Powers which he had created and, as it were, impersonated. Both Sea Powers were equally interested in this Spanish question which had impended over Europe for forty years. Their interests were bound together in the person of William and in his revolutionary throne. Accordingly if we would contemplate the Revolution as a whole we must embrace in it this second war not less than the first, the war which followed upon the death of James II and the recognition of his son as English king by Louis not less than the war which arose out of his deposition and his flight to France.

Summing up all that has been said, we would see in the second Revolution a great transition in English affairs which, beginning in 1669 and culminating in 1688, is not fairly concluded till the accession of George I, a transition by which not only our constitution was settled but the Scotch Union was established, a new system of Irish affairs introduced and at the same time our relations with the United Provinces, France and Spain rearranged in a definitive manner. All these relations together have been be-

fore us from the beginning of this essay. Under Elizabeth we considered chiefly those with the Spanish Monarchy and the United Provinces. Then we watched the rise of the House of Bourbon and the transformation of France by Richelieu; then the transformation of England and of the relations of the insular kingdoms in the first Revolution and in the age of Oliver. Then came a reaction and later a second Revolution, of the origin, nature and extent of which we have found so much to say. Regarded thus comprehensively this second Revolution brings us within the eighteenth century, where we come in sight of quite a new development and see the country entering upon a series of wars and expanding into a World-Empire. What has hitherto given unity to this long review has been the opposition between two systems of policy, the dynastic and the national. We began at a point where the former system seemed inseparable from monarchy, where the Habsburg system was everywhere supreme and all international history turned on royal marriages and royal births. We have seen however after many vicissitudes the two things separated, monarchy preserved and at the same time a national policy established. The difficulty however was too closely inherent in monarchy not to show itself again. The revolutionary monarchy was short lived. A supplementary revolution had to be made, and this put on the throne a foreigner, one of the Electors of the Holy Roman Empire. Accordingly in that eighteenth century period which lies beyond our limits the old dispute was revived. Under George I and George II no question of foreign policy was more warmly or perpetually discussed than the alleged postponement of British to Hanoverian interests.

We do not discuss this, nor do we even find room here

to inquire how far the policy of William and Anne might be held to be, though not dynastic, yet at times not wisely national. The question is how to bring this essay to an end, and we desire to do no more than to characterise broadly the results of the second Revolution. It closed a great period and opened a new period. Now that a national interest is established in foreign policy it would be satisfactory if we could state with some distinctness in what that national interest was supposed to consist. Hitherto we have had occasional glimpses of such a national interest, for instance the panevangelical idea of Oliver or the necessity of preserving access to the Baltic, but now that it begins to rule our policy a time has come when it must be more clearly and fully defined.

Throughout we have seen that it falls into two distinct halves. Considered as a state among other states England looks on one side at the great continental states, on the other at Scotland and Ireland. She cannot arrive at a definitive condition merely by holding in check the Bourbon and the Habsburg; she must also—and this seems even more difficult—devise a satisfactory system for the two islands, create a Great Britain out of England and Scotland, and fix the relation of Great Britain to Ireland. Elizabeth, we saw, commenced this work by laying a foundation of Protestantism upon which a union of Scotland and England could be built. A common monarchy has since been added to a common religion. But even now that the Second Revolution is far advanced the insular settlement is still as far from being completed as the settlement of the position of England among the European Powers. The fundamental conditions of a Britannic Union are by no means fully realised. After the struggles of the seventeenth century even Scotland and England remain distinct in religion, the

one Presbyterian, the other Episcopalian, while Ireland is divided from Britain by the whole difference between Catholicism and the Reformation. Thus disunited the three communities are called upon first to make a common revolution upon the basis of religion. Catholic Ireland has to expel a monarch because he is Catholic, and Presbyterian Scotland has to cooperate with Anglicanism. And then the three communities thus undermined by religious discord have to fight side by side against the two branches of the House of Bourbon.

It is this incredibly difficult transition that was made under William and Anne. We had astonishing success in our war against the two crowns and at the same time we dealt also with the Scotch and Irish problems. With the first successfully, so that almost at the same moment that by the victory of Ramillies we tore the Low Countries from the House of Bourbon we also created Great Britain, and the fabric has proved much more solid and satisfactory than such political combinations usually prove. The Irish problem proved far too difficult for us under William and Anne, being complicated with Popery and with dire memories of massacre and confiscation, as it had been too difficult for Elizabeth and Cromwell, and yet even this was dealt with after a fashion.

If we continue to look at the transition as a whole we shall perhaps discover a certain unity in it. We shall find, that is, that the national interest which has emerged after all the struggles of the seventeenth century has a distinct character, and that British policy, which now takes the place of English policy, has its own definite object. It is the object which from the course of development in the seventeenth century we might anticipate. For underneath all the fluctuations of the first and second revolutions we have

perceived that our state has been gradually assuming a peculiar type. Ever since the struggle of Elizabeth with Spain it has been growing more maritime and more commercial. It has advanced in this course side by side with the United Provinces and at the expense of the Spanish Monarchy. Under Elizabeth it established itself as a kind of piratical state on the oceans which then belonged to Spain. Under James it founded colonies in America. While the first Revolution was proceeding it became a leading maritime Power. With the Navigation Act it became an aggressive commercial rival of the other Sea Power. And now in its second Revolution it arrives at a critical point in this development. For with William the peculiar relation of our state to the United Provinces is settled for a long period and by the war of the Spanish Succession the fundamental maritime question, which is the monopoly of Spain in the New World, is thoroughly overhauled. Thus we arrive at the consummation of the development of which we marked the commencement under Elizabeth. What began about 1567 with the commencement of the Dutch rebellion is in a sense completed at the Treaty of Utrecht. For us the result is that our state begins to assume the character of a great Trade Empire.

This fact, if we well consider it, brings together the two halves of our policy. The Union with Scotland and its success, the new system in Ireland and its failure, are closely connected with those wars with France and Spain which gave us a new position among the Powers. Commerce is now the clue to everything alike, at once to the changes in our foreign relations and to the development of our insular relations. Why do we interfere with such decision in the question of the Spanish Succession, fight battles on the Danube and send our armies to Madrid?

The answer is that the commercial classes clamoured for war, demanding in the interest of trade that the House of Bourbon should not be allowed to swallow up the Spanish Monarchy with its boundless colonies. But again, why did we make a union with Scotland and why did the Union prosper? We made the Union because the revolution settlement, at least that supplementary part of it which is the Hanoverian Succession, imperatively required it. And the Union prospered because we had one invaluable boon to give to the Scotch and did give it. This was a free admission into the commerce of a great Trade Empire. And once more, why did we at the same time make a settlement with Ireland which proved to be no settlement and which is the opprobrium of English history? We failed here mainly because we adopted the opposite system, because instead of granting freely to Ireland a share in our trade we jealously excluded her, because we interfered to crush Irish industry. But in whichever direction we look we find ourselves in the midst of economic phenomena. The second Revolution, which seemed to take its rise in religion, ends in commerce, its results, if we regard it comprehensively, in establishing a greater commercial state than the world had yet seen.

The international interest of the insular state, as soon as it began to be studied, could not but appear to be mainly commercial. The English were not aggressive or conquering like the Turks, and they had now abandoned the dynastic policy of the peoples who were subject to the Habsburg and the Bourbon. But they inhabited a group of islands looking abroad over the Atlantic and they now saw a near prospect of uniting these islands under a common government. Their internal difficulties appeared

almost at an end. It remained for them to embrace the globe with their trade, as Spain, in spite of her great opportunities, had so conspicuously failed to do, and as the United Provinces, their cousin-state, had shown them the way to do. But in order to do it they must on the one hand complete the union of the insular kingdoms, on the other hand they must remove the great hindrance which lay in the ancient monopoly of the New World still claimed by Spain, which, in whatever way the question of the Spanish Succession might be settled, Spain did not intend to abandon. And thus it already appears that England on emerging from her second Revolution would have before her probably a war with Spain and unions between England and Scotland and Ireland. Just this was in fact the work which William bequeathed to his successor Anne. Besides this it would be necessary to make English institutions more suitable for commercial purposes. This was what William himself was specially qualified by his Dutch training to do, and what accordingly he did by the commercial policy which gave us the Bank and the reform of our finance, which combined our East India Companies and purified our currency.

Such was the positive or constructive task which lay before William when he found himself king. There was also the negative task of maintaining the Monarchy in the form which he had given it. At first this did not seem likely to be difficult. Mary would probably survive him by many years, in which case Jacobitism would have time to die out. Mary might have children who would succeed to William's position both here and in the United Provinces; in that case another king-stadholder would be seen. Mary herself, we know, hoped for children. In any case Anne might live to be old and she had children enough to

maintain the Monarchy. If all these resources, contrary to expectation, should fail, then certainly a great difficulty might be foreseen. Someone must be found similar to William himself, a Protestant and possessed of a certain hereditary claim to the throne. The Revolution of 1688 would need to be repeated, the old mystical controversy would need to be revived. That the Monarchy could pass safely through such an ordeal we know by the result, yet assuredly he who would have predicted it would have seemed a bold prophet.

But another Power remains to be considered whose relations to England have occupied us throughout this essay. What effect will the great transition of the second Revolution have upon our relations with France? France was still the most prominent Power, the Power which had mainly caused our Revolution and had engaged in war with us on account of it. And yet until 1689 France had rarely since the accession of Elizabeth appeared as a direct antagonist of England and never as the head of the opposite system in Europe. Spain had all along occupied that position, and all along France had been in opposition to Spain and for the most part in friendly relations with England. The chronic antagonism of Spain and France has hitherto been the most unalterable feature of international relations. France has had to shake herself free from a certain internal dependence on Spain, in one age from the League, in another from the Fronde. She has achieved this successfully, and in achieving it she has well-nigh dissolved the complex fabric of the Spanish Monarchy. She has taken a leading share in depriving her first of the United Provinces, then of Portugal and the Portuguese Colonies. She has also straitened her boundaries on the side of Flanders and she has robbed her of Franche-

Comté. As against the United Provinces and Portugal England has cooperated with France, so that it may be questioned from which of those two Powers the Spanish Monarchy has suffered most injury. William's work has hitherto consisted in raising the British state to a position in the world similar to that which had been hitherto occupied by Spain. He unites the two maritime Powers which on the sea and in the New World are the successors of Spain. The British Trade Empire which now begins to take shape can only flourish at the expense of Spain. The maritime sceptre is about to pass from Spain and seems likely to pass to Britain. The question of the Spanish Succession is thus twofold; it is the question not only who shall be Spanish King on the death of Charles II, but also who shall succeed to the ancient maritime and colonial monopoly of Spain.

France will put in her claim to the latter succession as well as to the former. For France too has experienced that singular transformation which marks in England, as we have seen, the age of the second Revolution. French politics too have been passing into the commercial phase. It could not be otherwise since the position of France and her relation to the Spanish monopoly was very similar to that of England. If England was insular and oceanic, France too has a long sea-board, facing at once the Northern Seas, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. She has flourished hitherto upon the spoils of Spain, why should she not acquire the most precious of all Spain's treasures, her colonial monopoly? She is prepared to do so, for of all the many developments of French activity in that age, in which she was so active, perhaps the most remarkable was that to which Colbert gives his name. With him she had entered into commercial and maritime

policy, and before the battle of La Hogue she had ranked as the first maritime Power.

These considerations prepare us to understand what a vast revolution in international relations was involved in the war of the Spanish Succession. It did not merely put the Spanish Monarchy into the hands of the House of Bourbon, but it also founded a wholly new relation between France and Spain, a relation which in the eighteenth century was the most important of all international relations. The misfortunes of France during the war did not prevent her from founding a Bourbon dynasty in Spain nor even from founding a permanent alliance, which by and by became a *pacte de famille*, between France and Spain. We saw how in the days of Cromwell Louis XIV regarded the war of France and Spain as something necessary and, so to say, eternal. Now at the opening of the eighteenth century this gives place to a friendship which is almost equally close and necessary between the same Powers. The effect of this upon British policy could not but be all-important. Hitherto we have seen England standing between France and Spain, regarding the latter usually as her enemy and therefore the former usually as a friend. This phase is now at an end. In the eighteenth century France is her standing enemy, but it is France aided by Spain. A new Hundred Years' War of France and England is opening, but England's enemy is not to be strictly France but the House of Bourbon, which now rules France and Spain alike. This new phase begins with the War of the Spanish Succession. England's participation in this is but a part, as we have remarked, of that transformation of her policy which left it mainly commercial. In like manner the new relation of France to Spain is grounded in the commercial and maritime develop-

ment of France, and thus at the same time that we see Great Britain preparing for a long struggle with the House of Bourbon we are able to foresee what the nature and what the scene of that struggle will be. It will be no longer confined to the Channel or the Flemish towns; it will be a great Oceanic and New World contest. Englishmen and Frenchmen will confront each other in the eighteenth century in America and in India.

Such then are the various aspects of the Second Revolution. It was in the first place a rising against arbitrary power, but a rising undertaken in circumstances so peculiar that it necessarily involved (1) an immediate war with France, (2) a supplementary revolution of the same kind, which we call the Hanoverian Succession, (3) another great war with Spain and France, (4) a union with Scotland and at least the introduction of a new system in Ireland, (5) and as the result of all these things a great development of trade and the foundation of a Trade Empire, which brings us into a position of permanent rivalry to France and Spain henceforth united in a family policy.

To complete this general view of the results of the second Revolution one more reflexion is required. We must think not only what that Revolution was but also what it seemed to be to the generation that made it. That generation fixed its eyes far too exclusively upon the constitutional and especially the ecclesiastical aspect of it. The question of divine right and non-resistance, what Anglican divines called the doctrine of the cross, possessed the public mind in a surprising manner from the days of the Exclusion Bill to those of Sacheverell. This was the most obvious philosophy of the Revolution, but another theory of it also prevailed which had great practical impor-

tance and which concerns us more nearly. What was at the time most striking about the second Revolution was just the fact that it was the Second, that is, that the nation after having failed in and repented of revolution once should so speedily betake itself again to that discredited remedy. Naturally therefore they instituted perpetual comparisons between the two revolutions and, as the first was acknowledged to have failed, as the Great Rebellion had been followed by the Restoration, put themselves on the watch to see whether a similar disappointment would not follow upon the change of 1688. And they soon made an observation which was ominous and at the same time really important. The failure of the first Revolution had been due to the intrusion of a military element. In fact the so-called Commonwealth had been from the outset a government by the army, what has been called here an Imperialism. It was natural therefore to conclude that Revolution was exposed to this danger, that rebellion, however justified, against constituted authorities led naturally to the establishment of a military authority. A Charles I would be succeeded, through some unknown law governing states, by a Cromwell. Now in this respect the experience of the country after 1688 was really most menacing. The change of government had no doubt been effected with ease, and it had been found possible this time to preserve the principle of Monarchy. No Restoration this time would be necessary because no Commonwealth had been set up. But the military element had reappeared in the most striking manner. The second Revolution had restored by its Mutiny Act that standing army which in the first the Rebellion had created and the Restoration had to dissolve again. Much more than this; the second Revolution had plunged the country into

a European War which was on a great scale, and scarcely had this war been brought to an end when a new one on a still greater scale came in prospect. The old fatality seemed plainly to be still at work. The second Revolution, like the first, had produced its Cromwell, or rather it produced in succession two Cromwells. William himself was one and Marlborough was the other. They did not indeed dissolve Parliaments, or put the country under a government of Major-Generals, but they involved it in foreign wars which seemed to have no end, and these foreign wars brought with them new taxes, new governmental machinery, and a debt which, as it could not be paid, seemed to be a bankruptcy.

This reflexion gives the clue to all the phases of reaction under William and Anne. Behind the Toryism of divine right there grew up another Toryism which consisted in opposition to the militarism which came in the train of the second Revolution as of the first. In the last five years of William it takes shape in measures for diminishing the army and checking the interference of the English government in European affairs. Under Anne it begins with opposition to Marlborough, and then in the last four years of her reign, which may almost be called a revolutionary period, it blends with the Toryism of divine right and succeeds both in dethroning the Cromwell of the day, Marlborough, and in extricating the country after eleven years of war from those foreign complications in which it seemed to be losing itself.

This curious theory of revolution is not only important as explaining the party politics of the reigns of William and Anne. It cannot be overlooked when we try to understand the great transition in policy which occupies us here. The age of revolutions led to the tranquil Georgian period.

The constitutional question was satisfactorily settled and at the same time the monarchy came safely through the crisis. But the country could not forget its misgiving about militarism. After all the second Revolution did end like the first by giving a military tinge to our policy. It did create an army; then it gave us military glory such as we had not known for centuries. And it was not found possible, as time went on, to restore the old habit of peace. The army could not be disbanded again, and the habit of intervention in European wars grew upon us. The Georgian period was, except under Walpole, warlike throughout. After William and Marlborough came others of their kind, the elder Pitt with Wolfe and Clive and later still the younger Pitt with Nelson and Wellington. And necessarily debt grew along with the habit of war. It grew at last to a fabulous amount. These two features, war and debt, along with their result, a commercial and maritime empire, are the principal features of the eighteenth century in English history, that period to which this essay undertakes only to furnish an introduction.

Between the Treaty of Utrecht and the Battle of Waterloo, a period of rather more than a century, we engaged in five great wars similar to the two which had sprung out of the Revolution. Most of these wars lasted for several years; they were waged in all parts of the globe and involved us in expenses which confounded not only the finance but almost the very arithmetic of those times.

This essay began with a purely insular England, with that cession of Calais which seemed finally to shut us up in our island. After so many changes we leave England at the commencement of a new expansion which will be on a greater scale than ever. From her trials she has learnt much, but she has not learnt peace, nor has she learnt to

rest content with a modest sphere of action. What she has learnt is foreign trade, and now that she has settled so many internal questions her next step will be to succeed the Spanish Monarchy on the Ocean and in the New World. She has therefore before her a period of war, but not such war as in old Plantagenet times. She will not again invade France, but she will proceed on the new lines laid down at La Hogue. Her wars in the coming period will be mainly maritime, they will end in acquisitions either of colonial territory or naval stations. The Treaty of Utrecht marked the direction of our new expansion by giving us Gibraltar, Port Mahon and Acadie.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMMERCIAL STATE.

IN the last chapter an attempt was made to bring together into one view the great occurrences which belong to the morrow of the Revolution, that is, to the age of Anne, and to establish a sort of unity among them. These occurrences are (1) the war in which England took a leading part against the two crowns of France and Spain, the war called from the Spanish Succession and remembered in England chiefly from the victories of Marlborough, (2) the Hanoverian Succession decreed during this time and realised at the end of it, (3) the Union of England and Scotland and the meeting of the first parliament of Great Britain in the year 1707, (4) the new Irish settlement including what is called the Penal Code. That all these things arose by a kind of necessity out of the Revolution and that taken together they brought to an end a great period of English history and introduced a period markedly different is evident enough. It will be however worth while to consider somewhat more at length how necessarily they arose out of the Revolution and how closely they were connected together.

A war in Flanders, Bavaria and Spain on the question

of the Spanish Succession does not at first sight seem necessarily connected with the expulsion of James II; and it may cost us an effort to bring together in our minds this war with the incorporating union of England and Scotland or that Union with the Revolution of 1688. This essay has throughout studied to bring together the two great movements which mark the period from Elizabeth to Anne, the foreign movement by which our State grew at the expense of the Spanish Monarchy and in concert with the United Provinces, and the insular movement which fixed the mutual relations of England, Scotland and Ireland. The essay will therefore be best closed by an exposition of the last stage in this double process, the definitive settlement of our foreign relations after the Revolution and the definitive settlement at the same time of the relations of the three parts of the insular community.

In the period immediately following 1688 this requires little exposition. A war with France could not be avoided considering the course Louis chose to adopt towards James and William, nor does it require explanation that the civil war which arose out of the Revolution should overflow into Scotland and Ireland. In the second as in the first Revolution the great difficulty lay in the fact that the community which made the Revolution was triple. But it might seem that all these complications came to an end at the Treaty of Ryswick when the civil war on the one hand was over and when on the other hand France was disarmed. The Treaty of Ryswick therefore seems at first sight to mark the close of the second Revolution. How came it that within a few years all was unsettled again; that England was again at war by land and sea both with France and Spain; that a

new revolution, under the name of a Union, took place in Scotland, and that a new system was established in Ireland? Were these new changes accidental and unconnected with each other or are they also to be reckoned among the necessary consequences of the Revolution?

One manifest link connects the second war with the first and with the Revolution. For the second war did not arise simply out of the question who should succeed Charles II in Spain or whether the successor should enjoy the whole undivided Spanish Monarchy or only a part of it. This was indeed in itself a vast question, but it might be questioned how far it concerned England and still more how far it concerned our Revolution. But all the work of the Treaty of Ryswick was undone and the revolution controversy was reopened by the death of James II on September 6th, 1701, and the proclamation of the Pretender as King of England, Scotland and Ireland by Louis XIV. In opening his last parliament in the next January William said, "The recognition and declaration which have been made of the so-called Prince of Wales as King of England is not only the greatest injury done to my person and to the nation, but it also comes home so particularly to every man who has any regard for the Protestant religion or for the present and future tranquillity and happiness of his country that I need not press you to take it seriously to heart and to consider what new measures may efficaciously be taken to assure the succession of the Crown in the Protestant line."

So far then as it was caused by this reckless act of Louis XIV, the second war, it appears, was a war of the Revolution as much as the first. Nevertheless a mere recognition of the Pretender on the part of Louis, though

a fair ground of war, was by no means so necessary a ground as that active and aggressive aid furnished to James II in 1689 which had brought on the former war. Nor was it the ruling ground which decided us to participate with so much energy in the War of the Spanish Succession. What was the real ground of that decision is almost the fundamental question upon which our comprehension of English history in the eighteenth century depends. The most obvious and perhaps the received view of it is that we went to war in order to prevent France and the House of Bourbon from acquiring excessive power by the absorption of the Spanish Monarchy, or that we did so partly for this purpose and partly out of resentment for the recognition of the Pretender. But there was a third ground of war which in the circumstances was more urgent than either of these and which characterises more clearly the transition through which our state was then passing.

The testament of Charles II of Spain by which the succession passed undivided to the Duke of Anjou and the acceptance of the testament by Louis XIV are occurrences belonging entirely to that dynastic system of policy which we had left behind us. Since the age of Charles V there had been no example so striking of the predominance of the principle of royal marriage as when the whole Spanish Monarchy was disposed of as if it had been an estate and by means of a will, and when the French were called upon to wage war through eleven years for no public interest of France but for the family interest of the House of Bourbon. But with all this we had no concern. We did not go to war to prevent the Duke of Anjou from succeeding in Spain nor even on the speculative ground that so vast an augmentation of the

power of the French king was likely to be dangerous to Europe. It is to be remarked that the death of Charles II of Spain took place in November 1700 and that the Duke of Anjou arrived in Spain early in 1701, i.e. a full year before England intervened as a belligerent. It is also to be remarked that in the two Partition Treaties by which the succession had been regulated before the death of the King of Spain very large concessions had actually been made to France with the consent of William. William had been prepared to give France the kingdom of Naples and Sicily with a number of Tuscan towns and the province of Guipuscoa on the Spanish frontier. All this had been arranged before Louis made the death of James II the occasion of so direct an attack upon England and the English Revolution.

We are not to think of that generation of Englishmen as actuated by a half-barbarous love of war or insensibility to the evils involved in war. Their state of mind was different. They were fresh from the second Revolution, and they had an almost superstitious misgiving that it would lead, like the first, to a military government. A new Cromwell was held to be due; men waited till he should be revealed. Already the army was there, for the Mutiny Act had been passed, already the country had passed through a European war of eight years. A second war after so short an interval seemed likely to fix the military yoke for ever on our necks and to make the debt, already so serious, a permanent burden. Why did they then dismiss these misgivings and plunge after all into the war which they felt to be so dangerous?

The answer is to be found in that growth of commercial policy which was the main characteristic of the age. It was not a general augmentation, however vast,

of the power of France through the absorption of the Spanish Monarchy that was feared but an augmentation of a special kind, especially intolerable to the two trading and maritime Powers represented by William. William had been prepared, as we saw, to see the House of Bourbon acquire Naples, Sicily and even more. But he could not see it absorb the Spanish Monarchy, for the Spanish Monarchy was the very Power at the expense of which since the reign of Philip II both the Dutch Empire and the British Empire had grown up. Not French aggrandisement in general but French aggrandisement in two special quarters was inadmissible to William. He could not see the House of Bourbon swallow up the Catholic Low Countries nor yet the American trade. Throughout the period that has been reviewed in this essay and since Alexander of Parma had rescued a large territory for Spain from the rebellion of the Low Countries, the whole struggle of the Western Powers has centred in these Catholic Low Countries. Richelieu had hoped to absorb them in 1635. Here the alliance of Cromwell and Mazarin had been most active. Here had been the scene of the first war of Louis XIV. Here later he had for a moment held possession of Luxemburg. This region was adjacent to William's two dominions, that which called him King and that which knew him as Stadholder. Since France had succeeded Spain as the great enemy of the Dutch and especially since she had renounced religious toleration, the Dutch had come to consider that their independence and their religion forbade them to allow this region to pass into the hands of France. England for her part had withdrawn from Dunkirk and renounced the continental schemes of Cromwell's military state. On the other hand she was now more closely united than

ever with the Dutch and more decidedly Protestant. Her unwillingness therefore to see France swallow up the Low Countries was no mere vague jealousy of French aggrandisement, but was a necessary part of her general policy and of that relation to the Dutch which was alike the cause and the consequence of the second Revolution. But through the acceptance by Louis of the testament of Charles II the Catholic Low Countries passed under the rule of the House of Bourbon. How much this change involved appeared in February 1701, when Louis contemptuously swept away the nascent Dutch Barrier, seized the eight fortresses of the Catholic Low Countries which the Dutch had in their hands and made the Dutch garrisons prisoner.

But another French aggrandisement of the most intolerable kind was to be feared. The absorption of the Spanish Monarchy did not mean simply the absorption of certain European territories; it meant that of the greatest colonial and commercial system in the world. The Spanish Succession which was really all-important was the succession to Spain's commercial position. The Power which had discovered America, which had for a long time divided with Portugal the oceanic world, and then for almost a century had possessed the Portuguese colonies along with Portugal itself, and which though it had greatly declined maintained still its old pretensions—that this Power should pass into new hands involved the greatest commercial revolution that can be conceived. For any European Power that was mainly commercial it raised the most vital questions, questions of life and death. England had become by this time just such a state. William had made her conscious that she had this character, that she was a kind of successor in commercial

supremacy to the United Provinces. Commercial states, it had been found, must have religious toleration, and he had given us the Toleration Act; they must have a bank, and he had created the Bank of England. By the Navigation Act she had entered into direct rivalry with the United Provinces and she seemed now to have settled all her domestic difficulties. But in most of these stages of economical progress France had marched abreast with her and France had outstripped her in war and in general influence. The Spanish question might decide the competition of the two states once for all in favour of France, by throwing open all the oceans and at the same time the Mediterranean to French trade and to French ships, and perhaps also by closing all this area to the trade of England.

In the critical year 1701, when the question of peace or war was decided, the Tory party, that is the party which was most nervously afraid of military politics and foreign complications, had the lead in England. It was in spite of their inclination that in the course of that year public opinion became decisively convinced of the necessity of war. The argument was mainly economic. The nature and conditions of our trade were more carefully considered than at any former time. It was understood that a crisis had been reached in the commercial development of the country.

The character of this war, the greatest in which we were engaged before the Napoleonic time, ought to be clearly understood. It was unlike those that had gone before in this, that it was a war against France and Spain at once. This very fact marks the transition that was being made, since throughout the eighteenth century those two Powers are commonly in alliance against us.

Elizabeth and Cromwell had made war with Spain alone and we were to make war with Spain alone again in 1739. Those Spanish wars have all a common character. All arose alike out of Spain's monopoly in the New World; all are alike mainly trade-wars. The peculiarity of the Marlborough war lies in this that it sees France passing over from opposition to Spain to alliance with her. But in other respects the war, so far as it concerns England, resembles those which had preceded and those which were to follow it. It too is a trade-war. It was especially necessary to us because in this case our old enemy and trade-rival was aided by the greatest of military Powers, which was also a great naval and a great commercial Power. The conjunction of the old maritime Power of the past with the great military Power of the actual time threatened such a Power as England had now begun to be with ruin. This was the view which influenced us in 1701. William revived the Grand Alliance and it was determined by a new war to obtain security for Britain and for the United Provinces and at the same time an indemnity for Austria, the rival claimant to the Spanish Succession on the ground of hereditary right. Such was the commencement of the war; let us now look at its results. One of its results was to deprive the House of Bourbon of the Catholic Low Countries which were given to Austria, while a barrier of fortresses in this region was given to the Dutch. Such was the final settlement of that long debate which had really begun when Alva was sent to the Low Countries in 1567. For eighty years the Dutch had struggled with Spain and then after a stadholderless interval they struggled for nearly forty years with France. In the end the French power was held at a sufficient distance from their frontier and a barrier was established

which was to serve as a bulwark to them for the greater part of the eighteenth century. Thus did the United Provinces by the help of England crown the work which they had begun in the sixteenth century. But what did England acquire for herself by this war of the Spanish Succession ? By considering this we may see in what way she thought herself interested in the war. She took Gibraltar and Port Mahon ; she took Acadie ; and by the Asiento Compact she acquired a certain share in the trade with Spanish America. Thus preoccupied is the English mind with the subject of trade. By occupying two Mediterranean stations she enters upon that policy which she has since pushed so far. She first establishes that *Weltstellung* which in her modern World-Empire is so characteristic. She takes up a position at the entrance of the Mediterranean. In course of time she was to take up many similar stations both in the Mediterranean and in greater seas. Gibraltar was to be the first of a series to which within a century Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, besides Quebec, Madras and Calcutta, and within two centuries many other trading and military stations in all parts of the world were to be added.

So far the war was waged for the commercial interest of the English and Dutch. It travelled however beyond these objects. For, first, it gave to Austria not only the Catholic Low Countries but also Milan and Naples, to which territories was added a few years later Sicily. Thus at the same time that England stationed herself at the entrance of the Mediterranean she prevented the House of Bourbon from taking possession of its central region, which, be it remarked, she had consigned to that House in the Second Partition Treaty. Secondly, in the course of the war, though not in the original design of it,

other questions of vast extent were raised. An attempt was made to dethrone the Bourbon prince in Spain itself and to set up the Habsburg claimant in his place. More than once the English Parliament affirmed that the honour and interest of England would not allow any part of the Spanish Monarchy to remain under the government of a prince of the House of Bourbon. But from this position we were forced in the end to recede, as we had not at the outset contemplated taking it up. It was an unfortunate afterthought, which altered the whole character of the war, transforming it from a necessary vindication of our position in the world into a speculative half-dynastic struggle of the kind which we especially desired to avoid. It was reduced to an absurdity when the Habsburg candidate, the Archduke Charles, became Emperor in 1711 on the death of his brother Joseph, after which we found ourselves pledged, in order to prevent the House of Bourbon from becoming too strong, to make the House of Habsburg stronger still. It now began to be said that the Emperor Charles VI was the greatest Emperor that had been seen since Charles V, and the English public now prepared for the reaction which swept away Marlborough and the war together. It is enough that the war, so far as it was based on a truly national and self-consistent policy, was a war of trade, marking the transition through which we assumed the character of the great commercial state.

Not less than the war, the party politics of Queen Anne's reign betray the commercial character which our policy was beginning to assume. The great reaction of 1700 brought to light another phase of Toryism besides its dread of militarism. The reaction against the second Revolution had several aspects, which in the four last

years of the Queen came to light together. First there was ecclesiastical Toryism represented by Sacheverell, which would have led naturally to the recall of the Pretender. Then there was that Anti-Cromwellism of which we have spoken, that misgiving that Revolution ended naturally in military government, and that Marlborough was the predestined successor of Cromwell.

But Harley and St John gave the reaction a third aspect when they also maintained that the government of the country belonged by right to the landed interest, but that in consequence of the Revolution and the wars it brought in its train government was being transferred to the monied and the trading interest. This contention certainly grasped the true character of the transition which was going forward. It perceived that England was to emerge as a commercial state from the second Revolution.

But it is time to consider another great change which falls in the midst of Anne's reign and in its magnitude rivals the Marlborough campaigns or that supplementary revolution which came on the death of Anne to close the whole transition, namely, the succession of the German Elector. This change is the Union of England and Scotland, and it is to be considered here only so far as it may illustrate the general nature of the transition by which the Commercial State established itself. The creation of Great Britain by an incorporating union of the two parts of the island is an event which it is particularly necessary to consider historically. In the abstract such a union might seem as desirable as the union of Aragon and Castille, and we readily understand that in a time of war it might appear absolutely necessary. And yet it did not take place simply because it was desirable or even

necessary, but for much more special reasons. If a change which had been found impracticable during many centuries was now brought without extreme difficulty to pass, these special reasons, which belong to the time and to the transition which necessarily followed upon the second Revolution, explain the remarkable result. As Marlborough's war, so the Union with Scotland is to be explained less by general considerations of policy than by those special commercial and maritime interests which were becoming supreme in that age or by these conjoined with the question of succession which had arisen out of the Revolution.

We have remarked throughout how the great internal changes in England invariably brought the Scotch question into prominence. The Elizabethan settlement of England caused and prepared the personal union of England and Scotland under the family of Stuart. The first Revolution, when it destroyed monarchy in England, turned the heir of Charles I into a King of Scots and led to the Anglo-Scotch wars in which were fought the battles of Dunbar and Worcester. The second Revolution could not but produce a similar effect; it too revived the Scotch question. This second settlement of the relations between the nation and the monarchy brought to light the unsatisfactory nature of the relation between North and South Britain and offered a choice between two courses. Either the personal union must come to an end and the Scotch kingdom have its own royal House, or a completer union must be formed and a new State be founded whose territorial basis should be the whole island of Britain. It was indeed by a remarkable good fortune that the unsatisfactory semi-union had held together through the crisis of 1688, that almost at the

same time that in London the Convention pronounced the throne to be vacant the Scotch Estates also declared that King James the Seventh "hath forefaulted the right to the Crown, and the throne is become vacant," and that having done so they declared William and Mary, king and queen of England, France and Ireland, to be also king and queen of Scotland with succession first to the heirs of Mary, then to Anne and her heirs, thirdly to the heirs of William. Thus the personal union was preserved for the moment, yet even this remained exposed to risk. As in England, so in Scotland the Revolution of 1688 required a supplementary revolution. Heirs of Mary, Anne and William failed in both countries alike, and, if it was remarkable that the two communities should consent to travel together over so much rough ground from 1688 to 1714, was it to be expected that they should also agree to adopt the supplementary revolution, that Scotland as well as England should consent to be governed by a German Elector? Moreover Scotland as well as England suffered from that fatality which we have remarked as attending the second Revolution. Scotland, if she continued to wait upon England, would have to take part in two European wars, wars too waged against the ancient ally of Scotland, France.

If Scotland could go with England not only in the Revolution but also in two European wars and then in the Hanoverian Succession, she might probably consent also to a union more complete and definitive. In the meanwhile it seemed more natural for her to take the opposite course and struggle for complete national independence. Two ways presented themselves in which this might be attained. The Revolution itself might be cancelled; the country might surrender itself to James

or to the son of James. Or the country might decline to adopt the supplementary revolution, that is the Hanoverian Succession. By either course Scotland would disentangle herself from England and restore the independence she had had before the marriage of James IV to the Tudor Margaret. She had evidently arrived at a parting of the ways, and it may seem strange that a proud race of strongly marked character should have decided to travel by a road so strange as the Hanoverian Succession to a goal so little inviting as a union which resembled an absorption, rather than take one of these alternative courses. On the face of the history we may see how strongly these alternatives impressed their minds, for we see a phase begin in which Jacobitism becomes predominantly a Scotch interest. In Queen Anne's reign we see Louis XIV fomenting Jacobite disaffection in Scotland; Scotland organises the Fifteen and then the Forty-five. The Scotch dynasty in its decline retires to its ancient kingdom, and the Stuart cause dies out where it had first arisen—in Scotland. We need only look a very little closer to see how much the other alternative course, that of acquiring national independence by rejecting the Hanoverian Succession, commended itself to the Scotch mind. When we discover what the attraction was which outweighed all this we shall make a step towards understanding the transition which was then in progress.

When William died the centenary of the union of the crowns was at hand. The experience of a century had by no means convinced the Scotch people that well-being was to be found on the path of union or that that path ought to be pursued further. Fletcher of Saltoun talks of the poverty, misery and dependence of the country. The

union of the Crowns had led the country into two revolutions and several wars. If it had given scope to its peculiar religious ideas, so that at one time the Covenant had been actually adopted by England and Presbyterianism was now at length triumphing under William, on the other hand England had decisively rejected it. Prelacy was victorious, and the two parts of Britain, though faithful alike to the Reformation, retained a marked difference in religion. It was by no means clear that the next step ought not to be rather a step backward than a step forward. ‘For my own part,’ says Fletcher, ‘before I will consent to continue in our present miserable and languishing condition after the decease of her majesty (Anne) and heirs of her body failing, I shall rather give my vote for a separation from England at any rate.’ He expresses these views in a tone of confidence that they must of necessity be adopted by all public-spirited men. And yet within a few years the very opposite views prevailed once for all. Scotland followed England in accepting the succession of the German Elector, and instead of claiming a royal House to itself Scotland surrendered her Assembly of Estates and entered into an incorporating union with Prelatic England.

For the Commercial State was establishing itself. Scotland entered into the spirit of an age in which the Sea Powers were invading the Spanish monopoly of the New World, in which great commercial companies were becoming prominent and which was soon to see ruinous bubbles both in England and France. In June 1695, the Scotch Parliament passed an Act in favour of ‘a company trading to Africa and the Indies.’ This is the Darien Company, for which a capital of £400,000 was speedily subscribed. It contemplated the most various enterprises,

trade to Greenland, Archangel, the Gold Coast, the Negro Coast, even trade with India ; especially it contemplated a Scotch colony to be founded on the Isthmus of Panama. The excitement and enthusiasm which was aroused in Scotland by this new enterprise were such as to mark a new departure in the Scotch mind, the opening of a new chapter in Scottish history. It is the entrance of Scotland into the commercial career. At this moment it seems to pass out of the atmosphere of theology into that of commerce, as both Holland and England had done before in the course of the seventeenth century.

These new commercial views, as they modified everything else, would modify the relation of Scotland to England. England had been regarded till then from the point of view of nationality, as the powerful neighbour who threatened Scottish independence and Scottish religion. Henceforth she must be regarded from the point of view of commerce, and the question must be raised, since Scotland was now deciding to aim at wealth through trade, what relation to England would be most conducive to that object. In like manner England must modify her way of regarding Scotland.

The history of the Darien Company introduces us to precisely the same phenomena with which we have become familiar in following the developement of England. William was at that moment busy with his Partition Treaties, and the Darien Company raised for Scotland the same questions which those negotiations raised for England. Any nation which in those days conceived a commercial ambition could not but turn its eyes towards the New World, the West Indian islands and the Gulf of Mexico, and on doing so was immediately confronted with the hostility of Spain. The Scotch carved out a district

on the Gulf of Darien where they proposed to plant a New Caledonia and to build a New Edinburgh and a New St Andrews. They did this in the summer of 1698 and no doubt believed themselves to be occupying a central position for the trade of the planet. But they found themselves in the very midst of the Spanish monopoly, neighbours of Cartagena and Porto Bello. And in May 1699, Spain protested by a memorial presented to William against the Scotch settlement as an invasion of Spanish territory. The question of the Spanish Succession, then coming to a head, showed itself everywhere, for there was a succession of trade as well as a succession of government.

The Scotch Colony failed disastrously, but not without transforming the whole aspect of the relation between England and Scotland. Scotland had now come forward as a Commercial State, and England now began to regard her as a Commercial rival. The aspirant to colonies in Central America began to seem a natural enemy, as the United Provinces had seemed when Shaftesbury said of them "Delenda est Carthago." And on the other hand Scotland had now an additional reason for desiring to disentangle herself from England, from the great Commercial State which might thwart her newly conceived ambition. It was likely that the commercial classes in England would exclude Scotch competition as resolutely as they were then bent upon checking French competition.

So far trade was the greatest argument against union between the two kingdoms. But the matter might be regarded otherwise and in such a way as to make trade the greatest argument in favour of union. If England had it in her power to close, she had it also in her power

to open, the trade of the world to Scotland. If she might indulge her trade jealousy she might also lay it aside. The advantage to England of union with Scotland was evident, especially in time of war. Scotland would be called upon to sacrifice much, her pride in an independent Parliament if not also an independent Monarchy. But the Commercial State was founding itself, and England had it in her power to offer to Scotland a share in her own commercial and maritime greatness.

Commercial jealousy was in that age the dominant feeling of the English mind. It was scarcely therefore to be anticipated that England would be magnanimous enough for the sake of any contingent advantages to admit Scotland to a share in her trade. The Darien affair stimulated this English jealousy, and William in his last days provoked much bitterness by occupying a sort of neutral position in the trade rivalry of England and Scotland, which for his misfortune was now added to the old trade rivalry of England and Holland. He did not live to make the Union but he declared strongly in favour of it more than once, at the beginning of his reign in 1689 and again at the close of it a month before his death. He may be said to have laid the foundation of the incorporating union as we remarked that the union of the Crowns though founded at the accession of James I rested on a basis which had been laid by Elizabeth.

Thus the first step towards Union was taken at the time when England was preparing to enter into the war of the Spanish Succession. At that moment Scotland found herself entering the Commercial movement and acquired quite a new sense of the intolerable entanglement of her interests with those of England. That the relation could not remain unaltered was the conclusion

forced upon her by the failure of the Darien enterprise. A wild quarrel between the two communities now began, and proved strangely to be the prelude to their union. The reign of Anne commenced and brought with it new and vast complications. It brought a new European war, in which it might be held that Scotland had no interest. Now too the Hanoverian Succession was established, by which Scotland would lose the kind of precedence she had hitherto had as the home of the royal House. It was a settlement which not only seemed highly artificial, but also suggested that if a new relation were needful between England and Scotland there was an alternative to union, viz., complete disunion. The former union of the Crowns had grown up naturally and to Scotland it had been honourable; a new union of the Crowns now came in prospect of which this could not be said. Why should Scotland crown a German Elector? A second step was now taken which again shows how closely related is the developement which ended in the Union to the general developement of the second Revolution. The Scotch passed in 1703 an Act for the Security of the Kingdom, which was directed against the Hanoverian Succession. It provided that on the death of the Queen without issue the Estates should name a successor from the Protestant descendants of the royal line of Scotland, but not the successor to the crown of England 'unless there be such conditions of government settled and enacted as may secure the honour and sovereignty of this crown and kingdom, the freedom, frequency and power of parliaments, the religion, freedom and trade of the nation, from English or any foreign influence.' This Act was passed, and though the touch of the sceptre, which in Scotland corresponded to the royal assent in England, was refused

to it in 1703, even this was granted when it was passed a second time in 1704. Strange things were brought into prospect by this Act of Security. It appeared that the House of Brunswick was to resemble the House of Tudor rather than that of Stuart. Its dominion was to be bounded by the Tweed; an independent king was to rule at Holyrood, who would have his ambassadors at Madrid and Vienna, who would sign treaties of alliance, perhaps also marriage treaties, with the royal House of France. Who this king would be could not yet be known, but it was not impossible that he might come from St Germain; some thought he would be the Duke of Hamilton. There was, as we may see from Lockhart, a considerable Jacobite party in Scotland. It might prove that by refusing the supplementary Revolution of 1714 Scotland would in fact cancel the Revolution of 1688. And thus in 1704 the Scotch question assumed quite a new aspect. Meanwhile the rancorous quarrel between the two communities was raised higher than ever, chiefly through the affair of the Worcester. The trial of Captain Green began in March 1705; in April took place his execution with that of two of his crew, of which act Mr Burton says simply, the poor men were sacrificed not to penal laws but to national hostility; they were victims of war rather than of justice.

It began to be evident that there was no time to lose. Queen Anne herself indeed had nine years to live, but the Tory reaction was to come in five years. Had Harley and St John in those last four years of the Queen been backed in Scotland by a strong national party headed by Fletcher and Belhaven, at a time when the Scotch people had been further embittered by long brooding over the Darien failure and had the Act of Security to work with, it is evident that the crisis of 1714 would have been much

more difficult than it actually was. The time was not lost. In 1706, that is, the year after the execution of Green, commissioners were appointed in both kingdoms to agree upon articles of Union. In January 1707 the Act passed the Estates and was touched with the Sceptre by the Duke of Queensberry, Queen Anne's High Commissioner; in March it received the royal assent in England from Queen Anne herself. Mr Burton remarks, 'If it were to be asked what one man did most for the accomplishment of the Union it would not be unreasonable to say it was the Duke of Marlborough.' And indeed that decisive year 1706 was the year of Ramillies, that is the most decisive of his victories and the victory in which he had not the help of Eugene. It was the victory which more even than Blenheim brought home to Louis XIV the conviction that he was beaten. Thus the Union passed at a moment when the Revolution after so many vicissitudes had gone through its most difficult ordeal and had decisively beaten France and Spain in fair fight. It was a necessary part of the Revolution, as much a supplement to it as was the Hanoverian Succession.

A measure so thoroughgoing as the Union, adopted at so short notice and carried through in spite of difficulties so various and prejudices so deeply rooted, excites astonishment. Burnet introduces it with this natural remark, 'The union of the two kingdoms was a work of which many had quite despaired, in which number I was one; and those who entertained better hopes thought it must have run out into a long negotiation for several years; but beyond all men's expectation it was begun and finished within the compass of one.' It involved practically the ruin of Jacobitism and the establishment of the Hanoverian Succession, but at the particular moment

perhaps the most surprising feature about it was the concession which was made to Scotland of commercial equality. It has always been remarked that the modern wealth and prosperity of Scotland have been based upon its admission by this article into the commerce of a leading commercial state. But it surprises us that the admission should have been granted at that precise time, a time when commercial jealousy was at its height in England. Our commerce had just emerged from a long period of rivalry with the Dutch commerce. The Dutch never ceased to complain of our Navigation Act, and not all the community of our political interests nor our military alliance could for a moment abate the keenness of that rivalry. We were engaged at the moment in resisting in the interest of our commerce the conjunction of the two Crowns of France and Spain. And yet at this moment we freely admitted the competition of the Scotch, who had just given evidence by founding the Darien Company of the extent and audacity of their commercial ambition. But of all the contrasts by which the commercial liberality of the Scotch Union can be set off, perhaps the most striking is that which is afforded by our conduct at the same time towards Ireland. For the afterswell of the second Revolution required a new settlement in Ireland as much as in Scotland, and in Ireland too the commercial question which dominated the age would have to be dealt with. The question arises if a union with Scotland in spite of its enormous difficulty was achieved, why could it not be accompanied or followed up by a union with Ireland? Most of the arguments which pleaded for the one union pleaded also for the other. Nor were they overlooked. An Irish union was demanded and discussed almost at the same time that the Scotch union was enacted. And it

was so much in the drift of things that an Irish union did in the end take place. The Dublin Parliament in the end ceased to sit as did the Parliament of Edinburgh. This essay is no contribution to the redoubtable Irish question, and yet a general view of the second Revolution and of the establishment of the Commercial State must take account of the fact that the Irish Union did not form a part of that transition, that it was delayed for another century and that in the meanwhile a different, a very strange and unsatisfactory settlement was provided for Ireland. The contrast between our Irish and our Scotch policy is one of the most marked features of the transition, and it is the more striking because the commercial jealousy characteristic of the time was carried to its extreme point in our dealings with Ireland at the same time that it was so happily renounced in our dealings with Scotland.

The problem which the second Revolution left behind it was in some respects the same for England, for Scotland and for Ireland. All three countries alike had to make also the supplementary Revolution of 1714; all alike had to submit to the necessity of taking part in two great European wars; all alike had to withstand reactionary tendencies represented by Jacobitism and Popery; lastly supposing all alike to accomplish with success this great transition, they had also to accept its total result and take their places as parts of a great commercial empire.* A great Britannic Union suggested itself as almost a necessary condition of the transition. But of the whole complex problem different parts presented special difficulties in England, Scotland and Ireland. It may be said of Ireland that her special difficulty was to resist the tendency to reaction, to prevent the Revolution of 1688 from

being undone again. In England and Scotland that change had been accomplished with surprising unanimity, and the revival of Jacobitism in Queen Anne's time, though startling, had its evident limits. There was not now, as in Queen Elizabeth's reign, any doubt that England and Scotland belonged to the Reformation; Popery, as such, was no longer dangerous in either part of Britain. But in the other island, in Ireland, the Revolution of 1688 seemed to have been much less definitively made. There in the first place Popery itself reigned and had a majority in the population; in the second place Jacobitism had appeared in its most intense and aggressive form at the time of the Revolution itself. There James and William had decided their quarrel in the field; there a Catholic Parliament had met; there French troops and French diplomats had openly aided the Jacobite cause. In the second Revolution Ireland had played much the same part as in the first, and had been a kind of citadel of the Stuart cause. The Dublin Parliament with its Act of Attainder had corresponded in the second Revolution to the rebellion and massacre of 1641 in the first. Here then it might appear that Jacobitism would revive in vigour, since here alone it had a popular basis, here alone that which in England and Scotland was its fatal weakness, viz., the creed, first of James himself and afterwards of his son, was actually its strength and the ground of its popularity. Accordingly the problem in Ireland under William and Anne differed from the problem in England and Scotland. Here progressive changes were made, and at last an incorporating union was established. But in Ireland policy is more retrospective and directed rather to consolidating the Revolution than to developing it further. No union is enacted there, but the foundation

upon which the existing state of things rests is examined and, being recognised to be hollow, is strengthened by new legislation. The question is what to do in the Britannic world with an island where the majority of the population is Catholic. It appears that this fact, inconsistent with the Revolution and with all that can be built upon it, must at all risks be altered. Acts must be passed for the repression of Popery; a penal code must be introduced. How else can a German Elector peacefully succeed to the throne, or the descendants of a king whose only fault was that he was a Catholic be permanently excluded?

In the whole period before us we are astonished at the success which attends legislation, since it is a commonplace in general that legislation is an instrument of very limited efficacy. Thus the Union of 1707 seems a marvel, and it seems also a miracle that the Revolution of 1714 should have been so easily accomplished and should have had results so durable. But the Irish legislation of the period seems to form a grand exception. The penal code,—those ‘tremendous statutes,’ to speak with Hallam—‘the ferocious acts of Anne,’ to use the language of Burke—are now condemned on all hands as detestable. Even here however we have to recognise that the object contemplated was in a remarkable degree attained. New evils no doubt were introduced; an Irish question was created which would take a form almost revolutionary in the last years of the eighteenth century and would dominate English politics through most of the nineteenth. But the old evil was really removed. Ireland did cease to be the citadel of the Stuart cause. The second Revolution was secured at least from Irish reactions. Jacobitism had its headquarters henceforth not in Ireland but in Scotland.

The Revolution of 1714 met with no opposition in Ireland; Ireland took no share in the risings of 1715 and 1745.

How great this result was is best measured by comparing in this respect the second Revolution with the first, and remarking how in the second Ireland drops out of the struggle, whereas in the first it had throughout from the days of Strafford to the Restoration contributed the largest share of the bloodshed and the horror.

Thus the penal code so far as it was directed against Popery arose naturally out of the Revolution. It was a violent and demoralising scheme, yet a scheme which in the circumstances was held necessary for securing a Protestant government in a country where the population was in majority Catholic. But the age required something more than this. Throughout the Britannic world the transition we are studying had a double aspect. It was not merely a settlement of the religious question; it was also the establishment of the commercial state. In Marlborough's war and in the Union with Scotland we have traced the dominant influence of commerce. In the settlement of Ireland too we may expect to find this double character. It will have an aspect looking towards the past. In this aspect it will be, as we have seen, the establishment of a Protestant government in a Catholic country and on a territory strewn with the ashes of past conflagrations. But it must also look towards the future; it must have also a more positive aspect. The government once established must do something; the Irish people once pacified must occupy themselves in some way. Here too must they not follow the example of England and Scotland, must they not turn their attention to commerce and set up in Ireland too the Commercial State? This commercial aspect of the transition is not less con-

spicuously visible in Ireland than in Scotland. Complex as is the Irish legislation of this age, vast and intricate as is the Irish Question in the new shape which it now assumes, we easily discern a doubleness in it. There is on the one side the attack made by legislation upon Popery, whether by crippling the priesthood or preventing a succession in the priesthood or by offering inducements to individual Catholics to adopt Protestantism. But on the other side there is legislation upon Irish trade, those acts of commercial repression which have shared pretty equally with the penal code itself the reprobation of later times.

It is this point alone with which we are now concerned. Those questions so numerous and so much discussed, where we first went wrong, who was most to blame, what we ought to have done and what we ought to do now, the moral side and the political side of the Irish Question, do not occupy us. We desire only to find its right place for the settlement of Ireland in the great universal settlement of the Britannic World which followed the Second Revolution. It was a general characteristic of that settlement that it gave a new importance to commerce. In general we find the British state at this time bidding for supremacy in the commercial world and disposed to see in every other Power a commercial rival. She has however waived this view in the case of Scotland, where she found herself on the point of awakening a national rivalry so close to her own doors that it threatened to overthrow at once the Revolution and the Hanoverian Succession. We remark now that the very same question arises in Ireland too. Shall England offer the same liberal treatment to Irish as to Scotch trade or shall she here follow the dictates of commercial jealousy?

And we observe at once that Ireland has not the same means that Scotland possesses of putting pressure upon England. Scotland has already national independence and her own Assembly of Estates and she now plunges independently and with enthusiasm into the commercial career. Complete national independence, if England should refuse to come in to her terms, seems within her reach and she had enjoyed it as recently as the sixteenth century. Ireland can contemplate no such alternative. She has no such tradition of national independence to look back upon; her parliament has no real independence; in her Popery she stands quite isolated in the Britannic world; by resistance to England she can only bring on herself another of those ruinous calamities, those subversions of the very foundations of society, to which since Elizabeth's time she has been several times exposed. She was fresh from a destructive civil war. No sane man in Ireland could adopt the tone of Fletcher of Saltoun; Ireland had no alternative but to submit to the destiny which England might ordain for her. This is the relation between the two communities which made it possible for Burke himself to describe the settlement we are now considering in the following words. 'All the penal laws of that unparalleled code of oppression which were made after the last event [the reduction of Ireland in 1691] were manifestly the effect of national hatred and scorn towards a conquered people, whom the victors delighted to trample upon and were not at all afraid to provoke.' But the code of oppression had two parts; it was directed in one part against Irish popery, in the other against Irish trade. Neither part is discussed here; it is sufficient to remark the sharp contrast between the admission of Scotland to English trade and the commercial legislation

which was provided about the same time for Ireland, and which is thus summed up by Mr Lecky:—Irish forbidden to export cattle to England—Excluded from the colonial trade—Forbidden to export unmanufactured wool to the Continent—Forbidden to export manufactured wool—Effects of the destruction of manufactures—Extreme poverty—Famine.

In short in Ireland too politics take, though in a very unhappy way, the same economical or commercial tinge that they take everywhere at the same time. In Irish history a transition is made which is none the less decisive for being unhappy. The old Irish question at least disappears though a new one forms itself. The Stuart cause with all that belongs to it passes into an obsolete condition. The second Revolution with its supplement the Hanoverian Succession are disturbed by no Irish reaction. A new leaf is turned over; the seventeenth century recedes into the past with all its violence, civil war, massacre, confiscation; Ireland leaves behind the days of Strafford, Phelim O'Neil and Cromwell, and does not revive in the eighteenth century the scenes of Derry, Aghrim and Limerick. A new scene opens and new topics are discussed. These are in a great degree industrial and economical. It is complained that the jealousy of England destroys Irish trade; it is asked how in such circumstances the people are to find subsistence. Government seems to be regarded from a new point of view, as if its object were actually the material prosperity of the people. The new Ireland has its thinkers who discuss with vigour the condition of the people. But Jonathan Swift and George Berkeley bring to the discussion of political topics a novel kind of realism. They speak of industry and money making, of the means of averting

famine. Swift conjures the people to reject all the products of English industry, to prove their Irish patriotism by the food they eat and the clothes they wear. Or look at a paper like the Querist of Berkeley and remark how the antithesis of wealth and poverty, industry and beggary pervades it. He asks, whether the drift and aim of every wise state should not be to encourage industry in its members. This is his third query; his nineteenth runs thus:—Whether the bulk of our Irish natives are not kept from thriving by that cynical content in dirt and beggary which they possess to a degree beyond any other people in Christendom? And this is the 132nd, Whether there be upon earth any Christian or civilised people so beggarly, wretched and destitute as the common Irish? These hints are woven together by a series of reflexions on the nature of wealth, its relation to money, to trade, especially foreign trade, to banks, to culture and education. In short here is the science of political economy in an embryonic stage. But we may be surprised to find the great idealist so intensely preoccupied with the subject of wealth and industry as to write for example, query 359, Whether it be not a sad circumstance to live among lazy beggars? And whether on the other hand it would not be delightful to live in a country swarming, like China, with busy people?

Such is the Commercial State which grew up in the Britannic world in the afterswell of the second Revolution. That unparalleled settlement which dealt so successfully with questions so fundamental, which at the same time settled the succession of the Crown, waged war victoriously against France and Spain, and established the state of Great Britain by the union of England and Scotland, left us a state predominantly commercial. The British policy, which had ceased to be dynastic and had established

itself upon the national interest, found that interest in trade. The eighteenth century was to show that in that notion of trade was involved the empire of the sea and a vast colonial dominion. But this was not as yet recognised. For the moment, that is, in the reign of Anne, it was only visible that the Britannic State showed a military and diplomatic skill which were wholly novel, and interfered in Continental affairs with more decision than had been her wont under either the Tudors or the Stuarts. When the period of war was over, the House of Brunswick speedily succeeded to an insular state far more consolidated at home than had been known before. And then after a few years France recovered under the guidance of Fleury from the serious blows she had received, and it seemed that the age of Louis XIV was to be followed as it had been preceded by a great age of the Cardinal. And then gradually the total result of the great transition became measurable; Europe of the eighteenth century displayed its main international features. Frederick the Great finds that all the states of Europe are drawn in the train of England and France and that the standing hostility of those two states rules everything. This grand rivalry reminds him of the Punic Wars. The French, restored to their old influence by Fleury, strike him as the modern Romans. Great Britain, he admits, cherishes no designs of conquest; she desires only to push her trade. She is the modern Carthage; but it is a great evil that all the states of Europe alike are forced to take part in this grand rivalry which embraces the globe. This, we see, is the very conception which in the first years of the nineteenth century possessed the mind of Napoleon and led to a Punic War indeed, which had its Hannibal and had also its Battle of Zama. But the international situation which led to this result was already visible

before the middle of the eighteenth century and had begun to exist earlier still. It was the consequence of that transition which we have considered, of the establishment of a Commercial State including the whole Britannic world. The modern Carthage was founded when the second Revolution followed by the Hanoverian Succession established a secure government with a national and no longer a dynastic policy, and when this acquired Britain instead of England for its territorial basis and was able also to draw in its train Ireland, not indeed united nor satisfied but pacified and withdrawn from the influences of reaction. When this great Britannic State defeated in the field the combined powers of France and Spain and began to be acknowledged as the leading maritime Power, while at the same time it devoted itself to trade, a State appeared which resembled the ancient Carthage as much as the great states of the modern world can resemble the small states of antiquity.

The same eighteenth century was to exhibit this Britannic State as no mere commercial state. Even in the two transition-reigns of William and Anne the learning and philosophy of Europe had begun to look to Britain as they had never done before. In William's reign were published the *Principia* of Newton, Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*, and Bentley's *Inquiry into the Letters of Phalaris*. When George I ascended the British throne he could boast for a year or two that both Newton and Leibnitz were his subjects, though the former called him King and the latter Elector. Soon after Voltaire, in reviewing the great historical periods of literature, was compelled to acknowledge that by the side of the age of Louis XIV must be placed the English period.

All has now been said which falls within the plan of this essay. I may bid farewell to my readers with a few sentences of recapitulation. They will have discovered long since that the work is strictly a historical essay and makes no pretension to be a history. It has been throughout rather a dissertation than a narrative, and if it has thrown any important light on the period of which it has treated, this has not been by direct investigation of the occurrences that happened but by presenting a connected view of their significance. The occurrences dealt with have been those larger revolutions which belong to the very outline of history, but they have been presented from an unusual point of view. Some of the best known and most important events of English history have been reviewed from a point of view not English but European, not national but international. Whether we have contemplated the Elizabethan age or the Great Rebellion or the Revolution, we have seen events in a framework different from that in which they appear in histories of England. We have had always before us not one state but several, not England but the relations of England to the Houses of Habsburg and Bourbon and to the United Provinces. The great transitions have thus assumed a somewhat new appearance. Thus in the Great Rebellion we have been less struck by the quarrel itself of King and Parliament than by the action and reaction of France transformed by Richelieu and England transformed by the Rebellion. In like manner what has chiefly occupied us in dealing with the Revolution has been the European war which immediately preceded William's expedition and that other European war which grew out of it.

Looked at from this point of view it has seemed to us that the long period beginning with the accession of

Elizabeth and closing with the reign of Anne has a certain unity. Much has been said on this point, but in concluding I may tell the reader again why my essay set out with Elizabeth and why it closed with Anne. In one word this period covers the whole age of the Spanish Habsburgs and also the whole great age of the Dutch. Nearly at the commencement of it the Dutch question was opened at a time when the Spanish Monarchy was rising to a sort of universal empire. This period saw on the one side the House of Philip II die out and the Spanish Habsburgs give place to the House of Bourbon; on the other side it saw the heroic branch of the House of Orange-Nassau die out with the death of William III. Throughout the period international relations were dominated by this struggle and the attitude which was assumed towards it by England and France, at first while they favoured the Dutch against Spain, afterwards while France meditated the absorption of the Spanish Monarchy. This struggle comes to an end, and at the same time it may be said that the Counter-reformation, with which throughout it was closely connected, comes to an end, with the settlement of Utrecht. Upon the Counter-reformation the greatness of the Spanish Habsburgs was from the outset founded, and the Counter-reformation was still vigorous in the year 1685 when the Edict of Nantes was revoked in France and James II came to the throne in England. But after the Peace of Utrecht it may be said that the Counter-reformation is at an end. For the first time Protestant Powers had given the law to Europe; Voltaire was beginning his career; and the characteristic eighteenth century view of religious questions, the opposition of the modern state to all ecclesiastical powers, was beginning visibly to prevail. Accord-

ingly, if we take the international point of view, this long period, whether as the period of the Counter-reformation or as the period of the Habsburg Monarchy in Spain, may be regarded as one. If I pursued the subject further I should in like manner treat the period beginning with the settlement of Utrecht and ending with the fall of Napoleon as one. This would be the period of the struggle between Great Britain on the one side and France, commonly allied with Spain, on the other, the period of English ascendancy on the sea and in the New World.

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